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ABSTRACT
The Section 235 home purchase program provided lower-income
families with a "chance to own", in the dual sense of chance as opportu-
nity and as risk. Based largely on a 1973 survey of Section 235 purchas-
ers in ten major metropolitan areas, after one to four years of owner-
ship experience, this study examines the opportunities and risks asso-
ciated with tenure choice from the vantage point of participants in the
235 program.
Study findings serve to deflate some of the negative myths that have
emerged out of the 235 program experience, e. g. , the presumed incom-
patibility of home ownership and low income, and judgments about the
potential dysfunctions of ownership for marginal urban families. De-
spite the problematic nature of the program, in the aggregate purchas-
ers found much to be satisfied with: better living conditions than they
had encountered in the rental market; the prospect of equity accretion
as family savings; and the gratifications and autonomy associated with
ownership status. However, the distributive consequences of the pro-
gram were such as to favor white purchasers over minority purchasers,
aid higher income over lower income purchasers, in the distribution
,of relatively sound housing, in healthy submarkets. Nevertheless, near-
ly all purchasers, regardless of income and race, favored continued
ownership rather than a return to tenancy, even in the face of high own-
ership cost burdens.
Despite the poor quality of many homes sold under the program,
serious mortgage default and aborted ownership were more closely asso-
ciated with family crises resulting from loss of employment and major
illness, and mortgage degeneration was more likely to occur in urban
areas of relatively high unemployment. Income stability, rather than
income level, was the more important determinant of sustained owner-
ship viability, as evidenced by the relative stability of the most econom-
ically disadvantaged owners, many of whom depended on public assis-
tance. Mortgage default episodes were common occurrences among
owners, reflecting periodic income stresses of finite duration, but they
were usually successfully resolved and rarely slid into foi'eclosure.
On the whole, consumer experiences over the early years of 235
ownership are sufficiently positive, in light of the administrative im-
perfections in the program, to argue for reconsideration of the role of
tenure choice as an aspect of future federal low-income housing policies.
Recommendations are made that, in the author's view, would signifi-
cantly improve the effectiveness and equitableness of future subsidized
ownership programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden, Professor of City Planning
M. I. T. , Department of Urban Studies & Planning
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Here I come!
Been saving all my life
To get a nice house
For me and my wife.
Neighborhood' s clean
But the house is old.
Prices are doubled
When I get sold:
Still I buy.
-- Langston Hughes
from the poem
Little Song on Housing
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Chapter I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Section 235 Program: Dawn to Dusk
At its emergence during the late 1960's, the concept of a federal policy
of lower-income home ownership -- one which would subsidize and under-
write the purchase of homes in the open market by families of relatively
marginal income -- was hailed by its chief progenitor, Senator Charles
Percy, as "a new dawn for our cities. 1 After considerable debate, the
concept was forged into legislation as the Section 235 program of the mile-
stone Housing Act of 1968 and launched with a fair degree of optimism on
the part of Congress, despite the uncertainties and special risks which
were recognized to be inherent in the program. In the prevailing climate
of urban discontent and turbulence, the Johnson administration and Con-
gress deemed it preferable to act under uncertainty than to delay action
on a program that had already gathered considerable legislative momen-
tum, and that had come to be considered a significant response to the
housing and residential stresses endemic to lower-income households
across the nation's cities.
Two years after its implementation, the 235 program was badly shaken
by the exposure of market abuses and federal maladministration which
had permeated a substantial sector of the national effort and left many
families the title-holders of sorely deficient and often overpriced housing
1. Senator Charles Percy, "A New Dawn for Our Cities", Congressional
Record -- Senate, October 17, 1966, pp. 27258-27260.
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units. Almost simultaneously, rising mortgage default rates throughout
the program and a high rate of mortgage failures in some areas served
to stigmatize the image of the program even further, despite the origi-
nal understanding on the part of Congress that the program would involve
high, but worthwhile risks. These national events made the program in-
creasingly vulnerable to the will of an administration, headed by Presi-
dent Nixon, which was manifestly disinterested in the cause of federal
assistance to the nation's housing-poor. Despite a number of valid at-
tempts on the part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
to remedy defects in the operation of the program and improve its ability
to realize its potential, the administration judged the housing subsidy
programs to be irremediable when it imposed a moratorium on any fur-
ther subsidy commitments in January, 1973. After a scant four years of
program operation, characterized by a high degree of turbulence and
often inept or callous administration, the sun had rapidly set on the con-
cept of lower-income home ownership.
B. AlteTrnativ& Interpretations of Program Malfunctioning
Alternative interpretations of the problematic nature of the 235 pro-
gram experience tend to ascribe the shortcomings of the program either
to a failure in the policy concept itself or to a failure in the administra-
tive implementation of otherwise realizable objectives. The former
view holds that there is an inherent incompatibility between the demands
of home ownership and the conditions of life at the margins of lower-
-10-
income. The "life at the margin" theory,-as it is often called, maintains
that lower-income families are, by and large, incapable of sustaining
ownership obligations because of intermittent crises -- in employment,
health, and family stability -- which assume catastrophic proportions,
require the deferral of mortgage payments and essential repairs, and
ultimately contribute to aborted home ownership. Against the charges of
faulty and improper administration of the program, HUD Secretary
Romney questioned the basic concept of the program:
". .. no matter how carefully we inspect and appraise, and no
matter how carefully we screen and counsel purchasers, when
we are dealing with low-income buyers we are dealing with'
the fundamental problems of people living at or near the sub-
sistence level... To such people, any temporary loss of in- 2
come or unusual expense amounts to a financial catastrophe.
The latter view, here referred to as the "systemic" interpretation,
holds that flawed implementation was a primary contributor to the 235
program's malconsequences, leading to market abuses and the placing of
many lower-income purchasers in untenable ownership situations char-
acterized by seriously defective housing conditions and negative equity
positions at purchase. This view was first forwarded by the investiga-
tive Staff report of the House Banking and Currency Committee during
the 1970 disclosures of abuses in the program:
"... In some areas, 235 purchasers are either 'walking away'
from their homes or, through arrangements with FHA, are
turning their houses back to that agency.. . Because of the
relative newness of this program, the impact of widespread
2. U.S. House of Representatives. Investigation and Hearings of Abuses
in Federal Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Programs, Staff Re-
port and Recommendations, Committee on Banking and Currency,
91st Congress, 2nd Session, December, 1970, p. 141.
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turnbacks and foreclosures will not be felt immediately. But,
unless the 235 program undergoes a drastic remedial change
the Federal Government... may soon find itself owning thou-
sands of substandard homes bearing inflated mortgages...,"3
Citing one national mortgage company's foreclosure rate of about 5 per-
cent, the report speculated that they were primarily "walk-away" mort-
gage failures:
"While some of the foreclosures can be traced to financial
inability to meet payments, perhaps the major cause of
abandonment is the utter frustration of homeowners who
thought they had purchased a home of reasonably sound con-
struction only to find that the monthly mortgage payments
on the home only entitled them to make other payments for
major repairs. "4
In contrast with these blanket assertions about the program as a
whole, strong local variations in program performance were increasing-
ly evident by the eve of the subsidy moratorium; mortgage default rates
varied from a low of two percent in one HUD area office to a high of
twenty percent in another. 5 During the eleventh-hour deliberations of
the Joint Economic Committee in late 1972, Senator Proxmire used the
local differentiation argument to bolster his attack on HUD's administra-
tion of the program while defending the program concept itself:
"We have a stiuation in Milwaukee where our foreclosure
rate is extraordinarily low although the credit has been
made as widely available as elsewhere, whereas in Detroit
it is extraordinarily high, 10 times as high in Detroit as
Milwaukee. Why? They have exactly the same program,
3. Ibid., p. 1.
4. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
5. U.S. Congress, Housing Subsidies and Housing Policies, Hearings,
Joint Economic Committee, 92nd Congress, Second Session, Decem-
ber, 1972, p. 37.
-12-
Federal, privately financed, and federally guaranteed. The
problem is HUD management is much better in Milwaukee
than in Detroit. "6
Elsewhere in the proceedings, Proxmire asked:
"Does this not indicate that the primary reason for a high
number of repossessions is the overwhelming failure in
management by HUD rather than the intrinsic nature of the
program?" 7
The jockeying between Congress and the administration over the fate
of the 235 program had contributed to an artificial polarization of views
and contending interpretations of program experience. Congressional
proponents of the program placed the blame on HUD's implementation of
the effort and sought administrative remedies, while administration of-
ficials asserted the "life at the margin" view and questioned the funda-
mental viability of ownership tenure for lower-income families. -SurM-
prisingly little attention was given to the consideration of alternative
factors contributing to local differences in program performance, such
-ae- local economic conditions and the extent to which they were favorable
or unfavorable to sustained home ownership. Such a "contextual" inter-
pretation would have seemed likely in the face of Seattle, where a major
recession in the dominant aerospace industry had clearly precitpitated
the highest 235 mortgage default and failure rates in the country, but it
received only passing mention in the Committee's attempt to diagnose
6. Ibid., p. 355.
7. Ibid., p. 34.
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the problems that were manifest in the program. "
The three contending views -- the "life at the margin" interpretation,
the "systemic" interpretation, and the "contextual" interpretation --
represent alternative attempts to isolate a dominant, if not exclusive ex-
planation that accounts for 235 program behavior during its early years.
They also have substantially different implications for future federal
policies regarding ownership opportunities for urban lower-income fam-
ilies. If relative poverty or the problems of life at the margin involve
substantial and pervasive risks to sustained, viable ownership then the
policy concept which guided the formulation of the 235 program needs to
be scuttled, and federal housing policy should restrict tenure options for
lower-income households to assisted rental opportunities. On the other
hand, a clear confirmation of the systemic interpretation as a major
cause of 235 mortgage degeneration would suggest that, under proper
administrative revisions and safeguards, the 235 program model might,
at some point, resume its role in tact as a major national housing strat-
egy. However, if local economic conditions, particularly those related
to employment, constitute a powerful explanation of local variations in
program performance in accordance with the contextual interpretation,
then future federal policies of lower-income home ownership are
8. Ibid. , p. 37. In response to Senator Proxmire's assertion that local
variations in program performance resulted from differences in HUD
program management, Elmer Staats, the Comptroller General, added:
"Plus the economic conditions that may affect one locality more than
others. " But this contextual theme was never picked up in the re-
maining Committee deliberations.
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feasible provided they are regionally selective and restricted to metro-
politan areas where economic conditions are favorable. Such regionally-
differentiated policies would be a substantial departure from the Section
235 concept, which viewed home ownership as a universal good for urban
lower-income households and made its benefits available wherever the
private housing sector was willing to respond, without regard to differ-
ences in local economic contexts.
C. Research Objectives and Approach
At its heart, this research constitutes a diagnostic assessment of the
235 program experience, which attempts to sort out the dominant factors
that account for the problems manifested in the program, as represented
by the alternative interpretations described above, as well as to deter-
mine more generally the extent to which and the ways in which the pro-
gram succeeded or failed as a lower-income housing strategy. In gener-
al, there is much to be gained among the policy community in learning
from the experiences of past programs, and particularly so in the case of
the Section 235 program which represents a significant and unique federal
excursion into low-income housing policy. But, more importantly, the
research is intended to contribute to the development of future policy
alternatives regarding expanded tenure opportunities for urban lower-
income households. In short, the research addresses the question of
what can be learned from the 235 experience with respect to the role of
home ownership -- its worthwhileness and viability -- as a potential
-15-
component of future low-income housing policy.
In so doing, the analysis rests largely on data derived from structured
interviews with program participants within the context of a national sur-
vey of 235 home purchasers. There are several reasons that argue
strongly for this kind of consumer-based assessment of the program.
Alternative interpretations of the brief and controversial history of
the 235 program hinge on largely unverified assumptions about consumer
experience, behavior and motives, as well as on assumptions concerning
post-purchase housing conditions, residential and life circumstances of
the owning family. Given the strong tendency to ascribe the malconse-
quences of the 235 program to its consumership, in yet another variant
of the "blaming the victim" theme,9 the previous lack of any systematic
approach to obtaining consumer experiential data is deplorable. The
paucity of relevant survey data regarding the precipitants of 235 mor-
tgage default and aborted ownership was clearly recognized in testimony
to the Joint Economic Committee as late as December, 1972. In a
letter to the Committee, William Whitbeck, the director of the HUD
Detroit area office, asserted:
". .. No information has yet been obtained from the class of
persons best qualified to speak of reasons for default -- the
defaulting homeowners themselves. This lack of hard sur-
vey data on reasons for default and later movement by the
defaulting homeowner lends a flavor of unreality to almost
all of the present discussions of this problem" 1 0
9. William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1971).
10. U. S. Congress, op. .cit. , p. 264.
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In its report to the Committee, the General Accounting Office recom-
mended that available data should be "supplemented by other information
obtained through such means as interviews with mortgagors... 111 That
this kind of analysis was postponed by HUD was undoubtedly the result of
the subsidy moratorium, which came soon after the Committee hearings
and served to deflate the mounting pressures for survey analytic assess-
ments of the program.
Beyond the kinds of post-mortem diagnostic analyses intended to shed
light on programmatic problems, a national survey eliciting consumer-
based assessments of their 235 experience as a whole can be sden to have
other substantial benefits for the analysis of tenure-related issues in low-
income housing policy:
1) From the vantage point of those intended to benefit, how
worthwhile are lower-income home ownership objectives within the
urban context? Do the assessments of 235 program participants
confirm the prevailing negative image of the national program, or
do they suggest that despite the imperfections of the program, sub-
stantial benefits were derived or might be enhanced by more effec-
tive policies? What benefits were derived from 235 home purchase?
If so, at what risks and costs?
2) What were the distributive consequences of the 235 program
in terms of alternative program constituencies? Did the program
succeed or fail selectively with respect to different purchaser
-17-
11. Ibid. , p. 94.
groups -- differentiated by race and income -- or were program
benefits and disbenefits equitably distributed across the purchaser
groups? Did the functioning of the program largely succeed for
some purchaser groups and fail for others? If so, in what ways
and for what reasons? What are the implications for potential el-
igibility and improved equity in future ownership programs targeted
at urban lower-income households?
3) What does consumer experience in the 235 program suggest
by way of improved policy means and program mechanisms for the
delivery of ownership opportunities to urban lower-income households?
Can the shortcomings of the 235 program mechanisms be avoided or
substantially diminished and future program viability strengthened?
More general arguments can be advanced to support the utility of con-
sumer-based program assessments derived through the means of survey
sampling and information gathering. As a rule, all too few programs are
evaluated in light of the consumer component of the policy equation, using
data drawn at the level and perspective of the affected program constitu-
ent. As a result, our judgments of policy rest on often inadequate pro-
gram statistics, on evolving images of the program in the media, on the
opinions of relatively small groups of influential elites, or on biased
bureaucratic assessments. Given the tendency to ascribe the malconse-
quences of many socially oriented programs to their respective consum-
erships, the general lack of consumer-based data represents a telling
gap in program analyses. Apart from the analytic benefits of consumer-
related data, there are also values of consumer expression which need
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to be considered. In particular, housing and residence have meanings
and values attached to them which lie beyond the realm of impersonal,
readily objectifiable data, but which should be important considerations
in policy formulation and assessment. Although the structured interview
is far from an ultimate medium of free consumer expression, if properly
designed it can be a useful medium for registering values, judgments,
beliefs and expectations that may be of considerable importance for rel-
evant policy analysis and speculation.
The survey sample of 235 home purchasers on which this research is
based and the resulting survey data derive indirectly from a sttdy of
counseling efforts under the 235 program which was conducted from 1972
to 1974, and which the author directed. 12 Structured interviews of ap-
proximately an hour-and-a-half in length were carried out in each of ten
metropolitan areas across the country with a randomly selected sample
of about 35 home purchasers in each metropolitan area. Factors guiding
the choice of metropolitan areas are described in Appendix A as are
other aspects of the research design. As a whole, the resulting sample
population of 235 home purchasers resembles closely the characteristics
of the national population of 235 home purchasers. The sample cluster-
ing by metropolitan areas has the further advantage of allowing for some
comparisons of program performance and outcomes based on differing
local conditions. In its entirety, the consumer sample represents a
12. The study was conducted under HUD funding at OSTI (Organization
for Social and Technical Innovation), Newton, IVass.
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composite of metropolitan 235 home purchasers across a richly varied
set of program contexts, and forms the basis upon which generalizations
are made concerning the national performance of the program within the
urban context.
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Chapter II. URBAN LOWER-INCOME HOME OWNERSHIP:
AN HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
The question of whether public policy should enable and assist the
urban housing-poor to purchase homes aroused considerable controversy
prior to the passage of the 235 program. The currency which the concept
of lower-income home ownership gained during the 1960's as part of the
Great Society housing agenda can be viewed, in part, as a singular occur-
ence during a unique period in American public policy, characterized by
rapid innovation of new programs geared toward redistributive objectives.
It can also be seen as a consequence of evolving urban housing and resi-
dential patterns, as a continuation of prior federal-policies encouraging
the expansion of home ownership, and as a reflection of changing views of
the function of housing policy within a social welfare framework. This
chapter provides an historical and theoretical perspective for the general
examination of the role of tenure in urban low-income housing policy and,
in that sense, a framework within which to assess the particular strengths
and weaknesses of the Section 235 program on the basis of consumer sur-
vey findings.
A. Trends in Urban Housing Tenure
The concept of "home ownership for the poor", as the 235 program
came to be called, addressed a longstanding duality in federal policy and
in American society as a whole. Americans have long prized the institu-
tion of home ownership. Periodic consumer preference surveys have
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consistently identified an "urge to own" among American families which
cuts across socioeconomic strata and which is most intense at the lower
income strata. 2 Since the turn of the century that preference has been
increasingly satisfied in what has been a gradual, but massive revolution
in housing tenure, one which has taken place with particular rapidity in
the urban context. 3 The relatively elite one-third (37%) of urban house-
holds who owned their homes in 1900 had, by 1970, shifted to nearly a
two-thirds majority (62%). 4 But, although the characterization of Amer-
ica as "a nation of home owners"5 has been increasingly realized over
the past decades, the distinction between owner and rentor has continued
to be stratified largely by income and race.
In 1960, among metropolitan households with incomes of $10,000 or
more an overwhelming majority (79%) owned their homes, while only a
minority (43%) of households with incomes below $5,000 were home
1. See John P. Dean, Home Ownership: Is It Sound? (New York: Harper
& Brothers Publishers, 1945), p. 1-2; Irving Rosow, "Home Ownership
Motives", American Sociological Review, XIII, December, 1948, pp.
751-756; and Nathan Glazer, "Housing Problems and Housing Policies",
The Public Interest, Spring, 1967, pp. 21-51.
2. A Fortune survey reported in "Only Once Every 142 Years," Fortune,
June, 1935, p. 168.
3. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973),
Table No. 1167, p. 689.
4. Ibid.
5. Attributed to Calvin Coolidge; see Dean, oE. cit., p. 40.
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owners. 6 Even more striking are the tenure barriers for non-white
metropolitan households at similarly low-income levels. By 1960, home
ownership had reached little more than a quarter (18%) of non-white met-
ropolitan households with incomes below $5,000. Given the generally
strong preferences expressed for home ownership by non-white families, 8
and the sizable response of minority families to the 235 program in most
cities, these figures can be interpreted as clear indications of discrimin-
atory barriers which have prevailed in the purchase market. Thus,
although ownership tenure has been assumed to be a widespread aspira-
tion among American families, and has indeed become the prevailing ur-
ban housing norm, the result of the increasing democratization of home
ownership in past decades -- particularly since the late 1930's -- had
been to sharpen the visible differences in housing consumption between
minority and lower-income families, on the one hand, and the rest of
urban society.
The long-term shifts in urban tenure patterns raise more than just a
question of magnitudes or of changes in prevailing housing norms and
expectations. Viewed from a social perspective, the pattern of housing
6. U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Volume I.
7. Ibid.
8. See: Nathan Glazer, op. cit.; Dean, op. _cit. , p. 92; and William A.
Stacey, Black Home Ownership (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1972), pp. 20-24.
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tenure, which up to the 1930's had bisected a respectable urban middle
class into both renters and owners, has increasingly come to represent a
more fundamental and visible class schizm or stratification in the housing
sector between the mainstream "haves" of urban society and the under-
class "have nots", one which achieves its most apparent manifestation in
the contrast between the low-density suburbs and the higher-density cen-
9
tral cities of the nation's older metropolitan areas. Among the discon-
tents which lay behind the urban civil disorders of the 1960's, housing
retained a fairly high priority,10 even in the Watts area of Los Angeles
where low-density housing was the prevalent form. To the extont that
such pressures for housing betterment represented severe dissatisfactions
with the conditions of urban tenancy and a continuing preference for owned
housing -- and whatever it represents -- the lower-income ownership
programs of the 1960's constituted a response to those pressures, one
which might not have been politically feasible had not the mainstream of
urban society already benefited from expanding ownership opportunities.
B. The Implications of Ownership Tenure: Channels of Mobility
The implications of housing tenure go well beyond the question of
9. James Q. Wilson, "The War on Cities", The Public Interest, III,
Spring, 1966, pp. 31-32.
10. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commis-
sion), Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.
7-8.
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trends and changing norms, or social inequities in the distribution of
housing attributes and opportunities. For the relatively marginal urban
family who managed to purchase a home under favorable market condi-
tions, the institution of home ownership has tended to serve important
functions as a channel of mobility -- of several kinds of mobility: loca-
tional, economic, and social.
An observer of the Harlem ghetto of New York City during the 1930's
noted the tendency of many black families to purchase homes in outlying
areas of the city as soon as they had the means, and interpreted this trend
not so much as a quest for ownership but as an attempt to extricate them-
selves from the squalid and exploitative conditions of the slums and to
obtain stable residence in a superior setting. Over recent decades the
increasing disparity between central cities and their suburbs, in income,
race, and housing attributes,12 has exacerbated the nature of housing
tenure as a potential barrier to outward movement. In 1970, a substan-
tial portion of suburban housing units (70. 3%) in metropolitan areas was
owner-occupied, while central cities were more evenly divided in tenure,
with slightly more than half (51. 5%) renter occupied units. 13 Consequently,
differences in tenure opportunities, as well as differences in market
11. James Ford, Slums and Housing (Cambridge, hss. : Harvard Univ-
ersity Press, 1936), Volume I, p. 331.
12. National Commission on Urban Problems (Douglas Commission),
Building the American City (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government
Office, 1963), pp. 40-55.
13. U.S. Department of Commerce, 2p. cit. , Table No. 1169, p. 691.
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levels, which distinguish the central city from the suburb, serve to con-
strain the geographic mobility of the urban housing-poor and their access
to alternative locational opportunities, thereby contributing to the contin-
ued relative concentration of lower-income and minority households
within the central city and within its older rental areas. 14
The potential economic benefits for the owning family of modest in-
come are well recognized, as are the potential risks. On the benefit side
of the ledger are the family savings realized in increasing equity in the
property; the "forced savings" aspect of monthly mortgage payments for
families who cannot readily set aside capital; the nature of hom'e owner-
ship as a feasible form of investment for families of modest income; the
value of real property and fixed loan terms as a "hedge" against inflation;
the income tax savings through ownership deductions and sheltered equity
income; the decreased housing expenditures and economic security that go
along with mortgage fruition. On the negative side are some of the poten-
tial risks of the "caveat emptor" home purchase market, such as over-
pricing for the prevailing market and unexpected, serious defects in the
condition of the house, though such risks are avoidable by the cautious,
resourceful, and knowledgable purchaser. However, the experience of
the 235 program suggests that such risks may be great for many lower-
income purchasers in the absence of effective safeguards against
14. Bernard J. Frieden, "Housing and National Urban Goals", The Met-
tropolitan Enigma, (James Q. Wilson, Ed.), (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 170-225, pp. 216-217.
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consumer misinformation and abuse. 15 Other risks are an inevitable
aspect of ownership tenure: increased maintenance and repair burdens,
a vulnerability to declining housing market and neighborhood conditions,
and to the effects of local and national economic conditions on the viabil-
ity of ownership and the resale value of the property.
In the wake of the home ownership casualties of the Great Depression
of the 1930's -- characterized at its worst by 1,000 foreclosures a day 16
there was little reason to be sanguine about the long-term economic bene-
fits of home ownership in light of existential economic uncertainties. In
1945, on the eve of the post-war home building boom, John P. bean pub-
lished a caustic and exhaustive study of the institutional setting for home
ownership in which he used the hindsight of the Depression to caution
against the potential perils of home ownership:
"...it is safe to say that a tidal wave of home building and
home buying will sweep over our postwar urban areas. With
the American people steeped in the values of home owner-
ship and flush with savings to buy homes, and with an eager
construction industry encouraged from all angles to avert
a postwar collapse of production, home ownership is likely
to run rampant much as it did following World War I... Amer-
ica will no doubt look back on our time as an era in which
society encouraged its families to stride ahead through a
field deliberately sown with booby traps. "t17
15. U.S. House of Representatives, 
_ cit.
16. Martin Meyerson, Barbara Terrett, and William L. C. Wheaton,
Housing, People, and Cities (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962),
p. 223.
17. Dean, op. cit., pp. 170-171.
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By 1968, when the Section 235 program was passed, the positive ex-
perience of post-war home purchasers over two decades tended to dis-
count Dean's Cassandra-like portents and argue for the potential economic
benefits of ownership rather than its risks. An advocate of "home owner-
ship for the poor" argued:
"The entry of millions of the depression poor into the middle
class was aided by a rise in home values between the 1930's
and 1950's. There should be no objection to the elevation of
our current poor in similar fashion... if an owner loses his
job and can no longer pay for his house, he still has some-
thing to sell. A renter has no alternative but to move, and
nothing to salvage from his misfortune. "118
While adverse circumstances were recognized as a potential threat to sus-
tained ownership for the individual home owner, it was common to assume
that a prevailing prosperity would continue to support sound purchase
markets which yielded equity benefits even when a home owner was forced
to sell.
Less visible than the potential economic benefits of home ownership,
and less well recognized, are the more intangible functions which attach
themselves to the attainment of home ownership among working and lower
class families. At various reaches of the American social ladder, the
perception of upward mobility and self-betterment -- the next rung up,
if you will -- takes on different manifestations and forms. For those at
the middle and upper reaches who have managed to secure the accoutre-
18. Robert Kolodny, "Should Poor Families Own?", Home Ownership for
the Poor, by Charles Abrams in association with Robert Kolodny,
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 197.
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ments of higher status -- the advantages of a comfortable income, a
socially-valued occupation, or an advanced education -- housing and res-
idential choices may play a part in the perception and realization of one's
status, but the choice of tenure tends to reflect a relatively reasoned pre-
ference among alternative residential arrangements and opportunities.
Upward aspirations take on more widely recognized forms of accomplish-
ment along avenues of occupational achievement, social recognition, power
accretion, or individual self-realization. Lacking those advantages and
the resources necessary to obtain them, those at the lower reaches of
society tend to perceive the next step upward in terms which ar~e more
accessible to them. Within this social context, the attainment of home
ownership tends to be regarded as a key aspiration and a signal accomplish-
ment, a major differentiator which confers a degree of stability and re-
spectability on the holder. In an historical study of an industrial town in
Massachusetts, Thernstrom traces the mobility patterns of laboring fami-
lies:
"By 1880 the undifferentiated mass of poverty-stricken labor-
ing families, the 'lack-alls' who seemed at mid-century to be
forming a permanent class, had separated into three layers.
On top was a small but significant elite of laboring families who
had gained a foothold in the lower fringes of the middle class
occupational world. Below them was the large body of famil-
ies who had attained property mobility while remaining in man-
ual occupations, most often of the unskilled or semi-skilled
variety; these families constituted the stable, respectable
home-owning stratum of the Newburyport working class. At
the very bottom of the social ladder was the impoverished,
floating lower class... ''
19. Stephen Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nine-
teenth Century City (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press,
1964), p. 164.
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A striking confirmation of the pre-eminence of home ownership among
blue collar families occurred in a 1940 study of the characteristics of
American home owners:
"Homeowner families also include those who, for reasons of
nativity and occupation, do not have the social attributes im-
portant for the achievement of status and 'social' security in
our society, and so regard homeownership as a compensatory
device for acquiring such status. Thus homeowners are more
likely to include a greater share of foreign-born white fami-
lies [than renters], who believe that 'a stake in the land' will
provide a greater sense of belonging... homeowner heads of
families are more likely to be engaged in physical production
occupations than are tenant families and are less likely to be
engaged in service occupations, professional or clerical. ,20
The massive suburbanization that occurred in urban America after
World War II, and the role of the media and advertising in casting the
owned single family home on a quarter-acre lot as the residential norm,
have undoubtedly served to sharpen rather than dull the aspirations of
marginal urban families for home ownership. 21 For those who preferred
to own, and whose income and employment were sufficiently stable to
validate that preference, the scarcity of affordable home purchase oppor-
tunities prior to the 235 program constituted a significant, if not crucial,
mobility deprivation and a major constraint on residential opportunity.
C. Tenure and Policy
The lower-income ownership programs of the 1960's are, in a sense,
20. Lillian Cohen, "Family Characteristics of Homeowners", American
Journal of Sociology, No. 55, May, 1950, pp. 565-571, p. 566.
21. George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord (New Brunswick, N. J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1966), p. 6.
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the legacy of previous federal policies which consistently promoted ex-
panded home ownership and brought it within reach of the urban majority.
The marriage between federal interests in national economic well-being
and growth and private sector interests -- those of the building industry,
the real estate industry, the banking industry, and organized labor -- has
by now become axiomatic. The actualization of that relationship underlies
the evolution of federal housing policy as a whole and, more pointedly, of
those policies regarding home purchase.
In his study, John P. Dean traces the courtship and marriage of fed-
eral concerns with home building interests to the 1920's, during which the
federal role took the form of a kind of informal boosterism of home pur-
chase on the part of the Department of Commerce. 22 Even earlier, as
early as 1913, federal income tax policies had provided indirect incen-
tives for home ownership in the form of tax deductions for mortgage in-
23
terest and real estate property taxes.
22. Dean, o_. cit. , p. 42.
23. For a discussion of the tenure bias implicit in federal income tax
policy and its implications for tax expenditures, see: Harry C. Kahn,
Personal Deducations in the Federal Income Tax (Princeton, N. J. :
Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 4-6, 115-116; Patricia Leavey
Hodge and Philip M. Hauser, The Federal Income Tax in Relation to
Housing, (prepared for the Douglas Commission), Research Report
No. 5 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968);
Committee for Economic Development, Financing the Nation's Hous-
ing Needs (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1973),
pp. 62-63; Henry J. Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies (Washington, D. C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1972), Chapter 4; and William C. Baer,
"On the Making of Beautiful and Perfect Social Programs", The Pub-
lic Interest, Spring, 1975, pp. 80-98.
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But it was not until the onset of the Depression and the rapid failure
of the banking and construction industries, the major industrial casualties
of the period,24 that the federal government, first under President Hoover
and subsequently under President Roosevelt, seriously addressed its at-
tention to direct policy measures within the housing sector. In 1931,
Hoover convened the President's Conference on Home Building and Home
Ownership which embarked on a study of then present obstacles to viable
home ownership and resulted in an unqualified endorsement of home own-
ership as a national aspiration (at a time when the risks were enormous):
"Every American family which so desires and is able financially should
OWN THEIR OWN HOME". 25 The period from 1932 to 1933 ushered
in the first pieces of ownership-oriented legislation intended primarily
as economic relief measures geared to stimulating the flow of capital
through the banking system, which was impacted by deposit with-
drawals and the frozen housing assets of failing mortgagors, and to the
simultaneous relief of defaulting home owners. Hoover's Federal Home
Loan Bank Act of 1932 strengthened the borrowing power of savings and
loan institutions but accomplished little by way of relief to the rapidly in-
creasing rolls of ailing owners. 25 Roosevelt brought about direct mort-
gage relief measures in 1933, through the creation of the Home Owners
24. Meyerson, _et al., op. cit. , p. 221.
25. President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership
(Washington, D. C.: 1932), Volume II, p. 15.
26. Thomas B. Marvell, The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 22.
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Loan Corporation which provided for the federal purchase of mortgages
facing imminent foreclosure and for federal refinancing directly from the
Treasury under longer terms and, thereby, lower monthly cash payments.
By 1934 the New Deal ownership policies had moved from economic
stabilization objectives to economic stimulation through accelerated con-
struction activity. Under the Keynesian macro-economic principles which
guided the New Deal strategies, labor-intensive public works and private
construction were crucial countercyclical channels for creating jobs and
stimulating the levels of consumption in a depressed economy. The fed-
eral instrument for economic acceleration through private hom'e building
was the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) which was legislatively
created in 1934. The FHA provisions represented a radical innovation to
the restrictive mortgage system which had prevailed previously and
which had been largely geared to relatively affluent purchasers. 27 Under
FHA, the federal government underwrote long-term, low down payment
mortgages through insurance premiums paid by the mortgagor, thereby
overcoming the traditional reluctance of mortgage lenders to advance
financing to the modest income market and liberalizing mortgage terms
at no risk to the lender. The result was the expansion of the effective
demand for new houses by bringing ownership within reach of large num-
bers of modest income families. A network of FHA insuring offices was
set up throughout the country, and over a period of time FHA further lib-
eralized mortgage terms and began to actively advocate home purchase
27. Henry J. Aaron, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
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28
through a form of public salesmanship. Dean observed the success of
the FHA program by 1940 in capturing the modest income market:.
"... The FHA plan has been held forth temptingly to families
needing homes but able to pay for only modest housing. That
these families have been brought increasingly into the fold is
attested by the fact that among families purchasing FHA
homes a rising proportion have incomes under $ 2000: 19. 8
per cent of the purchasing families in 1937, 28. 5 per cent of
the families in 1940, and 34. 2 per cent of the families in
1941. ,,29
Despite the home construction standstill that occurred during the World
War II mobilization, by 1944 FHA had insured a total of about 1. 2 million
mortgages accounting for more than a third (35%) of the mortgages ad-
vanced during the period. Although FHA mortgage insurance could be
extended to multi-family rental properties, the bulk of FHA's business
concentrated in the one to four-family house market. 30
But the FHA program did not address the housing deprivations of the
urban poor and near poor, and intentionally ignored discriminated minor-
ities. 31 Although the Social Security Act of 1935 led to the provision of
welfare shelter allowances for AFDC families, subsequent assessments
of the allowance program indicate that it has had a very limited impact
28. Dean, op. cit. , p. 50.
29. Ibid. , pp. 53-54.
30. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969 HUD Stat-
istical Yearbook, 1970, derived from Table 4, p. 28.
31. See: National Commission on Urban Problems (Douglas Commission),
o. cit. , p. 100; and Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors (New
York: Harper, 1955).
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either in opening up home purchase opportunities for families of low in-
32
come or in providing adequate rental accommodations. The public
housing program created by the 1937 Housing Act further expanded the
federal repertoire of economic pump-priming strategies through increased
public construction and signaled an important shift in federal policy toward
direct subsidization of housing opportunities for marginal urban house-
holds. 33
The Housing Act of 1937 defined as low-income those "families who
are in the lowest income groups and who cannot afford to pay enough to
cause private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan area to build an
adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use. "
Standards of affordability first incorporated into the Act were reflected in
the prescribed maximum rent-income ratios set for public housing, which
specified a 20 percent rent burden for families with at most two minors.
and a 16 2/3 percent burden for families with three or more minor de-
32. See: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Role
of Public Welfare in Housing (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1969); Martin Rein, Welfare and Housing, Working
Paper No. 4,(Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I. T. and Cam-
bridge, Mass. : Harvard University, 1971); and George S. Sternlieb
and Bernard P. Indik, The Ecology of Welfare (New Brunswick, N. J.:
Transaction Books, 1973).
33. For a synopsis of issues surrounding the original public housing leg-
islation, see: Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Hous-
ing(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. , 1968); and Leonard Freedman,
Public Housing, The Politics of Poverty (New York: Holt, Reinhart,
and Winston, Inc. , 1969).
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pendents. 34 Although these standards have since been revised, 35 what is
significant is that the legislation established a concept of housing poverty
-- and a corresponding definition of low-income -- which was based on
the twin principles of maximum reasonable rent burden and economic ex-
clusion from the local private supply of quality housing. These have
formed the major public welfare underpinnings for federal intervention and
assistance in the low-income housing arena ever since.
The two housing programs -- FHA and public housing -- which emerged
by the late 1930's formed, by and large, the dual pillars of federal housing
policy through the next two decades. 36 As such, they represerited an im-
plicit dualism in the federal conception of appropriate tenure opportunities
for different strata of urban society. FHA promoted expanded ownership
opportunities in the private purchase market for the stable and emergent
middle class of the Depression and subsequently, together with its sibling
34. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
35. See Robert Moore Fisher, 20 Years of Public Housing -- Economic
Aspects of the Federal Program (New York: Harper and Row, 1959),
pp. 223-227, for a history of rent-income ratio requirements. In
1969, the Brooke Amendment established a maximum rent-income
ratio of 25 percent in all federally-assisted housing.
36. The other major ownership-oriented program was the Veterans Ad-
ministration loan guarantee program legislated under the GI Bill of
Rights in 1944. Although separately administered by VA, it was a
variation of the FHA model, requiring no down payment or insurance
payments on the part of the mortgagor. See: Sar A. Levitan and Karen
A. Cleary, Old Wars Remain Unfinished (Baltimore: The Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1973), pp. 155-159.
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VA program, 37 for a rapidly suburbanizing middle class during the post-
38
war years. By contrast, the public housing program provided direct
federal support for rental housing construction, publicly-owned and de-
veloped at the initiative of local housing authorities, targeted exclusively
at a newly-defined constituency of "low-income" households. 39 In sum-
ming up the record of FHA by 1967, after more than thirty years of oper-
ation, the Douglas Commission was sharply critical of FHA's exclusion-
ary policies toward lower income and minority households:
"The main weakness of FHA from a social point of view has not
been in what it has done, but in what it has failed to do -- in its
relative neglect of the inner cities and the poor, and especi6lly
Negro poor. Believing firmly that the poor were bad credit
risks and that the presence of Negroes tended to lower real es-
tate values, FHA has generally regarded loans to such groups as
'economically unsound'. Until recently, therefore, FHA bene-
fits have been confined almost exclusively to the middle class,
and primarily only to the middle section of the middle class.
The poor and those on the fringes of poverty have been almost
completely excluded. "t40
Viewed as the body of federal housing policy which prevailed for more
than twenty years, the two programs established a dual principle which
37. Ibid.
38. It is estimated that as much as 35 to 50 percent of post-war residen-
tial construction involved the FHA and VA programs. Meyerson
et al. , o. it. , p. 219.
39. The notorious "20 percent income gap" clause of the 1937 public hous-
ing legislation further excluded families with incomes above 80 per-
cent of the housing poverty line at which maximum "low-income"
levels were set. As a result, public housing benefits were not ex-
tended to all low-income families. See: Friedman, op. cIt, pp.
110-111.
40. National Commission on Urban Problems (Douglas Commission),
22. _cit. , p. 100.
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guided federal commitments in the housing sector: an expansionary home
ownership policy for the credit-worthy middle class, and public rental
housing for the poor and near poor. With regard to tenure, an invisible
dividing-line had been implicitly drawn -- largely in terms of income,
but also by class and race -- which determined those for whom each form
of tenure would receive federal encouragement.
The pervasive tenure dualism in federal policy was gradually eroded
during the 1960's. Although the 221(d)(2) mortgage insurance program
begun in 1961 was a variant of the FHA model which was legislatively
41
targeted at moderate-income families, in some urban areas -- most
notably Milwaukee and Detroit 42 -- it served relatively large num-
bers of families with marginal incomes. By 1965, the emerging move-
41. "Moderate-income" was administratively defined as the income
range below the local median income but above the maximum income
limits for admission to public housing. The upper limit could be ex-
tended by exception, and the exception became the rule. See: Na-
tional Commission on Urban Problems (Douglas Commission), cp_.
cit., p. 145; and The President's Committee on Urban Housing
(The Kaiser Committee), A Decent Home (Washington, D. C. : U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 62.
42. The two cities came to represent polar opposites in terms of 221
ownership programs; Milwaukee's program was considered a posi-
tive model to emulate, while Detroit's was the most heavily scandal-
ized. For a description of the Milwaukee FHA-Welfare Department
program, see: HEW, SRS Newsletter (Community Services Admin-
istration), August 27, 1970; and U.S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee Hearings, 2. cit. , Lawrence Katz' testimony. For a
journalistic account of the Detroit program, see: Brian D. Boyer,
Cities Destroyed for Cash, The FHA Scandal at HUD (Chicago:
The Follett Publishing Co. , 1973).
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ment of non-profit housing sponsors, 43 which had been catalyzed by new
federal programs subsidizing privately- sponsored rental housing, had
created a number of local groups that were beginning to experiment with
housing rehabilitation and subsequent purchase by low-income families;
some of these efforts received federal funding as demonstration programs.
The first legislative recognition of the concept of low-income home own-
ership occurred in 1966 with the passage of the 221(h) program, as a
direct and supportive response to the innovative efforts of several non-
profit groups. But the program was small in scale, and restricted to
housing rehabilitated by non-profit sponsors. Conceived as a piece of
special legislation rather than a major housing strategy, it received
little more than passing attention from the Congress or the Johnson ad-
ministration. It was Senator Percy's aggressive crusade on behalf of
low-income home ownership in 1967 that first served to focus political
and public attention on the issue and to escalate the question of tenure in
relation to low-income housing policy to the level of a major national pol-
icy issue. 44 The new-found currency of the low-income ownership con-
cept led to new administrative initiatives, among them the Turnkey III
program of 1967 which enabled local housing authorities to provide
43. Langley C. Keyes, "The Role of Nonprofit Sponsors in the Produc-
tion of Housing. " Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Housing
Panels, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and
Currency, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, June, 1971, pp. 159-181.
44. Christa Lew Carnegie, "Homeownership for the Poor: Running the
Washingtor Gauntlet", Journal of the American Institute of Planners,
Volume XXXVI, No. 3, May., 1970, pp. 160-167.
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suitable units to public housing families under a long-term lease-purchase
plan. 45
But this series of discrete low-income ownership programs were over-
shadowed in both significance and scale by the passage of the Section 235
program in 1968, which represented the final breech in the tenure dualism
of the earlier decades. The 235 program extended ownership opportuni-
ties for families of lower income beyond the confines of the non-profit
sector and the public housing sector to the open purchase market con-
strained only by limits on purchase price. Consistent with the ambitious
federal housing goals embedded in the 1968 Act, the program sought to
create incentives on a relatively massive scale which would mobilize pri-
vate sector involvement in the production of new and rehabilitated homes
for 235-eligible families, envisioning the production of as many as 100,000
units annually during the program's early years. The new interest-rate
subsidy format potentially lowered the effective rate of interest for pur-
chasers to one percent. Although this form of subsidy tends to be regres-
sive in its distributive effects by income group, providing potentially
46
larger subsidies to higher income purchasers, it constituted the deepest
45. For an evaluation of Turnkey III, see: Comptroller General of the
United States (GAO), Problems in the Homeownership Opportunities
Program for Low-Income Families (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, March, 1974).
46. Victor E. Bach, "The 235 Home Ownership Subsidy Program: The
Wrong Instrument for the Right Purpose", Joint Center for Urban
Studies, Working Paper No. 2, Cambridge, Mass. , January, 1971,
pp. 6-9.
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federal subsidy available in the private market. Viewed explicitly as a
"socially-oriented" ownership program, which would involve substantial
federal risks and costs, the Section 235 program represented an unprece-
dented federal recognition of the values of alternative tenure opportunities
for urban lower-income families.
With the Housing Act of 1968, a new constituency of "lower-income"
families was coined. There is perhaps no more confusing a definition of
a program constituency in the federal lexicon, for it constitutes a set of
program quotas rather than a consistent definition of eligibility. VAthin
each FHA jurisdiction, at least 80 percent of the families assisted under
the 235 program were to have incomes within 135 percent of the maximum
permissible for entry into public housing. Remaining participants could
be drawn from among families having incomes above this limit but within
90 percent of the locally-specified limit for moderate-income families.
Moreover, the Act promoted "a preference for families whose incomes
are within the lowest practicable limits for achieving homeownership
with assistance under this section."
A somewhat clearer image of the 235 program's lower-income consti-
tuency emerges from consideration of the "135% provision" in relation to
the concept of housing poverty or "low-income" as legislated in 1937.
Since maximum income limits for public housing eligibility lie 20% below
the locally-established housing poverty line, for a given household the
line can be extrapolated as 125 percent of the income ceiling for admis-
sion to public housing. A program intended exclusively for the housing-
poor defined as low-income by the 1937 Act would have as its income
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ceiling the 125% figure based on public housing eligibility. As a result,
the 235 program defines predominantly a constituency which potentially
includes all low-income families below the housing poverty line as well as
47
families whose incomes lie marginally above the line. In contrast with
previous programs, the lower-income constituency defined in 1968 can be
judged to adhere most closely to the original definition of housing poverty
advanced by the 1937 Act, while rectifying past inequities -- most notably
the 20 percent income gap in public housing eligibility and the exclusion
of public housing eligibles from the Section 221 moderate-income rental
assistance programs.
Although the Section 235 program was subsequently dubbed "home own-
ership for the poor", the intended constituency corresponded more closely
to traditional concepts of housing poverty than to concepts of income pov-
erty which had emerged during the 1960's. While the housing-poor of the
late 1960's were inclusive of the income-poor, they were hardly compar-
able constituencies. By 1966 standards, a family of four could be eligible
for Section 235 purchase under the "135% provision" with an income of as
47. By at most 8 percent. In 1966, the average locally-set housing pov-
erty line for a family of four can be estimated at about $5,000 annual
income. (Derived from: National Commission on Urban Problems,
oE. cit. , Table 14, p. 133.) The "135% provision" -- representing
at least 80 percent of the 235 constituency -- would extend that line
by only $400, allowing similar households with incomes of up to
$5,400 to participate.
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much as 56 percent above the income poverty line. 48 Consequently, at
its inception the 235 program addressed itself to a relatively broad sub-
stratum of urban society, one which potentially included many working
class and lower middle class households as well as the harder-core
income-poor.
D. Home Ownership and Low-Income Housing Policy Perspectives
What role should home ownership occupy as part of a coherent national
policy addressed to the housing problems of urban low-income families?
The question itself invites controversy by challenging commonly-held
precepts concerning the poor and the role of public policy. It is signifi-
cant that among the innovative housing programs of the Great Society
period, which forged new subsidy mechanisms opening up private rental
housing for low-income families,50 the concept of a major strategy of low-
income home purchase constituted one of the last frontiers to be crossed.
The notion of enabling the urban housing-poor to purchase homes flew in
48. Derived from: National Commission on Urban Problems (Douglas
Commission), op. cit., Table 14, p. 133. The "190% of moderate-
income" provision would raise eligible income levels even further.
49. For a good working definition of these class distinctions, see:
Herbert Gans, The Levittowners (New York: Random House, 1967),
pp. 24-31.
50. Most notably the rent supplement and leased housing programs en-
acted in 1965. For a description of the controversy surrounding the
rent supplement legislation, see: Joe R. Feagin, Charles Tilly,
and Constance W. VAlliams, Subsidizing the Poor: A Boston Housing
Experiment (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), Chapter 3, pp.
47-65.
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the face of the conventional wisdom that the market risks, the higher
costs, and the encumbering responsibilities attached to home ownership
made it a questionable, perhaps unattainable benefit for many families at
the margins of urban society. Ownership was an appropriate housing ar-
rangement only for those who could afford it on their own (or with federal
mortgage insurance). On the other hand, to the extent that the benefits of
ownership might be realizable by lower-income households, there was an
inherent incongruence in the notion of subsidizing home purchasers who
might ultimately profit from the sale of their homes. 51
The question of tenure choice as an issue of low-income housing policy
and its relation to policy objectives, as they might be formulated, is one
which needs to be considered within the context of broader perceptions of
the nature of urban housing problems and of appropriate policy responses.
In so doing, it needs to be recognized from the start that there is no such
single policy-theoretical framework on which experts would be likely to
agree. On the contrary, there are differing, competing perceptions of
the underlying nature of urban housing problems as a policy issue and of
the role of public policy in addressing these problems. These alterna-
tive views or policy perspectives -- here identified as the adequist, rela-
tivist, and functionalist perspectives -- represent significantly different
ideological positions or policy orientations in regard to housing and the
51. Realizing this, Senator Percy originally proposed a mechanism for
the recovery of federal subsidies upon sale of the house, out of ac-
cumulated equity and possible capital gains.
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urban poor, based on important differences in underlying values and as-
sumptions. As a result, within each perspective the question of tenure
choice takes on a different set of valences and priorities.
The Adequist View
Under the adequist view, urban housing problems are perceived pri-
marily in terms of housing supply and accommodation. Its focal concern
is with the adequacy of the urban housing stock both in terms of the quan-
tity of units available to meet needs and in terms of the quality of the
occupied stock as judged by accepted, measurable standards of minimally
decent housing accommodation. One analyst has termed these paired pro-
blem syndromes as the "too little housing" problem and the "bad housing"
problem. 52 According to this view, housing deprivation53 can be con-
ceived in fairly objective, measurable terms which reflect the degree to
which housing occupancy fails to conform to minimal criteria or standards,
such as standards related to the physical condition and design of dwelling
units; housing cost burdens in relation to household incomes; the number
of rooms needed to accommodate households of given size and composition;
and, at times, standards related to neighborhood qualities and character-
istics. The conventional concept of "substandard" housing is itself a
52. Henry J. Aaron, op. cit. , p. 2.
53. For a recent operational definition of housing deprivation in relation
to housing standards, see: David Birch, et al. , America's Housing
Needs: 1970 to 1980 (Cambridge Mass. : Joint Center for Urban
Studies of Harvard University and M. I. T. , December, 1973).
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manifestation of the adequist orientation.
Such standards are useful indicators or benchmarks for assessing the
distribution and maldistribution of housing consumption in the aggregate,
and for planning further policy interventions. But it is not the use of stan-
dards, per se, that characterizes the adequist orientation, so much as
their application to policy. Adequist housing policy tends to incorporate
these standards as policy objectives. That is, policy succeeds or fails in
the degree to which it fosters a redistribution of housing consumption which
more closely conforms to prescribed standards of housing adequacy. In
this sense, adequist policy interventions focus primarily on the aggregate
quality of the occupied housing stock and usually involve strategies geared
to expanding or upgrading the supply so as to deliver more adequate hous-
ing accommodations to the urban housing-deprived. For the adequist, a
policy which succeeds in bringing housing occupancy to within standards,
at minimal public costs, constitutes a solution of the urban housing prob-
lem.
Deriving from nineteenth century concerns about the health conditions
and decency of urban slum housing54 and grounded in environmentalist
precepts relating the betterment of housing conditions to social better-
ment,55 the adequist view has dominated most local and federal policy
interventions to the present, with its emphasis on "decent, safe, and
54. Friedman, op. cit.
55. See the early housing reformers: Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half
Lives, (originally published in 1890), (New York: Hill and Wang,
1957); and Lawrence Veiller, Housing Reform, 1910.
-46-
sanitary"shelter. Some of the dilemmas inherent in the adequist view
are reflected in the shortcomings of past policies which delivered sound
housing at reasonable costs, but failed in other respects -- witness the
complex of factors that transformed the high expectations for public hous-
ing into what has been called a "dreary deadlock",56 a "graveyard of good
intentions". 57
The Relativist View
The relativist view is similar to the adequist view in that it also em-
phasizes the central importance of housing as a commodity of consump-
tion and concerns itself with differential patterns of consumption which
characterize the distribution of housing attributes in our society. But it
rejects absolute standards of housing adequacy as a useful way of ap-
proaching urban housing issues meaningfully, and advocates a social-
dynamic interpretation of housing problems and policies. From this per-
spective, housing deprivation is viewed as socially relative in nature.
That is, housing dissatisfactions are seen as emerging from distributive
inequities which relegate inferior housing to the poor -- inferior in terms
of broad socially-defined norms and expectations concerning what consti-
tutes acceptable housing, regardless of whether minimal standards of
housing adequacy are met. Within the context of American society, which
prizes upward mobility and maximizes expectations, the relativist argues
56. Catherine Bauer Wurster,"The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing",
Architectural Forum, May, 1957.
57. Term coined by Glazer, op. cit.
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that the social meanings attached to housing, and its ability to stigmatize
and stratify, lie at the heart of the urban housing problem.
This point of view is best articulated by Nathan Glazer. After com-
paring physical housing conditions among major industrial nations,
Glazer found that American housing was generally superior. Yet this
country, more than others, experiences anurgentlyfelt and chronic prob-
lem. Considering the apparent paradox, Glazer observes:
"Indeed, the issue may not be whether housing, in terms of any
world or absolute standard, is adequate or crowded. It may be:
Where does one's housing stand in terms of the standards of the
system, and what does falling behind that standard mean? In a
society in which quarter-acre lots become the norm, anything
less will be correlated with a whole range of measures of poor
health, family instability, and social disorganization... But it
is not housing as such that has an effect, but housing as medi-
ated through a complex culture and the expectations it variously
distributes among its people. "58
Despite the diversity of urban society, it is generally acknowledged
59
that the poor tend to share mainstream norms and aspirations , in hous-
ing and other aspects of life betterment, although they lack the means to
achieve them. The effect of the communications media has been to shar-
pen further the awareness among the housing-deprived of the gap between
housing poverty and prevailing middle class standards. Recent improve-
ments in urban housing conditions (by adequist standards) have not mellow-
ed the sense of distributive injustice which has been intensified by the
58. Ibid. , p. 26.
59. See: Herbert J. Gans, "Culture and Class in the Study of Poverty"
and Lee Rainwater, "The Problem of Lower-Class Culture and Pov-
erty-War Strategy, " both in On Understanding Poverty, (Daniel P.
Moynihan, ed.), (New York, Basic Books, Inc. , 1968), pp. 201-259.
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media. Sternlieb observes:
"The effect of slum housing on the 'psyche' of its inhabitants
has changed markedly over the years... Through the media
of communications, the standard of 'appropriate' life in hous-
ing has risen very markedly. At the turn of the century there
was no common denominator of appropriate expectation for all
people. Today the degree of popular knowledge of the discre-
pancy between the irresistably promulgated standard of what
the good life is for middle-class Americans, and that which is
actually endured among depressed urban groups is the chief 60differentiator between the present period and that of the past.
From the relativist perspective, the proper objective of low-income
housing policy is to provide upward mobility within the housing sector,
that is, to raise the level of housing consumption among the poor to ap-
proximate more closely middle-class norms and values:
".. . housing policy has permitted the majority of American
families to improve their living conditions, and to gain family set-
tings for themselves that were superior to those they left. It has
done little for substantial minorities of poor families who have
not had the resources to achieve what society considers (and they
do, too) minimally desirable housing; for them we must devise
income maintenance policies that permit them to achieve such
housing, housing subsidies that work to the same effect... "61
The failures of public housing can be seen as partial confirmation of the
relativist view. By producing socially inferior, stigmatized housing for
the urban poor, albeit satisfactory by adequist standards, public housing
recreated the syndrome stereo-typically associated with slum conditions.
Sam B. Warner, the urban historian, noted the sad fate of a philanthrop-
ic housing effort in Boston at the turn of the century which had produced
only minimal housing, and concluded:
60. George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord (New Brunswick, N. J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1966), p. 6.
61. Glazer, oR. cit. , p. 51.
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"... slum housing is one of the prices that a society pays
for allowing any major amount of its building to proceed
at a level below its common understanding among the mid-
dle class as to what constitutes a satisfactory home envir-
onment. "62
By replacing physical standards of housing adequacy with social stand-
ards of acceptability, relativist policy aims at a much vaster redistribu-
tion of housing consumption than does adequist policy. It is this fact that
makes it far more vulnerable to questions of economic and political feasi-
bility. To what extent is society willing to pay the costs of providing the
urban housing-poor with opportunities that approximate the housing amen-
ities enjoyed by the middle class?
The Functionalist View
The functionalist view diminishes the importance of relative housing
consumption patterns, whether assessed by the adequist's physical stan-
dards or by the relativist's social norms, as a basis for interpreting
63housing issues or formulating policy. Based on an holistic view of the
life conditions of the economically marginal urban family, the functional-
ist perspective concerns itself with housing only to the extent that housing
constitutes a functional or dysfunctional aspect of broader life choices,
conditions, and opportunities among the urban poor. Anthropocentric in
62. Sam B. Warner, Jr. , Streetcar Suburbs, (Cambridge, Mass. : Har-
vard University Press), (A publication of the Joint Center for Urban
Studies of M.I. T. and Harvard, 1962), p. 105.
63. For a definition of the term "holistic", see: Robert S. Weiss, "Al-
ternative Approaches in the Study of Complex Situations", Human
Organization, Fall, 1966, pp. 198-206.
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its focus on the microcontext of the family, and holistic in its broad range
of life concerns, the functionalist view attaches primary importance to
the role housing plays in the economic and social consolidation of the mar-
ginal family, and less importance to observable aspects of housing con-
sumption as a critical factor in isolation from these broader priorities.
Housing standards as such -- whether physical or social -- are viewed as
externally imposed values often unrelated and, at times, antagonistic to
the central needs and concerns of the poor. Policies which elevate those
standards as a mandate for public action may conflict with the basic in-
terests of the poor, regardless of their intent. For example, from the
functionalist standpoint, it may be preferable for a low-income family to
choose to occupy substandard, slum housing because of the income man-
euverability which low rent makes possible:
"Most people who live in slums do so because they cannot
afford better housing. Their basic trouble is poverty, not
poor housing. They need better housing, but they also need
better health services, better food, better education. If our
institutions have the effect of raising housing standards but
make the poor pay the costs in increased rents, we are do-
ing the poor a dubious service. Whatever name we give to
what we are doing -- 'renewal', 'rehabilitation', 'improve-
ment' -- if it forces the poor to live beyond their limited
means, if it forces them to pay for a certain standard of
housing whether or not they wish to do so, we are making
poverty more of a box than before. ir64
Although the impoverishments and risks of slum living are recognized
in the functionalist perspective, so too are the functions which these areas
64. Lisa R. Peattie, "Social Issues in Housing", Shaping an Urban Future,
Bernard J. Frieden and William W. Nash, Jr., eds., (Cambridge,
Mass.: MI. T. Press, 1969), pp. 15-34, p. 32.
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potentially serve: access to job opportunities, proximity to social re-
sources represented by kinfolk and persons of similar ethnic origin, the
maintenance of satisfying associations within the community. 65 The im-
position of external standards of residence are seen as deriving from
materialist and bureaucratic values having little to do with the existential
needs of the poor:
"If there were simple or invariable correspondences between
material products and human satisfactions (and frustrations)
there would be no issue and the problem of standards would be
easily resolved... it is perverse to attach human values to
things or the measure of things. Yet this is what is done in
common housing practice. Housing problems are defined by
material standards... more is better; more plumbing is better
than less plumbing, more space per person is better than less
space... According to those for whom housing is an activity,
these conclusions are absurd. They fail to distinguish between
what things are, materially speaking, and what they do in
people's lives," 6 6
The functionalist critique of American housing policy finds its ultimate
confirmation in the successful urban squatter settlements of Latin Amer-
ica. 67 Beginning as rudimentary shanty settlements, they provide rela-
65. See: Oscar Lewis, "Epiolgue: Cruz Moves to a Housing Project",
La Vida (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 661-669; John Seeley,
"The Slum: Its Nature, Use, and Users", Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, 1959, Volume 25, pp. 7-14; and Marc Fried
and Peggy Gleicher, "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an
Urban Slum", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Novem-
ber, 1961, pp. 305-315.
66. John F. C. Turner, "Housing As A Verb", Freedom to Build, (John
F. C. Turner and Robert Fichter, eds.), (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1972), p. 152
67. See: John C. Turner, "Barriers and Channels for Housing Develop-
ment in Modernizing Countries", Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, May, 1967, pp. 167-181; and Peattie, op. cit.
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tively secure tenure while demanding little cost, and undergo physical
transformation and improvement as families prosper within the urban
economy. Comparing the American and Latin American institutional
context, Peattie begins to suggest what might be the underpinnings of a
functionalist housing policy:
"1... our institutions do less well in serving the people at the
bottom than do the 'less developed' institutions of the Latin
American countries. Our general level of housing standards
is better, but standards, I believe, are not as relevant to the
people at the bottom as are some other aspects of housing:
Housing as a means of access to opportunity; housing at costs
such as to make income maneuverability possible; house own-
ership as a means of economic and social consolidation; house
construction as a path of entry into the skilled labor market'
for the unskilled worker. "68
"We will have to shift from a focus on buildings to one'on
people and social institutions and social trends, from a focus
on housing standards to one on housing needs, to one which
treats housing not simply as an economic and social material,
but also as an economic and social resource. And then we
will have the sizeable job of designing and creating the insti-
tutions which will do what needs to be done. "t69
Turner places a high premium on consumer choice and autonomy with-
in an open system of housing resources which can be used flexibly to suit
the needs of the individual household:
"1... if housing is treated... as a means to human ends, as an
activity rather than as a manufactured and packaged product,
decision-making power must, of necessity, remain in the
hands of the users themselves. . . This is not to say that every
family should build its own house, as the urban squatters do,
but rather that households should be free to choose their own
housing, to build'or direct its construction if they wish, and
to use and manage it in their own ways... No house can be
68. Peattie, o2. cit. , p. 29.
69. Ibid. , p. 34.
-53-
be built and maintained without land, without tools and mater-
ials, without skilled labor (and management), and without an
exchange system which allows the users to obtain resources
they do not possess themselves... In housing based on open
services, the builder, buyer, or householder is free to com-
bine the discrete services in any way his own resources and
the norms governing their use allow. "70
The human resources and energies, manifested in the self-help efforts
which progressively transform the squatter settlements, are viewed as
wasted in American society where users are relegated to passive roles as
consumers of packaged housing rather than as decision-makers and par-
ticipants in the housing production process. Within the American context,
the strongest articulation of functionalist policy has been in the' self-help
housing movement which occurs largely in rural contexts but has also been
applied to urban housing rehabilitation geared to low-income home pur-
chase. 72 Current policies promoting urban homesteading in declining
neighborhoods have strong functionalist implications, but they have not yet
proved to be feasible as a lower-income housing strategy. 73
70. Turner, "Housing As A Verb", 22. it. , p. 154.
71. Ibid., p. 174.
72. See: OSTI, (Organization for Social and Technical Innovation), Self-
Help Housing in the U.S. A. (Cambridge, Mass.: OSTI, Inc. , 1969);
and Turner and Fichter, Freedom to Build, oE. cit. , particularly
William C. Grindley, "Owner-Builders: Survivors With a Future",
pp. 3-21, and Rolf Goetze, "Urban Housing Rehabilitation: Two
Approaches", pp. 53-72.
73. See: Chris W. Drewes, "Homesteading 1974: Reclaiming Abandoned
Houses on the Urban Frontier", Columbia Journal of Law and Social
Problems, Spring, 1974, 10: pp. 416-455; and James W. Hughes and
Kenneth D. Bleakly, Jr. , Urban Homesteading (New Brunswick:
Center for Urban Policy Research, 1975).
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Alternative Views of Tenure
Under the adequist approach to low-income housing policy, tenure
choice issues tend to be subordinate to concerns about the quantity and
quality of the housing stock and its capacity to accommodate low-income
households within acceptable standards of occupancy, condition, and cost.
The direct provision of ownership opportunities for lower-income fami-
lies is a less focal concern, with limited relevance. The strongest ade-
quist arguments for lower-income ownership programs stress its values
in terms of housing conservation through incentives for improved mainte-
nance, and as a way to conserve deteriorating slum neighborhoods:
"There is no question of the significance of landlord residence,
particularly of single parcel landlords, as insurance of proper
maintenance of slum tenements... It is the resident landlord, and
only the resident landlord, who is in a position to properly screen
and supervise his tenantry. No one-shot wave of maintenance and
paint up-sweep up campaign can provide the day-to-day mainte-
nance which is required in slum areas... Given the dearth of a-
vailable financing, which is currently the case in the slums, there
is obviously no alternative but to provide something in the way of
long-term FHA guaranteed mortgages for slum tenement purchases
by residents. "74
Although the adequist view does not necessarily ignore other values which
may be attached to home ownership, such values do not assume a very
high priority in the scheme of things. By and large, the adequist per-
spective, to the extent that it considers tenure options for the housing-
poor, tends to view home ownership as instrumental to other housing ob-
jectives rather than as an end in itself.
74. George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord, 22. cit. , pp. 228-229.
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By contrast, relativist concerns with social norms and preferences,
and with their role in urban housing issues, tend to place the single-
family house and home ownership close to the top of the policy agenda:
"The overshelming preference of the American family in
housing is the sin le-family home, preferably owned, pref-
erably detached. " 5
At present, attainment of the mainstream norms embodied in the single-
family house is strongly contingent on purchase. In 1960 about 70 percent
of the national housing stock were single family units; about 89 percent of
these were owned by their occupants. 76 However, the evidence also sug-
gests a strong, independent preference for ownership tenure, an "urge to
own" which goes beyond the residential amenities associated with the
single-family house. 7 The constellation of goods that may be packaged
in the image of the owned home was neatly described as follows:
"Simple as the attractions of homeownership may appear at
first thought, a wide variety of motives may be involved.
The constellation 'owned home-suburbs-outdoor space' may
be a single image, but it is three ideas which presumably
could be satisfied separately. Other motives that people
offer are these: feelings of independence; ready ability to
adapt an owned home to one's own needs; more economy or
a sound long-term investment; ownership represents forced
savings; security for old age; rental housing is simply un-
available; greater personal freedom; a more desirable
family environment; and neighborhoods are better where one
purchases. These are motives that families volunteer. ,,78
75. Glazer, oa. it., p. 29.
76. Ibid. , p. 31.
77. Irving Rosow, "Home Ownership Motives", American Sociological
Review, XIII, (December, 1948), pp. 751-756.
78. Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity "Psychological Factors
in Buying Housing", U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 148.
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The potential significance of housing as a conveyor of social status
and as a perceived channel of upward social mobility is fundamental to the
relativist perception of housing issues. To the extent that home owner-
ship is a dominant facet of widely-held cultural values reflected in hous-
ing -- as in the "stable, respectable home-owning stratum" of laboring
families that Thernstrom describes in late nineteenth century Newbury-
port 9 -- it becomes an integral consideration in the relativist formulation
of housing policy. It is possible, nevertheless, to conceive of a relativist-
oriented policies which raise housing consumption among the poor to a
level more closely resembling mainstream standards without n'ecessarily
providing opportunities for home ownership. For instance, if public hous-
ing provided well-designed, low-density rental units on scattered sites in
preferred neighborhoods, this would constitute a substantial improvement
over past policies in relativist terms. Whether such policies would con-
stitute a solution to the relativist formulation of the housing problem rests
on the ultimate significance of tenure in itself, of owning over tenancy.
So long as the conditions of tenancy -- under public or private landlordship
-- represent deeply-felt dissatisfactions, dysbenefits, or inequities in
regard to the poor, that distinguish them in economic or social terms
from the rest of society, the drive toward home purchase will continue to
absorb the energies and aspirations of families at the lower socioeconomic
reaches. If that is the case, then a relativist formulation of housing
policy will need to take into account feasible tenure options.
79. Stephen Thernstrom, op. cit., p. 164.
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By contrast, the functionalist approach views tenure choice as a funda-
mentally significant issue in low-income housing, more so than either of
the other perspectives.
"If we are thinking of the 'housing problem' merely as a problem
of providing people with places to live, it is not crucial whether
those places are owned or are rented by those who live in them.
But if we think of the 'housing problem' as part of the whole
problem of deploying resources to handle a given situation in life,
the difference between rental and ownership can be extremely
important. "80
Turner defines shelter, location, and tenure as the three major func-
tional parameters of housing through which the family's existential goals
-- identity, opportunity, and security -- are potentially furthered or
thwarted. 81 Ownership is viewed as an opportunity to invest family cap-
ital and, thereby, a form of economic consolidation, particularly in a
rapidly inflating economy where failure to invest in capital goods means
a rapid loss in family savings. 82 Wen compared with other channels of
investment, house investment is not only the most familiar form of capi-
tal realization for most marginal urban families. It is also one which can
absorb savings in irregular and small amounts, depending on how much
money the family is able to set aside from immediate necessities. 83
Ownership is also seen as serving important psychological and social
80. Peattie, op. cit., p. 24.
81. Turner, "Housing As A Verb", 2E cit. , pp. 164-167.
82. Turner, JAIP, op. cit. , pp. 172-174.
83. Peattie, . cit, , pp. 24-27.
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functions. Turner speaks of "the security provided by the possession of
a homesite",84 but he is referring to the freehold ownership -- de facto
or de jure -- the Latin American squatter maintains over property rather
than the system of mortgages and liens more characteristic of ownership
in this country.85 But the mortgagor-owner also has a more secure hold
over this residence, within the constraints of indebtedness, than does the
renter who is more subject to the imposition of a landlord's authority and
more vulnerable to rent increases or possible eviction.
Peattie speaks of the sense of freedom and potency, that often go along
with ownership, and of the rise in social status that accompanies property
mobility among those who have low occupational status and limited mobil-
ity channels. 86 Stable ownership also provides an opportunity for residen-
tial consolidation, for the social and psychological benefits that may de-
rive from stable residence in the same neighborhood over a period of
time -- maintaining a stable network of associations, avoiding disruptions
in the school-life of children, enjoying a familiarity with places, people,
and local institutions.
Large households stand to reap the greatest benefits from ownership
84. Turner, JAIP, op. cit. , p. 172.
85. U.S. Bureau of the Census, The 1970 Census of Housing, Volume V,
Residential Finance, Table 1b, p. 135. Over 87 percent of single-
family owner-occupied properties within SMSA' s are financed with
the use of mortgage instruments. The remaining 13 percent are
largely outright cash purchases or house acquisition through a gift
or an inheritance.
86. Peattie, o2. cit. , pp. 26-27.
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housing. Apart from the greater amount of elbow room -- both inside and
outside -- that a house would afford, the scarcity of adequate low-rent
opportunities for large families, and the objections to large numbers of
children exposes them to the more marginal, disinvesting landlords will-
ing to accept them, resulting in repeated, frequent moves and consequent
disruptions.87 In Milwaukee the FHA director, Lawrence Katz, managed
to convince the local Welfare Department that it would be cheaper to pay
higher shelter allowances for ownership housing than to pay the frequent
moving costs many of their beneficiaries incurred. 88
In summary, each of the three dominant policy orientations'-- adequist,
relativist, and functionalist -- make differing claims for the priority which
should be accorded to ownership tenure within a purposive policy frame-
work for low-income housing. The adequist view attaches no intrinsic
value to home ownership, and sees its value primarily as a strategy for
housing preservation in the city's impoverished or transitional neighbor-
hoods. For the relativist, the quest for better housing among the urban
poor is seen as a mode of mobility striving in a relatively affluent society
which induces high expectations. From this perspective, policies which
thwart the attainment of mainstream norms -- are doomed to failure; to
87. See: Walter Smart, Walter Rybeck, and Howard E. Shuman, The
Large Poor Family--A Housing Gap, Report for the National Com-
mission on Urban Problems, 1968; Sternlieb and Indik, op. cit.
88. Interview with Lawrence Katz, FHA Director, Milwaukee, who de-
veloped the Welfare Department home ownership program. (Sept. ,
1972)
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the extent that the single family house and ownership of it are regarded as
important societal norms they are crucial relativist considerations for
low-income housing policy. The functionalist view recognizes ownership
tenure as a source of housing security and as a significant opportunity
within the housing system for furthering the economic and residential
consolidation of the marginal urban-family.
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Chapter III. THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 235
PROGRAM
This account of the Section 235 program through its legislative formu-
lation and the early years of implementation -- as it might have been
gleaned by chronicling major program events and reports in Washington
-- serves several purposes with regard to the subsequent survey analysis
of consumer experience in the program: (1) It provides some understand-
ing of the complex of forces, factors, and constrained choices that account
for the particular form and operation of the 235 program mechinism, as
one among other conceivable strategies toward lower-income ownership,
and that helped shape subsequent consumer experiences, (2) Because
the 235 program and its underlying concepts were hotly debated both dur-
ing its legislative career and during the subsequent controversies that
emerged upon its implementation, a chronicle of federal events in the
program illuminates many of the issues surrounding the program and
frames some of the key foci of the consumer-based assessments that fol-
low, (3) Since the federal images of the program among the policy com-
munity evolved largely in the absence of systematic data derived at the
level of the program participant, this account provides a potentially use-
ful counterpoint to consumer assessments of their own experience of the
program.
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A. Formulation of the Program
Sullivan's 221(h) Home Ownership Program
In 1966, the concept of low-income home ownership represented a ma-
jor departure from previous federal policies. Nevertheless, the legisla-
tive inception of an ownership program explicitly intended for low-income
purchasers -- the section 221(h) amendment to the National Housing Act
-- received only passing attention and no debate at all. In legislative de-
liberations that were dominated by issues surrounding the formulation of
the Model Cities Program, mention of the amendment was infrequent and
largely at the initiative of Representative Leonor K. Sullivan of St. Louis
who had introduced it. She succeeded in obtaining general, nodding ap-
proval both from fellow members of the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee and from Committee witnesses. 1
Sullivan's advocacy of the 221(h) program can be seen as a by-product
of the non-profit housing sponsor movement which had been gathering
momentum since the early sixties. 2 The Bicentennial Civic Improvement
Association, operating in Sullivan's district, had been attempting to re-
habilitate and sell homes to low-income families as part of a broad, com-
munity-based strategy of neighborhood improvement. Despite the origi-
nal willingness of local banks to participate in BCIA's innovative program,
their decision to limit their investments in a relatively high-risk area of
1. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Subcommittee on Housing, 89th Congress, 2nd Session,
February 28, March 1-4, 8, 9, 1966.
2. Keyes, 22. ci
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St. Louis had seriously frustrated BCIA efforts to mount a program on a
scale large enough to make a visible difference in the neighborhood.
Sullivan was impressed with the attempt to "rehabilitate neighborhoods
as well as houses. "3 She was also taken with the idea of home ownership
as a social strategy:
"The idea is to give the low-income family a real stake in its
own housing -- not as a tenant but as a purchaser. This is
the best approach in trying to rescue neighborhoods from
blight. "4
But Sullivan's conception of low-income home purchase, as embodied in
the 221(h) formulation, was as a component of a broader strategy of neigh-
borhood rehabilitation rather than as an end in itself. Moreover, it relied
on the initiative of local non-profit sponsors and their willingness to act
as intermediaries in the rehabilitation and sale of property. Sillivan' s
observation of the BCIA program had convinced her of the importance of
the sponsor's role in selecting families, and in providing assistance and
counselingto families making the transition to ownership. Thus, the
221(h) program was not intended as an open market purchase program for
low-income families. As a response to a growing number of experimental
non-profit efforts around the country which were similar to BCIA's pro-
gram, all of them encountering the same difficulties in obtaining mortgage
capital, Sullivan's program represented a logical, incremental extension
of Section 221 rental assistance for non-profit sponsors to meet changing
3. U.S. House of Representatives, February-March, 1966, op. cit. , p.
954.
4. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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needs. The limited scope of the program was reflected in the $20 million
authorization it sought; at an average purchase price of $10,000, the pro-
gram could promote the purchase of only 2,000 homes by low-income fam-
ilies, by no means a federal commitment to low-income ownership on a
major scale. Its limited aspirations and its reliance on non-profit spon-
sor initiatives, which insulated it from the open market, serve to explain
the lack of controversy the Sullivan amendment aroused.
Percy's Publicity Machine
The movement which culminated in the passage of the 235 program,
and in a massive federal commitment to the objective of low-income home
ownership, had its origins in Illinois rather than St. Louis in Charles
Percy's first senatorial campaign. 5 Spurred on by a campaign assistant,
who first sensed the potential appeal of a national program of home own-
ership for the poor as a major Republican thrust into an otherwise Demo-
crat-dominated set of urban and poverty-related programs, Percy inten-
tionally put himself on record in September, 1966, in the midst of his
campaign, as an advocate of low-income home ownership. It was Percy's
campaign that first gave some national visibility to the ownership issue
and heralded it as "a new dawn for our cities". 6 Moreover, it established
his image as progenitor of the concept, at the same time that 221(h) was
quietly making its way through Congress.
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5. Carnegie, 2p. cit.
6. Percy, op. cit.
Shortly after his election, Percy took unprecedented initiatives for a
junior Senator and proceeded to work up a major bill. His commitment
to the legislation is said to derive, in part, from his own family back-
ground -- a series of abortive evictions during the great depression of
the 1930's -- as well as from a shrewd political calculus. In the first
month of his Senatorship in January, 1967, Percy was able to cull unpre-
cedented support for the bill (S1592) from the Republican side of the Sen-
ate -- "from Javits to Tower" -- and had established himself as a Presi-
dential possibility for 1968. What Representative Sullivan later came to
call "Percy's publicity machine" had clearly placed a Republidan stamp
on a major new urban program and established Percy as its spokesman.
The Percy bill closely resembled Sullivan's 221(h) program in its re-
liance on the local initiative of community-based, non-profit organizations
as the intermediaries through whom purchase opportunities would be chan-
neled to low-income families. But the similarity ended there. Although
the potential neighborhood benefits to be derived from a gradual increase
in resident ownership within the inner city were acknowledged, the pro-
gram viewed home ownership as a primary objective in its own right,
rather than as part of a concerted strategy of neighborhood improvement.
Where 221(h) had restricted purchase opportunities to units rehabilitated
7. Carnegie, 22. cit.
8. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Subcommittee on Housing, 90th Congress, 1st Session,
April 20, 1967, p. 213.
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by non-profit organizations, the Percy bill extended the eligible housing
domain to include newly-constructed and existing units as well. It envis-
ioned the turnover of more than 100,000 units to low-income purchasers
during the first year of the program, a scale that dwarfed the 221(h) pro-
gram by comparison.
The administrative and funding arrangements called for in the Percy
bill were a departure from past federal practice and a major threat to
the newly-established HUD bureaucracy. The bill advocated the creation
of a federally-chartered National Home Ownership Foundation, distinct
from HUD, and financed through the issue and sale of $2 billiori worth of
fede rally- guaranteed debentures. The move toward a quasi -independent
administering body served two underlying purposes. First, it was an at-
tempt to "de-bureaucratize" federal housing assistance through the crea-
tion of a public-private executive board that would run the program on the
sound business principles of corporate enterprise in which Percy had come
to believe. Politically, divorcing the program from HUD would allow it
to establish its own visibility through the Foundation and retain its parti-
san identity.
The basic functions of the Foundation were to provide loans and techni-
cal assistance to grass-roots coalitions with non-profit or limited-dividend
corporate charters. Financing arrangements would reduce monthly mort-
gage payments for low-income mortgagors to an effective interest rate of
2- percent. However, the subsidies which were realized in the difference
between that rate and the market interest rate were to be recoverable from
the owner if the unit was sold at a profit or if the owning family realized
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substantial increases in income. With considerable foresight, the bill
also envisioned the development of a private program of "mortgage relief"
or mortgagor insurance that would protect low-income mortgagors against
foreclosure by providing mortgage payments in the event of loss of em-
ployment, illness, or death -- factors beyond the mortgagor's control
which might seriously impair the owner's ability to meet mortgage pay-
ments.
Percy's aggressive promotion of his proposals succeeded in elevating
the question of low-income home ownership to the level of a major legis-
lative issue. In the wake of the Watts riots of 1965 and growing signs of
urban unrest across the country, 9 the rhetoric which Percy attached to
low-income home ownership -- not only as a good in itself, but as a major
cure for urban ills -- readily capitalized on the increasing disenchantment
with the Great Society's urban poverty programs and threatened to split
apart the traditional Democratic urban constituency:
"For a man who owns his own home acquires with it a new
dignity. He begins to take pride in what is his own, and pride
in conserving and improving it for his children. He becomes
a more steadfast and concerned citizen of his community. He
becomes more self-confident and self-reliant. The mere act
of becoming a homeowner transforms him. It gives him roots,
a sense of belonging, a true stake in his community and its
well-being. And as it does so, the nation gains in strength.
Thus, home ownership must be a central element in any pro-
gram for resurrecting American's cities and giving new life to
its people; not only for the well-to-do, with their luxury apart-
ments, nor even for the middle class, with modest homes in
well-maintained neighborhoods, but also for poor people who
now live in the great blighted areas of city slums...
9. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, op. cit.
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I am proposing today a new Republican approach to meeting
the challenge of our cities and their people -- a plan that will
make possible a New Dawn of opportunity for the thousands of
today's poor people who yearn to own their own homes...
While the Democratic Party explores new ways of making the
poor man not merely dependent, but doubly dependent -- once
on the landlord and once on the dole -- the Republican Party
must again lead the way to a New Dawn of opportunity for the
poor but honest man in whose heart still burns an unquenchable
spark of pride -- a golden opportunity to own a decent home of
his own... "10
The Percy-Weaver Debate
A counterattack by the Johnson administration was inevitabl'e. In a
March, 1967 message on urban and rural poverty, President Johnson sum-
marized the Democratic initiatives that had already put low-income home
ownership on the books -- in the form of Section 221(h) -- and declared
the administration's intent to make active use of the 221(h) program to
the fullest extent. Soon afterwards, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver issued
a formal denunciation of the Percy bill as "a panacea", "the single small
gimmick... that will quickly solve all our problems", "a snare and a de-
lusion. .. a cruel hoax. " In a subsequent appearance on the media,
Weaver also indicated his belief that the Percy program would raise un-
fulfillable expectations and might be a potential cause of urban violence, 1 1
Nevertheless, the Percy proposal proved to be irresistible. That spring
the National Housing Conference -- a vocal and influential coalition of
10. Percy, 2p. cit.
11. Carnegie, 2p. .cit. , p. 163.
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housing reformers and interest groups that dates back to the New Deal --
gave its support to the Percy bill and honored the Senator with a standing
ovation.
Apart from the tactical aspects of the partisan dueling which shaped the
legislative career and ultimate form of the Section 235 program, the sub-
stantive debate which emerged in the subsequent legislative hearings con-
fronted many of the key issues and dilemmas which lie at the heart of an
expanded home ownership policy for urban low-income families and iden-
tified many, though not all, of the problems which were later to haunt the
235 program. In the Congressional hearings, Weaver's testimbny laid
out a well-reasoned, supportive, but cautious approach to the provision
of low-income ownership opportunities, stressing the need for more dem-
onstration programs and gradual learning, under the 221(h) program, as
a prelude to any greater federal involvement or commitment to a broad
national program:
". . .this is something we want to encourage, but we want to
be sure we are not getting people led down the primrose path
into believing they are going to get homeownership when the
cards are stacked against them. We want them to be able to
identify what the risks are and when they can safely undertake
it. ''12
For Weaver, the risks were three-fold. First, there was the problem of
family screening, and the need for administrative learning in determining
how to identify those families who could bear the risks of home ownership
and stand a reasonable chance of succeeding. Weaver's own background
12. U.S. House of Representatives, April, 1967, o2. cit. , p. 22.
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in public housing administration had probably sensitized him to the need
for some form of selectivity apart from the normal income guidelines,
and led him to doubt the ability of some families to sustain ownership over
the long term. Potential risks both to the program and to the low-income
home purchaser called for the exercise of sound judgment in determining
who might benefit from the program. Although FHA had already estab-
lished purchaser approval mechanisms which had proved successful for a
largely middle class constituency, the screening of low-income home
buyers could be expected to be considerably more complex and treacher-
ous. Weaver's position reflected a cynicism born of the realities of past
housing programs, and a mistrust of the sweeping generalities and scale
of the Percy program. This led him to press for a moderate-income own-
ership program, rather than one targeted exclusively at low-income fam-
ilies, and to insist on the importance of gradually accumulating experi-
ence in dealing with low-income families within the context of a purchase
program.
The second area of risk that Weaver identified in his testimony was
the problem of negative or diminishing equity that might occur when fam-
ilies purchased homes in rapidly declining submarkets:
"I am very much worried about this notion that poor families
may be euchred -- which is what it would be in many instances
-- into undertaking homeownership only to find at the end of
three years they have no equity but really a negative equity
rather than with any money that has been accumulated in this
process. "13
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13. Ibid.
Although Percy's program tended to understate the possible investment
advantages to the owning family -- indeed it called for repayment of sub-
sidies if a profit was realized on sale -- and to exaggerate the social-
psychological and community benefits, Weaver had a clear realization of
the potential importance of economic incentives to the purchasing family
and of the consequences that might ensue if families could not realize an
increasing equity in the house. Whether the dynamics of a federally-stim-
ulated low-income purchase market were such as to create relatively stable
or appreciating property values, particularly in the inner city where the
market risks could be assumed to be greatest, remained an open question.
Like Percy, Weaver was also concerned about the risk of default and
foreclosure to which low-income families would be vulnerable as a result
of periodic crises that might be expected to occur with greater frequency
among families living at the margin. Although this issue reflected one of
the few areas of consensus between Percy and Weaver, Weaver contended
that Percy's insurance strategy was "hopelessly naive" and would be "pro-
hibitively expensive" as a private program. Weaver went on record in
favor of a government-owned-and-operated insurance program.
In contrast with Weaver's cautionary posture, Percy's stance during
the Senate hearings was to stress the urgency of the program and the need
to mount a large-scale program from the start, rather than a small ex-
perimental program like 221(h), in order to respond to an urban crisis of
major proportions. By the July, 1967 hearings civil disorders had just
erupted in Detroit and Newark, and there were rumblings elsewhere of
more to come. These events helped shape the climate of the hearings and
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gave further cogency to Percy's arguments that without massive and rapid
federal action, the despair of the inner city would manifest itself in fur-
ther violence.
The Administering Agency: FHA vs. NHOF
No less than four Democratic bills were brought up for deliberation as
alternatives to the Percy plan. 14 These proposals uniformly accorded
FHA the administrative authority for the program, thereby shunting
Percy's attempts to establish an independent foundation (NHOF). The
move was a controversial one, even within Democratic ranks, and ulti-
mately had a profound impact on the experience of the 235 program. Al-
though FHA had been the "blue chip" program of New Deal housing policy
and remained a power to be reckoned with in the embryonic HUD bureau-
cracy, under the pressures of the 1960's FHA had been increasingly laid
open to criticism for its largely suburban, middle class orientation and
its neglect of the center city. In his submitted testimony, Charles Abrams,
the influential New Deal housing reformer who was already deeply involved
in developing a low-income ownership program in Philadelphia, labeled
the low-income family "the forgotten minority" of FHA and firmly support-
ed Percy's program. 15 Senator Robert Kennedy, testifying in support of
his own bill to provide private incentives for the rehabilitation of inner
city neighborhoods, viewed FHA as inappropriate and ineffective in the
14. U.S. Senate, Hearings, Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcom-
mittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, 90th Congress, 1st Session,
July, 1967.
15. Ibid. , pp. 710-717.
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inner city and called for the creation of a Low Income Housing Adminis-
tration within HUD which would be separate from FHA.16 Even the Dem-
ocratic proponents of an FHA-administered program recognized the agency's
shortcomings. In introducing his bill, Senator Mondale called it ... a
charge to the FHA to take risks and to pay greater heed to the housing prob-
lems of low-income families... It is a mandate to FHA to take whatever
risks are necessary in order to put low and moderate income families in
decent housing. " 17
The strongest arguments in favor of FHA stressed the agency's long
experience and expertness in underwriting and appraisal, in screening po-
tential purchasers for credit approval and in evaluating residential prop-
erty, as against the relative inexperience of most of the non-profit organ-
izations upon whom Percy's plan would rely. The redundancies and admin-
istrative costs that would be involved in setting up a parallel bureaucracy
or an independent foundation were articulated by the FHA proponents.
Weaver emphasized FHA's ability to "do it better and quicker than a new
bureaucracy"18 and cited 221(h) as an indication of FHA's willingness to
revise its family screening procedures so as not to exclude low-income
purchasers with a potential for home ownership.
Under its established administrative procedures, FHA was surprisingly
16. Ibid. , p. 627.
17. Ibid. , p. 912.
18. Ibid., p. 80.
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unsuited to making the fine-tuned judgments that might be necessary in
working with a low-income clientele to determine the eligibility and poten-
tial of an individual family. As a rule, FHA rarely met the families whose
mortgages they insured. The primary communication link in the FHA
mortgage insurance transaction was between the FHA insuring office and
the lender, between the insuror and the insured. It was the lender on
whom FHA relied for face-to-face contact with the potential purchaser and
for discerning judgments regarding the family's ability to manage the long-
term commitments of ownership. FHA's only knowledge of the purchasing
family came through the mortgage credit application submitted'by the
lender. 1 To provide the kind of selective screening Weaver saw as es-
sential to a low-income ownership program, FHA would have to radically
alter its administrative procedures. By contrast, the non-profit, com-
munity-based organizations -- like BCIA in St. Louis, BRL in Rochester 2 0
-- that were beginning to use 221(h) and would continue to be primary
actors under the Percy plan, could claim a high degree of contact with
prospective purchasers, offered counseling and advisory services prepar-
19. See: HUD, 1Vbrtgage Credit Analysis Handbook (#4155. 1), July, 1972,
pp. 1-5, which summarizes established FHA policies and procedures.
Note the following: "The type and volume of credit analyses inherent
in HUD-FHA's mortgage insurance underwriting do not permit, as a
general practice, the use of many methods commonly used by other
credit institutions. HUD-FHA seldom has the benefit of personal
interviews with mortgagor-applicants.
20. For a description of Better Rochester Living, see: Rolf Goetze, "An
Illustrative Case of Urban Self-Help Rahilitation", in OSTI, Self-
Help Housing in the U. S. A., oP. cit. , pp. V /I-V/11.
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atory to ownership, and planned to maintain some form of continuity in
their contact with home-owning families after purchase. A program
which combined the operation of FHA and a consumer-oriented non-profit
intermediary, as in 221(h), might have capitalized on the complimentary
assets of each -- FHA's administrative expertise and the non-profit's
contact with the purchaser -- while it minimized their individual weaknesses.
In moving to an extended private market program, how would consumers be
dealt with so as to minimize their own risks and the risks to the program?
Such administrative details or projected administrative impacts seldom
emerged in the Congressional deliberations. Nor were FHA's operations
carefully scrutinized to determine their applicability to a low-income pro-
gram.
Private Market vs. Non-Profit Approach
The question of FHA involvement was a foregone conclusion in light of
the consensus among the Democratic proposals that consistently accorded
FHA the administrative authority for the program. A key remaining issue
was whether the program would be restricted to the activity of non-profit,
community-based organizations, as prescribed in the 221(h) program and
in the Percy plan, or extended into the private market in accordance with
FHA's traditional mode of operation.
Secretary Weaver distrusted the non-profit sector because of its rela-
tive inexperience and its poor track record under the Section 221 rental
programs. In his testimony, he expressed concern over the consequences
of the accelerated non-profit movement that would result from the Percy
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proposal. 21 Moreover, the urban disorders of 1967, during what had
come to be called "the long, hot summer", had created a climate in Con-
gress which made a full-scale attack on inner city problems a necessary
response. But, to mount the all-out, large-scale effort that was called
for, the fullest involvement of the private sector was considered essential
-- for capital, for development initiative, for volume construction and re-
habilitation activity, and for "know-how". This prevailing attitude was
also reflected in the Kennedy-Smathers Bill of 1967, which envisioned the
involvement of large corporations in the process of rebuilding the urban
ghettoes. 22 In addition, a strong movement was emerging within Congress
favoring the establishment of national housing goals for the coming decade,
and concerted action that would, once and for all, solve the nation's urban
housing problems. But the images of private industry which dominated
the Kennedy presentation and the hearings as a whole were of "General
Motors", "Ford", and so on. The potential scale at which non-profit ef-
forts could operate were small by comparison, and the tide clearly moved
toward a private sector, open market program. No mention or consider-
ation was given to the speculators -- "the blue suede shoe types" -- who
were key private actors in the city's more impoverished housing submar-
kets, and who were to have a major negative impact on the subsequent
experience of the program.
21. U. S. Senate, oE. cit.., p. 79.
22. Ibid. , p. 638.
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It was Senator Mondale, whose bill proposed an open market, FHA-
administered operation, who was the most fervent opponent of the exclu-
sive non-profit approach which characterized Percy's program.
.... I am reluctant to tie every new housing program directly
to nonprofit sponsors. They can play a part... but I do not
think we can count on such organizations to service every com-
munity in the Nation... Nonprofit organizations may be neces-
sary to promote neighborhood revival... But I do not think
every modest-income family needs an intermediary or support-
ing services to purchase a home. Some may even look on these 23
organizations as patronizing. My proposal aims for flexibility. "
Mondale was also suspicious of the motives which sometimes lay behind
the non-profit designation:
"Many times I think you find that nonprofit organizations --
let's say a church -- wants to build some housing units under
a nonprofit provision. But it may be victimized by a promoter
who has a fast buck to make either as contractor or possibly
in some other aspect of the proposal... He comes in and gets
the church organized, but he sees to it that the proposal helps
him... He is somewhat like the missionary who came to do
good and did very well. "24
Although Mondale's allusion to "the fast buck promoter" was one of the few
indications during the hearings of an awareness of the sometimes abusive
character of the private housing sector, Mondale did not believe that the
non-profit intermediary was a sufficient safeguard for the low-income
consumer. Nor, obviously, did he believe that the low-income purchaser
could deal more effectively with speculators and promoters than could the
church. His implicit assumption, one that pervaded the Democratic ad-
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23. Ibid. , p. 480.
24. Ibid., pp. 491-492.
vocacy of an open market program, was that FHA's administrative over-
sight of the program would provide sufficient protection for the sonsumer.
Given FHA's proven record in dealing with the private market, there was
no reason to assume the contrary.
The Special Risk Insurance Fund: Expected Loss Rates and Supple-
mental Subsidies
Ironically, the problem most closely associated with the choice of FHA
to administer the program, which received major attention during the
hearings, was the reverse: How could FHA be encouraged to take greater
risks in approving low-income families who could not meet normal credit
criteria and to accept properties they would normally tend to reject, par-
ticularly in the inner city. FHA had long prided itself on the actuarial
soundness of its insurance program which had built up a reserve of close
to $2 billion against potential losses, and had come to manifest an actuar-
ial conservatism similar to any private insurance enterprise. It was this
conservatism that largely explained its continuing reluctance to insure
property in the graying areas of the center city, or to insure purchases
by lower-income families. FHA's effective "red-lining" of the inner city,
and its major role in contributing to increasing suburban dominance, had
made it a primary target of criticism both inside and outside of Congress.
Apart from the imprecations and mandates issued periodically to FHA
by various Congressional leaders, on an order similar to Mondale's
charge that it liberalize its policies, FHA also had to withstand criticism
from other quarters in Congress concerned that FHA had begun to take too
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many risks. Given the tightrope FHA had to walk between the two ex-
tremes, any attempt to facilitate its move into higher-risk, more socially
oriented programs, would require revising the actuarial incentives under
which FHA traditionally operated and modifying or replacing them with
service incentives. The strategem that was devised in the Democratic
bills was the establishment of a Special Risk Insurance Fund, which could
be expected to absorb possible losses from the new higher-risk purchase
program. The special risk fund was not expected to be actuarially sound,
and the legislation was to make clear that excessive depletions of the fund
as a result of losses would be replenished through the annual aypropria-
tions process. By insulating the special risk fund and making clear its
actuarial weaknesses, FHA could proceed to extend itself into the low-
income purchase market without jeopardizing the integrity of its previous
insurance program and without incurring Congressional wrath because of
risks taken under Section 235 and the losses that might result. Under the
new program, FHA was to act on the basis of what it considered to be
"acceptable risks, " rather than on the basis of "actuarial soundness".
Those were the assumptions.
But on what basis was FHA to be accountable to Congress for its ac-
tions? What constituted acceptable risks? Given the actuarial uncertain-
ties inherent in insuring older properties in some of the center city's less
stable residential neighborhoods and in insuring the mortgages of pur-
chasers with relatively marginal incomes, what loss rates could be expect-
ed and how large a loss rate would be tolerable? Although these issues
were crucial in estimating the ultimate costs of the program, they tended
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to be treated in relatively cavalier fashion during the hearings. Senator
Clark, sponsoring a bill of his own, was one of the few subcommittee
members to venture his own estimates:
". . . if Congress directs the Department to start this kind of
program it must acknowledge in the Congressional purpose
that we expect foreclosures. Of course, we expect losses,
but we hope that the number of persons who will be able fin-
ally to achieve ownership will be substantially more, maybe
3 to 1, than the number who suffer foreclosures and of
course when you have a foreclosure you don't always lose the
equity in the mortgage and the interest on the property either
... I hope we won't call it very risky. I hope we will just call
it a little bit marginal and Mr. Brownstein [FHA Commissioner]
will look on it with not a jaundiced eye, but with a view that
maybe here is an opportunity to get into the core city where FHA
has not been successful before. ''25
The documented committee hearings contain no debate or discussion
on the point of Clark's estimate of an anticipated 25% mortgage failure
rate under the 235 program. If silence can be construed as acquiescence,
the inference was that such a loss rate would constitute an acceptable tol-
erance for the purposes of subsequent Congressional review and oversight
of the program. In addition, HUD's early estimates in the absence of
actuarial data subsequently agreed with Clark's estimate of a 25% aggre-
gate failure rate:
... HUD's actuarial staff has estimated an aggregate fore-
closure rate of 25 percent for the Section 235 program. This
estimate was made prior to the development of any actuarial
data on the Section 235 program. . . the estimate of 25 percent
was based upon the assumption that the program would sustain
25. Ibid. , p. 83. Underlining is at the author's initiative and does
not appear in the transcript.
-81-
greater losses than Section 221(d)(2) and it included allow-
ance for the possible occurrence of a major economic de-
pression. '26
More importantly, an assumed consensus on this point implied that
Congress envisioned the possibility of a substantial supplemental subsidy
beyond the interest-rate subsidy itself -- a casualty subsidy, if you will,
to take into account mortgage casualties beyond the actuarial confines of
the special insurance fund -- as necessary to the viability of the 235 pro-
gram and the furtherance of its social objectives. This was not the first
time that special risk insurance funds were utilized for federal mortgage
insurance programs where there was much uncertainty about the level of
risk involved. The Section 221 programs had also been placed in a spe-
cial risk pool from the start. But while the 221 fund had been used to
segregate differential risk levels among FHA programs and safeguard the
original mutual insurance fund, Congressional expectations were that the
special insurance programs would ultimately prove to be actuarially sound
and that the special risk status of the fund would be temporary. The sig-
nificance of Clark's 25% loss estimate was that, if taken seriously, for
the first time there was recognition that an entirely new form of subsidy
would be necessary to the ongoing operation of the 235 program in the form
of supplemental casualty subsidies. In that sense, Clark's statement had
punctured the illusion that interest-rate subsidies and mortgage insurance
26. U. S. Comptroller General (GAO), Opportunities to Improve Effective-
ness and Reduce Costs of Homeownership Assistance Programs, Re-
port to the Congress, (B-171630), (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972), p. 69.
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mechanisms would be sufficient to the viability of the program, and had
established the only working definition of supplemental subsidy levels that
might be reasonably expected. But, for the most part, the significance of
his statement was largely ignored or overlooked.
To the extent that mortgage default and foreclosure were an anticipated
consequence of periodic hardships beyond the control of lower-income
mortgagors, the supplemental costs of the program would be heavily de-
pendent on available mechanisms for providing mortgage relief for a suf-
ficient period of time to allow defaulting mortgagors to recover and re-
store the status of their mortgages. 27 In such instances, lending institu-
tions may opt to allow for late payments, forbear, or recast mortgages
for defaulting owners whom they deem to be reasor-able subsequent risks. 28
But there was no guarantee that mortgagees would do so even in the most
reasonable cases. In addition, under the 1959 Housing Act, FHA could
take over a seriously delinquent mortgage through assignment by the mort-
gagee, and provide its own "indulgence" to deserving mortgagors. 29
27. A mortgage is in default status if the owner (or mortgagor) has fallen
behind in the established schedule of mortgage payments; a default of
at most one payment is often referred to as a delinquency. A fore-
closure is a legal action taken by the lender (or mortgagee) by which
a title for the property is transferred from a defaulting mortgagor
to the mortgagee. Under FHA procedures, a mortgagee may fore-
close upon a three-month period of default.
28. Insurance Technical Advisory Group, Insurance Protection Against
Foreclosure in Government-Assisted Home vbrtgage Programs, (A
Report to HUD), HUD Library #332. 72/A52i, April 24, 1969, See
Chapter I, pp. 19-25.
29. Ibid.
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However, such occurrences had been infrequent, and in the case of a
lower-income program might require a major commitment on FHA's part
to handle a relatively high volume of assignments. Percy's original pro-
posal of a private insurance mechanism which protected owners against
involuntary unemployment, death, and disability in terms of their ability
to maintain mortgage payments, had the particular virtue of providing
automatic mortgage relief as necessary without having to depend on the
mortgagee's or FHA's discretion. But the only oral testimony offered
during the hearings concerning the feasibility of mortgage relief insurance
was solicited at Percy's initiative. Two Chicago-based insurance execu-
tives provided support for Percy's insurance strategy, but their testimony
ultimately tended to cast some doubt on the risks involved in underwriting
mortgage payments in the event of involuntary loss of employment. In the
case of death, disability, or illness which impaired the owning family's
income-earning capacity, for which actual risks could be estimated, the
proposed insurance plan would cover mortgage payments for from 6
months to at most a year at a cost of from $2. 50 to $3. 00 monthly on a
$10,000 mortgage. Proposed unemployment benefits would involve a max-
imum 6 month limit on mortgage relief and was roughly estimated at about
the same cost. But both insurance executives were tentative and cautionary
in their assessments of the feasibility and cost of insuring against unem-
ployment:
"Mr. Smith: Insuring against unemployment is a more complex
question involving problems which will have to be given fur-
ther study before final conclusions as to the feasibility and
the best way to handle it can be reached.
Mr. Doss: ... these are estimates, you understand. As Mr.
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Smith's statement indicated, unemployment is very diffi-
cult to rate. There are so many unknown factors here,
particularly the characteristics of the group to be insured.
Senator Proxmire: It might take some time or experience.
This may or may not be. It would vary greatly. My as-
sumption is a lot of low-income people would suffer from 30
a lot of unemployment. Some would not, but some would. "3
In his written testimony, Charles Abrams lauded the Percy proposal's
initiatives in the area of mortgage relief insurance:
"If the Percy bill accomplishes nothing else but the production of
a formula to prevent unnecessary foreclosures due to temporary 3 1
hazards, it will be a landmark in American housing legislation. "
Abrams, himself, had been thwarted in his earlier attempts to persuade
FHA to develop and administer an insurance program protecting defaulting
mortgagors. His experience had convinced him that "the real obstacle is
not the administrative cost but FHA's traditional aversion to innovation
and its resistance to the assumption of any social responsibility. "32 In
addition to supporting Percy's private insurance program, which was still
in the drafting stage, Abrams offered for consideration three alternative
strategies for mortgage relief intervention:33 1) the creation of a federal
loan fund for distressed mortgagors, which had the disadvantage of putting
the owner further into debt; 2) federal equity insurance, tied to FHA mort-
gage insurance, covering at most a three-year period over the life of the
mortgage during which the owner was unable to make mortgage payments;
30. U.S. Senate, Ibid., p. 1109.
31. Ibid., pp. 710-717
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
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and 3) an innovative provision for "take-out" by local housing authorities,
a mechanism whereby financially-distressed owners could apply to the
local authority for continued occupancy as a subsidized tenant. Under this
last proposal, the house title would be transferred to the authority, as
well as operating costs and responsibilities, until the original owner was
in a position to reinstate ownership. Abrams viewed these mortgage re-
lief strategies not only as a way of protecting the home owner, but as a
way of accelerating the flow of mortgage capital to low-income areas,
while cushioning the federal mortgage insurance system against the poten-
tial consequences of a national economic crisis:
"... the insurance fund would benefit the government by (1) pre-
venting a large-scale loss of homes, a deflationary movement,
and a capital depreciation due to a glut in the home market;
(2) dispensing with the need for huge federal outlays for mort-
gage take-overs all at once; (3) making savings and loan societies
sounder operations and cutting down on federal advances by the
Home Loan Bank System; (4) making owners less inclined to drop
their homes when values are down; (5) saving the government
major expenditures in repairs, foreclosure charges, and resale
costs upon repossession. " 3 4
Although the equation which Abrams drew between the viability of the
mortgagor and the viability of the federal program was a compelling argu-
ment which foreshadowed some of the difficulties the 235 program was
about to experience, the aura of uncertainty which surrounded the feasi-
bility of mortgage relief insurance and the question of expected failure
rates led to the continued postponement of a Congressional decision on the
question.
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Failure of the 1967 Bill
The bill reported out of the Senate Committee in November of 1967
largely represented the Democratic consensus. 35 It established FHA as
the administrative body for an acknowledgedly experimental program gear-
ed to lower-income families -- then defined as within 70 percent of the
moderate income limits under the 221 programs. Declaring the existing
housing stock "entirely inadequate", the program was conceived as a pro-
duction program limited to newly-constructed or substantially rehabilitated
units that could be developed within legislatively prescribed maximum
price limits. Interest rate subsidies, rather than direct federal loans,
were to be used to reduce the effective mortgage interest rate to 3 percent,
and lower-income mortgagors were required to pay 20 percent of adjusted
income toward the mortgage payment. No provision was included for re-
covery of subsidy payments in the event of sale or a substantial increase
in family income. In recognition of a new generation of social programs
under FHA's aegis, the bill called for the creation of a Special Risk In-
surance Fund with the explicit provision that the fund was "not intended to
be actuarially sound". Another provision set up a parallel program of
credit assistance calling for the counseling of families with flawed credit
histories or unstable employment; its objective was to provide financial
and budget management counseling preparatory to ownership to potential
35. U. S. Senate, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1967, Report to
the Committee on Banking and Currency, (Report #809), 90th Con-
gress, 1st Session, November, 1967.
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purchasers who were at the margins of eligibility for the program as a
result of their questionable credit standing. In the critical area of mort-
gage relief insurance, the bill was indecisive; it authorized HUD to deve-
lop an actuarially-sound insurance program in cooperation with private
industry, which would cover loss of income, death and disability.
The only provision which bore any resemblance to the original Percy
bill was the establishment of the National Home Ownership Foundation as
a mechanism for mobilizing private sector efforts toward low-income
ownership and for providing technical assistance to non-profit organizations.
But NHOF had no authority to raise mortgage funds through the'sale of de-
bentures. The surgery inflicted on the original Percy proposal allowed
NHOF to maintain visible life signs, but removed the financial muscle tis-
sue which was essential to its having any direct impact on urban housing
issues.
However, it was still unclear by November, 1967 that the bill would
reach the Senate floor. The long-standing criticism of FHA which had
come to a head in the Congressional hearings had shaken the agency. The
expectation that it would now be responsible for a battery of low-income pro-
grams created mounting pressures for a reorientation of its policies. To-
ward the end of October, the FHA Commissioner, Philip N. Brownstein,
had articulated the new mandate at a national FHA Directors Conference:
"We have got to recognize that stimulating the flow of mortgage
funds into the inner city, yes, even into the slums, for the trans-
fer of houses, for rehabilitation, and for new construction, is an
FHA mission of the highest priority. I want you to go looking for
applications.
Since nobody has ever invested extensively in reviving the re-
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building of the inner city and since there has been little private
experience in providing housing for low- and moderate-income
families, I do not believe anyone is prepared to say exactly how
much risk is involved. "36
Despite FHA's attempts to reach a state of preparedness for the new pro-
gram, the bill failed to reach the Senate floor in 1967 largely as a result
of the Administration's disinterest in accelerating its passage and the
jockeying of several Senators, on both sides of the floor, to block its
arrival.
The Administration's Initiative: The 1968 Housing Act
By early 1968, the ball was firmly in the Administration's hands. It
had evolved an omnibus housing bill which dwarfed previous low-income
housing programs by comparison, through a massive and explicit federal
commitment to national housing goals over the coming decade. The bill
was announced in a special Presidential message to Congress in February. 38
Weaver referred to it as a "ten year program designed to substantially
wipe out substandard housing. "39 The lower-income home ownership com-
ponent designated as Section 235 called for the construction of a million
homes in the first five years, one of the key strategies for producing a
36. Philip N. Brownstein, FHA Commissioner, Address to a national FHA
Directors Conference, October 23, 1967.
37. Carnegie, 2. cit.
38. Message to Congress on "Housing and Cities", President Lyndon B.
Johnson, February 26, 1968.
39. U.S. Senate, Hearings, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, 90th Congress, 2nd Ses-
sion, March, 1963, p. 23.
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total of 6 million low-income units in 10 years. 1Vbreover, the bill repre-
sented an unprecedented expansion of low-income programs into the open,
private market for housing production, with FHA at the helm of both the
rental and purchase subsidy programs. Politically, the bill reestablished
the Democratic dominion over urban programs during a Presidential elec-
tion year. Percy's association with the home ownership component began
to fade. As Christa Lew Carnegie describes it:
"In the January 1968 State of the Union message, President
Johnson made H-P a living bill. The administration's proposal
resuscitated about 80 percent of S. 2700 although the National
Home Ownership Foundation was among the missing. The
Sparkman Committee reinstated it without question (NHOF had
mostly technical assistance functions). Secretary Weaver en-
thusiastically supported H-P in the hearings. During the floor
debate, subcommittee members ping-ponged compliments
among themselves for their excellent work. Sparkman was
singled out: 'The Senator from Alabama is truly the architect
of the major bill'. With the Republicans voting for the NHOF
and the Democrats supporting the administration... , the omni-
bus housing bill of 1968 was recorded as an outstanding legisla-
tive victory for President Lyndon B. Johnson. ''40
The 1968 hearings preceding the passage of the bill reiterated the
themes of the previous year and the lower-income home ownership com-
ponent went through with only a few changes. The interest rate subsidy
format was retained, but the President's message had proposed deeper
subsidies that would bring the effective interest rate down to 1 percent,
the rate ultimately adopted. The definition of eligible lower-income fam-
ilies was revised from the previous Senate definition, restricting the pro-
gram to at most 70 percent of moderate income limits, to the present
40. Carnegie, op. cit. , p. 166.
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definition which included a broader and somewhat higher income range.
Although Secretary Weaver declared the program to be "basically sound",
little more was known about probable loss rates under the program. The
Senate Report looked toward "relatively small appropriations" to sustain
the Special Risk Insurance Fund, but failed to set any operational stan-
dards for acceptable levels of risk or loss. If the tolerance for risk was
unclear, the rationale for uncertain risk-taking was explicit:
"It is naturally the hope of the committee that these programs
will be capable of sustaining themselves, but the benefits to be
gained from them far exceed what we believe to be the risks. "41
The report of the House Banking and Currency Committee weht so far as
to label the Special Risk Insurance Fund a "subsidy element" of the new
programs, 42 echoing Clark's earlier theme of supplemental subsidies.
Neither the Percy mortgage relief insurance program nor Abram's al-
ternatives were considered in any further detail. In that regard, the Con-
gressional committees were still operating in an information vacuum. The
urgency of the bill as a major response to mounting urban pressures, the
administration's close identification with the new program, and the climate
of an election year, all contributed to a legislative atmosphere in which it
seemed good judgment to forsake a more complete rationality for rapid
41. U.S. Senate, Report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, 90th Congress, 2nd
Session, March, 1968, p. 23.
42. U.S. House of Representatives, Report, House Banking and Currency
Committee, House Report 1585, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, June
25, 1968, p. 14.
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action. Recognizing that the development of a mortgage relief insurance
mechanism was of vital importance to the program, and, on the other
hand, that the information was not yet available, the committee left it to
the discretion of the HUD Secretary to determine subsequently the feasi-
bility of an insurance program, and required that HUD report back to Con-
gress in late 1968.
One of the most significant changes in the 235 program during this phase
of its legislative career was the inclusion of existing housing units among
those eligible for purchase under the program. During the hearings, in-
terest groups representing real estate brokers had pressed for'the inclus-
ion of existing units that had neither been newly constructed or rehabilitated.
Although Section 235 delimited the proportion of existing housing to be sub-
sidized under the program, what had been conceived originally as a "build-
er's program" -- a production program -- became in part a "broker's
program". NAREB (the National Association of Real Estate Brokers) had
scored a major victory. The rationale behind this change was expressed
by Percy:
"This will permit the Secretary to get the program underway
almost immediately providing a quick impact and visibility
which are so important to the success of new programs."'43
Moreover, it was felt that by working with existing housing during the
early stages of the program, over the lead-time required for new con-
struction, FHA could gradually build experience in the program before it
increased in volume.
43. U.S. Senate Report, May 15, 1968, of. cit. , p. 205.
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In the hearings of the Housing Subcommittee of the House Banking and
Currency Committee, it was Representative Widnall of New Jersey, a
long-standing Republican committee member who had initiated the leased
housing program of 1965, who registered dismay at the forsaking of
Percy's original concept of community-based effort as the driving force
behind the development of ownership opportunities for lower-income fam-
ilies. 44 In embedding the program within the FHA operation, initiatives
for the production, design, and location of units were to rest largely with
private builders, operating under profit incentives, in negotiation with FHA.
Although FHA would continue to commit subsidies to local non-profit
sponsors, by and large the bulk of program activity would be profit-oriented
and fragmented, without any coherent process of planning for community
development and community impacts. In response to Widnall's complaint,
Weaver raised the issue of volume and questioned the ability of non-profit
community organizations to mount a large-scale program:
"... each one of these families requires a tremendous amount
of assistance and aid by a nonprofit corporation. These are
not volume programs. These are custom programs. They
are very significant and we want to continue them, but they 45
are not going to supply the volume that is going to be needed."
The move toward a volume program which would contribute to the meeting
of national housing goals had precluded an exclusive reliance on the non-
44. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Subcommittee on Housing, 90th Congress, 2nd Session,
March, 1968, p. 59.
45. Ibid. , p. 126.
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profit production sector.
On the first of August the Housing Act of 1968 was passed and, with it,
the first federal program to subsidize home purchase opportunities in the
open private market for large numbers of lower-income families. Over
its eighteen-month long legislative career, the forging of the Section 235
program reflected the complexities and difficulties inherent in shaping the
public purpose within a highly partisan political setting, under pressures
of time which called for an appropriate and rapid response to increasingly
pressing urban conditions. Many of the program's vulnerabilities were
clear from the beginning, particularly among those most involved in sup-
porting its passage. The risks of a relatively high mortgage failure rate
were recognized but understated, masked by the unknown "subsidy ele-
ment" residing in the Special Risk Insurance Fund. Alternatives that
might have contributed to a substantial reduction of risk through insurance
mechanisms were only partially studied and explored when the program
went into operation. Furthermore, the program was to be administered
by an agency many Congressmen recognized as unsuited to the purpose.
The final irony was that a program as innovative and as fraught with risk
as the 235 program, one that required cautious experimentation and sound
administrative monitoring, should have been launched as a large-volume
program from the start, constituting a key component in meeting national
housing goals.
To a large extent, the dominant perceptions that framed the intent of
the 235 program represented a clear move away from the adequist founda-
tions of earlier federal low-income housing policies toward a more
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relativist formulation of policy. Senator Percy's "new dawn" rhetoric
viewed home ownership as a channel of upward mobility in the housing sec-
tor, and tenure choice as a means of correcting the inequitable social dis-
tribution of housing attributes and statuses among lower-income house-
holds. The kinds of functionalist arguments that emerged stressed the
values of ownership tenure in enabling a greater degree of social and res-
idential conolidation for the owning family -- the "stake in the community"
theme -- echoing Representative Sullivan's arguments for the 221(h) a-
mendment. But the functionalist valences of ownership as a form of family
investment and capital accretion were underplayed as argumenis for or
against the subsidization of ownership opportunities, with Percy himself
seeing an inevitable paradox in the notion of subsidizing equity accretion
and potential profit for the owning family. In that regard, Secretary
Weaver stood alone at the start in pointing to the potential dangers of neg-
ative equities resulting from the program.
Viewed within the context of the three policy perspectives, the program
formulation more accurately represents a hybrid combination of alterna-
tive policy valences. Adequist views continued to prevail in the heavy pro-
duction orientation of the program, despite its experimental nature; in the
imposition of FHA property standards and potentially high housing costs;
and in the lack of consumer choice and autonomy within a system controlled
by the long-established linkages between FHA and the private housing sec-
tor. It was far from the functionalist vision of an open resource system,
unconstrained by bureaucratic standards and controls.
In anticipating the potential negative consequences of the program,
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the legislative deliberations had registered a clear recognition of the
"life at the margin" risks inherent in an ownership-oriented program for
lower-income families. This recognition was most strongly manifested
in the creation of the special risk fund under relaxed actuarial standards.
But the rushed passage of the bill had precluded a legislative decision on
proposed mortgage relief insurance mechanisms that might have contribu-
ted to a reduction of these risks. The only administrative or "systemic"
flaws anticipated in the program were those associated with FHA's tradi-
tional conservatism, and the concern that FHA would exclude the more
marginal purchasers and higher-risk inner city areas from the'program.
Except for Secretary Weaver's early concerns about the difficulties of
avoiding negative equity situations in declining submarkets, there seemed
to be unqualified confidence in the demonstrated expertise of FHA in prop-
erty inspection and appraisal. No consideration was given to potential
"contextual" factors that might make some metropolitan areas unfavorable
for this kind of ownership program because of local economic conditions.
Like other federal mortgage insurance programs that had come before, the
Section 235 program was to be made available at all FHA insuring offices,
B. Implementation of the Program
Early Administration
The sense of urgency, which had led Congress to overlook the uncer-
tainties and risks inherent in the 235 program, resulted in a $75 million
subsidy authorized for the first year, enough to subsidize about 100,000
purchases. By the October, 1968 appropriations hearings, the Johnson
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administration registered its intent to kick off the program at a more mod-
erate and cautious pace by requesting an appropriation of $50 million.
With even greater circumspection, Congress cut its request in half during
the appropriations cycle, resulting in a figure which allowed for about
33,000 home purchases by June of 1969.
By January, 1969, just prior to the changeover to the Nixon adminis-
tration, President Johnson's message to Congress on national housing goals
reported positively on the general climate of acceptance the program was
encountering among the industry and consumers alike:
"There are signs that the 235 program may well be the most
rapidly accepted program for low- and moderate-income fam-
ilies. There is tremendous interest in it on the part of the in-
dustry and the lenders. It seems to be responsive to the re-
quests from the poor for a housing program for them that will
permit homeownership. "146
However, the report also indicated some concern with the maximum pur-
chase prices set by the legislation:
"The impact upon housing which carries a relatively low price
and low statutory maximum mortgages, in order to serve the
needs of the low- and moderate-income family, may be a seri-
ous reduction in profit and consequent loss of interest on the
part of the builder. ''47
The administration recognized that unrealistically low price limits might
dampen industry participation in the program and prevent it from becom-
ing the production-oriented, volume program that was intended to help
46. Message from the President of the United States, First Annual Report
on National Housing Goals, January 23, 1969, House Document No.
91-63, p. 25.
47. Ibid. , pp. 24-25.
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meet national housing goals. The question of whether low price ceilings
might affect the quality of construction under the program was obscured by
the prevailing confidence in FHA's role in maintaining construction and
property standards.
Early commitments under the program indicated that only 8,800 units
were likely to be produced by the end of fiscal year 1969, most of them
representing new construction rather than substantial rehabilitation. If
the program relied heavily on produced units rather than existing units, as
was intended by the legislation, it would come nowhere close to absorbing
its first-year appropriation. In what proved to be one of the mbst critical
of the early administrative decisions concerning the program, the Johnson
administration chose to expand the use of existing housing during the pro-
gram's first year, beyond the 25 percent limit set by the legislation:
"It has been determined that the percentage limitation is
based on authorized amounts rather than a proportionate a-
mount of the funds appropriated. Since the appropriation
action in October released only one-third of the contract
payment of $75 million per year... and existing home pur-
chases will absorb a large proportion of available contract
payment funds, the projected 69 evel of new starts and re-
habilitations is quite limited. . .
Under this administrative determination, as much as three-quarters of
the houses purchased during the first year could be existing units.
In an attempt to be responsive to urban pressures, Congress had
placed high priority on the early visibility and rapid delivery of ownership
opportunities. The administrative decision was consistent with the sense
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of urgency which lay behind the legislation, and with the generic ownership
objectives of the program. The limited production capacity of the program
during its early stages, due to the long lead-time required, made it clear
that the slashed appropriation had not had a profound effect on the program's
progress. By the end of 1969, a total of about 26,000 houses had been in-
sured under the program, and a majority of them (57/o) were existing units. 4 9
Thus, the predominant thrust of the program during its early stages was
to extend ownership opportunities within the existing housing stock of the
city.
In keeping with the provisions of section 109 of the 1968 Housing Act,
an Insurance Technical Assistance Group (ITAG) had been formed in Sep-
tember under Assistant Secretary Brownstein, the FHA Commissioner,
composed of officers from a number of major private insurance corpora-
tions. 50 Its mandate with respect to the 235 program was to determine
the feasibility and costs of a federally-funded mortgagor insurance pro-
gram which protected lower-income home owners against risks of fore-
closure due to death, disability, and involuntary unemployment. The ITAG
report, which was completed in early 1969, based its estimates on a bene-
fit design involving a one-month -waiting period after a crisis occurence,
followed by either a 12-month or a 24-month maximum benefit period, dur-
49. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969 HUD Stat-
istical Yearbook (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,
(0-409-124), 1970), FHA Table 4, pp. 28-29.
50. Insurance Technical Assistance Group, op. cit. , p. 12.
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ing which the owner's share of the mortgage payment would be covered as
long as necessary. There were no constraints on the number of times a
home owner might submit a claim, provided there was an interval of six
months between claims.
Given the range of coverage involved, the premium costs which would
be borne by the government seem within reasonable bounds. The cost of
the 12-month maximum benefit period (for a mortgagor with an annual in-
come of $4500, who initiated a 30-year, $14,000 mortgage at age 35)
was estimated at an average monthly cost of $5. 29 over the life of the
mortgage, or about $64 per annum,51 an amount representing an increase
of 10. 8 percent of the 235 subsidy received. If all 235 home owners were
similar to the one described above, and the program reached a volume of
500, 000 homes, the insurance fund would have been sufficient to cover six
months of benefits for roughly 12 percent of the insured home owners each
year.
The ITAG report described other mortgage relief measures that were
available in the absence of a new insurance mechanism -- forebearance
by the lender, recasting of the mortgage by mutual agreement -- but these
mechanisms depended on the willingness of the lender to adjust or reframe
the mortgage instrument in accordance with the merits of each individual
case. One of the particular values of mortgagor insurance was that it was
not dependent on mortgagee cooperation and obviated any need to alter
existing mortgage instruments and payment arrangements.
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The ITAG report also pointed to a number of "unique" administrative
and operational problems that would be involved: Administering agencies
would have to take responsibility for enrolling purchasers in the program,
informing them of potential benefits and procedures for making claims,
maintaining ongoing records for determining premium costs and claims
payments, and administering claims. In addition, the notion of insuring
against involuntary unemployment called for procedures to ascertain that
beneficiaries were actively seeking employment during the claims period:
"While death and disability claims are familiar to lenders and
insurance companies, and presumably would not present undue
difficulties for government agencies, unemployment claims'
could pose problems. In this regard, it would appear that any
claims administration mechanism used would have to rely
somehow on the state unemployment insurance system. For
example, an insured claiming mortgage payment benefits during
a period of unemployment might be required to obtain a certifi-
cation from the local unemployment insurance office that he was
unemployed under some standard definition. Arrangements with
the various state unemployment insurance administrators would
have to be developed through the Department of Labor. "52
Although the costs of these services were to be carried by the administer-
ing agency, the report made no estimate of the administrative costs in-
volved.
Whether the ITAG report was completed in January, or submitted to
Congress by the outgoing FHA Commissioner, Philip N. Brownstein, is
unclear. The report is dated April, 1969, and there is no record of a
Congressional submission; its index card in the HUD library is labeled
"for HUD internal use only. " Brownstein apparently attached a low
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priority to the study, believing that mortgagor insurance was "not very
feasible or necessary" and that FHA could always extend indulgence to de-
faulting mortgagors if the situation merited doing so. 53 Despite Congress'
interpretation of the special risk mortgage insurance fund as a supplemental
subsidy element of the 235 program, in early 1969 FHA did not envision
that large numbers of defaults and mortgage failures would occur under
the program.
Eugene Gulledge, a southern builder who was appointed FHA Commis-
sioner in October, 1969, gave some consideration to the ITAG report but
believed that the cost of private mortgagor insurance was too high. View-
ing FHA as the "biggest insurance company in the world", Gulledge pre-
ferred to depend on internal FHA mechanisms for mortgagor relief if they
became necessary, as had Brownstein before him. Although Gulledge had
developed some ideas of his own, the reorganization of HUD which Secre-
tary Romney initiated in early 1970 played havoc with FHA's traditional
structure by separating it into two branches: the Housing Production and
Mortgage Credit branch was made responsible for all front-end HUD com-
mitments to newly-assisted units, including public housing, up to the point
when the units were ready for occupancy; the Housing Management branch
was made responsible for monitoring the ongoing administration of assist-
ed units, including the handling of FHA-insured mortgages at the stage of
mortgage default and foreclosure. Gulledge became Assistant Secretary
of HPMC and a new Assistant Secretary, Norman Watson, was appointed to
53. Telephone interview, Philip N. Brownstein, June, 1976.
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head up Housing Management. In the resulting chaos, Gulledge claims
that "several good ideas were lost" including any systematic provision for
relief of defaulting mortgagors under the still embryonic 235 program. 54
These responsibilities now fell within the province of Housing Management.
Burdened by the problems besetting large numbers of housing authorities
on the verge of bankruptcy, which commanded a high priority, and by the
administrative and staffing problems related to the reorganization, Hous-
ing Management did not follow up on the issue of mortgagor relief. Wheth-
er there was the competency to do so is also an open question. For by
1972, well after defaults and foreclosures had become a major'issue in
the 235 program, Housing Management had not yet taken steps to develop
an effective system for monitoring mortgage defaults and foreclosures.
After its first year, the program proceeded at an increasingly rapid
pace in the FHA insuring offices, and began to generate a "pipeline" of
commitments from builders and speculators who had come to recognize its
potential. In Washington, the generally encouraging picture of program
acceptance "in the field" quelled the debate and uncertainties that had sur-
rounded its inception, and focused attention largely on the issue of expand-
ed appropriations. The new Nixon administration, with George Romney at
the head of HUD, had only barely begun to formulate its position on housing
policy by the Spring 1969 appropriations hearings, at which it requested a
a full appropriation for the program. Its popularity with industry and con-
sumers, the need to respond to the burgeoning pipeline of potential commit-
54. Telephone interview, Eugene Gulledge, July, 1976.
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ments, all argued strongly for an expanded appropriation which was grant-
ed with little controversy. Romney also pressed for and won increases
in the maximum purchase prices allowable under the program. 55
However, the companion section 237 purchase program, which was
similar to 235 except that it provided for financial and budget counseling
for purchasers who represented high credit risks, was denied an appro-
priation which would fund private counseling efforts. The low level of use
of section 237 at FHA insuring offices and the general optimism which sur-
rounded Section 235 combined to accord a low priority to 237 counseling
efforts in a highly competitive budget year.
The general mood of optimism persisted into early 1970. In April,
President Nixon's first report on national housing goals recommended an
increase of over 150 percent in the targeted program volume for fiscal
year 1971. 56 However, a second request for a 237 counseling appropri-
ation was refused by Congress on the grounds that voluntary agencies --
such as non-profit sponsors, local Urban League offices -- had already
stepped into the breach to help prepare marginal families for program el-
ibility and to provide financial counseling related to ownership.
55. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 91st Congress, 1st Session, April, 1969.
56. Message from the President of the United States, Second Annual
Report on National Housing Goals, April, 1970, p. 49.
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The Disclosure of Abuses in the Program
By mid-1970 early tremors of program difficulties and abuses began
to become audible in Washington. Over a period of months, the flow of
complaints to HUD and to relevant Congressional committees had begun
to accelerate. Individual purchasers, concerned citizens, and local hous-
ing officials attested to a multiplicity of abuses occurring under the pro-
gram: windfall profits; fraudulent sales practices; serious defects in the
condition of the houses purchased; and questionable FHA inspection and
appraisal procedures. Moreover, the complaints seemed to be concen-
trated with particular frequency in several cities, among them Washing-
ton, D. C. , Philadelphia, Seattle, and several cities in New Jersey.
The-House Banking and Currency Committee became one of the major
recipients of complaints. Following routine procedures governing the
disposition of the scattering of specific allegations that accompany all fed-
eral programs, the Committee had initially referred the material to the
relevant executive agency, inthis case to HUD. But, by the summer of
1970, it had become apparent to members of the Committee that there
might be serious and systematic shortcomings in the program. Perceiv-
ing that HUD was limiting itself to a case-by-case investigation of com-
plaints, rather than undertaking a more thorough review of the program's
possible weaknesses, by September the Committee, under the leadership
of Representative Wright Patman, endorsed a Congressional investigation
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to be conducted by the Committee's own staff. 5
The staff investigation undertook to confirm the reported abuses
through direct field investigation and to develop an assessment of the
causes that lay behind them. In so doing, the staff confined its efforts to
areas and types of units that were the predominant sources of complaints.
It did not undertake a program-wide investigation, nor did it make claim
to a more comprehensive program evaluation.
The staff report58 issued in December of 1970 provided strong con-
firmation of the presence of serious and widespread abuses in a number of
field locales, particularly Washington, D. C. , Paterson (New Jersey),
Philadelphia, Seattle, and Spokane. Despite the limited scope of the field
investigation, the systematic nature of the abuses uncovered in these
areas, as opposed to a random scattering of isolated instances, and the
implication of FHA in the miscarriage of the program stirred the Commit-
tee staff to sound a national alarm for the program as a whole:
"The Department of Housing and Urban Development and its
Federal Housing Administration may well be on its way toward
insuring itself into a national housing scandal. This conclus-
ion has been reached because of the role that FHA has played
in the operation of the section 235 and other programs. "5
57. HUD did begin to revise some of its procedures. See FHA circulars:
"Appraisal of Existing Dwellings -- A Policy Change", July 31, 1970
and "Intensified Valuation Review in Problem Areas", December 23,
1970.
58. U.S. House of Representatives, o. cit. , December, 1970.
59. Ibid. , p. 1.
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The catalog of abuses developed in the report spanned both existing hous-
ing and newly constructed units sold under the program, and laid the blame
squarely on FHA, in its inspection and appraisal procedures, for "turning
its back to" questionable or fraudulent market practices on the part of
builders, speculators, and real estate brokers.
"The Federal Housing Administration is insuring existing homes
that are of such poor quality that there is little or no possibility
that they can survive the life of the mortgage or even attempt to
maintain any reasonable property value. FHA has approved
housing for the 235 program which, within months after purchase,
has been condemned by municipal authorities. .. In many cases,
FHA appraisers and inspectors have failed to live up to even the
most basic agency requirements in inspecting or appraising
houses...
In the area of new 235 construction, FHA has appraised houses
for figures that are inflated by several thousands of dollars above
the true value of the home. The construction of these homes is
of the cheapest type of building materials; and, instead of buying
a home, people purchasing these homes are buying a disaster.. .
In many areas of the country, the 235 program is 'carrying' the
real estate market. In one county in the State of Washington, 80
percent of the real estate transactions in 1970 were made up of
235 houses. With this type of volume, FHA must make certain
at the very least that the houses it insures will retain a market
value roughly equal to the mortgage amount throughout the life of
the mortgage. It is doubtful if such a situation will exist in the
235 program. w60
The concern with mortgage failure rates that had permeated legislative
discussions of the program had its source in the anticipated risks associ-
ated with a lower-income consumership, in the inability of lower-income
owners to sustain mortgage payments under adverse family circumstances
that were involuntary in nature. The staff investigation is significant in
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having uncovered further risks in the program that were systemic in
nature -- abusive market practices, negligence or collusion on the part
of FHA -- beyond those grounded in "life at the margin" perceptions of
incapacity on the part of the lower-income purchasers. The report en-
visioned an accelerated number of voluntary "walk-away" mortgage fail-
ures, a wave of house abandonments as families attempted to extricate
themselves from faulty housing which they could ill afford to repair or to
sell at a loss. The inadequacies in FHA's operation of the program, par-
ticularly in its inspection and appraisal procedures, raised the spectre
of thousands of FHA-held properties, which would add substantially to the
program's anticipated risks and costs:
"When this happens, the FHA will either have to sell the prop-
erty at a fraction of the mortgage balance or rehabilitate the
property at a tremendous cost of additional funds. In either
case, the Government will have wasted millions of dollars and
there will be no way to improve the overall housing condition
in our country. "61
The supplemental subsidy implicit in the Special Risk Insurance Fund would
have to provide coverage against "walk-away" mortgage failures as well
as against involuntary foreclosures, and absorb any losses involved in
bringing FHA-owned property into resaleable condition. The sense of FHA's
expertness in the administration of mortgage insurance programs, on which
Congress had so totally relied during the formulation of the program, had
been badly shattered by the Committee's disclosures.
Although the staff report did not presume to constitute an assessment
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61. Ibid. , pp. 1-2.
of the program as a whole, it came to dominate the evolving national image
of the program. In the subsequent Committee hearings, members made it
clear their intention was not to condemn the program, but to seek admini-
strative and legislative remedies to abusive practices as a way of preserv-
ing and continuing it. It was inevitable, however, that the staff report,
though it constituted the findings of a "trouble-shooting" investigation in
designated problem areas, would begin to be generalized to the program
as a whole. The findings were certainly serious enough to merit program-
wide attention.
A parallel study of the program conducted by the Civil Rights Commis-
sion during the summer of 1970, just prior to the staff investigation, had
arrived at far more sanguine conclusions concerning the operation of the
program. 62 The Commission study concentrated on the racial and ethnic
impact of Section 235 as evidenced in four metropolitan areas: Denver,
St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Little Rock. Although the Commission re-
port was published a half year after the Committee staff report, and might
have been influenced by the Congressional findings, it reached somewhat
more positive conclusions concerning the overall quality of 235 housing:
"While most of the housing purchased under the 235 program,
existing as well as new, was of good quality -- superior to the
housing in which the buyers had previously lived -- some was
of poor quality. Speculators had been permitted to profit under
the program at the expense of lower-income buyers, many of
62. U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Home Ownership for Lower Income
Families, A Report on the Racial and Ethnic Impact of the Section 235
Program (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, June,
1971).
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whom are unsophisticated in the complexities and technical-
ities of housing and home finance. Most of the poor quality
housing was existing housing located in the central city and
nearly all had been purchased by minority families. "63
The two reports, when coupled, suggest a high degree of variation and
differentiation in local program outcomes, certainly more than the Con-
gressional staff report by itself would suggest. However, the Commission
report echoed the Congressional findings concerning the presence of wide-
spread market abuses, FHA's failure to prevent such abuses, and its "cav-
eat emptor" orientation to the program:
"... FHA continues to play only a passive role in the opera-
tion of the program, disclaiming any responsibility for the
quality of housing produced or the impact of the location of
235 housing on racial residential patterns. Although builders
and brokers frequently use FHA's name illegally in their ad-
vertising, leading unsuspecting buyers to conclude that the
agency is prepared to protect their interests, no such protec-
tion is afforded. As FHA officials have pointed out, the
agency's relationship is with the mortgagee, not with the buy-
er and although FHA appraises houses under the 235 program,
the purpose of the appraisals, as one FHA official explained,
is 'to assure the moneylender, not the property buyer. ' ...
Thus FHA, the agency charged by Congress with responsi-
bility for administering the 235 program, has abdicated its
responsibility and, in effect, has delegated it to members of
the private housing and home finance industry. "64-
Factors Accounting for the Abuses
In retrospect, there are a number of factors that account for the early
63. Ibid. , p. viii.
64. Ibid. , p. x.
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malfunctioning of the program:65 To begin with, the program had un-
leashed an enormous, suppressed demand for home purchase among urban
lower-income families in a market characterized by a limited supply of
readily available, purchaseable, quality housing. The excess of demand
over supply contributed to a price inflation bounded only by the program
price ceilings. Routine FHA appraisal procedures, when followed seri-
ously, were often unworkable for existing housing units in the untried
submarkets represented by older, inner-city neighborhoods where there
were no comparable sales on which to base a sound appraisal. In such
market areas, 235 purchases of existing units began to form their own
basis for future appraisals, a base which could be readily manipulated by
speculators to their own advantage, thereby creating an "uncheckable"
and uniquely inflated submarket. Moreover, the early emphasis on the
sale of existing units under the program brought into play an extremely
exploitative sector of the housing provider system -- the speculators,
"fastbuck promoters", "blue suede shoe types", as they were later to be
called -- who had brokered in minority-dominated rental markets and
knew their territory and their clientele. They were a far cry from the
images of private industry which had dominated the legislative hearings
65. Much of this account of field conditions during the early stages of the
program was developed by William C. Grindley as part of an OSTI
field study of the 235 program in 20 cities conducted from 1972 to
1973. For a fuller account, see OSTI (Organization for Social and
Technical Innovation), A Study of the Effectiveness of Voluntary
Counseling Programs for Lower-Income Home Ownership, (Report
prepared under contract to HUD), Newton, Mass. , May, 1974,
Chapter III, pp. 64-94.
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in Congress.
Newly-constructed 235 housing units, often located in large subdivisions
consisting of 23.5 units exclusively, were also subject to inflationary pres-
sures due to the sizeable demand. In high market areas where construction
costs were a major constrainf, the program's price limits acted as a dis-
incentive to quality construction and materials. Builders and developers
who viewed the program as an important opportunity were forced or en-
couraged to cut corners wherever possible to complete the house at sale-
able prices under the program. In addition, the program often attracted a
new generation of builders without established reputations in the middle-
income market, and without experience.
These problems were further compounded by the fact that most 235 pur-
chasers could be expected to be relatively inexperienced and unsophistica-
ted in negotiating the purchase market. Even in a marketplace free of frau-
dulent practices, "caveat emptor" -- "let the buyer beware" -- is a worth-
while axiom adhered to by the most knowledgeable purchasers. In dealing
with first-time home buyers, builders and brokers clearly had the upper
hand in the bargaining, a factor which may have encouraged them to go to
extraordinary lengths to maximize profits. In that sense, the sizeable de-
mand only served to exacerbate an already exploitative market. Builders
and brokers could afford to choose among competing purchasers, even for
the more impoverished properties. A buyer who looked potentially trouble-
some could be ignored or put off; there was always someone else who might
buy. Among the more unethical mortgage companies, there were strong
incentives for choosing properties and purchasers most likely to slide
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rapidly into foreclosure; the greatest profits were reaped at the "front-
end" upon sale and advancement of the mortgage loan, and an accelerated
foreclosure rate meant that mortgage capital could be retrieved through
FHA insurance and rapidly turned over toward additional sales. 66 In
short, whether or not abusive and exploitative practices were endemic to
the 235 purchase market, the market conditions themselves presented a
fertile opportunity for various kinds of fraud and consumer abuse, well
beyond the normal risks of a "caveat emptor" purchase market.
The turbulent market conditions under which the early program oper-
ated placed a premium, if not an absolute necessity, on the effective ad-
ministration and operation of the program by FHA field offices. That FHA
had, in some places, so badly fumbled the program or looked the other
way as market practices went unchecked, must have been a rude awaken-
ing for those in Congress who had strongly advocated FHA's stewardship
of the program. Although the quality of FHA performance seemed to vary
from one insuring office to the next, depending on local directorial prero-
gatives and orientations as well as on local housing market conditions,
there are a number of factors that tend to account for the likelihood of
broad, unintended lapses in FHA performance. First, there was the char-
acter of FHA itself as a bureaucratic culture that had evolved over a per-
iod of more than thirty years when Section 235 was passed. In making the
66. Interview with Jack Blum, majority counsel, Senator Hart's Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the
Judiciary, September, 1972. Also see: Boyer, 22. cit., Chapter
14, "Jack Blum", pp. 205-220.
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transition from an actuarially sound, middle-class program in which the
lender was viewed as the insured client, toward what Congress had termed
a "social program" involving high risks, a loosening of long-standing
credit and property standards, and a new, unfamiliar cast of suppliers
and buyers, FHA must have experienced a form of administrative "culture
shock". Grindley summed up the impact on FHA in the following way:
"In the post-Depression period, the Administration had built an
impressive record on a well-defined role. FHA prided itself on
its ability to return money to the Treasury. It had dealt only with
mortgagees, had known each succeeding year's approximate bud-
get and staffing requirements and, even more importantly, knew
how to 'read' an applicant mortgagor's file. Their applicants had
generally been stably-employed, middle and lower-middle class
families headed by two parents, most of whom had purchased dur-
ing periods of growing prosperity... Suddenly, in 1968, personnel
who were familiar with a certain pattern of doing business were
given a monumentally larger and unfamiliar clientele. New forms,
new records, new reporting requirements, were all coming into a
new, unfamiliar Department. Caseloads for credit and property
review tripled and quadrupled. Applicant mortgagors with differ-
ent surnames, with records of unemployment, questionable credit
histories, marital instability, and no prior home ownership ex-
perience were asking for insurance of units with heretofore avoid-
ed addresses. Pressure for high production from Washington and
the Director pushed an overburdened staff to process applications
and insure mortgages in record time. The result was overloaded
personnel, frustration, bitterness, and, occasionally, callous
irresponsibility...
There were also the administrative problems which generally ac-
company all new programs. Nearly every builder and broker com-
plained of what appeared to be constantly changing application forms,
guidelines for determining applicants' qualifications, lines of auth-
ority, and acceptability of existing or rehabilitated properties.
While many of these changes could not be avoided, given the haste
with which the program had been designed and implemented, they
were the cause of conflicts in external working relationships and a
residue of ill-will between Area offices and private housing sup-
pliers. "67
67. OSTI, William C. Grindley, o. cit., pp. 67-68.
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Other retrospective accounts of the program confirmed the "adminis-
trative shock" phenomenon at the FHA field offices. In his own study of
the program, Anthony Downs came to believe that the result took a form of
deliberate sabotage of the program by FHA itself:
"...[HUD failed] to prepare most of the administrators of the
program who had been working on suburban 203 units to en-
counter the different kind of inspection and other difficulties
they are likely to encounter. Many people we talked to said
they thought there was intent by some FHA officials to delib-
erately take a buyer-beware attitude because they did not
think the program was a proper one and they did not think it
should work... This is a kind of charge that is very difficult
to substantiate. It is a hearsay kind of thing that our inter-
viewers, when talking to people in regional offices of HUD,
encountered among both developers and HUD members. They
did not feel that this was a universal phenomenon among all
the people in FHA. Rather, some of the FHA personnel felt
that they were not very sympathetic with the program and they
did not like it; therefore, they would administer it by sort of
sticking directly to the rules without the use of the kind of
cautions---" [statement interrupted] 6 8
In addition to the newness of the program, and its particular character,
the rapidly accelerating volume of the program strongly contributed to its
early administrative flaws at the local level and to the resultant abuses. 69
While some FHA field offices were able to establish a cautious, low pro-
file involvement in the program -- particularly where the Office Director
and private market actors did not press for commitments -- the incentives
68. Anthony Downs' testimony, Hearings, Joint Economic Committee,
U.S. Congress, December, 1972, op. cit. , pp. 299-305.
69. See HUD Office of Audit, Audit Review of Section 235 Single Family
Housing, (05-2-2001-4900), (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, December 10, 1971). Also M. Car-
ter McFarland, "Unlearned Lessons in the History of Federal
Housing Aid", City, Winter, 1972, pp. 30-34.
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for a high volume, production orientation to the program were difficult
to ignore. The institutionalization of national housing goals in the 1968
Act, led Washington to press for rapid program visibility and increasing
volume performance in the field. Moreover, structured incentives with-
in the FHA establishment had consistently rewarded high volume insuring
offices with increased funding and staff positions for the future. As a re-
sult career motivations formed a basic incentive for joining the ranks of
the "high producers" among the insuring offices. Under the earlier mort-
gage insurance programs, which were unconstrained by subsidy alloca-
tions, office volumes were merely a reflection of local market activity
as well as the ability of the FHA office to work with the network of local
private suppliers and mortgagees. The ceiling on 235 subsidy appropria-
tions only served to heighten the competition for allocations among insur-
ing offices particularly in those jurisdictions with a high demand for com-
mitments from the private sector.
As a result, the actuarial caution which had characterized the early
FHA programs was set aside in an attempt to produce commitments rapid-
ly with too few personnel operating an untried program. FHA's new man-
date and ethos -- to serve lower-income and minority families, and insure
inner city properties -- must also have helped rationalize the risks being
taken under great pressure and the resultant relaxation of standards.
The failure of the Nixon administration and of Secretary Romney to
seek increased appropriations for HUD staff sufficient to meet the new
volume of business at field offices further exacerbated FHA's processing
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problems. 70 Staffing limitations had a profound and direct impact on the
occurrence of abuses, for the FHA insuring offices resorted to hiring fee
appraisers and fee credit examiners in order to handle the increased vol-
ume, estimated by Romney at 1 million appraisals a year. 71 As a rule,
fee personnel are hired out of the local real estate industry during peak
volume processing periods, on the assumption that they are experienced
and expert at inspection, appraisal, and credit examination. But their
major alignments and affiliations were with the private housing sector;
many of the reported abuses were the result of collusion between fee per-
sonnel and local brokers or speculators, or, at the very least,-a tendency
to overlook normal standards. 72
Tighter central monitoring of field operations from Washington might
have uncovered problems at the insuring office level early enough to pre-
vent continued malperformance in the field. Undoubtedly, the changeover
to a new administration, which was grappling with its own formulation of
housing policies and priorities, lessened the likelihood of effective central
administration from the start. Moreover, FHA's established reputation
and long-tested procedures tended to place it beyond suspicion. Romney
later admitted:
70. U.S. House of Representatives, December, 1970, op. cit. , p. 165.
71. Ibid. , p. 153.
72. Also see: HJD Office of Audit, of. cit.
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"FHA had such a good reputation for what it had done basically
through the years, that I had no reason to suspect that this re-
laxation had taken place, and that the procedures were as loose
as they were. 073
Apart from the lack of administrative oversight of the program, major
administrative decisions being made in Washington with regard to the re-
organization of HUD tended to weaken further the ability of the field offices
to operate effectively. Among several reorganizational strategies put in-
to effect soon after the administrative changeover, the effort to decentral-
ize HUD field operations below the regional office level to what came to be
called the area office level had a telling effect on local performance in the
235 program. The confusion of pressures and priorities at HUD central
during the early days of Romney's leadership was best described by Rom-
ney himself:
"Congressional leaders and private experts were cynical about
the new administration's interest in meeting housing needs and
were questioning my acceptance of responsibility for meeting
the new national housing goals... I concentrated on solving these
problems. In retrospect, it was a mistake -- in part -- not to
realize that the FHA was not prepared for its new role in cen-
tral cities and its exposure to speculators and fastbuck artists.
But we succeeded in meeting the mortgage money crisis. We
pushed production of all kinds of housing -- subsidized and un-
subsidized -- to all-time record levels... And, we did all this
at a time when we were implementing new programs, organiz-
ing and decentralizing the Department, and formulating and im-
plementing fair housing policies.
I am proud of this record. But I didn't recognize until the sum-
mer of 1970 that the major change which had occurred in the
role of FHA would require a corresponding and substantial
73. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 3,
April, 1972, p. 1421.
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change in administrative philosophy, procedures control,
personnel skills, and extensive monitoring at the local
level to avoid the flagrant abuses that have since come to
light. "04
The effect of theHUD decentralization was two-fold. Increased auto-
nomy at the area office level made FHA field operations more vulnerable
to the prerogatives of politically-appointed office directors and to local
influence networks. 75 In addition, the creation of new roles at the area
offices and the realignment of roles in accordance with the reorganiza-
tion induced a high degree of staff mobility, in grade, location, and as-
signment. The result was to dilute the expertise of FHA staff i~n the
traditional processing roles. As a former insuring office director under
the Johnson administration observed:
"The problem... is due to the decentralization process which
had taken people out of the central office or from the outside
and placed them into second, third, fourth, and fifth positions
from the top without experience in the specific jobs they were
supposed to do... If you were to go to many of the HUD offices
today, the wise, the knowledgeable sponsor-builder would find
that the man sitting across the desk knows much less about
housing than he does. The HUD representative is not the dir-
ector, the director may know his business but he has other
things to do. We are talking about the people in middle man-
agement in the HUD offices. There are some exceptions,
there are some able people. But the new people who have gone
in, have gone in without training. They were sent out from
regional offices into field offices and filled slots based on
their grade; slots that were open due to the new structuring of
the office. Men without management experience suddenly
74. Ibid. , pp. 29-30.
75. See testimony of Philip I. Emmer, Hearings, Joint Economic Com-
mittee,, U.S. Congress, December, 1972, op. cit. , pp. 292-293.
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found themselves in charge of five or six or eight technicians.
Unfortunately, they knew less than the technicians knew. . ."76
Although Katz agreed that the decentralization move was a valid stra-
tegy toward improved administration of HUD's various programs, his
criticism faulted the suddenness of the transition. Instead of bringing
about a new field network gradually, "a date was declared and HUD an-
nounced that an office had become operable, but it was not operable be-
cause new people came in and did not know which end was up. "
Administrative Reaction to the Abuses
By early 1971 the administration had begun to respond to the wide-
spread criticism of FHA's handling of the program and to mobilize a de-
fense which served to reinforce its longer range views of the federal role
in housing policy. To begin with, there were a series of FHA circulars
issued in late 1970 revising FHA appraisal procedures. 78 But it was not
until late November that Romney publicly acknowledged the presence of
abuses in the program, in a press conference intended to "scoop" the im-
minent release of the House Committee staff report. 79 In the months
that followed it became increasingly clear that the exposure of the abuses
76. Testimony of Lawrence Katz, ibid. , pp. 260-261.
77. Ibid.
78. FHA circulars, o. cit.
79. Secretary Romney press conference, November 25, 1970.
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had served to politicize the program.
The polarization of views was already apparent in the December, 1970
hearings on the abuses. Romney's stance was understandably defensive;
it was natural to attempt to place blame on the previous Johnson adminis-
tration for encouraging a relaxation of FHA standards in the inner city.
Although sources close to Romney tend to confirm his strong commitment
to the housing subsidy programs, his testimony was also aggressive in its
attempt to deflect from the issue of maladministration by questioning the
viability of the basic program concept of lower-income home ownership:
"The committee staff concentrated its attention on the prob-
lems uncovered in its study of the day-to-day operation of the
section 235 program, without attempting to relate them to the
fundamental premises and issues underlying the program's
operation. Serious as these operational problems may be,
they still are basically the symptoms rather than the basic
causes of some of the important weaknesses found in the 235
program. I believe it will be essential for us... to examine
the direction followed in the administration of the program
and to raise fundamental questions that go far beyond the
question of proper management. "180
Romney attacked the staff report as exaggerated and misleading,
writing off the abuses as unavoidable errors: "Mistakes are made when
you do a volume of 1 million appraisals a year. ",81 He rejected the staff
report's concern about growing numbers of "walk-away" home abandon-
ment, despite the fact that such abandonment was already occurring in
large numbers under the 221(d)(2) program in Detroit. By and large,
80. U.S. House of Representatives, December, 1970, o2. cit. , p. 137.
81. Ibid. , p. 153.
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Romney's counterarguments stressed the problems of life at the margin
as the primary cause of mortgage failure among lower-income families.
Although Romney's recommendations to the Committee included funds for
increased FHA staffing, more liberal forebearance policies on the part of
mortgagees, and the provision of financial assistance to home owners in
the event of emergency repairs, he also suggested that other ways be
found to house low-income families more suitably. His implication was
that the program was not administerable.
During the proceedings, the Committee repeatedly made clear its be-
lief that the program was viable and that the investigation should serve to
improve the program's operation. Against suggestions from individuals
on the Committee that the program be suspended temporarily until the ad-
ministrative problems could be ironed out, Romney was ambivalent.
About three weeks later Secretary called a press conference at which he
described the Committee report as "inaccurate, misleading, and very in-
complete. ",82 Only a week later Romney conceded to the press that the
abuses were more prevalent than had previously been suspected,83 and
announced a suspension of the existing housing component of the 235 pro-
gram 84 until HUD launched its own investigation and could take measures
82. Secretary Romney press conference, January 6, 1971.
83. Secretary Romney press conference, January 14, 1971.
84. The existing housing component of the program was gradually reinsti-
tuted as HUD took steps to remedy procedures. By April1971, the ex-
isting housing program had been reinstituted at 30 insuring offices in
17 states. By April, 1972, the suspension had been lifted at all but
the Washington, D. C. insuring office.
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to prevent the recurrence of abuses and to compensate current victims of
abuse.
By March of 1971, the HUD Office of Audit submitted an interim report
to the Secretary which confirmed the presence of widespread deficiencies
and abuses throughout the 235 program. A random sampling of 235 units
in 52 FHA insuring jurisdictions had uncovered serious defects in both
new and used homes sold under the program. The most serious problems
emerged in the used housing sector, particularly in large cities which had
maintained a high volume of 235 insurance applications. Among the used
homes, a strikingly large proportion (43%) were judged to have "serious
deficiencies". While a much smaller proportion of the new homes (11%)
were judged as similarly deficient, the report indicated an additional 15
percent manifested inadequacies in workmanship or in materials used.
As a corollary, HUD Audit found that a majority (53%) of homes insured
in the "inner city" manifested serious deficiencies, while roughly a third
(35%) of those located in suburban, rural, or small town areas were in
similarly poor condition.85 The report confirmed what had been feared,
that the abuses uncovered in the trouble-shooting investigation of the House
Committee staff had permeated much of the national program effort as a
whole and had assumed systemic proportions. It concluded:
"While most of the home buyers under the Section 235 program
have received good value and undoubtedly are living in better
houses than they previously lived in, we believe many unsophis-
ticated buyers of older inner-city housing have not been fairly
treated. The values stated on appraisals have been high and the
85. HUD Office of Audit, op. cit. , p. 65.
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condition of a number of properties at final endorsement
have been poor to bad. We believe this general condition re-
sults from a combination of factors including the relaxing
several years ago of inspection and appraisal requirements
in declining urban areas. Also, when production goals ver-
sus quality appraisals and inspections were at issue, the
matter was resolved on the side of production. ,86
Although the HUD Audit report echoed many of Secretary Romney's
criticisms of the program -- "unsophisticated buyers", earlier relaxation
of FHA standards -- it also pointed to the strong production orientation at
the FHA insuring offices ss a factor contributing to the malfunctioning of
the program. In the space of one year, the program had accelerated from
26,000 insured houses at the end of 1969 to 131,000 insured units by the
end of 1970. In the Spring of 1971, when HUD's Audit report was prepared,
it was-on its way to insuring a cumulative total of 275,000 units by the end
of the year. Increased appropriations in keeping with the national housing
goals embedded in the 1968 Act; the strong production incentives at the FHA
insuring offices; the popularity of the program with builders and brokers
which had created an irresistable pipeline of commitments; and the enor-
mous consumer demand for 235 homes had resulted in a rapidly acceler-
ating program in which normal administrative cautiors had been set aside
and the occurrence of abuses had assumed serious proportions.
Further oversight hearings on the 235 program were held by the House
Banking and Currency Committee on March 31, 1971. Although the HUD
Audit report was already in existence, the results were not provided by
HUD to the Committee on the grounds that the study was not yet completed.
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86. Ibid. , p. 70.
During the hearings, Secretary Romney provided modest confirmation of
the abuses transmitted by the Committee to BUD, while avoiding any
program-wide assessments. He pointed to several problems that had
been uncovered in the FHA field operation: failure to coordinate insurance
commitments for existing housing with local code enforcement authorities;
negligence in checking on mortgagee certifications that required repairs
had been carried out, and systematic underestimation of utility and main-
tenance expenses. As to whether HUD would compensate victimized own-
ers for necessary repairs, Romney responded that FHA was not authorized
87
to expend funds for that purpose. Instead, he recommended the follow-
ing actions: 1) Where defaulting owners had been subject to overappraisal
or major repairs resulting from faulty inspection, they would be allowed
to submit a deed in lieu of foreclosure -- an alternative which allowed the
owner to turn over the deed for the property to HUD without any jeopardy
to his or her credit record and without endangering their ability to pur-
chase another house under the program. 2) HUD would exert pressure on
builders to make the necessary repairs under threat of disqualification
from FHA mortgage insurance programs. 3) HUD would take steps to
strengthen the quality of FHA field operations. 4) HUD would develop
regulations, under an amendment to section 518, for processing com-
plaints. 5) HUD would set up a task force to develop a counseling program
for 235 applicants, to be carried out by voluntary agencies with possible fee
87. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Committee on Banking
and Currency, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, March 31, 1971, p. 21.
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incentives and to provide applicant purchasers with counseling in the
areas of budget management, ownership responsibilities and costs, home
purchase procedures, housing values and availability, and property main-
tenance. Romney indicated that 70 voluntary organizations were already
participating in 235 counseling efforts. 88
Thus, the exposure of abuses in the program had several direct im-
pacts on FHA program operation. It had led to a 4 tp 6 month suspension
of existing housing purchases under the program; to corrective actions
designed to prevent further abuses through a tightening of FHA standards
and procedures; to remedial action which attempted to enforce supplier
responsibility for repairing serious defects at no cost to FHA; to meas-
ures which allowed victimized owners the option of walking away from
their homes without negative legal sanctions (and without compensation);
and to an increased, though still unformulated commitment to consumer
counseling.
But the exposures also had important negative consequences for the
program. At the local FHA level, news of the impending scandal had by
late 1970 diffused throughout the FHA system. Well before the temporary
suspension in 1971 and the subsequent April guidelines concerning specu-
lator-dominated areas, many Area/Insuring offices had already responded
to these events by slowing down or halting lending in those areas which
seemed most similar to those described in rumors and reports of the
abuses. Regardless of whether the FHA office was vulnerable to the charge
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88. Ibid. , p. 14
of maladministration, the net effect was to halt nearly all inner-city
program activity and most insurance for existing housing. Neither the
lifting of the suspension, nor more accurate information on the extent of
the scandals and abuses, sufficed to reinstate existing or rehabilitated
inner-city housing as substantial sectors of local program activity. For
historical reasons, section 235 evolved into a largely suburban new con-
struction program, thereby limiting its ability to contribute to the revi-
talization of older urban neighborhoods and withdrawing the market sup-
ports for owners who had already purchased in such areas on the assump-
tion that the program would continue to have positive neighborhood effects
which would sustain and possibly appreciate the value of their property.
Moreover, the exposures induced a degree of caution within the FHA in-
suring offices that probably hindered the entry of many eligible families
into the program. Minority families, whose options were more limited to
the older core neighborhoods as a result of discriminatory barriers to
outward movement, had fewer opportunities available to them. In addition,
FHA's increased caution and unwillingness to take risks extended to the
FHA mortgage credit examination. As a result, families at the lower end
of the income range, those with minor credit infractions or questionable
employment histories found it much harder to be approved by FHA, par-
ticularly in tight housing market areas where more credit-worthy purchas-
ers could readily be found. The news of tighter credit standards gradually
made its way to the local builder and mortgage community, and forced
them to tighten their own screening standards as much as possible in order
to avoid costly rejections. The result was that the program began, more
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than ever before, to "cream" the pool of applicants in a way that excluded
otherwise eligible families at the lowest income levels, in opposition to
the "maximum feasible extent" provision of the legislation. 89
At the federal level, the exposures had even more telling effects. From
the start, the concept of lower-income home ownership was extremely
vulnerable; it constituted a controversial and untried federal strategy of
housing betterment for the urban housing-poor. The abuses seemed to
provide a clear confirmation of the belief that the poor could not manage
the responsibilities and risks of home purchase and ownership, and public-
ly stigmatized the program as a failure, as yet another "graveyard of good
intentions. ",90 Although the problems stemmed largely from abusive mar-
ket practices and faulty administration of the program, factors which were
potentially remediable within the program, it was convenient to believe
that the program concept was at question and that a strategy of low-income
home ownership on a national scale might involve unattainable objectives.
More importantly, the abuses provided an early target for forces in the
Nixon administration hostile to the Great Society housing subsidy programs.
Secretary Romney's questioning of the fundamental program concept during
the Committee hearings, was suggestive of the long range agenda of the
new administration.
89. OSTI, William C. Grindley, oE. cit.
90. Glazer, 2E. cit.
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Rising Default and Foreclosure Rates
During the latter part of 1970, Secretary Romney was beleaguered by
yet another problem within the FHA system. Mounting foreclosures were
occurring with particular intensity in the city of Detroit, largely among
homes insured under the moderate income 221(d)(2) program. By the end
of the year, properties acquired by HUD in Detroit as a result of owner
abandonment represented about 11 percent of HUD's total inventory; high
default rates were indicative of more foreclosures to come. By Septem-
ber, Romney had di'spatched a HUD team to investigate the default situa-
tion in Detroit. The conclusions reached after a survey of a sample of
defaulting 221 home owners undoubtedly colored Romney's concerns with
the 235 program, as well as the position he took at the subsequent hear-
ings:
"... While we found some failings on the part of underwriting and
we are recommending corrective steps, nevertheless, what we
found as the causes for default could be expected. There are no
changes in underwriting procedures which can reduce the inci-
dence of foreclosure without restricting our involvement in the
inner-city. We are dealing with high risk properties and high
risk purchasers. Losses will inevitably be high. The alterna-
tives are stricter credit and property standards which would have
the effect of depriving those most in need from the areas and hous-
ing they can afford. The high incidence of default and foreclosure
must be expected to be substantially greater than in the past.
We found that people in the inner-city are extremely vulnerable
to periodic losses of income whether from illness (loss of pay,
or doctor bills, or both) or job loss; and they have no reserve
funds. Illness, loss of job and family problems accounted for
70% of the defaults in our survey. These problems are compound-
ed by the attitude of mortgagees who are completely unsympathetic
of any delinquency and foreclose at the first opportunity. The
properties are old and require much maintenance while the low in-
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come purchasers are least able to afford high maintenance prop-
erties. The results are often neglect, deterioration, and even-
tual abandonment. "91
By the Spring of 1971, the news of Detroit had swept the media, focus-
ing public attention on the large number of abandoned properties which had
fallen into HUD's hands under the unsubsidized 221(d)(2) program. It be-
came commonplace in newspaper and television commentary to refer to
Secretary Romney as "the largest slumlord" in the country. Although
Detroit was relatively unique as a problem area for the 221(d)(2) program,
the images conjured up by the press left no room for the more positive
experiences of the program, such as the carefully worked-out program in
Milwaukee which had been targeted at welfare families without the disas-
trous consequences of Detroit. 92 But in the urban imagery of the 1960's,
Detroit had occupied a special role as a center of some of the worst condi-
tions and disorders of the period and as a subsequent target of remedial
federal attention. That the 221 program had contributed to turning many
of its vast, black, inner-city neighborhoods into a virtual ruin of abandon-
ed housing was a compelling image of the failure of federal efforts to im-
prove the fundamental quality of urban life among the poor. 93 The news
91. U. S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 3,
April, 1972.
92. See U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, SRS News-
letter, 2. cit.
93. For a journalistic account of the Detroit FHA program, see: Boyer,
22- cit.
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of Detroit, coming soon after the disclosure of 235 abuses, further stig-
matized the question of lower-income home ownership and made any re-
port of excessive defaults or failures under the 235 program a news-
worthy item. Despite the Congressional realization from the start that
the program would be actuarially unsound, and its crystallization in Sen-
ator Clark's estimate of a 25 percent failure rate, the image of Detroit
served to exacerbate the vulnerability of the 235 program to subsequent
judgments of failure and to sensitize the issue of defaults and mortgage
failures under the program.
By 1971 the 235 program seemed well on its way to developing its own
Detroits, though for somewhat different reasons. Although by the end of
the year the cumulative 235 mortgage failure rate was about 3 percent
nationally, the failure rate for metropolitan Seattle was estimated at 14. 5
percent and generally interpreted as a direct consequence of recent set-
backs in the city's dominant aerospace industry. At the same time 235
defaults in the Seattle FHA insuring office were running at about 10 per-
cent. Though Seattle maintained a uniquely high mortgage failure rate,
some other FHA insuring offices were beginning to experience alarmingly
high default rates -- Washington, D. C. (21%), Columbia, S. C. (11%),
San Antonio, Texas (8%), and Newark, N. J. (8%) - - against a national de-
fault rate of about 4. 6%. 94 Informed speculation offered a different
94. The data supplied here were provided by HUD's 235 Branch, Hous-
Production and Mortgage Credit, Research and Statistics.
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reason for each of these trouble spots in the program. In Washington,
it represented the aftermath of an abusive, speculator-dominated, exist-
ing housing program; in Columbia there were reports of serious deficien-
cies in much of the new construction; and so on. 95 But the prospect of
walk-away foreclosures, first predicted in the House Committee staff re-
port, as well as the spectre of Detroit, had stimulated a major concern
with the gradually rising wave of defaults under the program and a ten-
dency to view them as next year's mortgage failures.
The question of 235 defaults arose during the Spring, 1971 hearings of
the House Appropriations Committee, to which Secretary Romriey respond-
ed:
"I'ts mixed. Oh, sure, we have had some defaults. It's mixed.
In some places it's not good. I have seen areas where it is just
not good. It's one of those programs I describe as a very com-
plex program...It's one of those programs that I think we need
to take a look at from the standpoint of whether or not that is the
best way to do it.''96
Romney's perception of mixed results was accurate. Unlike Seattle or
the other isolated trouble spots in the 235 program, most insuring offices
maintained respectably low default as well as mortgage failure rates.
Even in the high-volume offices in Denver and Vllwaukee, default rates
were no more than 2 percent and failure rates less than 1 percent, well
95. Informal conversations with members of HUD's Housing Management
Branch in the fall of 1972.
96. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part 2,
April 20, 1971, p. 62.
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within the bounds of the more conventional FHA programs. 97 Although
the national rates had not yet escalated to a level that merited any alarm
the Committee probes of HUD officials reflected a central concern with
imminent mortgage defaults and failures, undoubtedly related to the re-
cent Detroit experience. Assistant Secretary Gulledge's testimony pro-
vided a partial confirmation of renewed Congressional concern with the
actuarial risks of the program: As of March, 1971, the 235 failure rate
was 1. 4% against the 1% rate that would have pertained under the standard
FHA program.98 Assistant Secretary Watson cited the high costs of
bringing HUD-acquired 235 properties into resaleable conditioil, averag-
ing $3400 per unit.
Although the prognosis for the program was not promising, it was hard-
ly disastrous in early 1971. But the commitment on the part of Congress
to a high-risk, actuarially unsound program, which in 1968 had been con-
sidered worthwhile because of its social objectives, had begun to erode
in the wake of Detroit. Ironically, when asked about the pattern under-
lying the 235 defaults, Watson cited the results of a recent survey of
221(d)(2) defaults in Detroit, in which illness, loss of income, and fam-
ily problems had accounted for the majority (70%) of defaults. 100 The
97. Source: HUD 235 Branch, Research and Statistics.
98. U. S. House of Representatives, April, 1971, cit. , p. 244.
99. Ibid. , p. 62.
100. Ibid., p. 458.
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implicit administrative critique of the 235 program was the "life at the
margin" argument:
"No amount of sound underwriting analysis can predict in ad-
vance when or where these events will occur". 101
The issue of default and mortgage failure had shifted the question of
whether the program involved worthwhile, though high risks to whether
it was at all viable from the perspective of the consumer. It had also
served to deflect the blame for the program's malfunctioning from the
administration to the home owner.
A year later, in March of 1972, a report developed by the House Ap-
propriations Committee sounded a clear alarm concerning rising defaults
in the program. 102 Interviews with HUD field staff and mortgagees had
indicated an expectation of high failure rates due to the inability of 235
families to sustain long-term ownership commitments. The reasons
cited included incomes too low to enable families to make necessary re-
pairs and a general lack of familiarity on the part of mortgagors with
normal ownership responsibilities. The report indicated that some mort-
gagees anticipated failure rates from 20% to as high as 50%. 103 Despite
Romney's guarded position concerning the program concept, he attacked
these speculations as biased and exaggerated. At the subsequent appro-
101. Ibid.
102. U.S. House of Representatives, "Surveys and Investigations Staff
Report", contained in Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, April, 1972, op. cit. , pp. 1294-1344.
103. Ibid., p. 1323.
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priations hearings in April at which Romney requested a first appropria-
tion, $195 million, for the special risk insurance fund, he indicted the
press for equating default with mortgage failure in estimating the num-
ber of HUD-owned 235 properties.104 Against a rising tide of criticism
from the media and from an increasingly cautious Congress, and an in-
creasingly unsupportive President, Romney and his staff mustered their
best, though belated defense of the program.
But the figures were undebatable. By March of 1972, the mortgage
failure rate had risen to 4. 4%, with every expectation that there would
be upsurges to come.105 And defaults were rising as well. The admin-
istrative loss for reconditioning HUD-acquired units was also inflating
to an estimated $5,000 per unit, and becoming a major subsidy element
in the program. Against these facts, Assistant Secretary Gulledge took
a position of moderated optimism; claiming that losses could be expected
to peak within the first few years of the program and then subside
and that steps had been taken in the field FHA offices to strengthen the
the quality of future 235 mortgages. 106 Romney cited a departmental
analysis which indicated that a majority of 235 home owners (62%) were
receiving decreased subsidies because of corresponding increases in
their income levels; only 25% were receiving increased subsidy amounts.1 0 7
104. Ibid., p. 62.
105. Ibid. , p. 178.
106. Ibid., p. 315.
107. Ibid. , p. 121.
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A departmental submission to the Committee stated:
"We find no evidence on a national basis that the section 235
program is approaching an actuarial unsound basis, nor do
we project such a position to occur. "108
Simultaneously, a GAO study issued in late 1972 found that 235 fam-
ilies who had purchased homes during the first half of 1969 had by June,
1971, experienced a mortgage failure rate of 11. 3 percent. 109 Although
the figure was high enough to unsettle the optimists, it provided some
comfort to those who tended to believe the earlier estimates provided by
mortgagees. However, it went unrecognized that the cohort sample used
by GAO consisted of early purchasers in the 235 program at a point when
the existing housing component of the program was disproportionately
large. As a result, the figure represented an overly high estimate of
mortgage failures that might be expected during the first two to three
years of 235 ownership. Moreover, improved administration of the pro-
gram would be likely to lower the failure rate as well. Against the
early HUD estimates in 1968 of a cumulative mortgage failure rate of 25%,
made well before actuarial data was available on the program, the GAO
report was reassuring:
". . . the data indicate that the program is not sustaining as
heavy a foreclosure rate as the Section 221(d)(2) program and
that the [actuarial] estimate of 25 percent is much too high...
The publicity given the foreclosure rate and associated prob-
lems in central-city areas of several metropolitan areas do
108. Ibid. , p. 1438.
109. U. S. Comptroller General (GAO), o2. cit. , pp. 92-93.
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represent very real and very vexing problems, but should
not be allowed to distort our impression of the overall exper-
ience in the low-cost subsidy programs. "110
Despite increasing evidence that the occurrence of mortgage defaults
and failures under the program would remain well within the bounds of
acceptable tolerances originally set by Congressional intent -- even in
the face of unanticipated market abuses and serious administrative short-
comings -- there were clear signs that the President was about to per-
form radical surgery on the program. Romney's increasing alienation
from the President had been well publicized by the press, and taken as
an indication of executive disdain for many of HUD's programs.' By
late fall of 1972, Romney had submitted his resignation.
In December, 1972, during the last days of the program, the hearings
of the Joint Economic Committee were used as an opportunity by Con-
gressional defenders of the program to defuse the issue of mortgage de-
faults and failures. The GAO conclusions were cited, and Senator Prox-
mire pressed for a "systemic" interpretation of mortgage problems, at-
tributing them to failings in program administration rather than to the
program concept itself. The Senator noted the differences between the
221(d)(2) programs in IVlwaukee and Detroit and ascribed them to differ-
ences in HUD management. ill In response, Elmer Staats, the director
of GAO briefly forwarded an alternative interpretation, the "contextual"
110. Ibid. , p. 69-70.
111. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, December, 1972, 2.
cit. , p. 34 and p. 37.
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hypothesis, that local economic conditions might also contribute to strong
variations in default rates from one locality to another. 112
In a prepared statement, Henry Aaron, of the Brookings Institution,
chided that the doubts over the soundness of the program had been "mis-
directed and out of proportion" and pointed to the fact that only a small
minority of 235 units were in default in a program that could be expected
to have high risks.113 Anthony Downs had recently completed a study of
the federal housing subsidy programs for the National Association of
Home Builders. His testimony before the Committee supported the
values of the program as a production strategy; by the end of 1972, after
four years of operation, it had insured close to 400, 000 homes. In his
view, the administrative problems in the program were being remedied:
"I think the administration has already taken a tremendous
number of steps to alter the way 235 is administered. In
fact... they have gone the other way. FHA is practically par-
alyzed with fear of being over-regulated, to the point that we
understand in many offices they are over-cautious now in
making commitments. They have gone from one extreme to
the other. I do not think the problem [of administrative neg-
ligence]... is now a significant one. ,115
A letter to the Committee from William Vhitbeck, the HUD Area Of-
fice Director in Detroit, echoed the GAO finding that the causes for
112. Ibid. , p. 37.
113. Ibid. , p. 277.
114. Anthony Downs, Federal Housing Subsidies: Their Nature and Ef-
fectiveness and What We Should Do About Them (Chicago, Ill.:
Real Estate Research Corporation, October, 1972).
115. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, December, 1972, op.
cit., p. 305.
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default were poorly understood, and that a systematic study of the de-
fault process should be undertaken rapidly. Whitbeck's letter was crit-
ical of HUD's failure to evaluate its own programs, and of the "unreality"
that seemed to pervade the issue of default. 116
The eleventh-hour deliberations of the Joint Economic Committee had
focused largely on a reassessment of the program's viability in terms of
expected loss rates, and attempted to consolidate expert testimony and
Congressional support for the continuance of the program. There was
little discussion of the plight of defaulting mortgagors who had already
purchased under the program, or of possible interventions that might
assist them in the remedy of default situations. Surprisingly, no men-
tion was made of mortgagor insurance, nor was the 1969 report of the
Insurance Technical Assistance Group considered. HUD had not exer-
cised its prerogatives of indulgence for mortgagors who had invontaily
fallen into default and were likely to recover in time, as former FHA
commissioner Brownstein had expected. Nor had there been any syste-
matic effort on HUD's part to encourage mortgagees to exercise forebear-
ance wherever possible. 117 Indeed, HUD had not yet operationalized an
an effective system for the timely reporting of defaults and fbreclosures
116. Ibid. , p. 264.
117. OSTI (Organization for Social and Tecnnical Innovation), An Evalua-
tion of the HUD Concentrated Default Counseling Program, (Report
contracted by HUD), Newton, Mdass. , January, 1974.
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by mortgagees.118 Interestingly, the GAO estimates of aggregate of
failure rates for the program had been based on implicit "status quo"
assumptions reflecting the continued absence of any supportive interven-
tion for defaulting mortgagors, whether in the form of insurance, indul-
gence, or forebearance mechanisms. Whether appropriate remedial in-
terventions during the default process might serve to reduce the GAO es-
timate of anticipated mortgage failure rates was unknown. The prevailing
bias among supporters of the program was to look toward preventive stra-
tegies rather than remedial strategies.
The Whitbeck letter, calling for a consumer-based study of default,
proved to be the only HUD presence at the late 1972 hearings. Romney
refused to testify himself or to send another representative of HUD: "I
just do not feel this is the proper time to appear. " 119 It could be inferred
that Romney was too busy briefing his successor, James T. Lynn, to pre-
pare to testify before the Committee. On the other hand, it was one of
the clearest signs of the imminent administrative abandonment of the
235 program.
The Moratorium Period
There were other, earlier signs of waning administrative support for
118. Ibid.
119. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, December, 1972, o.
cit. , pp. 2-3.
-140-
the program, even in the face of continuing Congressional support. In
what seemed a surprising administrative turnabout, HUD made no re-
quest in 1971 for a counseling appropriation under Section 237 for fiscal
year 1972. Though such an appropriation had already been twice refused
by Congress in preceding years, this was the first time HUD had failed
to make the effort. On the other hand, in the wake of the exposures of
abuses in the program, key Congressional supporters of Section 235 had
come to believe that pre-purchase counseling might be an effective means
of protecting consumer interests during the purchase process and reduc-
ing the risks of subsequent voluntary, walk-away foreclosures.' Existing
counseling efforts among voluntary agencies had reached only a small
proportion (3%) of 235 purchasers and were of uncertain and uneven
quality.120 To enable HUD to mount an effective pre-purchase counsel-
ing effort on a national scale, Congress passed a special appropriation of
$3. 25 million for fiscal year 1972.
It was significant that the appropriation went unused by HUD until the
last months of the fiscal year, and even more significant that Secretary
Romney chose to divert the funds from pre-purchase counseling toward
a new program of concentrated default counseling. The default counsel-
ing program was launched in the summer of 1972 as a way of providing
advisory assistance to defaulting mortgagors in 19 high-default cities
across the country. Although the program ultimately proved to have
120. OSTI, May, 1974, 2p2. cit.
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positive results in ameliorating defaults and reducing administrative
losses due to repossession,121 Romney's move was viewed as a cynical
expression of priorities which favored pragmatic remedial efforts over
new preventive strategies that would improve the prospects for ongoing
purchases under the program.
During 1972, reports grew more frequent of a continuing feud between
Nixon and Romney over the lack of Presidential support for HUD's urban
programs.122 In the face of accelerating inflationary trends, the admin-
istration showed increasing reluctance to support residential construction
and other federally-assisted construction efforts. It proposdd to sub-
stitute a housing allowance approach for the existing housing subsidy
programs. During the 1972 presidential campaign, both Nixon and
McGovern went on record as favoring housing allowances over the contin-
'123
uation of the subsidy programs. In the glare of the negative publicity
the 235 program had received, attacks on the subsidy programs occasioned
little public debate. Although the Downs study was completed by
121. OSTI, January, 1974, op. cit. Also see: U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Counseling for Delinquent Mort-
gagors, An evaluation Report, August, 1975, and Counseling for
Delinquent Mortgagors, A Staff Study, November, 1975.
122. The New York Times, March 29, 1972, 42:1, and August 13, 1972,
87:1.
123. See: Arthur P. Solomon and Chester G. Fenton, "The Nation's
First Experiment in Housing Allowances: The Kansas City Demon-
stration", Land Economics, August, 1974, pp. 213-23; and HUD:
First Annual Report of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program,
1973, and Housing Allowances: The 1976 Report to Congress, Feb-
ruary, 1976.
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October,124 its positive findings had little impact on the negative image
of the program.
Shortly after Nixon's reelection in November, Romney submitted his
resignation. By December, reports had begun to leak of an impending 18-
month moratorium on new commitments under the subsidy programs.125
The rumors stimulated a number of FHA insuring offices to step up their
application review procedures in order to make as many commitments as
possible before the deadline was announced. In one of his last official
acts, Romney issued a memorandum in early January, 1973 announcing
the immediate imposition of the moratorium. -
Congressional protest was intense but hardly effective. The Joint
Economic Committee report charged that:
"... the Administration has... chosen to abandon Federal hous-
ing subsidy programs without justification, and without alterna-
tive proposals... we strongly opose the Administration's arro-
gant solution by elimination. "
The report supported the view that the program's shortcomings were
largely the result of administrative mismanagement. Despite continuing
Congressional challenges to the power of the executive to impound appro-
priated funds, which elevated the issue to a constitutional question pending
124. Anthony Downs, oE. cit.
125. See The New York Times, December 23, 1972, 1:1.
126. U.S. Congress, Housing Subsidies and Housing Policy, Report of
the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint
Economic Committee, March 5, 1973, pp. 2-3.
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further consideration by the courts, the "18-month" moratorium has per-
sisted well beyond its proposed duration. Further administrative initia-
tives under the lower-income program have been largely remedial in
nature: continuation of funded counseling assistance to defaulting'mort-
gagors, attempts to improve mortgagee cooperation in remediating
serious defaults, and efforts geared to the turnover and resale of HUD-
acquired properties.
During its short and unhappy life span from 1968 through 1972, the
235 program had subsidized the purchase of close to 400,000 homes; the
overwhelming majority of them (81%) were newly constructed. .27 Its
sibling rental program -- section 236 -- had produced a roughly equiva-
lent amount of units. Taken together, the two constituted an unprecedent-
ed production record for federally-assisted low-income housing.128
More recently, the concern and controversy over anticipated mortgage
default and failure rates under the program has tended to subside for a
number of reasons. The increased availability of actuarial trend data
over time made it possible to predict aggregate failure rates with greater
certainty. A HUD task force study undertaken in early 1973, shortly
after James Lynn became Secretary of HUD, concluded:
127. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1974 Statis-
tical Yearbook, Table 131, pp. 120-121.
128. Since the moratorium an additional 72,000 units have been purchas-
ed under Section 235 as a result of outstanding commitments to
builders and developers.
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"The latest simulations conducted for the program, based on
four years of experience as well as the last 26 years of the
basic [FHA] mortgage insurance program, indicated that the
insurance fund for Section 235 was actuarially sound but at the
break-even point. A final default termination rate [i. e. aggre-
gate failure rate] of 18. 6 percent has been calculated... i" 129
Moreover, recent trends in the program confirm the expected "Rayleigh"
effect130 of a plateauing of mortgage default and failure rates after the
mortgages age beyond the first few years. (See Table III.)
Viewed from the legislative vantage point of 1968 when the program
was first passed, section 235 has undoubtedly confounded the optimists
who believed a program of lower-income home purchase could be readily
accommodated within the existing FHA structure and would manifest the
actuarial soundness of the more conventional FHA programs. For those
who were more cautious or pessimistic from the start -- like Secretary
Weaver or Senator Clark -- the record of the program is somewhat more
remarkable in that its failures seem likely to fall substantially below the
original 25% prediction. That it has managed to fare as well as it has,
despite a number of unpredictable and devastating occurrences -- abusive
market practices, careless if not negligent administration, "double-digit"
inflation in the price of consumer goods (particularly utility costs), a
major national economic recession which has resulted in unemployment
129. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing in
the Seventies, October 6, 1973, p. 4-54.
130. R. Jeffery Green and George M. von Furstenburg, "The Effects of
Race and Age of Housing on Mortgage Delinquency Risk", Urban
Studies, 1975, 12, pp. 85-89
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TABLE III. NUMBER OF INSURED
ULATIVE MORTGAGE
YEAR DEFAULTS, BY
1968-1975131
235 PURCHASES, CUM-
FAILURES, AND END-
CALENDAR YEAR,
Cumulative Number
of Insured Purchases
25,613
130,613
275,090
394,337
452,010
465,972
471,667
Cumulative Mort-
gage Failures*
0. 16%
0. 93%
2. 93%
6. 26%
9. 65%
13. 75%
16. 39%
End-Year
Defaults*
0. 55%
1. 96%
4. 61%
6. 49%
7. 77%
7. 01%
6. 03%
* as percentage of the cumulative number of insured purchase, referred
to by HUD as cumulative "default terminations".
** as percentage of insurance in force at beginning of year, referred to
by HUD as "in default".
131. Source: IUD-Washington, anagement Information Systems, Home
Activities Branch. The table excludes Section 235(j) purchases
through non-profit sponsors, which represented less than one per-
cent of 235 units.
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Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
rates second to those of the Depression -- seems even more remarkable.
The controversies that came to surround the implementation of the
235 program were the result of both unanticipated program consequences
and those which had been envisioned during the legislative process. The
early exposure of administrative and market abuses in the program had
shocked program advocates who had reasonably expected much more of
FHA. But the rising wave of mortgage defaults and failures had been
clearly anticipated by Congress as an inherent risk within the program.
Nevertheless, the issue of defaults and repossessions had been sufficient-
ly publicized and politicized in the interim to foster Congressional amnes-
ia concerning acceptable loss tolerances and to reignite the question of
program losses as a telling criticism of the program and its underlying
precepts.
The debates that ensued in Washington represented a politicized polar-
ization of views and interpretations of the program's increasingly ap-
parent shortcomings between a predominantly Democratic Congress sup-
porting continuance of the program and a new Republican administration
assuming a defensive or hostile stance toward continuing criticism. The
latter camp tended to rally around the "life at the margin" explanation of
the program's negative outcomes and questioned the validity of the lower-
income ownership concept itself. Congressional proponents asserted the
"systemic" interpretation, attributing negative outcomes to HUD's faulty
administrative management of program operations and sought remedial
changes in the program.
However, the unexpected stability of the program over the longer term
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and the fact that it has tended to remain within prescribed, acceptable loss
tolerances, despite exogenous occurrences that could be expected to un-
seat many owners, should give pause to both the "systemic" and "life at
the margin" propositions as dominant explanations of program realities.
To the extent that either of them is valid, their impacts are more finite
than would have been expected and confined to a limited sector of the pro-
gram. Certainly neither seems to have been a pervasive influence on
the program in terms of sheer numbers. The relatively bounded nature
of apparent problems in the program over the longer range suggests that
there are far more differentiations within the program -- as afnong dif-
ferent program areas or contexts, and among different kinds of owning
households -- than either of these views can take account of. It is also
an indication of the unfortunate tendency toward negative stereotyping of
the program that occurred during its initial years of implementation.
The survey analysis of consumer experience in the program, which is
presented in subsequent chapters, is an attempt to make some of the key
differentiations that will more accurately account for the program's
emergent outcomes.
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Chapter IV. CONSUMER EXPERIENCE: PRELUDE TO PURCHASE
The analysis of consumer experiences in the 235 program, which be-
gins with this chapter, is intended to serve three primary objectives:
(1) To determine the extent to which and the ways in which 235 own-
ership proved to be functional or dysfunctional among urban purchasers
as a whole, and among various subgroups of purchasers distinguished by
income and race. In this regard, one of the key foci for assessment is
the degree to which the adequist, relativist, and functionalist perspectives
respectively illuminate the role of tenure choice among urban lower-
income households as an aspect of public policy
(2) To assess the relative contribution of alternative factors --
income differences among purchasers, deficiencies in house condition at
purchase, and local employment conditions -- to the process of 235 mort-
gage degeneration indicated by default and aborted ownership. These
factors are intended to correspond respectively to alternative interpreta-
tions or theories of 235 mortgage degeneration: the "life at the margin"
interpretation, the "systemic" interpretation, and the "contextual" inter-
pretation.
(3) To learn from consumer experiences in the program whether and
how future policies might be more effective in providing viable ownership
opportunities.
The implied scope of concerns calls for the use of longitudinal assess-
ments before and after purchase, and for the chronological development
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-- in survey analytic terms -- of the purchase and ownership scenarios
of program participants, from the initial decision to move and purchase
through the early years of 235 ownership. As a result, the choice has
been made to structure the analysis chronologically. This chapter de-
scribes the characteristics of the urban purchaser sample and analyzes
their pre-purchase residential characteristics, their early orientations
to home purchase, and the process of house search and selection. Chap-
ter V, which follows, analyzes the housing outcomes immediately consequent
to purchase and the occurrence of pre-purchase abuses as perceived by
the new owners. Chapter VI treats key experiences over the initial years
of ownership, including an analysis of mortgage default and failure epi-
sodes, as well as terminal consumer assessments of their ownership ex-
periences as of the point of the survey interviews. The concluding chap-
ter VII represents an analytic synthesis of the survey material in terms
of conclusions regarding the three foci described above.
The analysis makes frequent reference to tabular material summariz-
ing survey responses and analytic indices. For the purpose of maintain-
ing the narrative flow of the analysis, the tables have been consolidated
in Appendix B, unless otherwise indicated.
A. The Urban Purchasers: Who Participated?
Despite the frequently-held images of Section 235 as a minority hous-
ing program, a two-thirds majority (66%) of the urban purchasers in the
sample were white households. The remaining families in the program
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were, with few exceptions, either black or of Spanish surname in a ratio
of roughly two--to-one respectively. Considering the earlier exclusionary
tendencies of FHA, it is worthwhile considering whether minority pur-
chasers were adequately represented among urban home buyers in the
235 program. For the purpose of drawing a comparison between the po-
tential urban constituency for the program and its actual constituency in
terms of minority representation, a convenient reference group was
chosen consisting of families in the ten metropolitan areas sampled whose
incomes lay between the poverty level and twice the poverty level,1 an
income interval which was assumed to be representative of most house-
holds for whom entry into the program was likely. The results indicate
that minority families were better represented among urban 235 purchas-
ers than they were in the reference population at large. Only 15 percent
of the reference population were minority families as opposed to 33 per-
cent of the urban purchasers, with a corresponding under-representation
of white households among the Section 235 purchasers. In short, relative
to their numbers, the rate of participation in the program among minor-
ity households was somewhat greater than that for white households, in-
dicating that the program -- whatever its faults -- succeeded in opening
up FHA purchase opportunities for minority families as had been intended.
Although the median annual income of urban purchasers ($6,537)
approximates the figure for the national program as a whole ($6,500), it
1. Figures obtained from 1970 Census of Population, Vol. 1, part 1,
section 2, Table 347.
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is striking to note the wide range of incomes served by the program.
Roughly a quarter (23. 4%) of the urban purchasers had incomes below
$5,000; another quarter (24. 3%) had incomes of $8,000 or more. Even
when household size is taken into account to estimate per capita income
levels (See Table IV. 1 .), it is apparent that the urban 235 program serv-
ing a diverse constituency ranging from the urban poor to families who
would be considered to have modest, but comfortable income levels. It
would seem that the "life at the margin" images of 235 home owners, to
the extent they are valid, are likely to apply only to a particular sector
of the program.
The diversity of the program's urban constituency is even more ev-
ident if one disaggregates household characteristics by purchaser groups,
defined in terms of race and income. (See Table IV. 2.) The most disad-
vantaged among the purchaser groups are minority households at the lower
levels. Constituting nearly a quarter of the urban purchasers (22. 5%),
they manifest the lowest median income levels and the largest household
sizes; low occupational skill and educational levels; a high rate of single-
adult household structures; and the strongest dependency on public assis-
tance. At the other extreme are white purchasers with relatively high
incomes, whose profiles indicate a substantial advantage in every respect
over minority purchasers within either income category and over other
white purchasers as well. That this group constitutes nearly half of the
urban purchasers (44. 1%) -- the largest among the purchaser groups --
2. Refer to Table A-4, Appendix A.
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is only mildly significant as a maldistributive effect of the program con-
sidering the general under-representation of white households among the
home buyers. But it is a telling indication of the distortions that emerged
in the evolving images of the 235 program.
In short, the urban 235 program attracted a constituency which was
diverse both in terms of income and race. Whether it promoted residen-
tial integration in those terms is a question to be addressed subsequently
in this study. However, the differences in the demographic profiles of
minority and white home buyers suggest that the program tended to func-
tion dichotomously in the selection of families from each group'. Mnor-
ity purchasers tend to cluster at the lower end of the income and social
class range, white purchasers at the upper end of the range. This ten-
dency of the program to allow entry to poor or lower class minority fam-
ilies at the same time it admitted more advantaged white families is
confirmed by key profile variables. The median income for white pur-
chasers in the urban program is over $7,000 as compared with $5,800
for minority purchasers; median per capita incomes are $1, 670 against
$940. Similar differences are observable in educational and occupational
attainment levels. In attempting to account for the dichotomous nature
of the program's urban constituency, it seems reasonable to assume that
the pattern is not the result of differing preferences among potential
minority and white purchasers, 3 or of a scarcity of minority families at
3. Consumer studies tend to argue against this assumption. See: Ford,
p. cit., Fortune, _o. cit. , Rosow, op. cit. , and Glazer, o2. cit.
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the upper income levels of the eligible range. 4 It is more likely the
pattern emerges as a by-product of structural factors within the 235 pur-
chase system, such as the nature of the housing sub-markets in which the
two groups tended to participate and the screening practices of housing
suppliers. This assertion will be discussed further in the subsequent
analysis.
As a whole, employment and occupational characteristics of the urban
home buyers fall generally within the expected range for the targeted
"lower-income" constituency. Only a small proportion of buyers (7%)
reported no income from employment, and a substantial majority (81%)
of wage earners had been stably employed for three or more years. 5 Job
stability was fairly high; most job-holders (87%) had held the same job
for at least a year before purchase, and the majority (51%) had maintained
the same job base for more than three years. Occupational designations
show a fairly even split between "white collar" clerical occupations and
"blue collar" manual occupations, clustering around the semi-skilled
level and the skilled manual level. (See Table IV. 3.)
To the program's credit, it was effective in serving large households
within the lower-income range, a group often neglected by previous federal
4. In the metropolitan areas studied, there were substantial numbers
of black renters at the higher income levels.
5. A stable employment period is one in which the wage earner did not
experience an unemployment episode of more than one week's dur-
ation.
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housing programs. 6 The median household size among urban 235 buyers
was 5 persons per household -- high compared to the national family
median of 3 persons7 -- and more than a quarter of the households
(27. 6%) consisted of seven or more persons. (See Table IV. 4.)
In summary, the characteristics of urban purchasers indicate a sur-
prisingly rich variation in socioeconomic and racial characteristics.
The strong income differences provide a useful framework within which
to assess the extent and influence of "life at the margin" problems among
Section 235 home owners with regard to different socio-economic levels.
The already observed dichotomous nature of the program constituency,
in terms of differences between white and minority home buyers, allows
for an examination of the influence of racial differentiation in the 235
program process in terms of the distribution of purchase opportunities.
The over-riding importance of income and racial factors in the program
is the principal reason for maintaining the purchaser group differentia-
tions defined here -- by income and race -- in the succeeding analyses.
B. Pre-Purchase Residential Characteristics
The pre-purchase housing arrangements of urban 235 purchasers man-
ifest a good deal of variation with the exception of tenure itself. However,
not all 235 purchasers were tenants just prior to purchase; a small
6. Smart, et al. , op. cit.
7. Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 41, Table 54.
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proportion (6. 2%) owned the houses they were living in and subsequently
moved to a 235-subsidized house. Nor did all renters move upon pur-
chase; a few purchasers (3. 0%) were occupying rental houses with an
option to buy and the 235 program facilitated the purchase.
Apartment living as opposed to single-family housing predominated
among purchasers (58. 1%), including the sixth of the purchasers (16. 0%)
who were living in public housing developments. That a sizeable propor-
tion of buyers (41. 0%) rented single-family houses prior to purchase sug-
gests that the simple desire for single-family housing accommodations
was not a pervasive motive among many lower-income buyers.' Whatever
the inducements to 235 purchase, or the comparative advantages consum-
ers associated with it, for many families they had little to do with the de-
sire for a single-family house.
By conventional standards of housing deprivation -- excessive rent
8 9 .10burdens, unit overcrowding, and substandard housing conditions --
nearly all 235 households (84. 9%) had been living in units which were
unsuitable on one or more counts during the period just prior to purchase.
The most pervasive housing deprivations among the urban purchasers
8. Defined as housing costs, including utilities, in escess of 25 percent
of household income.
9. Defined as a household density greater than one person per room.
10. Survey response categories indicating substandard conditions re-
flected either structural deficiencies or inadequacies in the working
condition of the plumbing, heating, or wiring systems.
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were in the form of excessive cost burdens, to which over two-fifths of
the families were vulnerable (42. 3%). About a third (32. 2%) were living
in overcrowded conditions, not surprisingly, considering the relatively
large households served by the program. Over a quarter (28. 1%) re-
ported either structural deficiencies in their pre-purchase units, or in-
adequacies in the plumbing, heating, or wiring systems.
As might be expected, the impact of high cost burdens was particular-
ly frequent among purchasers at the lower income levels, where about
two-thirds of the families (65. 0%) paid more than they could reasonably
afford on housing. (See Table IV. 5.) But, on the whole, the iricidence
of intense housing deprivation -- on two or more counts -- fell with par-
ticular severity on the minority purchaser group at the lower income
levels (61. 6%). (See Table IV. 6.) A quarter (25. 0%) of minority house-
holds with incomes below $6,000 were housing-deprived on all three
counts in contrast with a much smaller proportion (9. 5%) among white
families at similarly low income levels, though the latter tended to be the
second most seriously housing-deprived of the purchaser groups. To
the extent that pre-purchase housing stresses under the conditions of
tenancy bear on the motives of families to purchase under the 235 pro-
gram, they are likely to be particularly strong factors for the lower income
purchaser groups, and especially so for minority households.
To some extent, these differences in housing stress were also reflect-
ed in consumer assessments of their degree of satisfaction with their pre-
purchase housing and neighborhoods -- though less dramatically so --
with a consistently higher degree of dissatisfaction registered by lower
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income minority purchasers. The majority of 235 buyers (55%) express-
ed satisfaction with their pre-purchase housing, while a similar propor-
tion of lower income minority households registered dissatisfaction.
While two-thirds of the other purchaser groups had been satisfied with
their neighborhoods, only somewhat more than half of lower income min-
ority households (57%) felt similarly.
In general, the majority of purchasers who had been satisfied with
their pre-purchase neighborhoods stressed the desirable physical and
social features of the neighborhood -- convenience of location, accessi-
bility to key activity centers, physical appearance and character, as well
as the general "neighborliness" of local residents and the presence of
friends and relatives. 1 The most frequently mentioned neighborhood
dissatisfactions prior to purchase tended to be socially-centered rather
than physical in nature, though the mention of impoverished physical con-
ditions was also frequent. These concerns included social irritants --
harassing teenagers, drunks and other undesirables, bad influences on
young children -- and fears of house theft and street crime. This cata-
log of social discontents was consistently repeated with particular inten-
sity among public housing residents. 12 The following open-ended
11. See: Friedand Gleicher, oE. cit. , for confirming findings.
12. See: Lee Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls, Black Families in a Fed-
eral Slum (Chicago, Ill. : Aldine Publishing Company, 1970); "Fear
and the House-As-Haven in the Lower Class," Journal of the Amer-
can Institute of Planners, January, 1966, pp. 23-37; and "The Les-
sons of Pruitt-Igoe", The Public Interest, Summer, 1967, pp. 116-126.
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response, provided by a black family with four children living in an
Indianapolis housing project, is fairly typical:
"People were moving in and tearing up the houses and the
neighborhood isn't where you would want to bring the children
up in. All kinds of wild people living there. Children weren't
safe playing outside at all. [interviewer probe] You just didn't
know what would happen to them. [interviewer probe] We felt
at home. We had a good family of friends in the area. At
first when we moved in everyone was nice. People moved out
though and a different type moved in. But the area became
wild. Sometimes I was afraid. [interviewer probe] They
would steal everything you owned. Before we moved out the
area changed completely. "
The more frequent tendency among the lower income minority purchaser
group to live in public housing, or in what can be inferred to be the tough-
er declining areas of the city, undoubtedly accounts for their greater de-
gree of neighborhood dissatisfaction.
Thus, among the urban purchasers, minority families at the lower
income levels were situated in the most adverse residential circumstances
prior to purchase, adverse in terms of both housing deprivation and res-
idential dissatisfactions. As a result, it is more likely that for this
group residential "push" factors -- the push of stressful housing and
neighborhood conditions -- may play a strong role in the decision to move
to 235 ownership. For the other 235 purchaser groups, one might expect
previous housing and neighborhood circumstances to play a lesser role in
the decision to purchase, and a correspondingly increased "pull" toward
greater residential amenities and toward ownership tenure itself.
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C. Initial Tenure Orientations
In the controversy that arose over abuses in the 235 program and over
rising rates of default and foreclosure, it was convenient for administra-
tive spokesmen to attempt to account for the failings of the program by
calling on images of the "first-time home buyer" and "the inexperienced
home owner":
"You get in some instances welfare families who have been in
public housing, put in a 235 existing unit and they don't even
know when to have a toilet repaired to stop the water from run-
ning so that they won't get a $60. 00 to $ 70. 00 water bill at the
end of the month. "13
Such instances did indeed occur and, because they were frequently cited
during the various oversight hearings, came to dominate the evolving
image of the program. But, as a whole, the pre-purchase backgrounds
of urban home buyers suggest a high degree of "acculturation" to home
ownership well before they transacted a 235 purchase.
Surprisingly, more than one out of six urban purchasers (17. 5%) had
previously owned a home. (See Table IV. 7.) A majority (53. 0%) had not
been previous home owners, but had experiential resources suggesting a
high degree of familiarity with ownership, including at least one set of
parents who had owned a home, 14 as well as close friends or relatives
who had owned for at least five years. Another quarter (23. 4%) had some
13. Testimony of HUD Secretary George Romney, (Appropriations Hear-
ings), April, 1971, oE. it. , p. 63.
14. on the part of the purchaser or spouse
-160-
degree of contact with ownership through either parents or close ac-
quaintances. An extremely small portion of the urban purchasers (6. 2%)
had no familiarity with home ownership at all. While such experiential
resources do not guarantee sophistication on the part of the home buyer,
they represent the resources most families bring to their first purchase,
regardless of their income level.
Nevertheless, minority purchasers tended to have far less familiarity
with ownership than white purchasers, within both the higher and lower
income groups. (See Table IV. 8.) This pattern is undoubtedly a conse-
quence of the lower frequency of ownership among minority farnilies
nationally, which reinforces the observed differences in housing back-
grounds. Most importantly, the pattern suggests that the a priori risks
of purchase -- those which might have been due to ownership inexperience
-- were somewhat greater for minority families who decided to partici-
pate in the program.
It is to be expected that individuals participating in a home purchase
program would manifest a strong tenure preference for owning over rent-
ing. The initial tenure preferences of 235 buyers at the point they were
considering a purchase move indicate that a substantial majority (77. 5%)
clearly favored ownership tenure. However, roughly a quarter of the
purchasers (22. 5%) were either initially indifferent to tenure (13. 4%) or
clearly preferred to rent (9. 2%). The finding indicates that the "pull" of
home ownership among 235 purchasers, however strong, was not univer-
sal. IVoreover, though a majority of each of the purchaser groups shared
a preference for owning, the preference was somewhat weaker among
-161-
minority buyers, and weaker at the higher income levels. (See Table
IV. 8.) It is possible that the stronger ownership preferences among
white purchasers stem, in part, from their greater familiarity with own-
ership. But, to account for this pattern more fully, it is necessary to
understand the motives and concerns that lay beneath the purchase move.
D. The Purchase Decision Process
The events which led urban families to undertake a 235 purchase in-
clude a number of organically inter-related decisions and processes
which are difficult to isolate sequentially, each of which exert a partial
influence on the final purchase decision. Among them are (1) the initial
decision or impetus toward a move, which may or may not involve tenure
valences; (2) the decision to buy, which may have occurred with or with-
out a specific house in mind; and (3) the search process through which
buyers selected a specific house for purchase. With the caveat in mind
that the purchase decision process manifests these inherent complexities,
this section will describe each of these components of the process.
(1) The Decision to Move
Among the numerous reasons purchasers cited as the initial impetus
for the consideration of a move, physical housing factors -- as distin-
guished from tenure -- constituted the dominant concerns. (See Table
IV. 10.) These concerns were most frequently associated with needs for
more space, followed by dissatisfactions with the basic condition of the
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pre-purchase rental unit, and, thirdly, by an assortment of other hous-
ing disequilibria, such as the lack of yard space, dislike of "apartment
living", or concerns with specific housing features beyond space and con-
dition. This finding is consistent with what is generally known of the im-
portant role of disequilibria in physical housing accommodations in deter-
mining residential mobility orientations,15 and with the pre-purchase
housing stresses experienced by 235 purchasers.
Though, in that sense, 235 families were more "housing-oriented" at
the start than "tenure-oriented", tenure concerns constituted an important,
if secondary motive for the initial orientation to a move. Most such con-
cerns -- among a third (34%) of the families -- related to the intrinsic,
less tangible aspects associated with ownership, primarily "owning" as
a value in itself and secondarily as a way of achieving greater housing
autonomy or extricating oneself from landlords. A sixth of the families
(16. 9%) attached more instrumental valences to ownership tenure as a
form of investment or a way of achieving housing economies, typified by
the following statement: "With rents going up so high, it seems like so
much money going down the drain with nothing to show for it. " However,
to the extent that tenure contributed to the initial mobility orientations of
235 families, the less tangible valences attached to owning, rather than
its potential economic advantages, were dominant.
15. Peter H. Rossi, Why Families Move (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1955), p. 9.
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Less prominent as factors motivating the move were neighborhood
concerns, a pattern which reinforces the already observed satisfactions
among purchasers with their prior neighborhoods. Similarly, "quality of
life" factors -- concerns about safety and crime, residential stability or
"roots", family life and child rearing -- were relatively infrequent, though
hardly rare reasons underlying the impetus to move.
With regard to the factors that impelled them to consider a move, the
urban purchasers can be considered to divide into two predominant cate-
gories: those who were seeking housing and residential betterment inde-
pendent of tenure -- whether in rental or purchase units -- and' those for
whom the prospect of a home purchase constituted a primary incentive
for the move. The trade-offs between these bivalent aspects of the move,
and their differential importance among the purchaser groups, can best
be seen in the primary motives families attached to the purchase decis-
ion itself.
(2) The Decision to Buy
Once families perceived the option, the decision to buy a house was
dominated by the valences attached to ownership tenure. (See Table IV.
11.) That a substantial majority (78. 2%) of families cited tenure-related
reasons among the motives underlying the purchase decision is less sur-
prising than the fifth (21. 8%) who did not. That is, a considerable portion
of the urban purchasers -- albeit a minority -- viewed their participation
in the 235 program as instrumental to other residential goals having little
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to do with home ownership, and were relatively impervious to the so-called
"urge to own".
The more frequently mentioned tenure-related reasons involved the less
tangible aspects of home ownership -- owning as an end in itself, the values
of autonomy and independence, and other subsumed values. 16 In some
such instances, owning had been a persistent expectation and an assumed
norm. When asked the reasons for deciding to buy, a Pittsburgh woman
responded:
"Just one of them things. Even before we were married we
talked about a brand new house. We have always wanted a
home of our own. "
In other instances home ownership was imbued with deeply-ingrained im-
ages of the healthy, stable family life and the values of independence:
"When they are small the children have to have a place to play,
make friends, go to school, and be happy as well as ourselves.
Now there's only one way as far as Im concerned and that's to
have your privacy and independence and you have to start with
a home of some sort and to me that's to buy it and put into it
all you can for everyone. "
The second most frequent tenure-related reason for buying concerned
the potential economic advantages of ownership. Many such responses
16. Rosow, op. cit. , pp. 752-753. Although Rosow's sample was small
(n=33) and involved middle class respondents, the findings are in gen-
eral agreement with his, regarding the multiplicity of motives for
buying on the part of respondents and the pre-eminence of intangible
attachments to home owning. Also see: Alvin E. Coons and Bert T.
Glaze, Housing Market Analysis and the Growth of Home Ownership
(Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, Bureau of Business Re-
search, 1963), pp. 87-90.
17. Coons and Glaze, 2p. cit. , pp. 132-135. The lesser importance of
cost and investment factors in the purchase decision tends to con-
firm the Coons and Glaze finding that purchaser behavior more
closely reflects a consumer role rather than an investor role.
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showed a practical concern for the waste of capital that rent payments
engendered:
"Because how can you build up a future in rent? Your money
is gone and you have nothing to show for it but paper receipts
and upkeep for someone else's property. You put money into
it to keep things going that the landlord won't do and you have
nothing to show you even spent the money -- it's all down the
drain. "
Other economic responses radiated to broader concerns with property
mobility:18
"If we wanted to get ahead in life, why give someone else your
money like for rent if you can spend it for yourself? It's a
future and a way to get ahead and have something some day
even if it isn't the best. I'ts an opportunity to get ahead. "
In some instances, families simply calculated that the monthly mortgage
payments and utility costs under the 235 program would be less than they
currently paid for rental housing.
But, by and large, the reasons offered for the purchase decision were
richly varied and defied simple classification. 19 Though physical hous-
ing factors, quality of life issues, and neighborhood concerns were less
frequently mentioned as motives for home purchase, many responses
subsumed both tenure valences and a range of other, more palpable
18. Thernstrom, op. cit. and Peattie, op. cit. The association of ten-
ure mobility with class mobility is also discussed in Nelson N. Foote,
et al. , Housing Choices and Housing Constraints (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Company, 1960), pp. 204-206. Opposing findings
are cited in Bennett M. Berger, Working-Class Suburb (Berkeley,
Calif. : University of California Press, 1960), Ch. VI, "Class Con-
sciousness", pp. 80-89.
19. Rosow, op. cit. , p. 752, cities an average of 4. 5 different motives
for home ownership reported by each respondent.
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residential concerns. In that regard, the following responses are typi-
cal:
"We had spent 14 years paying rent to someone. You don't see
anything, it's gone. We were going to have to move because
the landlord was selling the house and it was later torn down.
Kids were getting bigger and we needed more room. The neigh-
borhood was getting bad. You like to raise your kids where you
feel it is safe to walk the streets. "
"When you rent a house you move around a lot because of the
change in rent. [interviewer probe] You don't like to put money
into fixing up someone else's house. [interviewer probe] Own-
ing a house gives the children a chance to settle down and put
down roots. They don't have to keep on changing schools. They
have a feeling of permanence. "20
Because of the complexity and number of reasons respondents can supply
for the purchase decision, an anlysis by frequency of mention is only
helpful in isolating which motivations are pervasive and those which are
relatively rare. By itself it is less illuminating in determining primary
motivations or priorities on the part of purchasers. Wien respondents
were asked to identify "the most important reason for deciding to buy",
the array of responses indicated a rich diversity of priorities among the
purchasing families. (See Table IV. 11.) The attractions of ownership
tenure -- both the affective and the economic valences -- continued to
dominate, but among only a bare majority of purchasers (54. 2%), most
of whom cited the less tangible valences attached to ownership. And a
substantial sector (45. 8%) viewed the 235 purchase primarily as a means
toward other residential ends. Over a fifth of the purchasers (21. 6%)
20. Coons and Glaze, op. cit., found residential stability a frequent
reason for purchase.
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viewed it as a means to housing betterment; another fifth (20. 1%) were
primarily concerned with the quality of life benefits attached to the pur-
chase -- a better place to raise children, benefits to family life, and in-
creased residential stability. Relatively few attached primary importance
to possible neighborhood benefits.
Thus, although over three-quarters of the households indicated tenure
mobility as a contributing motive for the 235 purchase, the prime reasons
offered for the decision indicate a sharper dichotomy among the urban
purchasers in the relative importance they attached to ownership tenure
itself. Roughly half (54. 2%) may be said to have been primarily "owner-
ship-oriented", the other half (45. 8%) "residentially-oriented" in that
residential betterment concerns superceded tenure concerns. These dif-
ferences in purchase orientations are further sharpened and clarified by
considering their incidence among the purchaser groups. (See Table IV.
12.) Though none of the groups maintained either orientation exclusively,
the strongest differences emerge between white and minority purchasers.
A majority of white purchasers (61. 5%) were primarily ownership-oriented
while minority purchasers (59. 4%) retained a strong residential orientation
to the purchase decision. More specifically, a significantly larger portion
of minority purchasers were primarily motivated by housing betterment
concerns. (See Table IV. 13.)
Coupled with what has already been observed of the weaker ownership
familiarity and preferences among minority buyers, the findings as a
whole indicate that minority households were more likely than white house-
holds to view ownership primarily as a means toward residential better-
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ment,21 and particularly as a way of relieving pre-purchase housing
stresses to which they were more vulnerable than whites. The so-called
"urge to own" or "quest for home ownership" was more typical of white
purchasers, particularly those at the higher income levels. The quarter
of the purchasers who either were indifferent to tenure or who preferred
22
to rent were, in a sense, "duress buyers" for whom the purchase was
a necessary prerequisite to residential arrangements and amenities they
preferred. In that respect, there were a larger number of duress buyers
among minority purchasers, particularly at the higher income levels.
Within the framework of the alternative policy perspectives' regarding
tenure choice, the motives and orientations of lower-income home buyers
toward the 235 purchase are illuminating. They suggest that the adequist
view seriously understates the role of ownership as a significant aspect
of the way in which marginal urban families view their housing and resi-
dential futures. On the other hand, they also suggest that the emotional
or social valences implicit in the "urge to own" are not as pervasive as
has been thought. Even among families who were primarily oriented to
tenure mobility, a substantial portion viewed it as property mobility,
stressing the more practical economic advantages of ownership arrange-
ments. Viewed within the relativist context of norm attainment, the
21. Tends to confirm Ford's observations of Harlem families. Ford,
o2. cit.
22. Foote, et al. , 2. cit. , pp. 200-201, discusses the phenomenon of
"duress buyers".
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intangible attachment to owning as an end in itself -- apart from its
economic implications -- manifested itself among most lower-income
purchasers. While this provides a partial confirmation of the importance
of ownership norms, the fact that such concerns were not more pervasive
suggests that home ownership is one among many possible elements pack-
aged in the relativist image of the "good life" in residential terms. The
primary motives for the purchase decision provide a strong reinforce-
ment of the functionalist perceptions of tenure choice and its caveat a-
gainst generalization. 1Vbst families viewed ownership primarily in
instrumental terms depending on their particular situations -- as a form
of family investment, as a means to better housing accommodation, to a
better life situation for the household, or to a superior neighborhood set-
ting. To the extent that the 235 program was to function well for its par-
ticipants, it would be to provide viable ownership situations which would
permit these diverse objectives to be achieved.
(3) The Search and Selection Process
For most families the search process for a purchasable house took a
relatively short period of time and involved a fairly limited range of
choice among available alternatives. A majority (63. 1%) spent at most
three months in selecting and purchasing a house; a third'(33. 9%) took a
month or less. While most home seekers undertook some comparison
shopping, in that they looked at houses other than the one they ultimately
purchased, it is particularly striking that for a majority (55. 0%) the
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purchased house was the only one seen that they considered in the afford-
able price range. (See Table IV. 14.) In addition, over a quarter (26. 2%)
of the families purchased the only house they had seen. It is possible
that the perception of a limited range of choices and the sense of a one-
time opportunity, motivated many families to make a rapid choice. In
part, it was also the result of normal sales pressures:
"I had a five minute walk through the house. I feel I was hur-
ried through the deal by the real estate people, by the statement
'If you don't grab it, someone else will take it. "I
For many purchasers, the imprimateur of a government-backed, FHA
program provided a sense of security that made the risks of a hasty
choice seem negligible:
"Well, we were both pretty dumb about that sort of thing, and
like I say we were desperate, and we looked for the number and
size of rooms. We didn't know too much about construction and
we felt safe because it was with the government and new, never
been lived in -- just felt safe."
However, most purchasers (59. 2%), reported having received some
form of useful outside assistance during the search and selection process.
Whether the remaining group (40. 8%), who reported no useful resources,
had not availed themselves of resources or had not found the help received
to be useful is unclear. Reported sources of useful pre-purchase assis-
tance include a variety of actors: friends or relatives, private market
actors, counseling agencies, lawyers, and FHA. 23 (See Table IV.15.)
Given the "caveat emptor" assumptions one makes about the private
23. Rossi, p. cit. , p. 160. A similar variety of channels of assistance
occur in most moves.
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purchase market, it is particularly striking that private market actors
were frequently considered helpful in retrospect. This is less surprising
if one takes into account that such actors were the "gatekeepers" of the
program, the controlling intermediaries. 24 Whether a family entered
the program or not depended on the selective screening -- at times, dis-
criminatory -- of builders and brokers who had properties to sell. About
a third (33. 4%) of the urban purchasers indicated they first found out
there was a "real opportunity to buy" through private market intermed-
iaries, though more (47. 5%) claimed they found out through friends or
relatives. If problems emerged with purchaser eligibility or With mort-
gage approval, the desire to make a sale made consumer advocates of
builders and brokers and, in that sense, purchasers appreciated their
role in facilitating the purchase. 25
It is less surprising that counseling agencies were infrequently consid-
ered useful sources of assistance. Only an extremely small number (3. 0%)
of urban purchasers were clients of the voluntary counseling agencies HUD
had certified, a factor which indicated the limited extent of HUD's volun-
24. For a discussion of the influence of market intermediaries in the
functioning of federal housing programs, see: Frieden, "Improving
Federal Housing Subsidies: A Summary Report", op. cit.
25. The frequent advocacy of the purchaser against FHA's questioning of
purchaser eligibility was evident in field interviews with brokers and
builders. (OSTI, o2. cit.) One real estate agent was critical of
FHA: "FHA just doesn't understand, and they keep turning back wel-
fare families. Why, with $15 they can buy $81 worth of food stamps,
and that's enough to feed that caliber of people. "
-172-
tary counseling program. 26 However, those few who were clients fre-
quently found the counseling agency the most reliable source of pre-
purchase assistance. 27 Few families made use of independent legal as-
sistance, and many subsequently regretted not having done so. That FHA
was so rarely mentioned as a source of useful help, considering its role
in inspection and appraisal, is indicative of the subsequent owner dissat-
isfactions with the agency's role in carrying out those functions.
Apart from the facilitation of the mechanics of the purchase, where
builders and brokers could be most effective, the more reliable sources
28
of important pre-purchase assistance were largely friends or r.elatives.
The lower level of familiarity with ownership on the part of minority fam-
ilies is an indication that they had lesser access to such network re-
sources. As a result, during the house search and selection process,
minority purchasers were more likely than white purchasers to be forced
to rely exclusively on their own resources in the absence of helpful net-
works, or to rely on private market intermediaries instead. This pat-
tern is particularly apparent in the channels through which families found
the purchased house. Most families (56. 7%) found their homes either
through their own independent search efforts -- following the ads, walk-
ing or driving around -- or through the assistance of friends or relatives.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. , pp. 155-156.
28. Ibid.
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(See Table IV. 16.) But minority purchasers at the lower income levels
were distinct among the purchaser groups in their predominant reliance
on real estate agents. (See Table IV. 17.) The substantial majority
(68. 2%) of lower income minority purchasers found their homes through
real estate agents, while the other purchasers primarily used indepen-
dent and network-related search efforts to locate their homes. 29
The greater reliance on real estate agents among lower income min-
ority purchasers can be accounted for by several factors: lesser access
to network resources who could help in finding a house; lower levels of
familiarity with purchase markets and home ownership; the lack of trans-
portation resources that would enable them to undertake the search on
their own (real estate agents provided transportation); a greater prefer-
ence for and familiarity with submarkets that tended to be broker-domin-
ated, and the possible tendency of real estate agents to target lower in-
come minority families for these submarkets. 30 Whatever the reasons
29. Rossi, op. cit. , p. 162. In Rossi's study of family moves, the find-
ing was opposite: high status movers tended more to use agents and
newspapers, others to use informal network resources. The inver-
sion found in this study may result from the fact that the purchaser
sample is consistently in the lower status range -- where relative
status may imply greater network resources -- and from the exclu-
sive focus on purchase-related moves. Moreover, the agents used
by Rossi's high status families were not likely to be the types who
dominated specific 235 submarkets, so that the parallel may simply
be lost.
30. See: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2p. cit. , pp. 47-61; and
Rose Helper, Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers
(Minneapolis, Minn. : University of Minnesota Press, 1969).
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were, the data indicate that lower income minority buyers -- more than
the other purchaser groups -- were guided to their homes through real
estate intermediaries.
E. Other Expectations of Home Ownership: Costs and Permanence
The motives that led families to undertake a 235 purchase offer some
indication of the range of expectations they had of home ownership: own-
ing as a form of gratification in its own right; its potential economic ben-
efits; improved housing amenities; and positive changes in the quality of
family life. It is also appropriate to consider what expectations purchas-
ers held, at the point they selected a house and made arrangements for
purchase, of the relative cost burdens of ownership compared to rental
and of the degree of permanence attached to the purchase move.
Against the conventional wisdom that owning would involve greater
out-of-pocket costs -- for mortgage payments, utilities, repairs and
maintenance, new furnishings and equipment -- it is surprising to find
that about half (50. 3%) of the home buyers expected that owning would be
cheaper than renting. (See Table IV. 18.) Only a fifth of the purchasers
(20. 7%) anticipated greater expenses, while the remaining purchasers
largely believed that there would be little difference in costs. Although
the subjective basis for cost comparison is uncertain -- whether it was
with the previously rented unit or prospective rentals on the market --
what is apparent is that many families viewed the purchase as a move to-
ward greater economies in housing. Whether this was a false perception,
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based on inadequate information or unreal expectations of the house, is
a question that remains to be addressed. Significant differences in cost
expectations were not observed between higher and lower income purchas-
ers, or between minority and white purchasers. As a group, however,
higher income minority purchasers tended to be more cynical of the po-
tential economies of the move. (See Table IV. 19.)
Expectations of residential stability after purchase are particularly
striking in that most purchasers (61. 0%) viewed the ownership move as
a permanent one rather than as a "stepping stone" or "waystation" to-
ward another home -- a preferable one -- at some point in the future.
(See Table IV. 20.) Despite the seemingly constrained choices made dur-
ing the house search process, the dominant tendency was for families to
view the 235 house as a potentially permanent homestead. However,
there are significant differences among the purchaser groups in this re-
gard. Minority purchasers and those purchasers at the lower income
levels manifested stronger expectations of residential stability. (See
Table IV. 21.) Higher income, white purchasers were the only group that
strongly deviated from the permanent homestead-valuing norm. This
finding suggests that the "stepping stone" or "waystation" view of lower-
income home ownership may have a strong ethnocentric, middle class
bias which distorts the meaning of ownership tenure among the more mar-
ginal urban households. 31 By and large, lower income and minority
31. George Sternlieb is a proponent of this view.
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purchasers in the urban 235 program viewed the opportunity to purchase,
in part, as a step toward greater residential stability and a permanent
home.
32. Coons and Glaze, op. cit. , also found great emphasis on anticipated
residential stability as a motivating reason for the purchase.
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Chapter V. CONSUMER EXPERIENCE: AT PURCHASE
This chapter deals with some of the consequences of the ownership
move immediately upon purchase, including general characteristics of the
purchased house, the new housing cost burdens imposed by initial mort-
gage payments, the condition of the house upon purchase, the degree to
which purchasers were aware of the condition of the house at time of pur-
chase and, in retrospect, the degree to which purchasing families felt
they were subject to abusive treatment during the purchase process. An
analysis and assessment of the general "impact" of the ownership move
along several dimensions is set aside for the subsequent chapter treating
ownership experiences up to the point of the survey interview.
A. General Housing and Residential Characteristics
For nearly all purchasers, the 235 move resulted in ownership of a
single family house (97. 3%), usually detached (86. 1%), on an entirely
(87. 6%) or predominantly (8. 3%) residential street. Only in a few in-
stances did the immediate housing environment fail to conform to a solid-
ly residential pattern, whether the family had moved to a neighborhood
in the inner city or in an outlying area. Moreover, purchasers had been
able to resolve many of the space needs that had contributed to the decis-
ion to move. The mean house size was 6. 2 rooms, excluding bathrooms,
as compared with 5. 4 prior to purchase, and overcrowding among the
purchaser households was reduced from nearly two-thirds before
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purchase (64. 8%) to about a third (36. 7%). Considering the number of
large families participating in the program, this is probably the best that
could be expected.
Although it was not possible to code and characterize the neighborhoods
of origin and destination for 235 purchasers in a multi-city survey sam-
ple, when purchasers were asked whether the 235 move was intraneigh-
borhood, to a nearby neighborhood, or further away, most families
(70. 0%) reported that they considered it a relatively distant move from
the pre-purchase neighborhood. (See Table V. 1.) And there was little
difference among the purchaser groups in this regard.
The observations of OSTI field teams visiting the ten cities included
in the survey sample confirmed a general pattern of new construction in
outlying areas which were "suburban" in character, while existing hous-
ing purchased under the program tended to be located in older, central
city neighborhoods, usually those with large minority concentrations.
This pattern of racial and locational stratification between new and exist-
ing 235 housing submarkets was also reported in a 1971 Civil Rights Com-
mission study of the program in four cities:
"In Little Rock and Denver, the two metropolitan areas in
which a substantial amount of new housing was being produced
... it was found that nearly all was being located in suburban
parts of metropolitan areas. Much of this new, suburban
housing was being purchased by white families. By contrast,
most of the existing housing purchased under the program was
located in ghetto areas or 'changing' neighborhoods in the cen-
tral city. Nearly all was being purchased by minority families.
1. U. S. Civil Rights Commission, o. cit. , p. viii.
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An analysis of the age of the houses bought by the various purchaser
groups in the survey sample tends to confirm this composite pattern.
Although most of the 235 houses were newly constructed (58. 9%), only a
small proportion of minority families (23. 2%) purchased new homes in
contrast with a substantial majority of white purchasers (79. 8%). (See
Table V. 2.) Significant differences by income level were also observed
with a greater tendency on the part of purchasers at relatively higher
income levels to buy new homes. Lower income minority families re-
mained almost exclusively within the existing housing submarket.
In part, the differences in submarket participation can be seen as
the consequence of prevailing price differences between existing and new
housing opportunities; the median price level for existing 235 purchase
was $13,400 against $20,800 for newly constructed homes. In that
sense, the pattern reflects what the various purchaser groups could af-
ford or chose to afford. (See Table V. 3.) The generally lower income
levels among minority purchasers undoubtedly restricted their range of
options for new homes. Their greater reliance on real estate agents,
which was noted earlier, served to reinforce the effects of discrimina-
tory marketing practices and to expose them to specialists in the ghetto
housing submarkets. 2 A relative lack of helpful network resources,
greater unfamiliarity with ownership in general, a more central concern
with better housing rather than with investment values, a preference for
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2. Ibid. , pp. 45-51.
familiar surroundings or a reluctance to break through discriminatory
barriers, all may have contributed to the resulting pattern of racial dif-
ferences in 235 submarkets. Undoubtedly, segregative preferences on
the part of white purchasers, preferred tratment accorded to them on the
part of builders and developers, and a stereotypical preference for sub-
urban surroundings contributed as well.
Whatever the complex of forces were that served to produce this pat-
tern, the consequences are clear. By and large, minority purchasers --
particularly those at the lower income levels -- bought existing houses
in older neighborhoods of the city, while white families more cbnsistently
opted for new houses in newly suburbanized outlying areas. 3 In effect,
the urban 235 program had functioned dichotomously to support two dis-
tinct purchase submarkets, sharply differentiated in terms of location, in
the kinds of purchaseable houses available, and in the racial character-
istics of home buyers.
B. Initial Mortgage and Housing Cost Burdens
Initial mortgage cost burdens are here defined as the percentage of
average monthly household income, based on earnings over the year just
3. It is a mistake to assume that all new subdivisions were dominated
by white purchasers. In general, however, OSTI and Civil Rights
Commission observations found the new subdivisions to be segrega-
ted, some functioning exclusively for whites, others for particular
minority groups. Ibid. , p. viii.
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prior to purchase, represented by the purchaser's portion of the monthly
mortgage payment at purchase. Mortgage cost burdens of 20 percent
were legislatively prescribed for the program, on the assumption that
an additional 5 percent burden would be required for utilities and mainte-
nance and that the result would be comparable to the 25 percent cost bur-
den under the earlier rent supplement program. 4 But the 20 percent
figure is obscured by several factors. Calculations are based on an
"adjusted income" figure derived by deducting from gross income $300
for each minor child in the household. The purpose of this adjustment is
to establish lower cost burden expectations for households with'larger
numbers of dependent children. A simple calculation confirms that these
adjustments should lead to a mortgage cost of burden of less than 20 per-
cent for 235 purchasers with minor children. However, this is further
complicated by maximum subsidy levels which are set at the difference
between mortgage payments at the market interest rate and those at a
one percent interest rate. Where purchaser incomes are so low as to re-
quire the maximum subsidy, the purchaser's portion of the mortgage pay-
ment may exceed the prescribed 20 percent mortgage burden. 5 Paradox-
ically, families entering the program at lower income levels could be
4. Frederic S. Le Clercq, "Entitlement Under Section 235 of the Nation-
al Housing Act", South Carolina Law Review (Columbia, S. C.: Univ-
ersity of South Carolina), Vol. 25, Number 1, 1973, pp. 1-92,
p. 18.
5. Ibid. , for explanation.
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expected to bear higher mortgage cost burdens, even beyond the 20 per-
cent prescribed, while purchasers with higher income levels might more
readily approach the legislatively deliberated standards. In that sense,
those at the lower income levels were expected to pay more for the op-
portunity to purchase.
The initial mortgage cost burdens of urban purchasers tend to confirm
these income disparities in mortgage cost burdens. (See Tables V. 4 and
V. 5.) Only a third (33. 3%) of the purchasers with incomes below $6,000
had undertaken initial mortgage burdens of 20 percent or less; the sub-
stantial majority of those with higher incomes (83. 1%) were within that
limit. Interestingly, among the purchaser groups white families at the
lower income levels undertock excessive cost burdens more frequently
than any other purchaser group and stretched themselves to the limit to
afford a 235 purchase, usually in one of the newer subdivisions with high-
er priced homes.
Although these differences in initial mortgage cost burdens are un-
doubtedly related to what families chose to afford as well as what they
could afford, they have important inferences regarding screening proce-
dures for entry into the program, those employed by builders, real es-
tate agents, mortgagees, and FHA credit examiners as well. Lower in-
come white purchasers were more likely to be approved despite high
anticipated cost burdens. Whether this was the result of preferential
treatment for whites over minorities, or of the particular leverage build-
ers may have had with FHA, or of both in combination, is uncertain.
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An analysis of approximate housing cost burdens at purchase,6 which
take into account utility costs and initial mortgage payments, yields
roughly similar results to those for initial mortgage burdens. (See
Table V. 6.) Most lower income purchasers (56. 9%) tended to face exces-
sive cost burdens -- burdens in excess of 30 percent -- and, among them,
white purchasers were the most overextended subgroup. While it is con-
sidered normal for middle income home purchasers to stretch their bud-
gets and savings to the limit during the early months of ownership, it is
striking that a lower-income ownership program would result in such
high burdens for families at the lowest income levels, considering the
additional costs that might be incurred for normal maintenance and re-
pairs.
The purchase move consistently produced an upward shift in housing
cost burdens for all purchaser subgroups, even in the absence of antici-
pated maintenance and repair costs. (See Table V. 7.) This does not
necessarily conflict with the prevailing belief among many purchasers
that owning would be cheaper than renting, since the implicit comparison
was between the purchased unit and available or comparable rentals
rather than a comparison with pre-purchase rental costs. The compara-
tive economies between a 235 purchase and alternative rentals are un-
6. Housing cost burdens at purchase were approximated rather than ob-
tained directly, because utility costs were requested only for the
period at which the interview was conducted in order to conserve in-
terview time. Purchasers had owned by then for from 1 to 3 years.
Utility costs at purchase were estimated at 90% of the utility costs
obtained directly.
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known. It is clear, however, that on the whole purchasers committed a
larger portion of their incomes to the 235 purchase than they had in their
pre-purchase housing expenditures.
C. House Condition At Purchase
The Congressional disclosure in late 1970 of abuses in the 235 pro-
gram, and the subsequent confirmation in the 1971 HUD Audit Report of
the widespread nature of deficiencies in FHA inspection and appraisal
procedures,8 had telling effects on the perception and operation of the
program. They led directly to a temporary suspension of the existing
housing component of the program, where deficiencies in housing condi-
tion and inflated appraisals seemed most numerous, and to expectations
of an imminent wave of "walk-away" foreclosures by families abandoning
sorely deficient houses. As a result, the question of house condition at
purchase is a key aspect of consumer experience and a possible deter-
minant of owner behavior within the program.
The analysis of the initial condition of purchased houses which fol-
lows relies on the use of a cumulative index of house condition based on
purchaser responses to a validated instrument. (Table V. 8 contains a
description of the index.) The results tend to confirm, by and large,
7. U.S. House of Representatives, December, 1970, on. cit.
8. HUD Office of Audit, op. cit.
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those of the HUD Audit Report which were based on expert inspection,
and help to refine some of those findings and determine their incidence
among purchaser groups.
Considering that most of the houses purchased under the program were
newly constructed, it is surprising that only a third of the houses (34. 6%)
were in fully adequate condition at purchase (on all six counts of house
condition). (See Table V. 8.) That so large a proportion fall into the
"inadequate" category (25. 2%) provides a further confirmation of FHA
laxness in inspection procedures and of the risks purchasers took in re-
lying on FHA standards. Even more striking is the observation that only
about two out of every five (39. 7%) new houses were reported to be in
fully adequate condition upon purchase, and that one out of every six
(16. 1%) were reported inadequate. 9 The most frequently reported prob-
lem areas with new construction were ceiling and wall cracks (29. 6%),
and leaks at the basement or foundation (25. 1%). Open-ended questions
concerning things wrong with the house at purchase elicited frequent re-
sponses concerning the "quality of construction" in the newly-built
homes.
There were sufficient problems with new construction to merit some
of the attention which was focused on the existing housing component
9. There is good reason to suspect that the quality of construction has been
steadily declining nationally, even for new houses in higher price brack-
ets. See: Ralph Nader, "Falling Apart Houses", The Nation, May 27,
1972, p. 11.
-186-
during the early Congressional disclosures. However, the condition of
existing housing purchased under the program was far worse. A some-
what smaller portion (27. 3%) were in fully adequate condition upon pur-
chase, and a much larger portion (38. 1%) were in inadequate condition.
(See Table V. 8.) But, interestingly, the incidence of severe house con-
dition problems was not endemic to the existing housing component as a
whole, and there were significant differences depending on the age of the
houses purchased. The condition of existing houses no more than 30
years old at purchase -- houses built during the late Depression or the
subsequent post-war period -- was nearly identical with that of new
houses, based on the composite index of condition. But major sources of
problem conditions differed for the post-war houses, and plumbing
(25. 9%) and wiring (29. 6%) problems predominated as well as basic struc-
tural problems. By contrast, the initial condition of older existing
houses -- those over 30 years old -- was disastrous. An extremely
small number (18. 5%) were in fully adequate condition at purchase, and
more than half (51. 9%) were in inadequate condition. (See Table V. 8.)
For these older houses, the range of negative responses on the six counts
of house condition was extensive.
It was a mistake in late 1970 to assume that the existing housing com-
ponent of the program was its only "problem child", given the incidence
of problems purchasers were experiencing with new houses. However,
to the extent that the primary crisis in the program focused on the condi-
tion of existing sales, it was a problem that strongly differentiated itself
by house-age submarkets within the existing market. The problems with
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used post-war houses -- a submarket in which FHA had had considerable
experience -- were on the whole no better or worse than those with new
235 houses. However, the much older housing purchased under the pro-
gram not only suffered from worse condition as a result of its age, a
condition that FHA frequently overlooked; it was also a market context
with which FHA tended to be relatively inexperienced, both in terms of
the nature of the housing stock and the neighborhoods in which the older
housing tended to be located.
In an analysis that represents a composite of 10 metropolitan areas,
there are uncertainties attached to any attempt to draw concrete images
or characterizations of alternative housing submarket characteristics.
But the strong differences among house-age submarkets in terms of pro-
gram functioning make it worthwhile to set aside that caveat for the pre-
sent. It has already been suggested that the three house-age submarkets
-- new housing, post-war housing, and older housing submarkets --
represented different levels of previous experience on FHA's part, which
may have contributed to FHA's poorest performance levels in the oldest
submarkets. The three submarkets also tend to have different locational
characteristics, differences in the degree of participation on the part of
minority purchasers, and differences in the kinds of private market actors
that dominate each submarket. Typically, the older house submarket
would tend to be located in the older pre-war neighborhoods of the inner
city. The clear majority of purchasers participating in this submarket
were minority families, particularly those at the lower income levels.
(See Table V. 9.) The particular reliance of these purchasers on real
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estate agents -- rather than network resources or independent search
-- conforms to the stereotype of the speculator- or broker-dominated
ghetto housing submarket, the image which arose over and over again
during the abuse hearings and the subsequent oversight hearings. Not
only were these older submarkets the most exploitative and abusive in
terms of market practices, they were also the neighborhoods in which
FHA inspectors were likely to make the most cursory "windshield" in-
spections.10 The post-war existing housing submarket was more likely
to be located in the fringe or outer sections of the city which were devel-
oped during a later period of relative suburbanization -- where', by the
way, many FHA offices are presently located when they are not in the
downtown business district. 11 Interestingly, in the post-war submarkets
both white and minority purchasers tended to manifest similar levels of
submarket participation. If the 235 program succeeded in providing op-
portunities for greater residential integration, it was most likely to have
occurred within these submarkets. The new housing submarkets tended
to be large-scale subdivisions which were predominantly white, mediated
by builders and their marketing agents, and located in outlying areas of
10. For an overview of the problems and issues raised by
public servants providing on-site services in the more impover-
ished neighborhoods of cities, see: Michael Lipsky, "Toward a
Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy", delivered at the American
Political Science Association meeting, New York, September 20,
1969, and "Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Re-
form", Urban Affairs Quarterly, June, 1971, pp. 391-409.
11. OSTI field team observations.
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the city.
The composite pattern of combined locational and racial stratification
of the program, represented by these submarkets and the differences in
house condition among them, suggests that differences in FHA perfor-
mance were, in part, differences in the degree of bureaucratic deference
on FHA's part -- whether intentional or unintentional -- toward submar-
kets outside of the inner city and toward those submarkets in which rela-
tively large numbers of white purchasers tended to participate. However,
the weaknesses of FHA performance in detecting serious defects, even
in the new house submarket, confirms a widespread negligence on FHA's
part and a pervasive operational problem in exercising normal adminis-
trative safeguards.
Because of this pattern, the incidence of inadequate house conditions
affected the various purchaser groups differently. (See Table V. 10.)
The process favored higher income over lower income purchasers, and
white purchasers over minority purchasers, with houses in better func-
tional condition from the start. In this regard, the strongest differentia-
tion among the purchaser subgroups occurred among higher income white
purchasers, where a substantial majority (85. 9%) obtained houses in
fully adequate or only subadequate condition. Differences among the
other subgroups were not great, but the incidence of inadequate house
condition at purchase was greatest among the lower income minority pur-
chasers (36. 8%). Although this group constituted little more than a fifth
(22. 5%) of the urban purchaser population, the relative exploitativeness
and high "housing age" risks of the submarket in which they tended to
-190-
participate -- older existing housing in older city neighborhoods -- made
them the most vulnerable, as a group and in absolute numbers, to severe
inadequacies in house condition at purchase. Lower income minority pur-
chasers constituted about half (49. 4%) of the purchasers buying houses in
inadequate condition. It is perhaps for this reason that the 1970 abuse
hearings and subsequent deliberations tended to focus on this particular
submarket, a factor which accounts for the evolving national image of the
235 program -- as a "slum" program, as a "welfare" program, and as a
"minority" program.
D. Consumer Awareness of House Condition Problems At Purchase
In any house purchase there are trade-offs to be made between price
and preferred housing attributes, among which house condition would be
a factor to be considered. The normal price effects of differential house
condition in the conventional purchase market are somewhat obscured in
the FHA mortgage insurance programs where minimal property standards
have been established and presumably exercised in the FHA inspection
process that precedes a purchase. It is for this reason that the poor
state of many 235 houses at purchase represents an aberration in the FHA
purchase market, though it would not be considered such in the conven-
tional market.
It is nevertheless reasonable to question whether 235 purchasers were
aware of the presumed protection afforded by FHA standards, if properly
administered, or where they were aware of FHA's defined role, whether
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it was set aside in the decisions purchasers made in order to get the best
house for the price they could afford. That is, 235 purchasers may have
behaved as if they were operating within the conventional market and, in
many instances, may have consciously opted for housing in poor condition
on the assumption of reasonable price trade-offs. The differences in the
median price levels paid by the purchaser subgroups correspond roughly
to the incidence of inadequate house condition, with lower prices paid for
housing in worse condition. Whether this pattern represents an inten-
tional "quid pro quo" decision on the part of purchasers depends on the
extent to which they were aware of initial house condition problems at the
point of the purchase transaction.
In the course of the survey interview, purchasers were given an open-
ended question asking them in retrospect for "the major things that were
wrong with the house when you bought it" and were subsequently asked
which of these items they knew about beforehand. Nearly half (47. 8%) of
the urban purchasers as a whole had been unaware of any of the initial
house condition problems they experienced at the time of purchase, al-
though a third (32. 4%) indicated they had had no condition problems at all.
(See Table V. 11.) Among those purchasers who found things wrong with
the house at purchase, a substantial majority (70. 6%) had been completely
unaware of the problems when they bought their homes. This finding in-
dicates that purchasers, by and large, were not taking account of defi-
ciencies in house condition as a basis for a "quid pro quo" trade-off on
the sales price. For the most part, purchasers had expected the houses
they bought to be in fully adequate functional condition.
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A scaled index of the severity of the house condition problems pur-
chasers experienced at purchase allowed a more concrete determination
of the seriousness of the problems cited, and of the degree to which
severe deficiencies had been unexpected. (See Table V. 12.) Most of the
problems cited (64. 5%) were major deficiencies, either in the structural
condition of the house or in the basic functioning of utilities. More than
two out of every five home buyers (43. 6%) had moved into houses with
major deficiencies, and nearly all of these problems were unexpected at
the time. These findings provide further confirmation of the severity of
the house condition problems many purchasers experienced, arid of the
fact that they were largely unexpected.
The incidence of major initial problems with the house -- unexpected
or otherwise -- seems to have been substantially greater for minority
purchasers than for white purchasers, with only relatively minor differ-
ences between income levels within each of these two groups. (See Table
V. 13.) Interpreted at the consumer level, it suggests that minority pur-
chasers either had fewer options among which to choose or were less cir-
cumspect in their selection of houses, perhaps due to a lesser familiar-
ity with ownership and fewer network resources to call upon. Interpreted
at the systemic level, FHA's failure to enforce its own property standards
was enormous considering the incidence of major deficiencies for both
white and minority purchasers. But the frequency of such oversights or
callous neglect was more than one and a half times as great among the
minority purchasers FHA served. The nature of the particular submar-
kets in which minority purchasers participated, the actors who dominated
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those submarkets, their relationships with FHA personnel, a differential
pattern of bureaucratic deference toward certain classes of purchase,
all seem to have contributed to a pattern of program performance which
was racially discriminatory and which strongly favored white purchasers
over minority purchasers.
E. Pre-Purchase Consumer Abuses
To determine the nature and extent of consumer-perceived abuses
during the purchase process, survey respondents were asked "were
there people you dealt with that you feel cheated you or took advantage of
you?", and subsequently asked to explain positive responses. About a
third of the purchasers (32. 0%) reported a sense of victimization in retro-
spect as a direct result of the purchase and its immediate consequences.
Most reports of such abuses -- over a quarter of the purchasers (27. 5%)
-- were related directly to defects in the initial condition of the house.
(See Table V. 14.) Whatever risks there were in a "caveat emptor" pur-
chase market, the abuses which reflected themselves in defective house
condition were uppermost in the purchasers' perceptions. Moreover,
the pattern of felt abuses directly related to initial house condition fol-
lowed closely the distribution of inadequate house conditions among the
various purchaser groups. (See Table V. 15, as compared with Table
V. 10.) By and large, minority purchasers at the lower income levels
more frequently reported abusive treatment in the purchase process that
was closely related to serious defects in initial house condition.
-194-
In the open-ended descriptions purchasers provided of their experi-
ences, the scenarios differed depending on whether the house purchased
was new or existing. In the older housing submarkets, purchasers were
usually first shown the houses in "as is" condition, and given promises
by the real estate agent that all improvements would be made prior to
purchase. As a result, initial consumer expectations were based less on
their inspection of the house, during which numerous defects were read-
ily observable, than on their trust that the agent -- under the watchful
eyes of FHA -- would see to it that the house was put into proper condi-
tion. Usually, cosmetic repairs were made that camouflaged the defects
without fully remedying them and enabled purchasers to move into a
house that appeared to have been "rehabilitated". The full realization of
what had happened occurred only after the initial months of occupancy,
followed by desperate attempts to locate the responsible parties. Few
families succeeded in having the defects corrected; they either mustered
what funds they had to make some of the key repairs, or decided to live
with the defects, or moved at the earliest opportunity. One St. Louis
woman, who managed to extricate herself from her house before it was
condemned and demolished, described her experience as follows:
"When the realty man showed me that house, it was in bad
shape. It needed so much. But he told me not to worry,
that everything would be put in A-1 shape and I believed him.
He told me that they always show the house before repairing
it and after someone look at the house and want to buy that's
when he have it repaired. Well, I fell for that and when I
moved in, the house looked good. Five months after I was in
that house, it fell in on us. I never knew that people doing
business could be so cold. I cried and begged that realty man
to trade homes with me since I couldn't live in that one. He
wouldn't. I asked him to give part of my money back. He
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wouldn't. I finally call the mortgage company long distance.
They told me to call FHA. I call FHA they told me to call
Legal Aid. I called Legal Aid and made an appointment. The
house was falling in. The pipes were busted in the wall. The
sewer was backed up in the basement. Worms were in the
basement. The condition of that house was sad. The saddest
part was that I never missed a payment but that didn't mean a
thing to the mortgage company or realty company. But thanks
to Legal Aid they got me out of that house without making my
credit bad. What I really needed was legal advice before I
bought. "
Although FHA was less frequently cited as a culprit and the blame was
more directly laid on realty companies, only those purchasers who knew
enough to rely on FHA inspection and approvals were most likely to im-
plicate it. Even when FHA made a careful inspection of a house and list-
ed its defects on the necessary forms, under usual procedures these were
generally communicated to the mortgagee submitting the application and
not necessarily to the purchaser. FHA proved to be extremely lax in its
follow-up of written certifications at purchase that the defects had been
remedied.12 The pervasive sense of victimization -- by government as
well as private market actors -- and an ensuing feeling of helplessness
was traumatic for a few families. One St. Louis father described the
state he was in prior to the family's abandoning their house:
"I thought anything the federal government was in that it had
to be alright. But I have learned the hard way that the federal
government is just as crooked as anyone else... that house
wasn't fit for anyone to live in... I didn't know what to look for.
All I was interested in was a big house because when I went to
see the house it was a mess but they told me everything would
be fixed like new and I believed that lie... All the ceilings were
12. U.S. House of Representatives, December, 1970, p cit.
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falling. The plumbing were bad. The house was just falling
apart. I couldn't take it any longer. I was losing my mind.
The worst thing is thinking you got a house for your family
and find out -- it is a shock with everyone trying to get rich
off you. "
Although most families who felt exploited had decided it was worth-
while remaining in their homes and managed to pay for some of the es-
sential repairs, they were rueful about the lack of legal recourse avail-
able and offered bitter rationalizations about what they had learned. A
respondent who had remained in an existing house in Denver reported:
"When [XXXI Realty who sold this house -- they covered over
flaws and didn't tell us the truth... I thought FHA and the Realty
did a better job of inspecting a house but it sure wasn't true. . .
I wish we had turned on the heat to see if it was in working or-
der. It might have saved us $1,000. . . .You can't trust any-
one -- real estate people at all. You have to check everything.
Even if it's a hundred degrees, you have to turn the heat on,
check the wiring, try the lights... I just think the [XXX] Real
Estate knew all the conditions of the house but covered up just
to make it look good and make the sale to us... I wish there
was a way that the real estate people could be held liable for
the fraud."
Initial defects in new houses were less discernible from the start.
The effects of shoddy construction practices -- what some purchasers
referred to as "hurry-up building" after they had made their selection on
the basis of more carefully constructed model homes -- became apparent
after repeated use and exposure to the elements. Attempts to extract
corrective action from the builder over the one-year warranty period were
often frustrated by long delays on the part of the builder and a series of
only marginal attempts to remedy serious defects after repair people
were sent out. The result in many cases was that defects were not cor-
rected during the one-year warranty period, and purchasers were left
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with the consequences. The kind of "corner-cutting" that took place in
some new construction was detailed by one Louisville Home owner as
follows:
"For the construction of the house they used half inch plywood
on the roof. The two-by-fours were turned to the two-inch
direction. The metal louvre doors, they want to come loose,
they are in need of constant repair. Poor workmanship on the
concrete slab -- it was not smoothed down before the floor was
laid. Plumbing rattles when you turn on the faucets. The
brick wall on the outside leaks when it rains. The windows in
the house, they're constructed from inferior products, they
leak. Used second grade lumber. I had to completely rewire
this house. I found some breakers were overloaded. The
driveway and sidewalks are breaking up because they used more
stone and less concrete."
Few families were as fortunate in being able to make repairs them-
selves, and most relied on the willingness of the builder to stand behind
the product, as well as FHA's ability to pressure for such willingness.
The following description from an Omaha purchaser provides much of the
typical scenario home owners encountered in attempting to obtain a re-
sponse to construction defects:
"The builder done such a bad job that everyday we have to spend
for some little thing. The door jambs are all loose and just
hanging with little nails. The basement had to be all cleaned up.
The yard had to be seeded and fertilized. We had to repaint
everything. The paint was chalky and you couldn't clean where
they got it dirty. You name it and we're doing it ourselves...
The copper pipes leak. The water heater leaks and we did call
and tell them but the process of them coming back to do anything
was a big problem. They make a short appearance, do a little
thing, and take off again. We had a guarantee for things for a
year that went wrong but a year went by and we never got any-
thing fixed right -- or got anything done. The concrete is bad
and all chopped out in hunks and the house is only three years
old and most all things turned up before the first year was up
and they didn't do anything about it after we complained... The
builder made a clean up on the home, he didn't finish. He said
he'd be back to do this and that but never returned. Could never
get a hold of him at all... The FHA are bad too, to let bad things
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happen like this. We called them constantly but they didn't
do a thing about it. It's a shame to let him get by with all
this... The FHA should be more protective toward the buyer.
It seems that they lean toward helping the builder. They
don't inspect the homes well enough or often enough to see
all the loopholes. Or else they close their eyes to it. "
In a program administered by an agency which had the gilt-edged repu-
tation enjoyed by FHA previously, it is at least mildly shocking to dis-
cover the extent of serious defects in house condition that seem to have
pervaded the program and the number of unconscionable consumer abuses
that occurred. It is even more discomforting to have to pose the cor-
ollary question of whether the 235 program resulted in families moving
into purchased housing which was in better or worse condition than the
housing they had occupied previously. Although it is difficult to compare
with any precision the condition of pre-purchase housing with the initial
condition of the 235 house,13 a rough comparison based solely on posi-
tive-negative responses concerning the functioning of plumbing, wiring,
and heating yields striking results. Nearly three-quarters (72. 5%) of
the pre-purchase housing units were adequate on all three counts, while
little more than a half (56. 5%) of the 235 purchased houses were in simi-
lar functional condition at the start. On the whole, purchasing families
had moved into housing in worse functional condition than they had occupi-
13. The house condition index previously used relies on observations of
roof leaks, basement and foundation leaks, cracks in ceilings and
walls -- factors not always observable by renters concerned primar-
ily with the units they occupy within larger structures. As a result,
this "rough" index relies exclusively on three functional counts:
heating, wiring, and plumbing.
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ed just previous to the move. Although families may have benefited in
terms of spatial accommodation, in having achieved ownership tenure, in
terms of the residential settings into which they moved, and in other
terms they saw for themselves, on the whole the program had resulted --
at least during the early stages of ownership occupancy -- in extracting
greater portions of family income for housing that was in inferior func-
tional condition compared with the units they had occupied previously.
The exposure of abuses in the program in 1970 represented more than an
attempt on Congress' part to "gadfly" a less than effective administrative
operation; it represented the uncovering of a major perversion'of the
program's intent.
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Chapter VI. CONSUMER EXPERIENCE: THE EARLY YEARS
OF OWNERSHIP
This chapter covers selected aspects of the 235 ownership experience
of urban families subsequent to purchase and up to the point when inter-
views were conducted. The major foci include shifts in income and em-
ployment among owning families, residential and economic consequences
of the purchase, the occurrence of mortgage default and failure, consum-
er assessments of their ownership experience, and projected residential
stability.
A. Duration of 235 Ownership
The sampling universe of urban purchasers excluded 235 families who
had purchased later than 1971, since the intent was to interview home
owners (in 1973) after at least a year of ownership experience was behind
them. A random drawing from HUD insurance files, and subsequent at-
tempts to contact purchasing families that were sampled, yielded both
families who were still resident owners of the 235 houses they had origi-
nally purchased and those who had moved elsewhere having either aborted
ownership or simply sold the house. The overwhelming majority (92. 3%)
of the resulting purchaser sample were still 235 owner-residents. (See
Table VI. 1.) The remaining 26 families had moved, most of them -- 17
out of the 26 -- having experienced mortgage failure. 1
1. The resulting rate of mortgage failure within the sample is 4. 7 percent,
a figure that closely approximates the average cumulative failure rate
of 4. 4 percent among the ten metropolitan areas as of March, 1973,
just before the interviews were conducted.
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Nearly all (96. 7%) of the purchasers had at least two years of 235 own-
ership behind them at the point they were interviewed. That so few fam-
ilies had owned for less than two years is not surprising considering the
suspension and deceleration of the program in 1971 subsequent to the dis-
closure of abuses. Thus, as of 1973, several months after the 235 mora-
torium was imposed, the program seems to have manifested a good deal
of stability despite the earlier abuses. As a whole, the urban purchaser
sample represents a group of fairly seasoned 235 home owners, who by
mid-1973 had owned for a median duration of about three years.
B. Changes in Household Characteristics Since Purchase
Over an average period of three years of ownership, urban purchaser
households underwent only marginal changes in size and composition.
About a quarter of the purchasing families were single-adult households
at purchase (27. 5%) and at the time of interview (28. 1%). A small pro-
portion of the single heads (10. 8%) had married since purchase; an even
smaller proportion (5. 3%) of the two-adult households at purchase had
separated over the course of ownership. The "life at the margin" argu-
ments against lower-income home ownership often stress family separa-
tion as one of the intermittent crises which make for ownership instabil-
ity, but the experience of the urban purchaser sample suggests otherwise,
that family separation was not a frequent or significant occurrence dur-
ing the early years of ownership. Indeed, household consolidation had
occurred at a larger rate than household separation. As might be ex-
pected, household sizes did not undergo major shifts over the few years
that had lapsed since purchase. Although home owning families under-
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went minor increases and decreases in size, on the whole the median
household size remained constant (at 5. 3 members per household) and
there were no major changes among the purchaser groups.
However, shifts in income over the course of early ownership were
substantial, and were strongly differentiated among the purchaser groups.
Median income levels for the urban purchasers as a whole went from
$6,500 at purchase to $8,530 after an average of three years of owner-
ship, an increase of about 27 percent. Among the purchaser groups, in-
comes rose most sharply for white households, and particularly for those
who had been at the lower income levels at purchase. (See Table VI. 2.)
It was noted earlier that lower income white purchasers had tended to
overextend themselves at purchase and take on higher initial housing cost
burdens relative to the other groups. In light of the high income mobility
they subsequently manifested, it becomes clearer that their purchase de-
cisions may have been made in light of reasonable expectations of antici-
pated income increases.
The fact that minority purchasers made smaller income gains over a
similar ownership period is distressing but not surprising. In general,
it can be expected that opportunities for income and employment mobility
are constrained by discriminatory pressures in the job market. Apart
from systemic discrimination, the lower levels of educational and occu-
pational attainment that obtained among minority purchasers in the 235
program undoubtedly further constrained their future income potential.
Moreover, significantly larger proportions of the minority purchasers
were single-adult households dependent on public assistance, with
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limited employability and income-earning capacity which constrained them
to smaller income gains. This was particularly so for minority purchas-
ers within the lowest income levels at purchase. (See Table VI. 3.)
Nor were the income gains experienced by urban home owners related
to changing patterns of employment within the household so much as they
were to occupational or income mobility within the same pattern of em-
ployment. Among the households which remained stable in terms of pa-
rental composition, the substantial majority (80. 0%) retained similar pat-
terns in terms of the number of working parents; among those experi-
encing changes in parental employment patterns, there were both upward
and downward shifts in employment rather than a consistent trend in any
one direction. (See Table VI. 4.)
It is worth noting that, on the whole, purchasing families were in a
better income position after the early years of ownership to afford the
cost burdens that ownership engendered. Like many modest income fam-
ilies who purchase unsubsidized houses, high initial cost burdens and
risks may well have been weighted against future income potentials that
would ultimately bring higher ownership costs to well within reason.
Whether these would be sufficient, hbwever, to repair some of the more
serious deficiencies in housing condition that purchasers experienced
at purchase remains an open question.
C. House Condition
Considering the blame that has been publicly placed on 235 home own-
ers for their presumed failure to maintain their homes properly or see
-204-
to repairs -- HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing Management, H. R.
Crawford, claimed in 1974 that families would rather abandon their homes
than see to the first major repair that became necessary -- it is striking
to note that by the time interviews were conducted with home owners,
after an average of about three years of ownership, the condition of 235
homes was somewhat improved over the condition which families found
them in at purchase. (See Table VI. 5.) Though a quarter of the purchas-
ers (24. 9%6) had purchased houses initially in inadequate condition, more
than half of these properties had improved to subadequate or adequate
condition within a few years after purchase. Among those who'had
found their homes to be originally in subadequate condition, only a small
proportion (7. 3%) had permitted their homes to deteriorate further and
over a third (37. 2%) had been brought into fully adequate condition.
About a third (35. 0%) of the homes which had been in adequate condition
at purchase had declined in condition, most to the subadequate rather than
the inadequate category. But, by and large, the general direction of
changes in house condition since purchase was for the better.
However, there were strong differences among the purchaser groups
in the extent of improvement in house condition. Improvements were
most frequent among the white purchasers, particularly those initially at
the lower income levels. (See Table VI. 6.) There are several factors
that seem to account for the observed differences. First, white pur-
chasers more frequently purchased new or post-war housing in substan-
tially better condition at the start; the lesser effort and cost required to
bring these newer houses up to condition undoubtedly increased the in-
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centives for making the necessary improvements. Moreover, new
houses were under builder warranty for the first year; despite frequent
problems in extracting satisfactory remedial action from builders for
construction defects, the likelihood is that builders did make some re-
pairs at no cost to the owning family. In addition, the income gains ex-
perienced by white purchasers over the course of ownership put them in
a better position to have the necessary repairs and improvements made.
Owners living in the oldest housing -- homes that were at least thirty
years old -- felt the greatest frustration at not being able to make the
necessary repairs. (See Table VI. 7.) Because of the way in vhich the
235 submarkets operated to provide the oldest housing to the most disad-
vantaged purchasers, that sense of frustration was keenest among min-
ority purchasers at the lower income levels. (See Table VI. 8.)
Whether the purchase move had resulted in ultimately providing the
home buyers with dwelling units in better condition than the ones they
had vacated is difficult to determine with any precision. 2 A primitive
objective index, based on reports of the functional condition of wiring,
plumbing, and heating, indicates that as a whole 235 purchasers were
living under no better or worse physical housing conditions -- apart
from reduced overcrowding -- than they had been prior to purchase.
(See Table VI. 9.) However, when purchasers were asked to compare
2. Because of the difficulty in obtaining an adequate range of comparable
dimensions for apartments and houses, which are suitable for closed-
ended survey responses.
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3their current house condition with that of the pre-purchase unit, subjec-
tive assessments indicated that a clear majority of the purchasers (73. 7%)
felt the 235 unit was in better physical condition. (See Table VI. 10.)
These positive assessments were least pervasive among lower income
minority purchasers; less than two-thirds (64. 5%) felt they had bettered
their housing condition and as many as a sixth (17. 1%) felt they were liv-
ing under worse physical conditions. In general, minority purchasers
experienced a worsening of housing conditions more frequently than white
purchasers. (See Table VI. 11.) Given the much stronger housing mo-
tives among minority purchasers at the start, this finding represents a
harsh irony of the program.
D. Residential Satisfaction
Whether the 235 move produced a greater or lesser degree of resi-
dential satisfaction -- in terms of both housing and neighborhood -- is a
critical issue in assessing the program's outcomes from the vantage
point of the consumer. In light of the imperfections in the program and
its consequences for purchasers, particularly in delivering sound housing,
one might expect the survey would be an opportunity for disgruntled own-
ers to voice pervasive dissatisfactions with the residential stiuations in
which they found themselves. To the contrary, a substantial majority of
3. For 235 purchasers who had moved, current condition refers to the
condition of the 235 house at the point it was vacated.
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home buyers expressed satisfaction with their 235 houses (77. 8%) and
with the neighborhoods in which they were located (78. 4%). 4 (See Table
VI. 12.) Nevertheless, the pattern of attained satisfactions was not dis-
tributed evenly among the purchaser groups.
As might be expected from observations that have already been made,
lower income minority purchasers realized the lowest degree of resi-
dential satisfaction among the purchaser groups, though it should be
noted that a majority -- over two-thirds -- of these purchasers also re-
ported satisfaction with current residential arrangements. However, to
assess the impact of the program on achieved satisfactions, it is neces-
sary to consider resultant shifts in residential effects since the period
prior to purchase. In that respect, lower-income minority purchasers
experienced the greatest net gain in housing satisfaction among the pur-
chaser groups, and the second highest with regard to gains in neighbor-
hood satisfaction. (See Table VI. 12.) That is, despite the fa.ct that
these home buyers were the most consistently victimized group among
the purchasers, the program resulted in strong net gains in residential
satisfaction when compared to the dissatisfactions and stresses associa-
ted with pre-purchase residence. Even a program as imperfect and
abusive as Section 235 was able to provide a greater degree of whatever
constitutes the "good residential life" than was attainable in the pre-
4. About two-thirds (65. 7%) were staisfied with both house and neigh-
borhood, and a small portion (9. 5%) with neither.
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purchase rental situations of these families.
At the other extreme, higher income white purchasers reported the
highest degree of residential satisfaction among the purchaser groups.
Despite their relative residential advantages prior to purchase, they also
experienced net gains in satisfaction, particularly in relation to housing
satisfactions and less so with regard to neighborhood.
On the whole, however, minority purchasers at the higher income
levels reported the highest levels of satisfaction associated with 235 res-
idence, both in terms of current satisfactions and in terms of improve-
ments over their pre-purchase situations. Whatever the reasons, this
group experienced the greatest improvements in the perceived quality of
residence as a result of the 235 move. This is particularly striking
with regard to neighborhood-related satisfactions, possibly as a conse-
quence of the their relatively high participation in the post-war housing
submarkets which gave them access to established neighborhoods in the
5less declining urban areas.
. By contrast, lower income white purchasers achieved levels of satis-
faction which were only marginally above those of minority purchasers
at similarly low income levels. Moreover, their substantial gains in
housing satisfaction were not accompanied by corresponding gains in
5. These findings also echo Ford's observations of Harlem's more
upwardly mobile black families for whom home purchase provided
an escape from ghetto conditions and an opportunity to obtain
superior residential settings. Ford, o. cit.
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neighborhood satisfaction.
The major sources of both satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
house center on its physical characteristics, most frequently on its bas-
ic condition and, secondarily, on special features of the house such as
storage space, lay-out, etc. (See Table VI. 13.) Not surprisingly, min-
ority home owners more frequently expressed discontent with the house
condition than satisfaction with it. In this regard, the responses of lower
income white purchasers were a strong mixture of positives and nega-
tives in terms of house condition. The clearest, unmitigated gains in
housing satisfaction across the purchaser groups had to do with "quality
of life"gains -- that it was a better way for children to live, offered a
sense of comfort or a secure, stable place to live and so on. Surpris-
ingly, the benefits or dysbenefits of ownership tenure were less fre-
quently mentioned as a source of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
house, and the same was true for housing costs, though when expressed
they were more usually negative rather than positive aspects. Thus, in
their assessments of their satisfaction with occupancy of the purchased
house, home owners tended to stress values and dysbenefits more closely
related to the consumption of housing services than to housing economy or
tenure. What contributed most to satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
house were the more functional aspects of the living experience, rather
than the less tangible values attached to "owning" itself or the more tan-
gible cost or investment aspects of ownership.
The complex adjustments required of 235 homeowners who, despite
deficiencies in the house, felt important gains in the living experience
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are reflected in their description of their combined satisfactions and dis-
satisfactions. One Pittsburgh woman, who found it necessary after pur-
chase to bring in a second income in addition to her husband's in order
to meet house expenses, expressed the following:
"When you move in a 235 home you really have a lot of extra
work because nothing is complete. You have to scrape up pennies
to complete things, and also [the builder] always made you feel
like you were a charity case. I am still dissatisfied with the car-
petings and some other things like the windows. But we love the
home, we really do, and we never would have had a place of our
own if it weren't for this 235 plan. "
Another owner expressed being "fairly satisfied" with the house, and in-
dicated why the response was qualified:
"We like it now because it is our home and we have made things
better and the house is very comfortable. [interviewer probe]
I would have said 'very satisfied' except that the leaking base-
ment is a constant problem. "
Quality of life issues were important to many owners in their experience
of the house, and reflected their previous negative housing experiences
in the city. One Milwaukee family who had purchased a new home indi-
cated a typical response pattern:
"I don't have to worry about my kids. You've got enough area
out here where they can run, and they're not hurting anything.
[interviewer probe] A lot of land space. When I look back at
what we have now compared to what we had then, it gives you a
sense of pride. [interviewer probe] Just a feeling that it be-
longs to me because I know that now it's all fixed up no one
can say "Now I'm selling it. ' "
Specific sources of neighborhood satisfaction indicated clear gains
among purchasers in terms of the physical and social characteristics of
the neighborhoods they purchased in. Less crowded, quieter, cleaner
residential settings with more elbow space for children were often given
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as the reasons for present satisfaction with the neighborhood. Location
in relation to work, convenience of the house to shopping, church, schools,
and other key activity sites were concerns about which home owners
registered a mixture of both satisfied and dissatisfied responses. More
purchasers found the social characteristics of their neighborhoods a
source of satisfaction than otherwise, though responses were mixed. In
this regard, purchasers undoubtedly had varied expectations -- some
sought close neighborly relationships, others preferred neighbors to be
pleasant but unintrusive -- but whatever the expectations were almost
half the home owners (46. 4%) found the social aspects of the neighborhood
worth mentioning as a source of residential satisfaction.
Dissatisfactions with the general quality of the neighborhood were re-
gistered with relative frequency among purchasers at the lower income
levels. Dissatisfactions were expressed with the general character of
the neighborhood -- whether it was "run-down", whether people were
keeping it up -- and with the occurrence of crime, burglary, or vandal-
ism. Minority households purchasing much older housing often moved
into neighborhoods that were already ridden with such problems. A
black family purchasing in an older St. Louis neighborhood reported:
"The people around there was fighting all the time. They
were always shooting and bombing houses in the neighborhood.
I was scared to death all the time. When I finally moved I was
sad and glad -- sad that owning my home was only a dream,
glad to be getting out of the neighborhood alive. "
Other lower income purchasers found themselves forced to make adjust-
ments to new kinds of neighbors with differing norms. A Seattle home
buyer, for whom the purchase move was the first venture out of the
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neighborhood in which she was raised, reported the following:
"I picked the neighborhood because of the schools and because
I saw people working in the yards. It was a clean area. But
there are too many children. As many dogs as children with
no leash law. Parents that don't watch their children. Low
class of people, rough language. Petty thievery by kids and
adults. Welfare families in the neighborhood. Men not want-
ing to work. "
But, by and large, the urban purchasers found the neighborhood transition
to be for the better, and much depended on their earlier neighborhood ex-
periences:
"This neighborhood is much better than where I used to live.
The people, the accessibility to schools and church, the size
of the lots -- there aren't as many people as in a congested
area. It's just plain better. The people are nicer. [inter-
viewer probe] No comparison, people you can talk to, dis-
cuss things with, converse. The kids can go baby sitting and
don't have to be afraid of what kind of a house they're going
into. ..
Families at the higher income levels had broader options for neighborhood
choice and perhaps a keener sense of the range of options and the distinc-
tions among available opportunities that better suited their preferences.
Having fewer options, lower income purchasers more frequently found
themselves in neighborhoods and subdivisions without the social screen-
ing mechanisms inherent in higher prices that allow a more conventional,
middle class group to aggregate itself.
E. House-Related Expenditures and Cost Burdens
The costs of home ownership -- those required to sustain payments on
the mortgage, insurance and utility costs, local property taxes, normal
maintenance and house repairs -- are a central issue in any attempt to
-213-
assess the feasibility of home purchase among lower-income households.
Because of administrative shortcomings in the 235 program, most in-
tensely reflected in the occurrence of program abuses, home purchasers
came to be burdened soon after purchase with necessary repairs to their
houses, to an extent that went well beyond the normal expectations of both
those who had drafted the program and those who participated in it. As
a result, although it will be useful to examine the repair activities and
expenditures of 235 home owners during the initial years of ownership,
it needs to be noted that such data reflects an abberation particular to
the 235 program which might well be obviated in future lower-income
ownership programs. By contrast, trends in mortgage payments and
utility costs provide a more reliable indicator of those housing expendi-
tures which can be more readily generalized to other future programs.
Under FHA procedures, monthly mortgage payments include princi-
pal, interest, taxes and insurance costs -- PITI -- leaving the payment
of utilities, maintenance, and repairs to the individual home owner. Over
the initial years of ownership, purchasers experienced a substantial rise
in FHA monthly mortgage payments from a median of about $103 at pur-
chase to a median of $119 current with the interviews, an increase of
roughly 16 percent. In part, this was due to rising taxes and insurance
costs which were characteristic of most cities during this period. In
part, it was also due to the rising income levels already observed among
235 urban home owners. Under the procedures for Section 235, mort-
gagor families were recertified every two years by the mortgagee
(lender), to update current household income and change the federal
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subsidy component correspondingly.
Because home owning families were often unaware of the amount of
federal subsidy that augmented their monthly portion of the payment --
since it was paid directly by FHA to the mortgagee -- it is difficult in a
consumer survey to determine with any accuracy the actual changes in
subsidy amounts that occurred over the initial ownership period. How-
ever, it is apparent that subsidy amounts must have decreased substan-
tially as the recertification process took account of rising incomes. For
two-thirds of the urban purchasers (68. 0%), family incomes had increas-
ed; for another fifth (20. 8%) they had remained relatively stable since
purchase; and only about one out of every nine home owners (11. 3%) had
experienced a net decrease in income. With increasing incomes, the fam-
ilies' share of the monthly mortgage bill increased, and many were in all
likelihood receiving no subsidy by the time of the interview. 6
In addition to rising mortgage costs reflected in monthly payments by
the family, the costs of utilities were also rising during the period though
at nowhere near the rapidly inflating rate that occurred subsequently in
late 1973 with the sudden OPEC inflation in oil prices. Because home
6. U.S. House of Representatives, (Appropriations Hearings), April
1972, op. cit. , p. 121. It was reported that by December, 1971,
about 5 percent of 235 owners were no longer receiving subsidies;
57 percent were receiving reduced subsidy amounts; 13 percent
were being continued at the original subsidy level; and about 25
percent were receiving increased subsidies. Nearly two-thirds of
the households were receiving diminished subsidies.
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owner incomes tended to change in the same direction as mortgage pay-
ment and utility costs, it is more useful to examine changing cost bur-
dens and their impact in relation to family income than to undertake an
analysis of absolute cost levels.
A comparison of the most current 235 housing cost burdens (as of the
interview) with those purchasers undertook upon purchase provides a
strong indication that income increases tended to outdistance, in relative
terms, increases in combined mortgage payments and utility costs. (See
Table VI. 14.) The median housing cost burden for urban purchasers as
a whole decreased from 26. 7 percent at purchase to 24. 2 percent over
the early years of ownership. Decreases in median cost burdens were
sharpest for white purchasers initially at the lower income levels who,
as a group, took on high cost burdens at purchase and were subsequently
able to compensate for them by rapid increases in income. By contrast,
cost burdens for higher income minority purchasers tended to increase
because of their relatively low income mobility, Moreover, except for
this group, it is even more striking to note that current ownership cost
burdens had decreased by 1973 after an average of about three years of
ownership, to a level consistent with, if not better than pre-purchase
rental cost burdens. Although the expectation that prevailed among home
buyers that owning might be cheaper than renting went largely unrealized,
the regular monthly cost burdens they undertook, relative to their incomes,
were not much different from their pre-purchase rental burdens.
These findings are interesting in several respects. First, they indi-
cate that purchasing families undertook relatively reasonable risks in
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light of their anticipated income earning capacity. Moreover, consider-
ing the general inflation in urban rental markets from 1969 to 1973 -- the
period over which this study tracked urban purchasers -- the decision to
buy was a reasonably economic one, enhanced by gains in residential sat-
isfaction and possible investment values, in which purchasers commited
themselves to monthly out-of-pocket costs -- apart from maintenance and
repairs -- at possibly lower cost burdens than might have been obtained
had they been able to find the suitable rental alternatives they needed.
Most importantly it suggests that had the program been administered in a
way that placed home buyers in houses in fairly sound condition, the reg-
ular monthly obligations engendered by home ownership for lower-income
families would not have been substantially greater than those for alterna-
tive rental situations.
Nevertheless, the program had a regressive effect in the distribution
of housing cost burdens among purchaser groups. (See Tables VI. 14 and
15.) The highest cost burdens continued to be carried by the most disad-
vantaged group, lower income minority purchasers, for whom over a
third (34. 7%) had current monthly cost burdens in excess of 35 percent.
Because of differences in subsequent post-purchase income gains, dis-
tributive parity obtained between the lower income white purchaser
group and the higher income minority group; roughly a sixth of each
group had monthly cost burdens in excess of 35 percent. Few among the
higher income white purchasers were similarly burdened. By and large,
minority purchasers and those purchasers initially at the lowest income
levels were bearing the highest monthly burdens of ownership. That
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minority purchasers at initially high income levels had difficulty main-
taining the advantages of higher income through the early years of own-
ership is a bitter reflection of the constrained income mobility opportun-
ities available to minorities in the urban economy.
Beyond monthly mortgage payments and utility costs, home owners
paid for repairs, improvements to their property, and other costs asso-
ciated with furnishing and maintaining the house. But the kinds of major
house-related expenditures they reported differed depending on the age
of the house at purchase. (See Table VI. 16.) Those who had purchased
new housing more frequently reported costs associated with house and
site improvements and with new furnishings; there was less necessity for
structural repairs or utility repairs, although a surprisingly large pro-
portion -- about one out of six (17. 9%) -- did carry out such repairs to
correct construction deficiencies. The older the house was, the more
likely owners were to concentrate what funds they could muster on basic
structural and utility repairs, postponing further improvements of the
house or more amenable furnishings. Among those who had purchased
housing over 30 years old, well over half (59. 3%) had undertaken
basic structural or utility repairs. On the whole, the types of efforts
which owning families made is an impressive indication of the earnest
attempt on their parts to maintain and improve their properties within
the limits of their income.
7. The findings reinforce Sternlieb's view of the productivity of owner
occupancy with regard to structural maintenance repair. Sternlieb,
The Tenement Landlord, op. cit. , pp. 228-229.
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Despite the fact that higher income purchasers tended to buy new
houses, and the most disadvantaged purchasers the oldest housing, on
the average the absolute levels of house-related expenditures differed
little with the age of the house or the characteristics of the owner. (See
Tables VI. 17 and 18.) Home owners expended, on the average, a total
of $620 over the initial years of ownership, at an annual average expense
of about $240. These results are striking in their lack of relation to in-
come; one would expect families at relatively fixed lower income levels
-- in particular, minority purchasers manifested relatively fixed income
levels -- to expend less on house-related costs. But the operation of the
235 program was such as to place the families who could least afford re-
pair burdens in the housing in poorest condition. As a result, repairs
became necessities for many such families, and extracted high burdens
in terms of income, with the highest burdens carried by minority pur-
chasers at the lowest income levels. Although these owners expended
limited funds to make some of the necessary repairs, it is also the case
that many of them had not currently been able to bring the house to
within acceptable condition. (Refer to Table VI. 6.) To do so would re-
quire more than they could afford. In any case, the evidence strongly
suggests that 235 home owners did not shy away from repairs or, as has
been suggested, leave their homes in preference to repairing them.8
8. Attributed to H. R. Crawford, HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing
Management, 1974.
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Most families made what repairs they could and remained in their homes
as long as they could despite its original condition.
F. The House as Investment
To carry out an accurate assessment of the investment value of 235
houses would have required professional on-site appraisal as part of the
survey interview process. Since this was not feasible, much of this dis-
cussion of investment values hinges on the accuracy of perceptions among
home owners of the changing market value of their homes. At the very
least, such perceptions reflect the way in which owners themselves were
viewing the accrual or attrition of equity in their homes, and shed some
light on how they viewed their current situations. To the extent that home
owners were aware of real changes in local market values, either through
recent sales of similar housing or through their own probes into the mar-
ket, these perceptions have at least a partial claim to external validity.
Although investment incentives were not uppermost in purchasers'
minds in their decisions to buy, for nearly half of the urban purchasers
(48. 8%) it had been a factor contributing to the purchase decision. When,
after an initial period of ownership of 3 years on the average, home own-
ers were asked a closed-ended question: "How good an investment would
you say that this house is?", a substantial majority (79. 5%) registered
their feeling that it was a good investment. Although higher income white
purchasers were the most sanguine in this regard and lower income min-
ority purchasers the least, a clear majority of each of the purchaser ,
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groups assessed the house as a good investment. (See Table VI. 19.)
However, when purchasers were asked, "What would you say houses
like yours are selling for now?", and the results were compared against
purchase prices, it became evident that although 235 property values
were generally seen to be rising, a significant, though small group
(11. 4%) were in negative equity situations. A substantial majority (69. 4%)
of the urban purchasers saw their property values as appreciating; another
eighth (12. 6%) saw very little change in the value of their homes during
the initial years and were still at a break-even point within 5 percent of
the original purchase price. (See Table VI. 20) But about one out of nine
purchasers (11. 4%) saw their property depreciating in value, many at a
relatively sharp rate.
As might be expected from previous observations, this was particular-
ly the case for lower income minority purchasers; nearly a third (31. 5%)
were in negative equity situations, facing a loss if they attempted to sell.
None of the other purchaser groups experienced so large a rate of equity
casualties. The influence of house-age submarket factors is apparent here,
in that lower income minority purchasers tended to buy the oldest housing
within the most exploitative ghetto submarkets.
In general, the median rate of property appreciation varied greatly
with the age of the house. Used houses over 30 years old at purchase
averaged a 5. 5 percent appreciation against a 13. 2 percent for post-war
existing housing and 14. 8 percent for new houses. As a result, those pur-
chasers participating in the post-war and new house submarkets fared
much better and instances of declining property values were relatively
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rare -- 3. 5% for new houses; 10. 4% for post-war houses; and 30. 9% for
houses over 30 years old at purchase. With the exception of those who
had purchased the oldest housing, 235 purchasers by and large viewed
their property as appreciating in value, and had reason to believe it had
been a good investment.
It is important to note, however, that the equation between "goodness
of investment" and stable or appreciating property values -- positive
equity, if you will -- is not universally held among 235 purchasers. A
number of purchasers consider their house a good investment even though
they recognize it is declining in value, and this factor accounts for the
disparity between consumer assessments of "goodness of investment" and
the estimate of changing market values, particularly among purchasers
at the lowest income levels. What seems to account for the disparity is
a divergence of housing values or precepts among 235 purchasers. The
less upwardly mobile among the purchasers tend more to view home own-
ership from the perspective of homestead values -- which seem to be
rural in origin -- in which secure property ownership and a permanent
homestead are valued as investment independent of the market value of
the house and associated equity. Since the house is viewed as a perma-
nent residence, rather than as a transferable commodity or a "way-sta-
tion" for trading up to a better future house, less utility is attached to its
yield upon sale and more valence is given to long-term accretion of
equity in the house -- some equity at any rate, if not the full equity re-
flected in the original price of the house. For instance, a Washington,
D. C. owner of an older, deteriorated house responded that the house was
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a "very good" investment:
"I can't complain... I don't know that much about investments.
A house is a lifetime thing. We'll get some equity out of this."
Another home owner in a declining market situation had a similar re-
sponse:
"Anytime you pay for something and one day it will belong to
you and not someone else, it's a good investment. "
For these home owners, many of them coming out of abortive experiences
in the rental market, the purchase price meant little more than whether
monthly payments would be affordable. Ownership meant some accretion
of equity upon mortgage fruition -- an investment value not attainable in
the rental market -- as well as a permanent home and the autonomy of
ownership which removes one from dependency on landlords. Higher in-
come and white purchasers undoubtedly viewed their tenure options dif-
ferently, and maintained housing orientations more closely related to
mainstream conceptions of house investment in terms of market values
and upward housing mobility.
Despite differences in housing values and orientations among 235 pur-
chasers, which suggest that many of the most disadvantaged purchasers
find much that is positive in their negative equity situations, the fact that
as many as a fifth of the purchasers (20. 5%) viewed their homes as poor
investments after only a few years of ownership is a telling criticism of
the program. These perceptions permeated among owners of new houses
as well as existing houses, though the latter to a greater degree, and
reinforce many of the criticisms of FHA procedures made during the dis-
closures of abuses in the program. Although many of the home owner
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responses accounting for the poor investment value of the house
were related to declining market values, which may or may not have been
predictable by FHA, more than half specifically concerned the poor con-
dition of the house which made it difficult to market without taking a loss.
Nevertheless, when viewed as a whole in terms of broad trends, the pro-
gram succeeded despite its imperfections in placing the substantial
majority of home purchasers in what were perceived to be viable market
situations with appreciating property values.
G. Assessments of Home Ownership
Despite the hazards associated with 235 purchase, the early years of
ownership resulted in sustaining and strengthening the initially strong
tenure preferences among purchasing families which favored owning over
renting. In contrast with the three-quarters majority (77. 5%) who had
preferred owning prior to their decision to buy, a more nearly universal
majority (90. 2%) expressed similar preferences after their initial exper-
ience with 235 ownership. (See Table VI. 21.) Whatever the problems
and frustrations with the program were, the experience had been suffi-
ciently positive for most urban purchasers to convince them of the com-
parative advantages of ownership tenure.
The most dramatic shifts in tenure preferences occurred among min-
ority purchasers. (See Table VI. 22 and Table IV. 9.) The roughly three
out of ten minority purchasers who were either indifferent to tenure or
preferred to rent prior to their purchase decision had shifted to one out
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of ten after the initial years of ownership. Despite relatively weak own-
ership preferences at the start and their strong housing and residential
orientation to purchase, despite the difficulties minority purchasers en-
countered in the program, after the course of early ownership their
tenure preferences were indistinguishable from the other purchaser
groups.
But the strong preferences for ownership over rental were not accom-
panied by similarly strong attachments to the 235 houses purchased. Less
than half (42. 3%) would have definitely bought the same house "if you had it
to do all over again", and lower income minority purchasers were the
least likely to do so (34. 2%) while higher income white purchasers were
the most likely (47. 3%). This finding reinforces the fact that large num-
bers of purchasers were disappointed with the quality of 235 houses --
more so than with ownership itself -- and that these discontents were
most pervasive among those who had encountered severe deficiencies in
house condition at purchase. It also may reflect an underlying instability
in 235 ownership situations, no matter how sound the houses, because of
the tendency of families to seek preferable houses as soon as they can
afford them. This issue will be examined in a subsequent section of this
chapter.
To identify the reasons behind current tenure preferences, urban pur-
chasers were asked to assess from their 235 experience what the "best
things" and "worst things" were about owning a house. They responded
more frequently on the positive side and the major single benefit pur-
chasers associated with ownership were related to "owning" itself,
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rather than to its economic or residential consequences. (See Table
VI. 23.) For more than a third of the purchasers (35. 7%) home ownership
was an unmixed blessing without any associated dysbenefits. Most men-
tions of "owning" as a benefit specifically cited the relative autonomy af-
forded by home ownership (158 mentions); fewer responses referred to
"owning" as a generic benefit in its own right (114 mentions), without
more specific reference to aspects of ownership.
The strong equation between housing autonomy and tenure, as per-
ceived by 235 purchasers, can be seen as more closely related to the pol-
itics of tenure -- the increased power home owners have, compared with
tenants, over the residential domain of their lives -- than it is related to
more intangible or sentimental attachments to home ownership. For the
higher income purchasers, the autonomy responses usually concerned the
relative manipulability of the owned home -- the power to alter and change
it to one's own tastes, to shape it as a reflection of oneself -- a factor
which gives the owned house an aspect of identity not attainable in rental
housing. One St. Louis home owner phrased it in the following way:
"I have been free to make it into the type of home that I
want it to be."
Lower income and minority purchasers, especially those with large house-
holds, tended to view the autonomy of ownership in somewhat different
terms, usually related to past negative experiences with landlords. In
Omaha, a black home buyer with eight children put it in the following
terms:
"Don't have to worry about the landlord, that he just might
put you out at anytime and you know you have roots somewhere."
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The relative dominance of positive tenure responses related to the auton-
omy benefits of home ownership, is less a reflection of socially-relative,
norm-related attachments to ownership than an indication of more deeply-
based, existential needs and goals satisfied by ownership tenure, whether
they reflect the identity needs of more socially mobile families or the need
for security, particularly residential security, among those least likely
to find it in the rental market under the conditions of tenancy. Though
these findings confirm, to some extent, both the relativist and function-
alist perceptions of the valences of ownership tenure, they more closely
correspond to the "freehold" advantages of ownership which play an im-
portant part in the functionalist argument.
Next to owning itself, the most frequently mentioned benefit associ-
ated with home ownership concerned improvements in the quality of life
for owners and their families. Most frequently, these responses center-
ed on the relative privacy which ownership afforded (74 mentions), and
on the pleasures, comforts, and superiority of the owned home as a locus
of family activity (73 mentions). Only a few purchasers gave expression
to the relative stability of ownership residence (21 mentions). In short,
a number of purchasers viewed the quality of their daily lives as having
been enhanced by ownership occupancy.
On the whole, purchasers tended to view the economic aspects of own-
ership more negatively than positively, mentioning the excessive costs of
ownership more frequently than its investment advantages. In part, this
may be due to fact that rising monthly housing costs and periodic repairs
are immediate and repeated experiences while increasing equity in the
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house is a benefit largely postponed for the future. But it is significant
that despite the general comparability of monthly ownership cost burdens,
with pre-purchase rental burdens, owners retained a stronger concern
about the expenses of ownership than about its possible investment advan-
tages. Along with the higher dollar cost of ownership were the higher
personal costs of ownership responsibilities: the stresses of having to
cope with high costs, unpredictable repairs, normal maintenance efforts
often within the context of uncertain employment situations -- these were
the personal costs in the quality of some owners' lives against which the
more frequent tenure-related gains in housing status or autonomy and in
the quality of residential life had to be measured.
Surprisingly few purchasers directly mentioned specific aspects of
the 235 house as a benefit of ownership, though undoubtedly the house as-
pects of ownership were subsumed in responses concerning improvements
in the quality of family life, such as those related to privacy and family
life. A larger number of purchasers viewed the 235 house as a deficit of
ownership, most frequently referring to its poor condition. Neighborhood
concerns were rarely mentioned either as a benefit or deficit associated
with ownership.
In summary, it is apparent that most urban purchasers viewed them-
selves as having derived substantial benefits from ownership tenure it-
self along with the levels of residential satisfaction they had obtained
with respect to house and neighborhood. Most frequently these benefits
were associated directly with the autonomy and goal-fulfillment gratifica-
tions that ownership tenure afforded, and with improvements in the qual-
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ity of family life. Undoubtedly, these positives account in part for the
shift in tenure preferences among those owners who had initially been
indifferent to tenure or had preferred to rent. On the negative side, the
deficits of ownership were primarily the greater costs involved, the bur-
den of associated responsibilities and financial pressures, and, in a
number of instances, having to put up with the seriously deficient condi-
tion of the house in order to own. Since this last factor is a less inher-
ent aspect of ownership deriving from the particular flaws in the Section
235 program operation, the evidence suggests that, by and large, the
benefits of ownership as perceived by urban lower-income families out-
weigh its potential deficits and that, in particular, these home buyers
found much that was valuable in the tenure transition itself.
It is also notable that there are relatively few differences among the
purchaser groups in these respects. Higher income white purchasers
more frequently cited the "pure" satisfactions of owning and its more
palpable investment advantages. The median groups -- lower income
white purchasers and higher income minority purchasers -- were more
likely to emphasize the quality of life benefits they associated with own-
ership. Interestingly, the perceptions of ownership deficits showed rel-
atively little differentiation among the groups, apart from the higher
housing discontents among buyers at the lower income levels. Higher
income white purchasers more frequently experienced the pure satisfac-
tions directly related to tenure, with fewer of the countervailing deficits
but, by and large, the deficits were fairly consistently expressed by all
groups. Similarly, lower income minority purchasers were least
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affected by a sense of quality of life improvements as a result of owner-
ship and more likely to stress the expenses of owning. On the whole,
however, the composite of ownership benefits and deficits among the
groups were remarkably similar, considering the differences in their
purchase experiences and subsequent ownership situations.
But the question remains as to whether the benefits of ownership were
perceived to be worth the greater costs. To begin with, only two-thirds
of the owners (65. 7%) considered home ownership to be more expensive
than their previous rentals; about a sixth (15. 7%) found ownership less
costly; and another sixth (18. 1%) found no change between the costs of
renting and owning. For the latter two groups, there were no serious
cost trade-offs associated with home ownership. Those who found owner-
ship to be more expensive were asked whether they felt home ownership
was worth the increased costs. A considerable majority of those re-
sponses were positive (86. 9%), and the reasons behind positive responses
bore a close similarity to the ownership benefits already described: ten-
ure achievement and autonomy were the primary reasons (64. 8%), qual-
ity of life secondary (38. 9%), and economic investment reasons tertiary
(32. 1%). Among those paying increased housing costs for ownership, a
small proportion felt the benefits were not worth the cost (13. 1%),
largely because of the high expense involved. These figures are summar-
ized in Table VI. 24. What they indicate is that even when home ownership
extracted higher costs than households had been used to paying for rental
housing, the benefits were, by and large, thought to be worth the compar-
ative expense. Moreover, these owners tended less to rationalize the
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value of the additional expense in investment terms than in terms in con-
sumption values related directly to tenure and quality of life issues. In
that regard, their pattern of decision behavior reflects more a consumer-
oriented view than an investment-oriented view, a pattern which has
been observed in other studies of home purchasers. 9
Some of the more typical responses, as to why ownership was worth
the increased expense, are indicative:
"That is the price that one has to pay in order to have a place
where your kids can have freedom. Plus it is giving me what
I wanted. It is our home and I take great pride in it."
"Yes, I just don't think I can go back to the landlord-tenant
-- other people in the same house with you -- rat race. I'd
do anything not to go back to that. "
"Yes, for the family's sake. We get a lot of happy days from
it. Well, it's ours I guess and what we put into it we know
someday we will get it back and be happy too. "
Yes, security. They can't sell it from under you and you feel
like doing more and putting more money into it because it is
yours and you are gaining equity. "
They indicate some of the benefits purchasers came to attach to owner-
ship -- as a locus for family activity, as a context for children -- that
might be replicable in well-designed rental housing, possibly at lower
costs. On the other hand, the responses also suggest that many of the
other consumption benefits perceived by families -- security, absence of
abrasive interactions with landlords and other tenants, investment equity,
and an inexplicable sense of "home" -- are more intrinsically related to
9. Coons and Glaze, op. cit.
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ownership tenure and not fully replicable within the rental market.
H. The Viability of 235 Ownership -- the lVbrtgage Default Process
The strengthened preferences for home ownership among the urban
purchasers, and the satisfactions associated with ownership residence,
are positive indications of the kinds of incentives that existed among
most home owners to sustain their 235 ownership situations or to pur-
chase another, more preferable house through conventional sale and
transition procedures. But they are less useful as predictors of the vi-
ability of 235 ownership. Intervening difficulties -- the loss of work, a
major illness, family separation -- may make it difficult for an owner to
sustain mortgage payments and other high housing-related costs no mat-
ter how strong the owner's motivation or incentives. Moreover, the
substantial number of houses (16. 9%) that were in inadequate condition
after the initial ownership period present serious questions concerning
the continued habitability of some of the houses, many of which were re-
ported to be in declining market situations. In such market situations,
where it is impossible to sell without substantial loss, the need or desire
to move on the part of owners can be expected to lead to some form of
abandonment of the house, accompanied by progressive mortgage default
and failure, as owners attempt to extricate themselves from diseconomic
situations. In short, despite the benefits many families saw themselves
as receiving under 235 home ownership, there were a number of forces
both within and without the program -- already referred to as "life at the
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margin", "systemic", or "contextual" factors -- that might have been po-
tential precipitants of mortgage default and failure.
At the point the interviews were conducted in 1973, the current mort-
gage statuses of the urban purchaser sample paralleled fairly closely
what can be gleaned from national program statistics. (See Table VI. 25.)
The rate of aborted ownership (5. 0%) in the urban purchaser sample
closely approximated what might be expected from reported failure rates
among the ten metropolitan areas (4. 7%) at that time. A larger propor-
tion of the urban purchaser sample (5. 6%) reported they were in default
-- behind by one or more mortgage payments -- at the time of the inter-
view. As a percentage of insurance then in force, exclusive of sales and
aborted mortgages, this constitutes a sample default rate of 6. 1 percent
against the then comparable national default rate of about 7. 1 percent. 10
To the extent that the purchaser sample is a valid reflection of what had
happened to a cohort of home buyers after an average of three years of
235 ownership, it can be estimated that about 3 out of every one hundred
home buyers had sold their homes; another 5 had aborted ownership;
another 6 were at some stage of mortgage default; and the remainder
showed no signs of current mortgage difficulties.
Among the purchasers who were still in their 235 houses, a pervasive
10. See Appendix A. for a discussion of the sources of disparity between
these two rates. The sample rate can be assumed to a more valid
representation of default rates among purchaser in metropolitan areas,
and among those who had owned for at least a year.
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majority (93. 9%) were current in their mortgage payments. But the rel-
atively small proportion of defaults at any given point in time -- 5. 6 per-
cent among the urban purchasers as a whole, and 6. 1 percent among
resident purchasers -- is in itself a poor indicator of the incidence of
default among 235 owners or of the significance of default in relation to
mortgage failure. For nearly a third (30. 3%) of the urban purchasers
had fallen behind in their mortgage payments at one time or another dur-
ing the initial years of ownership. And nearly a quarter (22. 5%) of fam-
ilies whose mortgages were currently in tact -- families who had either
sold or were current in their payments -- had experienced default in the
recent past and successfully repaid their back mortgage payments. As
a result, it becomes apparent that mortgage default was a common occur-
rence among 235 owners, in the sense that a third of the owners had ex-
perienced at least a single default episode at one time or another during
the initial years of ownership. More importantly, the default process
would seem to be characteristically cyclical in nature, in that most own-
ers who fall into default are able to resolve the default in sufficient time
to avoid any serious threat to continued ownership. Furthermore, re-
peated instances of default, beyond one episode regardless of its duration,
were relatively rare (4. 8%) among urban purchasers. Most defaultors
had had a single experience over the average three-year period of owner-
ship. Thus, although the majority of urban purchasers (69. 7%) had never
defaulted, a significant portion had been involved in default, most of them
having resolved it successfully.
In that light, the concern with 235 mortgage defaults that permeated
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the 1971-72 Congressional deliberations prior to the program morator-
ium -- and provided fodder for the program's detractors -- can be seen
as somewhat exaggerated. For it was based on the implicit assumption
that defaults naturally tend to slide into mortgage failure, that this year's
defaults were next year's repossessions. Although default is nearly al-
ways likely to precede aborted ownership, the fact that most default epi-
sodes represent a temporary cycle of mortgage difficulties, which is
usually successfully resolved, makes default a poor predictor of mort-
gage failure.
How serious were the default experiences of urban purchasers and why
did they occur? An analysis of the most recent default episodes exper-
ienced by home owners indicates that most of the episodes (55. 3%) involv-
ed single payment delinquencies and short term defaults over at most two
payments (23. 3%). (See Table VI. 26.) In general, the pattern is one of
short intermittent crises among owning families which temporarily im-
pede the ability to make mortgage payments. In most cases the effects
are not long-lasting and reamin confined to one month of mortgage arrears.
The most frequent reasons owners cited for default were related to the
problems of living on a limited income, attempting to keep pace with
normal family expenditures and outstanding bills, at the same time that
sudden large expenditures -- for children's clothing, for Christmas shop-
ping, for unexpected house repairs, and so on -- periodically interrupt
the normal cash flow of family income. (See Table VI. 27.) The second
most frequent reason for default was loss of employment, which curtailed
income until the wage earner could get back on his or her feet. Medical
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crises which incapacitated a wage earner or meant unexpected expenses
were less frequent but significant. Family separation occurred only in-
frequently during the initial years of ownership, and was rarely the cause
of default, hardly more so than the problems with house condition that
caused a few families to default on their mortgages. Whatever the prob-
lems of "life at the margin" were that precipitated default, they had more
to do with periodic income stresses than with any manifestation of family
instability among owning households. Moreover, the "systemic" issues
within the program, as reflected in dissatisfactions among owners with
the condition of the house, only rarely triggered default.
When mortgage defaults were successfully resolved, as they frequent-
ly were, they were resolved rapidly with a double payment for the follow-
ing month or two. In most instances, attempts by home owners to work
out longer repayment schedules for more serious defaults, or partial
payments to help recover the default gradually, were thwarted by mort-
gagees who insisted on full and rapid repayment. One home owner in
Pittsburgh, who had been behind one month's payment and never defaulted
previously, described his experience in the following way:
"I contacted the bank to tell them I was on strike. I offered to
pay what I could afford that month. They refused. They wanted
the full amount. When I went back to work, I sent a single pay-
ment for a couple of months. They kept returning my check and
demanding a double payment right away. They didn't try to go
along with us at all. "
In other instances, the mortgagee demanded reimbursement for fore-
closure efforts that had presumably been initiated, as well as full repay-
ment of late mortgage payments. The example of a St. Louis home
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owner, who was three months behind, and ultimately aborted ownership,
seems typical:
"They tell me I had to pay some other kind of cost. I think
they said foreclosing cost. But anyway it would amount to
$500 and I couldn't come up with that kind of money. They
wouldn't let me just try to catch up my payment. "
Despite HUD's concern with defaults under the program from 1970 on,
the first steps to encourage or coerce mortgage forebearance and leni-
ency among mortgagees were taken in late 1972 with uneven success. But
the reports of owners indicate that the behavior of mortgagees, by and
large, was such as to thwart the resolution of serious defaults,, by refus-
ing to adjust mortgage servicing procedures on behalf of the motivated
owner, and consequently to promote their degeneration to mortgage fail-
ure. . The frequently successful resolution of mortgage default is probab-
ly more to the credit of the 235 mortgagor than to the mortgagee. Never-
theless, the strictness of mortgagee demands for currency in payments
and for integral rather than partial payments11 undoubtedly served to
clarify to 235 home owners -- particularly those who might be most
tempted to fall into chronic, repeated delinquencies or defaults -- that
mortgage payments were sufficiently unlike other bills to merit special
11. Usually on the grounds that any deviation from normal procedures
increases the mortgagee's servicing costs. But mortgagees re-
ceived a servicing fee of $ 3. 50 per month from FHA for each 235
mortgage serviced, a figure that made it profitable for many firms
to attempt to build up large volumes of 235 mortgage servicing
commitments. See OSTI, January, 1974, op. cit.
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care. This factor may account for the rare repetition of default among
the urban purchasers during the first few years of ownership; only one
out of six owners who experienced default (15. 7%) had been involved in
more than one default episode.
The more serious default episodes that owners experienced, those
episodes of two or more months duration, were triggered by a similarly
diverse set of causes. (See Table VI. 27.) But the reasons that purchas-
ers gave for serious default episodes were more closely related to loss
of employment than were episodes of less severity. Loss of employment
accounted for one out of six delinquency episodes (16.1%), and for as
much as two out of five (41. 5%) serious episodes. 12 Thus, although loss
of employment did not account for most of the serious default episodes,
and they too were caused by a variety of factors, the kinds of income
stresses that tended to lead to more serious default were more closely
associated with income instability resulting from employment changes.
To the extent that mortgage failure is a consequence of extended default, 1 3
employment instability would seem to be one of the stronger factors con-
tributing to aborted ownership.
In analyzing the incidence of default among the purchaser groups, it
12. The significance of this difference is between the . 01 level and the
001 level, with chi-square = 8. 2.
13. This is not always the case. For example, owners may give up
their deed to FHA under "deed in lieu of foreclosure" arrangements
without being in default at all.
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is not surprising to find that default rates differed considerably among
them, and that it occurred most frequently among the lower income min-
ority purchasers. (See Table VI. 28.) This group sustained the lowest
median income levels at purchase as well as over the course of owner-
ship, and the highest dependency on public assistance. As a result,
these households were likely to manifest the highest level of financial
stress among the purchasers. But while they were more likely to fall be-
hind in mortgage payments, they were somewhat less likely than other
purchasers to go into more serious default beyond one month's delinquency
Though higher income minority purchasers were the most vulnerable to
serious default, white owners defaulted with similar frequency despite
their relative advantages in income and income gains over the course of
ownership and experienced serious default more frequently than the most
disadvantaged minority home buyers. These differences are striking in
themselves but they also reinforce the observation that serious default
may be more closely related to instability of income than to absolute lev-
el of income. Despite the higher degree of relative income poverty among
lower income minority purchasers, a high rate of dependence on public
assistance afforded them stable incomes. Those who were more depen-
dent on wages for their livelihoods encountered greater difficulty in stav-
ing off serious default.
These observations concerning mortgage-related difficulties are fur-
ther reinforced by purchasers' responses to a question asking for the
kinds of difficulties they encountered in their lives over the course of
ownership that they felt constituted a possible threat to continued owner-
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ship. (See Table VI. 29.) Among the "intervening" difficulties reported,
those related to loss of employment were far less frequent among lower
income minority purchasers and consistently higher for the other pur-
chaser groups. In general, lower income minority owners were less
likely to experience any perceived threats to ownership as a result of in-
tervening difficulties. 14
These findings tend to shatter some of the more cherished stereotypes
associated with the "life at the margin" theory of aborted ownership. De-
spite the fact those purchasers most closely resembling minority welfare
families were the most frequently abused by the program, on the whole
they evidenced a relatively high degree of mortgage stability compared
to other 235 home buyers in terms of tendencies toward serious default.
Their relative stability despite the frequent incidence of serious housing
deficiencies at purchase also foreshadows some of the potential weak-
nesses in the "systemic" interpretation of mortgage degeneration: the
data on defaults offer no indication that relatively large numbers of lower
income minority purchasers were considering "walking away" from their
homes.
To the extent that income or employment instability, rather than mar-
ginally low income levels, is a frequent precipitant of serious default --
14. It is unclear why white owners would cite medical difficulties as a
potential threat to home ownership more frequently than minority
owners. The higher incidence of public assistance among the minor-
ity households, which afforded them a greater degree of medical
coverage under Medicaid, might account in part for these differences.
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and, by implication, of mortgage failure -- the findings suggest that the
local employment context is a potentially important factor in determining
whether conditions favor sustained, viable ownership. It should also be
recognized that employment-related problems are likely to constitute a
greater threat to continued ownership for minority owners as opposed to
whites. Despite the fact that employment crises occurred only slightly
more frequently among higher income minority owners than among white
owners, it can be expected that they had a more serious impact on min-
ority wage earners because of discriminatory pressures in the job mar-
ket and the generally lower skill levels among minority purchasers. This
conjecture is further reinforced by the comparatively low income gains
within this minority group over the course of ownership, a factor which
also suggests that they had fewer assets than white purchasers to draw
from when income sources were cut off. In that sense, the occurrence
of a higher number of employment losses on the part of higher income
minority purchasers, and the associated difficulties of recovering from
job losses once they occur, undoubtedly contribute to the much higher
rate of serious default among these purchasers.
I. Mortgage Failure
The sampling of urban purchasers turned up 17 families who had al-
ready aborted home ownership and no longer resided in the 235 homes
they had originally purchased; another two families were still owner-res-
idents but were deeply into default -- behind by 10 and 12 payments -- and
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mortgage failure was imminent. While these 19 cases are an insufficient
sample from which to draw generalizable analytic findings, and the in-
terview tracking process did not permit tracing former owners who had
moved to other metropolitan areas subsequent to mortgage failure, a cur-
sory review of these cases of aborted ownership provides some useful
indications of the incidence, characteristics, and causes of mortgage
failure during the early years of the program.
A qualitative assessment of causal factors related to mortgage failure,
based on a thorough reading of the interviews for the 19 cases, tends to
confirm the multiplicity of causes associated with mortgage failure. (See
Table VI. 30.) But the dominant reasons for aborted ownership centered
on the condition or quality of the purchased house. Loss of employment
ranked second as a contributing factor to aborted ownership, followed by
insufficient income and family separation. By and large those families
who had aborted 235 ownership, and who had been reached by the survey
interview process, represented an early wave of "walk-away" foreclos-
ures, a trend which would tend to confirm the fears stimulated by the
1970 disclosures of program abuses and the influence of systemic factors
on mortgage failures occurring during the early stages of the program.
To the extent that the problems of "life at the margin" contributed to
mortgage failure, they were largely problems more frequently related to
employment and insufficient income, than to other crises among owning
families.
In most of the cases -- 13 out of the 19 -- mortgages were terminated
within the first two years after purchase. Considering the average three-
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year duration since purchase for most of the urban purchasers, the ten-
dency for mortgages to fail soon after ownership or not at all -- the so-
called Rayleigh effect -- seems to be potentially characteristic of the
235 program as well.
Moreover, it was common for owning families to have fallen behind
in mortgage payments by the time their mortgages were terminated (13
out of 19 cases), most frequently well beyond one month's delinquency
(11 out of 19 cases). It is nevertheless surprising that about a third of
the families who aborted 235 ownership (6 out of 19 cases) were current
in their mortgage payments at the time. When it was necessary to ter-
minate 235 ownership, for whatever reason, most owners did it through
established HUD procedures by giving up the deed in lieu of foreclosure
(10 cases); in only 6 cases were owners forced out or about to be forced
out by mortgagee foreclosure proceedings and in only 3 cases did owners
abandon their homes without formal notice. Those who used the "deed
in lieu" provisions were more likely to be current in payments; foreclo-
sure and abandonment usually followed a period of serious default. In
general, failing ovners would have opted to sell had they been able to do
so rapidly and without taking a loss. Though a majority (12 cases)
thought market values for their houses were either stable or appreciating,
most owners (14 cases) had found it difficult or impossible to sell the
house. As a result, even in cases where negative equity was not in issue
and sale was potentially possible, the difficulties involved in effecting a
sale, and the time over which owners would have to carry the mortgage,
led them to terminate ownership through other means.
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The houses families vacated upon mortgage failure represented a mix-
ture of ages without any clear pattern, though most -- 13 of the 19 -- had
been purchased new. There was no significant tendency for much older
housing to be associated with the occurrence of mortgage failure, as one
would expect from age differences in house condition at purchase.
But unexpected patterns emerge in the incidence of mortgage failure
among the purchaser groups. (See Table VI. 31.) The rate of aborted
ownership was lowest (2. 0%) among the higher income minority purchas-
ers, the group that tended to fall into serious default most frequently, as
against the average failure rate of 5. 6 percent for the purchasers as a
whole. Ironically, the highest failure rates (7. 4%) were observed among
the higher income white purchasers, who had the greatest advantages in
terms of income and educational or occupational levels and who had se-
cured the best of the 235 housing stock.
While there are methodological limitations that preclude broad gener-
alizations from these findings, the trends are significant in several re-
spects. Although in most cases mortgage failures were the result of dis-
satisfactions with house conditions, the walk-away foreclosures that were
associated with speculator-dominated ghetto submarkets or the post-war
existing submarkets were less significant in numbers than were house
dissatisfactions occurring among relatively advantaged purchasers who,
as a group, had fared best in terms of initial house condition. That is,
among the purchaser groups failure rates seem to be inversely associated
with the incidence of severe program abuses. More importantly, the
trends suggest that the process of mortgage dengeneration, whether an
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abrupt termination by the owner or the gradual transition from default to
mortgage failure, may be as much related to motivational factors -- the
commitment to continued residence in the 235 house -- as it is to systemic
failures in providing quality housing under the program or to the prob-
lems of marginal income. Higher income white purchasers manifested
strong income and occupational mobility, particularly when compared to
minority purchasers. Yet minority owners less frequently underwent
mortgage failure, particularly those who were most vulnerable to em-
ployment fluctuations and serious default. The relative stability of min-
ority owners in the face of greater adversity is, in part, an indication of
the benefits they attach to 235 ownership and of the limited range of pre-
ferable options available to them.
It should be noted that these instances reflect mortgage failures at a
relatively early stage of the program. As a result, they are likely to
manifest problems in early adaptation to 235 purchase that led purchas-
ers to believe they had made the wrong decision and to seek other alter-
natives by extricating themselves from the 235 house- through whatever
means available. In addition, they reflect the toll of intervening diffi-
culties which led to involuntary forms of mortgage failure in spite of the
owners' best efforts. By contrast, subsequent mortgage failures in the
program may be somewhat different in nature, manifesting fewer of the
problems of initial adjustment to ownership, such as owner realization of
poor house conditions or high ownership expenses, and more of those
problems related to changes in the income and employment situations
among owning households.
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J. A Diagnostic Analysis of Early Mortgage Degeneration
In designing a diagnostic analysis which would weight the relative con-
tribution of alternative factors to mortgage degeneration during the early
years of 235 ownership, the attempt is to use multi-variate regression
techniques, in which specific independent variables serve as proxies for
alternative hypotheses concerning mortgage degeneration -- the "life at
the margin", the "systemic", and the "contextual" hypotheses already
described. The structure of the dependent variable representing the de-
gree of mortgage degeneration is presented in Appendix C. In choosing
the independent variables, a good deal of selectivity was required be-
cause of the limited size of the survey sample. The following describes
the alternative factors orhypotheses considered, and the independent var-
iables used as surrogates for them:
Factor 1: the "life at the margin" hypothesis. This hypothesis postu-
lates that low absolute income levels make home ownership tenuous be-
cause of periodic family crises -- loss of employment, major illness,
family separation -- which make it difficult for relatively poor owners to
recover their footing and sustain mortgage payments. Two proxy vari-
ables are used alternatively to represent this factor. The first is per
capita income level over the most recent year of 235 ownership. 15
15. Because of differential increases in income over the course of early
ownership that strongly favored white over minority purchasers, cur-
rent income levels were assumed to represent a more accurate indi-
cation of income resources during ownership than income levels at
purchase. The per capita definition more readily incorporates
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The second variable used is an index of the incidence of intervening dif-
flties the occurrence of sustained loss of employment, major ill-
ness, or family separation during the course of 235 ownership, as re-
ported by owners. (See Appendix C.) To the extent that there is a close
association between mortgage degeneration and relatively low per capita
income levels among owners or the incidence of intervening difficulties,
the life at the margin proposition would tend to be confirmed.
Factor 2: the "systemic" hypothesis. This hypothesis -- the "walk-
away" theory of mortgage failure -- asserts that the failures in the oper-
ation of the program were a significant contribution to mortgage degener-
ation, since they resulted in placing many purchasers in sorely deficient
houses and in negative equity or declining market situations. Since the
questions of changing market values of the house or its ultimate "sale-
ability" were based largely on unveribiable purchaser estimates, an index
of house condition at purchase was used as the surrogate variable for the
"systemic" factor. In general, this index was closely correlated with
purchaser perceptions of unfavorable market situations.
Factor 3: the "contextual" hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that
235 mortgage default and failure are a consequence of local employment
conditions which are unfavorable to lower-income home ownership. In
that sense, the mortgage difficulties manifested in the program may be
family budget stresses related to the size of the household.
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attributed to the fact that it was made universally available without regard
to local economic conditions. In areas of declining employment or rela-
tively high unemployment, owners may be unable to sustain earnings or to
readily recover from temporary loss of employment. In addition, poor
local employment conditions tend to weaken the house purchase market,
as owning families consider moves to jobs in other cities or to cheaper
housing while fewer households are in a position to purchase houses. A
weakened demand against an increased supply may require owners to sell
at a loss in order to move, making mortgage abandonment more feasible
than a sale. Although local employment conditions are related to the dyn-
amics of the "life at the margin" assumption, to the extent that such con-
ditions account for mortgage degeneration independent of relative income
levels or the incidence of difficulties among owners, the "life at the mar-
gin" hypothesis is nullified. For it suggests that under suitable local
economic conditions, lower-income families are capable of sustained own-
ership. The variable which is used as a proxy for this "contextual" fac-
tor is the area unemployment rate in late 1973 for the metropolitan area
in which the 235 house was purchased. 16 As a whole, the metropolitan
16. It can also be argued that local housing market conditions have a po-
tential impact on the viability of 235 housing. In tight local markets
characterized by low rental vacancy rates, owners have fewer suit-
able housing alternatives to the 235 house even when a move is desir-
ed, and strong, persistent demands for homes are likely to sustain
property values. In general, rates of default were observed to be
significantly lower in tight market cities. But the tightness or loose-
ness of local housing market conditions proved to be a less powerful
contextual factor in the regression analysis than the employment var-
iable. Because of sample size limitations, the housing market factor
was eliminated from the diagnostic analysis.
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areas sampled exhibited a good deal of diversity in the range of unemploy-
ment rates. (See Table VI. 32.)
Factor 4: the Rayleigh effect. From previous FIA actuarial experi-
ence, it has been observed that mortgage default and failure rates peak
during the first three years of ownership and then subside. The owner
who has not failed during the initial years of ownership is much less like-
ly to fail subsequently. To control for the likelihood that short-term
home owners are more likely to default than owners of longer duration,
the duration of ownership was used as a variable which would isolate the
contribution of 235 longevity to mortgage viability and allow for finer dis-
criminations among the three competing hypotheses.
Results of the Analysis
Since the incidence of intervening difficulties targets those households
that experienced particular hardships during ownership, it could be ex-
pected to have a fairly direct impact on mortgage viability and degenera-
tion, more so than the other factors considered. As a result, it seemed
advisable to conduct two regressions, one which excluded the intervening
difficulties factor and another which included it.
The first regression was intended to illuminate the more general pre-
dictors of mortgage degeneration in the absence of any information con-
cerning family difficulties. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table VI. 33. The influence of the four factors on the dependent variable
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for mortgage degeneration follows the expected directionality:17 the like-
lihood of mortgage stability increased with the duration of ownership,
with the adequacy of house condition at purchase, and with the current in-
come levels of home purchasers. The lower local unemployment rates
were, the less likely it was that mortgage degeneration would occur.
Although the four factors accounted for only 20 percent of the variance in
mortgage outcomes, their relative contribution to these outcomes differ-
ed substantially. Local unemployment rates made the most significant
contribution to negative mortgage outcomes, indicating that the "contex-
tual" hypothesis received the strongest confirmation. That is, poor local
employment conditions were the strongest predictor of mortgage degen-
eration; where employment opportunities were relatively scarce, it was
more likely that owning families would fall into default and more likely
that they would be unable to recover missing mortgage payments. The
"life at the margin" hypothesis, represented by the income factor, re-
ceived the weakest confirmation indicating that the broad income differ-
ences among owning families were not significant in differentiating those
likely to abort ownership from those who could sustain ownership. This
finding confirms an earlier observation that stability of income rather
than absolute levels of income were more closely related to ownership
17. Higher values for the dependent variable for mortgage dengeneration
indicate greater mortgage stability over ownership, or lesser mort-
gage difficulties. Higher values for house condition at purchase in-
dicate better housing conditions. The other variables are scaled in
direct proportion to their magnitudes.
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viability, and that higher income owners subject to fluctuations in em-
ployment were the most vulnerable to serious default. Although inade-
quacies in house condition at purchase contributed significantly to early
mortgage degeneration, it would seem that walk-away foreclosures were
less representative of early mortgage problems in the program and that
involuntary mortgage failure resulting from unstable employment condi-
tions were a more powerful explanation in terms of their contribution to
mortgage degeneration.
When the incidence of intervening difficulties is taken into account in
the second regression, it proves to be as fertile a predictor of mortgage
degeneration as are local unemployment levels. The importance of house
condition at purchase seems to be a secondary factor again, and differ-
ences in income level seem to have the least potency in accounting for
mortgage degeneration. The paired problems of program abuses and of
mortgage difficulties, which the program encountered early in its career,
are more separate in nature than they are related; mortgage problems
are less a consequence of programmatic events occurring prior to or at
purchase than they are the consequence of occurrences exogenous to
housing which affect the owning family subsequent to purchase.
While the diagnostic analysis is clear in ruling out the importance of
the "systemic" assertion that program malfunctioning with regard to
house condition was a primary influence on subsequent mortgage default
and failure, it is less definitive in distinguishing between the cogency of
"life at the margin" and the "contextual" contentions. However, the weak-
ness of relative income levels -- among owners spanning a wide income
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range -- as a predictor of mortgage degeneration tends to detract from
the "life at the margin" argument which stresses the stereotypical asso-
ciation between poverty and instability. As has already been observed,
the most marginal purchasers -- the lower income minority group --
were the least likely to fall into serious default. To the extent that the
problems of life at the margin account for ownership difficulties in sus-
taining mortgage payments, they are primarily problems related to em-
ployment instability, which are reflected in both the index of intervening
difficulties and in the unemployment rate index. In that sense, the diag-
nostic analysis points to the primacy of local employment conditions and
employment difficulties among owning families as a consistent determin-
ant of mortgage stability or instability. In short, the analysis can be
interpreted as providing the strongest confirmation for the force of the
contextual argument, emphasizing local employment conditions, in ac-
counting for the mortgage difficulties experienced by owning families.
K. Projected Residential Stability
In general, home owners manifest a higher degree of residential
stability than do renters,18 and the desire for such stability constitutes
a frequent reason for the decision to buy a home.19 Among 235 purchas-
18. Cohen, o. c it.
19. Coons and Glaze, o. cit.
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ers this expectation was fairly widespread; a majority of families (61. 0%)
had viewed the 235 move as a permanent one when they made their pur-
chase decisions, and this view was particularly prevalent among minor-
ity purchasers and those at the lowest income levels. (Refer to Table
IV. 21.) In addition to considering whether 235 owners viewed themselves
as achieving the permanent residential consolidation they had expected,
there are other key issues that relate to projected owner stability. The
motivations of owners to either move or remain are important indicators
of future movement and turnover within the program that may have
significant implications for its viability and character over the longer
term.
By the time of the interviews, after an average three-year period of
ownership, roughly 8 percent of the urban purchaser sample had already
moved from their homes, most having aborted ownership (5. 6%) and some
having simply sold their homes before moving elsewhere (2. 7%). The
highest rates of early mobility occurred among the lower income white
purchaser group (See Table VI. 35.), representing mostly moves upon
sale (7. 8%) rather than mortgage failure (4. 7%). Early mobility rates
for higher income minority purchasers (2. 0%) were the lowest among the
purchaser subgroups; in light of the relatively high frequency of employ-
ment difficulties and serious default among that group, these home own-
ers had maintained a remarkable degree of stability even over so short
a period, partly accounted for the relatively high levels of satisfaction
with both house and neighborhood. Lower income minority owners were
the next most stable group, and nearly all moves on their part occurred
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as a result of mortgage termination. Considering the high incidence of
serious housing deficiencies they faced, this is not surprising. To the
contrary, it is notable that so few chose to leave their homes
These mobility patterns during the early years of ownership also
seem to be predictive of anticipated mobility patterns within the program,
judging from the way home owners viewed their residential futures at the
time of the interview. Roughly, one out of every five resident purchas-
ers (19. 9%) were either "thinking about" a move or "planning to move"
when they were interviewed. The anticipation of a move was highest
among the lower income white purchasers (25. 9%), and lowest among
higher income minority purchasers (12. 8%), much in keeping with the
pattern of previous moves. Among the two remaining groups, move an-
ticipations were at about the 20 percent level. When purchasers were
asked more specifically, "how much longer do you expect to live here?",
the responses confirmed these general patterns. Within the next two
years, about a quarter of the lower income white purchasers (23. 4%) an-
ticipated vacating their 235 homes and moving elsewhere; only a sixteen-
th of the upper income minority purchasers (6. 2%) had similar expecta-
tions. (See Table VI. 35.)
Similar trends are observable in terms of the length of residency
owners anticipated in the 235 houses they purchased. By and large, min-
ority purchasers viewed their homes as a stable residence far more fre-
quently than did white purchasers, and particularly so among the higher
income minority purchasers. About 40. 3 percent of minority purchasers
see themselves as residentially stable for at the least the next 20 years
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or permanently, while only 23. 9 percent of white purchasers feel simi-
larly. Among white purchasers, those with initially low incomes are
again somewhat less likely to consider their homes a place of long-term
residence -- for 20 years or more -- than purchasers with higher income
resources from the start.
For whatever reasons, minority owners more frequently viewed the
235 house as a relatively permanent homestead than did white owners.
And it has already been noted that they were more likely at the start to
view the purchase move as a permanent one. (Refer to Table IV. 21.)
However, it needs to be recognized that the expectations of residential
stability among all the purchaser groups at the start were substantially re-
duced after the early years of 235 ownership. The three-fifths of the pur-
chasers (61. 0%) who had hoped the purchase move would be a permanent
one at the start had been reduced to less than a third of the owners (30. 0%)
over the course of early ownership. However well or poorly the 235 pro-
gram functioned over the early years, it becomes apparent that it is not
likely to provide the kind of stable residence that the formulators of the
program and the participants had envisioned. Moreover, if the mobility
plans that owners reported come to fruition, the likelihood of a high de-
gree of turnover in the ownership of 235 houses is imminent over the near
future. To understand the motives that account for the high mobility an-
ticipations among 235 owners, it is necessary to examine the reasons they
offered for their anticipated moves.
Among owners who already moved, the major reasons offered for the
move were varied. Although the figures are too small to be statistically
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significant, the rough indications are that early moves evenly divided
themselves into three categories: those who decided to move in order to
better their housing; those who moved because of intervening family dif-
ficulties; those who moved for a variety of other reasons. (See Table
VI. 36.) By contrast, still resident owners who were considering a move
seem to be predominantly motivated by housing betterment reasons asso-
ciated with early dissatisfactions with the 235 house, or simply a desire
for better housing, or a specific need for more space to accommodate
household increases. To the extent that turnover in 235 residence is vol-
untary, rather than the result of intervening difficulties which force own-
ers out under adverse circumstances, it is likely to be largely the conse-
quence of preferences among 235 owners for better and larger houses
than the ones they originally bought.
In that sense, it is not surprising that white purchasers with initially
low incomes manifest the strongest mobility tendencies among the pur-
chaser subgroups. Limited income resources at the time of purchase un-
doubtedly constrained house choices in a way that forced them to sacrifice
possible preferences for price advantages. It has already been observed
that this group stretched its budget to the maximum in order to secure
desirable housing, but that tendency reinforces the assumption that these
purchasers had strong preferences which might not have been fully real-
ized in the initial 235 purchase. The subsequently high income mobility
among lower income white purchasers during the early ownership period
no doubt was a factor contributing to the high actual and potential house
mobility within this group, as were some of the more serious inadequacies
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in new house construction under the program. The fact that only a rela-
tively small portion of this group (9. 5%) perceived themselves to be in a
negative equity situation after purchase, and a number of those had al-
ready aborted ownership at the time of the interview, further suggests
that market conditions will support the mobility preferences of these own-
ers. (See Table VI. 37.) The lower mobility tendencies among the higher
income white purchasers, despite more favorable market conditions in
1973, suggests that this group was better able to exercise its prefer-
ences in the initial choice of the 235 house. The "way-station" concep-
tion of the 235 house as an initial investment toward a successi'on of sub-
sequent purchases of superior houses is most apt for white purchasers
with initially low incomes, and more true for white purchasers in general
than for minority purchasers.
By contrast, minority purchasers manifested a higher tendency to-
ward residential stability, actual and potential, even when market condi-
tions and their positive equity positions favored mobility. Higher income
minority purchasers perceived their equity positions to be negative only
slightly more frequently than did the lower income white purchasers, yet
they retained the highest tendency toward residential stability among the
purchaser subgroups. A high degree of satisfaction with 235 residence,
limited income mobility that constrains house mobility, possible discrim-
inatory contraints on alternative opportunities, as well as a possible
preference among these owners for long-term residential consolidation
which mitigates the potential advantages or utility of successive moves,
are factors which in combination may account for this difference in move
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orientations.
Minority purchasers who were at the lower income levels will tend to
move more frequently, but at a lower rate than the most advantaged white
purchasers. Their relative residential stability, despite the fact that
they were more frequently victimized by market abuses, is also a reflec-
tion of continuing low income levels and a high incidence of deficient
houses in declining market areas which make a sale infeasible. That
more of these families do not simply abandon their homes or offer the
deed to FHA is a clear indication of the stresses to which they had been
subject in the rental market which make their present ownership situa-
tions favorable in contrast. The response of a woman in St. Louis who
had purchased an older house which was ultimately condemned is indica-
tive:
"I want to be in my own house but not in something that has
been condemned. Because all my life I have been living in
old run-down houses and when you have children that is all
you can get. I figure the only way I could ever have a decent
home is to buy one... Now I'm right back where I started. I
need a larger place. I don't have enough room for my fam-
ily... I would like to ask you something. Will I ever be able
to buy another home under the same plan?"
It is also indicative of the particular value of ownership tenure alterna-
tives to rental among the most disadvantaged purchasers, even in light
of the negative experience of the 235 program.
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Chapter VII. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The metropolitan survey of 235 purchasers, upon which this research
is based, took place only a few months after the program moratorium
was imposed. It is apparent from the thrust of the survey findings, and
the analysis thus far, that the administration's misgivings about the pro-
gram were not fully consistent with the ways in which purchasers viewed
and assessed their own experiences in the program. The purpose of this
chapter is to present a synthesis of the survey findings regarding the
values and shortcomings of 235 ownership --- and, by implication, of
lower-income home ownership programs in general -- as they might be
assessed from the vantage point of consumer experience over the early
years of the 235 program. The major foci of assessment are as follows:
(1) On the whole, how well or how poorly had the 235 program func-
tioned with regard to a number of key criteria: in providing opportunities
for residential betterment; in its impact on the family economy; and in
providing positive, viable channels of tenure mobility?
(2) What can be said of the viability of home ownership for urban
lower-income families, and of the primary factors that account for mort-
gage degeneration?
(3) What differences are there in the way the program functioned for
different groups of purchasers?
(4) What can be learned from the 235 program with respect to future
policies regarding tenure choice for urban lower-income families? What
are the values of ownership-oriented policies for their potential lower-
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income constituencies, and how can program mechanisms be improved in
ways that avoid the shortcomings of the 235 program and enhance program
equities and outcomes for lower-income purchasers?
A. Overall Consequences of the Initial Years of 235 Ownership
Despite the imperfections of the 235 program and the negative pro-
gram experiences of many purchasers, the early ownership experiences
of urban purchasers served to reinforce and strengthen their initial ten-
ure preferences favoring owning over renting. Although a small core of
owners (3%) expressed a preference for renting and a larger number (7%)
found themselves indifferent to tenure after the early years of 235 owner-
ship, a pervasive majority of 235 buyers (90%) clearly preferred owning
to renting. Whatever the benefits or deficits of 235 ownership were, the
program had provided a sufficiently positive channel of tenure mobility
to convince purchasers, rather than disconvince them, of the comparative
advantages of home ownership for themselves.
The generally positive shift in ownership preferences -- from 79 per-
cent prior to purchase to 90 percent -- occurred most dramatically among
minority home buyers. The 7 out of 10 minority buyers who had clearly
preferred owning prior to purchase had shifted to 9 out of 10 after the
initial years of 235 ownership. Although minority buyers had tended more
than white purchasers to view ownership as a means to residential better-
ment rather than as an end in itself, although they far more frequently en-
countered the abuses and house deficiencies associated with the existing
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housing sector of the 235 market, their first ownership experiences under
the 235 program served to strengthen their preferences for owning to a
level which matched the tenure preferences of other purchasers.
However, the positive attractions of home ownership, based on con-
crete experiences in the 235 program, are not accompanied by similarly
strong attachments to the 235 house. Though three-fifths (61%) ofthe
urban purchasers had initially viewed the purchase move as a permanent
one, less than a third (30%) saw themselves, after the initial years of
ownership, as remaining in the house for 20 more years or permanently.
The fact that a majority (58%) expressed a preference for owning a house
different from the ones they had originally purchased was consistent with
the reasons given for anticipated mobility, most of which had to do with
the desire for a preferable house with greater amenities, more space, or
less of the deficiencies manifested in the condition of the 235 house.
Though minority owners registered a stronger orientation to residential
stability in the 235 house than did white purchasers, neither group had
found the permanent home to the extent they had anticipated.
Thus, the 235 program had provided a positive channel of tenure mo-
bility to the extent that it had provided families with initial ownership ex-
periences that were sufficiently positive to convince them of the relative
advantages of owning. But, for most purchasers it succeeded less well
in providing the permanent residential base, the consolidation implied by
"a stake in the community", that had been envisioned by those who had
formulated the program. In part, this can be viewed as a consequence of
administrative failures in the 235 program, most strongly manifested in
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the poor quality and value of many 235 homes. In that sense,
more effective and conscientious administration might have enhanced the
stability of 235 residents. But the residential mobility orientations of
owners are also an inherent consequence of upward income rmobility among
many families -- even among those initially eligible as "lower-income"
households -- which affords them the subsequent opportunity to exercise
their preferences for more desirable ownership housing no matter how
sound the 235 house had been. This tendency accounts, in part, for the
higher degree of anticipated residential stability among minority purchas-
ers, whose income gains over the course of early ownership were sub-
stantially lower than those for white home buyers and whose
homes were in substantially poorer condition. To the extent that the 235
program, and other possible lower-income ownership programs, provide
"minimal ownership housing" -- that is, the minimal house amenities
available in even the best of the 235 stock -- to families who can subse-
quently afford better houses, the program will tend to manifest a consid-
erable degree of residential mobility and turnover over the long range.
Thus, the 235 program served as a positive channel of tenure mobil-
ity primarily in terms of providing many lower-income households with
a "first purchase" opportunity for entry into the house purchase market.
That it served subsequently as more of a "way-station" than purchasers
had originally anticipated or wanted, and seemed in 1973 to have not pro-
duced the degree of residential stability that the program rhetoric called
for, is only partly a remediable consequence of the administrative and
market abuses in the 235 program. It is also an anticipated consequence
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of income mobility within the context of a "minimal" home ownership
program, a consequence which in itself is neither positive or negative in
its implications for policies related to tenure choice.
In terms of its impact on the economy of owning families, the 235
program had somewhat more mixed results. Although the majority of
urban purchasers (69%) estimated that their homes had appreciated in
value over the early years of ownership, the possibility that a substantial
portion of the purchasers -- from 11 to 25 percent -- found themselves
in potential negative equity situations is a telling indication of the admin-
istrative malfunctioning of the program, considering the generally infla-
tionary trends in urban purchase markets from the late 1960's on. More-
over, the investment benefits associated with the 235 house were strongly
differentiated among the purchaser groups and regressive in their distri-
butive effects. A large majority of white purchasers at the upper reaches
of the eligible income range (85%) assessed that their homes had appre-
ciated in value since purchase, and were generally satisfied with the 235
purchase as an investment. At the other extreme, minority purchasers
at the lowest income levels were most frequently involved in negative
equity situations, and had been "euchred" in the way that Secretary
Weaver had forewarned during the early legislative deliberations. Never-
theless, among this group of purchasers over two-fifths (44%) saw their
houses appreciating in value and, surprisingly, a two-thirds majority
(66%) viewed their houses as good investments. The difference between
these two estimates reflects differences in the perception of investment
values among lower-income minority buyers, some of them taking a view,
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which seems rural in its origins, that the house constitutes a permanent
homestead with positive long-term equity accretion regardless of chang-
ing or declining market values. Ultimate ownership of property as such
makes it a good investment without regard to the transfer value of the
house in the market. Although this latter view is not a dominant one, it
suggests that many disadvantaged households place a value on a perma-
nent homestead and the holding of property that has little to do with more
mainstream, market-oriented standards of the goodness of investment.
Although such positive views concerning 235 investment values were
reported by the majority of 235 purchasers, and on investment grounds
the program seemed to be succeeding much more often than it failed, it
is difficult to overlook the fact that a substantial number of families under
the program did not experience the investment benefits usually associated
with home purchase and found themselves in homes they could not sell
without taking a loss. The frequent occurrence of negative equity under
the program so soon after purchase suggests that market fluctuations ex-
trinsic to the program were less to blame than faulty inspection and ap-
praisal procedures on FHA's part. Ironically, in the attempt to correct
the abuses under the program, FHA suspended the sale of existing houses,
thereby destroying the market in older neighborhoods where families
often purchased on the assumption that the 235 program would ultimately
succeed in revitalizing a declining rental area. However, to the extent
that negative equities are directly attributable to recognized flaws in pro-
gram administration, they are remediable and not inherent in any attempt
to facilitate lower-income home ownership.
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In terms of "out of pocket" housing cost burdens for mortgage and
utility payments, the findings indicate that upon purchase most families
experienced a considerable increase in cost burdens compared to the por-
tions of their incomes they had been allocating to rental housing costs.
And families at the lowest income levels carried the highest initial bur-
dens. It is not unusual even among middle-income purchasers, that fami-
lies stretch their budgets to the limit when they make a home purchase in
the anticipation that future income gains will moderate the effects of ini-
tially high mortgage burdens. This pattern seems to have prevailed
among 235 purchasers as well. Over the initial years of ownership, there
were substantial income gains among most purchasers, except for higher
income minority purchasers whose median income level increased only
marginally relative to other purchaser groups, gains that offset the initi-
ally high cost burdens and brought them, by and large, to within the levels
families had been accustomed to paying in their pre-purchase rental situa-
tions. Additional house-related costs beyond monthly mortgage and utility
payments -- such as those for repairs, site improvements, house furnish-
ings and appliances -- remained at similar absolute median levels of
about $600 for all the purchaser groups with obvious regressive effects
for those at the lowest income levels who could least afford additional ex-
penses. Assuming these expenses were paid over a two year period, with
some interest on installments, they represent an additional annual cost
burden averaging about 4 percent for higher income purchasers and 6 per-
cent for lower income purchasers. As a result, total house expenditure
burdens over the early years of ownership, when some of the "front end",
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nest-feathering costs of home ownership tend to be high, were well in
excess of pre-purchase rent burdens.
Thus, in terms of absolute outlays, and housing expenditure burdens
relative to income, 235 home ownership was, by and large, somewhat
more costly than the pre-purchase rental situation. While there is no
evidence to suggest that 235 home ownership was more costly than com-
parable rentals for housing with similar attributes, or, for that matter,
more costly than alternative rental situations families might have found
themselves in had they not opted for a 235 purchase, the cost findings re-
inforce the perceptions among most owners (66%) that owning was indeed
more expensive than renting.
However, the fact that families paid more for 235 ownership, even to
the point of undertaking excessive cost burdens by most standards, is not
in itself an indictment of the program from the consumer's vantage point.
In positive equity situations, potential investment yields resulting from
equity accretion and appreciating market values represent family savings
which offset increased out-of-pocket costs. Naturally this economic ra-
tionale does not maintain for families in negative equity situations, whose
increased housing expenditures offer no comparable investment benefits.
But the strong consumption orientation among many home purchasers,
which places a premium on the consumable benefits associated with own-
ership occupancy rather than the optimization of ultimate investment
1yields, argues for an assessment of ownership cost burdens in terms of
1. Coons and Glaze, ocit. , for confirming findings.
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their relative utility with regard to the consumption of what are perceived
to be superior residential "goods".
When 235 ownership cost burdens are assessed, on a quid-pro-quo
basis of perceived value for the consumer's dollar, the program seems
to have been fairly successful over its early stages. Among the two-
thirds majority of purchasers (65%) who found owning to be more expen-
sive than renting, nearly all (87%) reported that owning was worth the in-
creased costs. And the dominant reasons they gave suggest the diverse
utilities they attached to ownership occupancy: owning as its own gratifi-
cation (33%); superior housing amenities (30%); equity investment advan-
tages (27%); and the autonomy associated with ownership (24%). Only a
small proportion of the purchasers (8%) found owning more expensive and
not worth the increased expense. In short, despite the difficulties 235
purchasers encountered in a federally mismanaged program and the high
cost burdens extracted for ownership housing -- at times without compen-
sating equity yields -- 235 owners either felt they were spending no more
than they would for rental costs or nearly universally reported they were
getting their money's worth in terms of the intrinsic utility or values they
attached to ownership occupancy.
By adequist standards of physical housing accommodation, there were
marked improvements in the housing situations of families as a result of
the 235 purchase move. The two-thirds majority of families who had been
living in overcrowded conditions (65%) was reduced to little more than a
third (37%) after purchase. Although the survey was not able to provide
an objective comparison of pre- and post-purchase housing condition,
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when purchasers were asked to compare the current condition of the 235
house with that of the pre-purchase dwelling unit, three-quarters of the
home buyers (74%) felt the 235 house represented an improvement, with
more than half (56%) reporting that the 235 house was in "much better
condition" than their previous dwelling. 2 However, one out of nine pur-
chasers (11%) felt they were living under worse conditions as a result of
the purchase move, and the remainder (15%) reported no change at all.
But, by and large, urban purchasers were able to effect substantial re-
ductions in the kinds of physical housing stresses they had encountered
prior to purchase.
Shifts in residential satisfaction before and after purchase provide a
more natural, consumer-subjective criterion of the degree to which urban
purchasers associated the purchase move with their own residential bet-
terment and clarify some of the residential gratifications they associated
with ownership occupancy. (Refer to Table VI. 12.) Reports of current
housing satisfaction with the 235 house represented a substantial increase
over retrospective judgments of the pre-purchase dwelling -- a shift
from 55 percent of the purchasers to 78 percent. And increases in the
incidence of housing satisfaction were most notable among minority pur-
chasers, who had been more vulnerable to housing stresses in the rental
2. Minority purchasers were less sanguine with regard to changes in
housing condition. About 17 percent of minority purchasers felt
they were living in housing in worse condition, while only 8 percent
of white purchasers felt similarly.
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market. While shifts in neighborhood satisfaction were relatively margin-
al by cormparison, they were also in a positive direction -- from 68 per-
cent prior to purchase to 78 percent after the initial years of ownership.
Moreover, minority purchasers reported increased neighborhood satis-
factions far more frequently, in terms of improved physical and social
characteristics associated with the neighborhood transition. In short,
the 235 purchase move resulted in substantially improved residential con-
ditions and increased residential satisfactions for owning families.
Despite the program's vulnerability on purely rational economic
grounds, it seems to have been particularly successful in providing con-
sumers with residential goods -- expressed largely in terms of tenure-
related benefits and residential life improvements -- that they considered
worth the costs and tribulations associated with the program. The parti-
cular calculus of values attached to home ownership among urban lower-
income families is central to these issues. Whether one is critical of
those values as an external observer -- as from the vantage point of
Marx's "false consciousness" -- is less important than that many mar-
ginal urban families attach a functional importance to them within their
own reality frames. In that regard, they share with the rest of main-
stream society the behaviors, norms, and beliefs associated with upward
residential mobility that have led to the massive metropolitanization and
suburbanization of our urban areas. Although many 235 owners were
straining their budgets to sustain home ownership, probably far more than
families at the lower income levels should, it needs to be recognized that
they themselves viewed it as a worthwhile cost in order to secure what
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they consider a higher order of residential goods and values largely un-
attainable in the rental market, if one is to judge from their pre-purchase
experiences. What is most remarkable is the apparent fact that even so
imperfect a program as section 235 succeeded in providing many lower-
income families with an opportunity channel for realizing and actualizing
those values.
B. The Viability of Ownership
The benefits and gratifications that families derive from the move to
ownership have also to be weighed against the ability of urban lower-
income families to sustain ownership arrangements and obligations. Po-
tential problems with the viability of home ownership for marginal urban
families were recognized by the drafters of the 235 program who antici-
pated a 25 percent mortgage failure rate as an acceptable loss tolerance
for the program. Actuarial projections made in 1973 -- before the-ePee
inflation in energy prices and the onset of a deepening employment re-
cession -- envisioned that program losses would remain well within those
bounds. 3 In that sense, the program could be considered to have succeed-
ed against expectations in proving that home ownership was a viable hous-
ing arrangement for most lower-income families -- within the limits of
acceptable losses -- even in the face of the additional problems incurred
3. HUD, Housing in the Seventies, o2. cit.
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by federal mismanagement of program efforts. 4
The survey data concerning mortgage difficulties and ownership fail-
ure during the initial years of 235 ownership are useful in illuminating
the nature and extent of mortgage problems among lower-income owners
and in considering the ways in which such problems might be dealt with
as an inherent aspect of lower-income ownership programs. To begin
with, the evidence indicates that mortgage default was a common occur-
rence among 235 owners despite substantial income gains by many house-
holds over the course of early ownership. Nearly a third (30%) of 235
owners had fallen behind in mortgage payments at one time or another
during the initial years of ownership. But, characteristically, these de-
fault episodes were short-lived or temporary in nature, without long-
lasting effects in terms of sliding into more serious default or the ulti-
mate abandonment of ownership. Among those who had experienced de-
fault at some point, about two-thirds (66%) were current in their mortgage
payments at the time of the survey interviews or, in a few cases, had
already effected a sale of their homes without failing as mortgagors.
It would seem that mortgage default, in itself, is a poor predictor of
either more serious default or subsequent mortgage failure. Most default
episodes (55%) involved a one-month delinquency in payment, resolved
without more serious consequences through a double payment the follow-
4. What had not been envisioned, and what helped make even acceptable de-
fault and failure rates a source of subsequent controversy, was that
owner failure came to be associated with house failure as a result of
program abuses and maladministration. That is, when an owner failed,
additional federal losses were incurred in bringing the house into resell-
able condition.
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ing month. Another quarter of the episodes (23%) went as far as a two-
month default, which was usually resolveable if the mortgagee was suffi-
ciently tolerant of late payments. The incidence of repeated defaults
was rare. Characteristically, default episodes were triggered by tem-
porary income stresses among owning families, usually as a result of un-
expected cash flow problems (36%), loss of employment (26%), or medi-
cal problems (17%). And most owners were able to recover their missing
mortgage payments within a month or two. The more serious defaults --
episodes of two or more months duration -- were similarly diverse in
their causes, but more frequently related to loss of employment (42%) and
the time required to find alternative employment.
While the multiplicity of problems associated with "life at the margin"
account for the onset of default episodes, specific problems associated
with employment instability are more closely related to attenuated default.
In that respect, minority purchasers at the lower income levels consti-
tute the strongest counter-example to the "life at the margin" stereotype
of mortgage difficulties. They constituted the most disadvantaged sub-
group of purchasers, in terms of low occupational and educational attain-
ment levels, in terms of low median income levels at purchase and only
marginal income gains over the course of ownership, in their degree of
dependence on public assistance rather than wage earnings. Mbreover,
they were most vulnerable to the worst program abuses which left them
with houses inpoor condition and often with negative equities. Yet,
despite the fact that they were involved in one-month mortgage delin-
quencies more frequently than the other relatively affluent purchaser
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groups, they were less likely to slide into more serious default. The
vulnerability to loss of employment seems to be a more potent cause of
serious mortgage degeneration than chronic income poverty.
The diagnostic analysis of mortgage degeneration gives further cre-
dence to the above conjecture and tends to confirm most strongly the em-
phasis placed on local employment conditions in the "contextual" interpre-
tation of mortgage degeneration. Although the regression analyses upon
wpich this assertion is based were not definitive in explaining the full var-
iation in the incidence of mortgage degeneration, the weighting of the fac-
tors is most consistently in a direction which would confirm the strong
influence of local unemployment rates on the likelihood of serious default
and its progression to mortgage failure. (Refer to Tables VI. 33 and 34.)
This relationship is more dramatically presented in tabular form in Table
VII. In metropolitan areas of relatively high unemployment, both the rate
of default and of serious default are considerably higher.
The regression analyses also provide some confirmation of the "life
at the margin" assertion in that the incidence among families of interven-
ing difficulties during ownership -- employment problems, major illness,
family separation -- is one of the factors that contribute substantially to
the mortgage degeneration process. But the sense of the "life at the mar-
gin" interpretation, with its emphasis on the poverty syndrome, is some-
what diluted by the weak relation between low relative income levels and
mortgage degeneration. This is most strikingly illustrated by the relative
mortgage stability of minority purchasers at the lower income levels, who
more than other purchasers represented the stereotype of the marginal
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TABLE VII INCIDENCE OF DEFAULT BY METROPOLITAN
AREA UNEMPLOYMENT RATE*
Low
Unemployment
(less than 4%)
% purchasers who
experienced default
(1 or more payments)
during 235 ownership
% purchasers who
experienced serious
default (2 or more
payments) during
most recent default
episode
Metropolitan Areas:
Moderate
Unemployment
(4. 0 to 4. 9%)
25. 1% (n=203) 21. 0% (n=67)
9. 4% (n=203) 11. 9% (n=67)
Denver Omaha
Indianapolis Pittsburgh
Louisville
Milwaukee
Rochester
Washington, D. C.
High
Unemployment
(5% or more)
55. 2% (n=67)
19. 4% (n=67)
Seattle
St. Louis
*Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Area Trends in Employment and
Unemployment, October, 1973.
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owning family in the controversies that arose during the implementation
of the 235 program. By and large, employment instability among the
better-off 235 owners who were dependent on wages, further exacerbated
by a poor local employment context in which it was difficult to recover
rapidly from a job loss, provide the most potent explanation of serious
mortgage problems occurring during the initial years of ownership. In
that sense, the analysis confirms both the contextual interpretation of
mortgage degeneration and a qualified, predominantly employment-
oriented "life at the margin" interpretation.
Surprisingly, the analysis gave relatively low weight to the "systemic"
interpretation of early mortgage degeneration in the program, in that
the condition of the house at purchase was less important than local em-
ployment conditions or intervening difficulties among owners. Though
dissatisfactions with initial house condition accounted for most of the in-
stances of aborted ownership uncovered in the survey, initial house con-
dition had less of a systematic relation to serious default and mortgage
failure as a whole. What the evidence suggests is that an initial wave of
walk-away foreclosures did occur, as predicted during the early dis-
closures of abuses, but that the wave was of more finite duration and
extent than had been anticipated. This is confirmed by the relative stabil-
ity of lower income minority purchasers who were most frequently sub-
jected to the program's worst abuses. The evidence leads to the conclu-
sion that the problems of mortgage degeneration during the initial years
of the program were less the product of systemic program mismanage-
ment prior to purchase than the result of difficulties exogenous to the
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program that families faced after purchase over the course of early own-
ership.
The usefulness of this analysis in assessing the viability of lower-
income ownership over the longer-range should be qualified. For in-
stance, the legacy of the poor quality of houses provided under the 235
program may be an increasing number of "house failures" over the years
which owners either cannot afford to mend or will not care to mend. If
that is the case, then the early wave of walk-away foreclosures may be
only the tip of an iceberg of increasing mortgage failures which are "sys-
temic" in their origins. The evidence over the early years of ownership
indicates that owners were able to bring about a considerable number of
improvements and repairs to the condition in which they found their
houses at purchase, particularly those families who had either purchased
new homes or whose income gains during ownership enabled them to af-
ford major repairs. In that sense, the motivation for appropriate main-
tenance of the house was manifestly present, even when purchasers could
ill afford the associated costs. But whether the houses will adequately
withstand the wear they receive over the life of the mortgage remains an
open question which cannot be fully addressed in this research.
Nor is it easy to project the effects of the combined inflation and em-
ployment recession over the years subsequent to the relative national
prosperity from 1968 to 1973, the years over which the consumer survey
data spanned. On the one hand, it can be expected that the recent infla-
tion in house prices will have some positive effects in appreciating the
value of 235 properties even among those which represented negative
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equity situations for owners during the early years. This trend suggests
that 235 purchasers fared much better than their rental cohorts in that
ownership will have served as an effective hedge against inflationary rent
increases. Moreover, it is likely to increase the incentive for improve-
ments in the house, and for longer-term residential stability.
On the other hand, the effects of a deepening recession and rising un-
employment are such as to increase the likelihood of serious mortgage
problems and rising losses, despite the best intentions of owners. They
are also likely to sharpen the differences in mortgage performance among
urban areas representing different employment contexts and differing
trends in economic growth. The survey evidence indicates that even dur-
ing the relative prosperity of 1968-1973, problems related to employment
instability and poor local employment conditions had the strongest observ-
able influence on mortgage degeneration during the early years of owner-
ship. In that sense, these are inherent risks in lower-income ownership
programs against which acceptable loss tolerances have to be considered
as natural or inevitable companion costs of the program -- as they were
in 1968 -- depending on both national and local economic conditions. To
the extent that the risks of employment instability and its consequences
can be reduced in any future lower-income ownership programs, the vi-
ability of urban lower-income families as home owners will be corres-
pondingly increased.
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C. The Distributive Effects of 235 Ownership: Differential Program
Functions and Consequences Among the Purchaser Groups
In assessing the relative validity of the adequist, relativist, and func-
tionalist views of tenure choice policy from the vantage point of consumer
experience in the 235 program, it is necessary to recognize the diversity
that was manifested both in the program's lower-income constituency and
in the distribution of program benefits among the different kinds of pur-
chasers. Moreover, an understanding of the distributive tendencies of
the open market ownership program that the 235 program reprsents is
useful in the formulation of future policies which will better serve the
purpose of distributive equity.
Much of the preceding analysis points to the differences in the way the
235 program performed for different kinds of purchasers and to the diffi-
culty of speaking in general of the values or dysbenefits consumers de-
rived from the program or the consequences it held for them. Similarly,
the term "lower-income families" subsumes a variety of households or
families functioning under different life conditions and manifesting differ-
ing housing values and tenure orientations, differing expectations of the
program and, consequently, differing ways of perceiving and using the
program as a housing opportunity. To understand how and why the 235
program performed as it did from the purchaser's vantage point, it is
useful to develop a synoptic understanding of alternative consumer scen-
arios that compose the program's experience. To do so requires a dis-
aggregation of purchasers into appropriate but artificial classifications
that make for meaningful differences in consumer experience. It has been
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the assumption of the survey analysis from the start that race and income
are the most useful dimensions for differentiating among purchasers and
their consequent experiences. The purpose of this section is to summar-
ize and synthesize the previous analyses by purchaser group, so defined,
as a way of sharpening some of the already apparent differences in pro-
gram functioning among purchasers.
(1) Minority Purchasers at the Lower Income Levels
Pre-purchase housing situations among these purchasers were those
which are characteristically associated with urban families at relatively
low income levels, who are frequently dependent on public assistance for
the support of relatively large households and have only limited opportun-
ities in the rental market. As a group, minority purchasers at the lower
income levels bore the greatest housing deprivations prior to purchase --
high cost burdens, overcrowding, and poor basic housing conditions --
and were more likely than other purchasers to be located in public hous-
ing and to be dissatisfied with their rental situations in terms of both
housing and neigbhorhood.
Though most of these purchasers shared an early preference for own-
ership over rental tenure, in common with the other purchaser groups,
these preferences were not as pervasive among lower income minority
purchasers. It is not surprising that most of these purchasers cited hous-
ing or residential betterment as the most important reason for deciding to
buy rather than benefits more directly associated with ownership tenure
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itself -- its goal-fulfilling aspects or its investment advantages. That is,
in contrast with white purchasers, these families took a more pragmatic
view of purchase opportunities provided under the 235 program, seeing
it more in terms of upward residential mobility than tenure mobility and,
in that sense, as a way of extricating themselves from unsatisfactory and
exploitative living conditions associated with their previous rental situa-
tions. It can be said of this group of purchasers that the "push" of
earlier residential stresses was a more compelling motive for their own-
ership moves than the simultaneous, seductive "pull" of home ownership.
Perhaps because of their relatively low familiarity with home owner-
ship, they attached less importance to the tenure aspect of the move and
also tended to be more naive about the relative expense of owning over
rental. A substantial majority tended to view the ownership move as a
permanent one from the start, as an opportunity to establish a stable
residential base. That they tended to view the 235 house as less of a
"way-station" to a better house in the future and more as a permanent
homestead, and that some maintained the view that any equity in real
property constitutes a form of long-term savings, partially explain their
relative lack of concern with shorter-term, potential investment yields.
In addition, their urgent needs for better alternative housing undoubtedly
created pressures among these families to trade-off for immediate resi-
dential benefits against less palpable equity considerations in their pur-
chase decisions.
The house choices made by these purchasers differ substantially from
those of the other purchaser subgroups, in that only a small proportion
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of the houses were newly-constructed and most were much older houses
over 30 years old. The fact that lower income minority purchasers were
largely constrained to choices among existing housing submarkets in
some of the older neighborhoods of the core city is the result of a complex
of causes. Having limited income and relatively poor income prospects,
they tended to be priced out of the more expensive, newer housing pro-
vided under the program, and could afford only the depressed prices in
the city's declining neighborhoods. Moreover, field studies of the pro-
gram indicated the presence of discriminatory barriers to minority fam-
ilies seeking purchase in some of the new 235 subdivisions. In addition,
their heavy reliance on real estate brokers in the house search process,
coupled with inexperience in purchase, urgent needs, and suppressed as-
pirations and knowledge in relation to alternative housing and locational
opportunities, all of these factors combined to make them easy victims of
high-pressure sales tactics and of speculator-dominated housing submar-
kets. It was largely the purchase experiences of these families that cry-
stallized the evolving national image of the program with the disclosure
of program abuses in 1970, a skewed image in the sense that this group
of purchasers constitutes less than a quarter of urban purchasers in the
metropolitan sample.
One of the saddest ironies of the 235 program is that it provided the
greatest dysbenefits to the most disadvantaged purchasers. Roughly a
third to a half of the lower income minority purchasers ended up in inade-
quate, seriously defective houses under conditions of negative equity.
Nor were these compensated by relatively lower cost burdens; because of
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their marginal income gains over the course of ownership they continued
to bear the highest housing cost burdens among the purchaser groups.
Yet, the perceptions and behaviors of these purchasers over the early
years of ownership indicate that they viewed their 235 ownership exper-
ience more positively than the external facts would suggest. This discre-
pancy between external programmatic judgments and consumer assess-
ments of their own experience is evident in a number of respects. Since
purchasers who had been subjected to program abuses were able to take
advantage of HUD's "deed in lieu" arrangements and give up their houses
without further penalty, and any purchaser could presumably abandon a
home -- as some did -- after a "rent-free" period of extended default, it
can be said that 235 owners "voted with their feet" in deciding whether it
was better to remain in the 235 house, whatever its shortcomings, or
better to move elsewhere. In that respect, the high degree of stability
among lower income minority owners over the course of early ownership
and their relatively high degree of anticipated residential stability in the
future are strong indications that they found much that was of value in 235
ownership. Although fewer maintained their original expectation that the
235 move would be a permanent one, lower income minority purchasers
remain one of the more stable purchaser groups even in face of serious
house deficiencies and high cost burdens. Moreover, the incidence of
serious defaults was lowest among these purchasers and the observed
rates of mortgage failure were lower than those observed among higher
income white purchasers.
In part, the relative stability of ownership among lower income
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minority purchasers was related to their income stability; many families re-
ceived public assistance and were therefore insulated from severe em-
ployment and income fluctuations which would otherwise promote serious
default and possible mortgage failure. But, to a large extent, their
tenacity as 235 owners is explicable in terms of their negative, previous
experiences in the rental market, their subsequent realization of the com-
parative advantages of even an imperfect ownership situation, and their
growing commitment to sustained home ownership. Despite their fre-
quently negative experiences in the program and their initially low fami-
liarity with and preferences for ownership, nearly all lower income min-
ority purchasers (92%) preferred owning over renting after the initial
years of 235 ownership -- though fewer (34%) preferred to own the same
homes than did the other purchaser groups (45%). Although nearly a
third of these owners registered some degree of dissatisfaction with the
235 house and neighborhood, as a group they made significant advances
in their physical housing accommodations and in residential satisfaction,
compared with their assessments of pre-purchase housing and neighbor-
hood conditions. The major benefits they attached to home ownership
were largely in terms of ownership itself, particularly its independence
from whatever intrusions landlords and other tenants represented, and in
terms of quality of life improvements associated with stable residence
and with better living conditions for family and children. 5 Though they
5. Many of these owners reported an abortive cycle of repeated moves
preceding the purchase move, and frequent abrasive experiences with
landlords and other tenants, often having to do with the numerous chil-
dren in the household. The sense of having found a refuge in the 235
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registered some degree of dissatisfaction with the costs and responsibil-
ities attached to ownership, and with the 235 house itself, their discon-
tents were no more pervasive than those expressed by other purchasers.
And like other purchasers, they considered the comparative advantages
of ownership to be worth the increased cost.
Viewed within the context of the perceptions and life conditions of low-
er income minority purchasers, rather than from the vantage point of
externally-imposed programmatic standards, the program had functioned
to provide significant benefits to these purchasers that they felt were not
attainable in the rental market. If they were displeased with their houses,
as they frequently were, they nevertheless felt they had made significant
improvements in their living conditions as a result of the 235 purchase.
(2) White Purchasers at the Lower Income Levels
The pre-purchase situations and prospects of lower income white
purchasers were somewhat less extreme than those of minority purchas-
ers at similar income levels. Income prospects were good, as evidenced
by the substantial gains they realized over the early years of ownership.
Though one out of six such purchasers received income from public as-
sistance, the substantial majority of them manifested a high degree of
upward income mobility within the limits of their full earning potential.
house was apparent in many cases, and reverberatedin the "house-as-
haven" theme in Rainwater, "Fear and House-As-Haven in the Lower
Class", og. cit.
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Nevertheless, limited incomes prior to purchase had severly constrained
their housing choices, and their pre-purchase housing situations were
characterized by a relatively high degree of housing deprivations -- inad-
equate space, high rent burdens, and poor housing -- as well as a high
degree of dissatisfaction with both housing and neighborhood. Their dif-
ficulties in finding suitable housing within a limited income is evidenced
in their high degree of residential mobility prior to purchase; they tended
to move far more frequently than the other purchaser groups.
Despite their suppressed incomes, and the consequent difficulties they
experienced in their pre-purchase rental situations, they possessed a
strong familiarity with home ownership deriving from other owners they
knew well and their own family backgrounds, the strongest degree of fam-
iliarity among the purchaser subgroups. Their tenure preferences prior
to purchase were more strongly oriented to ownership than were those of
other types of purchasers. Although they generally lacked the income
resources to achieve home ownership in the unsubsidized purchase mar-
ket, it may be said of this group that they viewed home ownership as an
important expectation and goal in its own right, as well as a solution to
some of thier pressing housing problems. The 235 program proved to be
an opportunity to instrument those goals, and the dominant reasons they
cited. for deciding to buy were multi-faceted, but concentrated largely on
tenure-related reasons -- home ownership for its own sake and for equity
investment advantages -- as well as on expected quality of life improve-
ments. In contrast with minority purchasers at similar income levels,
their dominant purchase motives reflected a high tenure mobility orienta-
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tion, expressed in terms of the intrinsic values they attached to owner-
ship tenure itself rather than a more direct concern with its consequences
for residential betterment. But most of these purchasers shared with
minority purchasers the expectation that the 235 move would be a perma-
nent one, although over a third expected to move at some point in the fu-
ture. They were also far more realistic than the other purchaser groups
about the increased expenses that ownership would involve. However,
most such purchasers had the initial expectation that owning would be
cheaper than renting.
The most dramatic difference in the way the 235 program functioned
for white and minority purchasers at the lower income levels is in the
house-age submarkets in which they purchased. A majority of lower
income white purchasers -- about two-thirds -- purchased new houses,
and far fewer purchased pre-war houses more than thirty years old in
the older neighborhoods of the city. This is a striking indication that
limited income was not in itself a major barrier to entry into the newer
subdivisions, as were possible discriminatory practices and the dynamics
by which minority families tended to confine themselves to the older sub-
markets. Unlike minority purchasers at similar income levels, white
purchasers seldom relied on real estate intermediaries; they had more
resources to rely upon during the purchase process and usually found
their homes through acquaintances or through their own search efforts.
More than other purchasers, they seemed to be willing to stretch
their budgets to the limit in order to be able to afford a preferable or
more expensive house. These purchasers tended to have a stronger
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neighborhood orientation, in that they had experienced strong neighbor-
hood dissatisfactions prior to purchase and were more likely to trade off
lower house prices for what they perceived to be neighborhood advantages
in their purchase choices. This sensitivity to neighborhood choice --
probably based on social judgments -- undoubtedly reinforced their ten-
dency to undertake higher costs in order to exercise their preferences.
However, their willingness to take on high mortgage obligations in order
to optimize thier purchase choices was not unrealistic, since many such
purchasers could expect income gains over the near future that would
bring high initial cost burdens to within the affordable range. Although,
as a group, they experienced the highest initial ownership cost burdens,
these burdens dropped considerably over the initial years of ownership
to a level below that of minority purchasers with similar incomes at the
start.
Nevertheless, their choice of new and post-war housing did not pro-
tect them from program shortcomings in the provision of sound housing.
Although they were subject to fewer market abuses than minority pur-
chasers at similar income levels, nearly a third of these families found
themselves at purchase in houses which were defective on several counts.
The used houses they purchased bore the effects of deferred maintenance,
though they seldom represented the "falling apart" syndrome associated
with cosmetic speculator rehabilitation. And the new houses they pur-
chased were among the most poorly constructed in the 235 new house
submarkets -- reflecting the lower prices these purchasers could afford
for new homes -- and rapidly showed evidence of "corner-cutting" by
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builders during the initial period of occupancy. However, over the
course of early ownership, these purchasers showed substantial im-
provements in the condition of their houses, both as a result of their a-
bility to extract some repairs under builder warranties and as a result
of their own efforts. (As a group, they possessed a fairly high level of
skills in making their own repairs.)
By the time of the 1973 survey, most of these purchasers (77%) as-
sessed their houses as good investments, and about two-thirds estimated
that the house had already appreciated in value. However, a relatively
small proportion (from 10 to 15%), small in comparison with lower in-
come minority purchasers, were either uncertain about their equity posi-
tionor felt they were already in a negative equity situation.
As a group, these owners registered substantial increases in housing
satisfaction as a result of the 235 move, but almost half of them continued
to be dissatisfied with the house, particularly with its poor quality and
the lack of adequate space. The degree of neighborhood satisfaction
among them changed only marginally from its pre-purchase level, with
major discontents expressed concerning the social composition and char-
acter of the 235 neighborhood.
The early 235 experience had reinforced the already strong ownership
preferences among purchasers in this group, and many of them cited the
direct gratifications of ownership status itself as well as the superior
quality of life it afforded. Home ownership seemed to be worth the high
expenses involved. Nevertheless, these purchasers manifested the high-
est rate of turnover and anticipated mobility among the purchaser sub-
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groups. Observed mortgage failure rates were only moderate compared to
the other purchaser groups, but the observed rate of sales during the ini-
tial years of ownership were substantially higher. By 1978, less than half
of these purchasers expect to be living in the 235 houses they had origi-
nally bought. The major reasons given for already completed or antici-
pated moves in this group were house-related -- strong dissatisfactions
with the 235 house, a desire for a better or a larger house, or, at times,
for a house that represents a better investment. In this regard, a number
of responses in this purchaser group expressed a concern with whether the
new houses they had bought would outlast the mortgage, and registered a
decision that it was perhaps better to sell early and "pull out" during a
period of appreciated equity before the wear on the house made it unsale-
able. 1Vbst of the turnover among these owners seemed to be voluntary
rather than the result of intervening family difficulties which made it im-
possible to keep the 235 house. Although lower income white purchasers
had experienced a greater incidence of intervening difficulties during own-
ership than had minority purchasers at low income levels, primarily as
a result of periodic loss of employment, these were reflected in higher
rates of serious default rather than greater tendencies to abort ownership.
As a result, the high rate of residential mobility among this group is
less a reflection of problems families had in sustaining their viability as
owners than it is a consequence of consumer perceptions that residential
and ownership situations provided under the program fell below their ex-
pectations and what they could ultimately afford. With rising incomes,
and the possible realization of some profit in the early sale of their 235
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homes, they could afford a subsequent purchase that came closer to meet-
ing their residential aspirations. Though most of these purchasers had
originally expected to make a permanent home of their 235 houses, the
program seems to have functioned, however imperfectly, as a first-
purchase opportunity, increasingly perceived as a "minimal ownership"
situation, a way-station to preferable ownership accommodations. The
high income mobility within this group, starting from low initial income
levels, produced a high degree of residential mobility.
(3) Minority Purchasers at the Higher Income Levels
These purchasers comprised the smallest sector of the metropolitan
sample of urban purchasers (14%). They differed from other minority
purchasers not only in terms of their income, their higher occupational
and educational levels, and their greater reliance on employment as a pri-
mary source of income, but in their pre-purchase housing characteristics
as well. They carried the lowest pre-purchase rent burdens, compared
to the other purchaser groups. Though they experienced far fewer pre-
purchase housing deprivations than families at the lower income levels,
whether minority or white families, they were more vulnerable to over-
crowding and poor housing conditions than white purchasers at similarly
high income levels. Roughly half of these purchasers expressed dissat-
isfactions with their housing situations prior to purchase, and their dis-
contents were focused on the poor quality of the units they occupied and
the lack of adequate space or privacy. Though discontents with the pre-
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purchase neighborhood were not as pervasive, about a third of these
purchasers had been dissatisfied, largely with characteristics of the
neighborhood that made them unsuitable contexts for children.
Despite their higher income levels, these purchasers were similar
to other minority purchasers in their relatively low familiarity with home
ownership and in their tenure preferences prior to purchase. Nearly a
third (29%) initially had no distinct preference for ownership over rental
tenure. Their dominant reasons for deciding to buy under the 235 pro-
gram were related to residential betterment and improved living condi-
tions for their families, and only secondarily to home ownership as a
goal or to its potential investment advantages. In contrast with white pur-
chasers, they manifested a relatively uncertain commitment to home own-
ership and a primary residential orientation. Like most lower-income
purchasers, they tended to expect that owning would be cheaper than
renting and that the 235 move would be a permanent one.
As a group, the higher income minority purchasers tended to distri-
bute their house choices across different types of metropolitan submar-
kets, without characteristically concentrating in any one. About a third
bought new houses, another third chose post-war housing, and the re-
mainder the houses available in older urban neighborhoods. The prices
they paid reflect a degree of practicality on their parts, for they ended up
with the lowest initial cost burdens among the purchaser groups. It also
reflected an accurate assessment on their parts of their income prospects
over the near future; they made only very marginal income gains over the
initial years of ownership, far less in proportion to their p, rchase
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incomes than any of the other groups. Nevertheless, the move to own-
ership represented a substantial increase in the relatively low housing
cost burdens they were accustomed to carrying.
Surprisingly, despite their higher income levels at purchase, they
fared no better than purchasers at lower income levels in the initial con-
dition of their houses. About a third of the houses were defective on
several counts. Unlike lower income white purchasers, over the course
of the initial years of ownership their houses show relatively little im-
provement in condition. Undoubtedly, the fact that they tended to buy
used homes rather than new ones meant they could not rely on builder
warranties as most white purchasers could, and that it was somewhat
more difficult to correct the defects due to deferred maintenance over
the short term. In addition, their very marginal income gains during the
course of ownership and a high rate of periodic disemployment accom-
panied by serious default, compared to the other groups, limited the re-
sources they had available for improvements in the house.
However, they fared much better than lower income minority purchas-
ers in terms of the investment aspects of their purchase decisions, and
in that regard they are roughly on par with lower income white purchasers
who bought newer houses. By the time of the 1973 survey, about two-thirds
estimated that their houses had already appreciated in value over the pur-
chase price; the proportion of those who were uncertain about their equity
position or estimated a negative position ran between 13 to 19 percent.
That they fared as well as they did in their investments against other
minority purchasers is probably due to their greater tendency to disperse
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their housing choices across a variety of locational submarkets and to
move outward from the oldest neighborhoods to post-war and new housing
subdivisions. In this regard, a number of them may have found the pref-
erable neighborhood settings they had wanted for their children. More-
over they relied less frequently on real estate brokers and more on their
own efforts or those of people they knew. In short, their greater "span"
of the metropolitan purchase market made them less likely to constrain
their choices to the more abusive speculator-ridden submarkets in minor-
ity neighborhoods. Although they were no more familiar with ownership
than lower income minority families and they had numerous holse-related
problems to contend with, they ended up in much sounder market situa-
tions.
Survey responses indicated that higher income minority purchasers
secured the greatest increases among the purchaser groups in housing and
and neighborhood satisfaction as a result of the 235 move. Though open-
ended responses concerning the sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction
uncovered a good many discontents with the basic quality and specific
features of their homes, the neighborhoods they had purchased in proved
to be a considerable source of residential satisfaction -- in both physical
and social terms -- to a greater degree than was evident among other
purchasers. Though they had nearly doubled their house-related cost
burdens, an increase in cost burdens that outdistanced the other purchas-
er subgroups, many had found the superior residential settings they were
looking for. And like other purchasers, they nearly universally felt that
the move to ownership was worth the increased costs.
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The 235 experience, despite its hazards, had resulted in a substantial
shift in tenure preferences among these purchasers, toward a preference
for owning that matched those of other purchasers and overcame some of
the uncertainties or doubts about ownership that a number of them had
originally held. The major benefits they associated with home ovnership
were, as in the case of other purchasers, with the intrinsic values of
home ownership itself -- largely its autonomy -- and with the benefits of
a better life for their families. However, they were somewhat less im-
bued than were white purchasers with the gratifications of ownership it-
self and more likely to emphasize its quality of life advantages. Surpris-
ingly, they were somewhat less concerned than other purchasers with the
cost dysbenefits of ownership, and it may well be that the relatively high
rate of appreciation in the value of their homes -- a median rate higher
than those of other purchaser subgroups -- gave them more assurance
that they would realize the costs in increasing equity savings.
Though many higher income minority purchasers could take advantage
of their positive equity positions to further optimize their residential pref-
erences through a second purchase -- as many lower income white pur-
chasers seemed about to do -- they remain the most residentially stable
of the purchaser groups. Their responses concerning anticipated moves
in the future yielded the highest rate of relative permanence or residen-
tial stability among the urban purchasers. Moreover, the 1973 survey
uncovered no sales among this group and the lowest frequency of aborted
ownership.
However, the viability of these owners is not without threat. It is
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generally acknowledged that problems of unemployment and employment
instability -- the last hired first fired syndrome -- are disproprotionately
high among discriminated minorities, and this pattern is reflected in the
relatively high rate of intervening employment problems among this group
of owners. 6 This pattern undoubtedly accounts for the high rate of ser-
ious default among higher income minority purchasers compared to those
for the other purchaser groups. That so few of these owners had lost or
sold their homes when these difficulties occurred indicates the ability of
many of them to recover and find re-employment without falling irrevo-
cably far behind in mortgage payments. However, white purchasers at
similar income levels had fewer employment problems yet manifested a
much higher frequency of sales and aborted ownership. In part, these
differences are explicable in terms of the marginal income gains among
higher income minority purchasers, which served to constrain their
range of alternative ownership opportunities and inhibit the kind of turn-
over manifested among white purchasers whose rising incomes enabled
them to consider better opportunities. But the relative viability and sta-
bility of higher income minority owners is, to a great extent, indicative
of a much deeper commitment to sustaining ownership of their 235 homes
and of the substantial residential benefits and satisfactions they associate
6. The fact that as many as a quarter of the households received income
from public assistance makes their relatively high rate of employment
instability an understatement of the kinds of employment problems wage
earners in this group encounter in contrast with white purchasers who
were employed.
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with it. Perhaps more than any of the purchaser groups, the early own-
ership experiences of higher income minority families reflect the values
of stability, equity, and enhanced family life that formed the images,
rhetoric, and policy objectives -- "the new dawn for our cities" -- during
the original legislative passage of the 235 program.
(4) White Purchasers at the Higher Income Levels
White purchasers at the higher eligible income levels constitute the
dominant consumer sector (44%) of the urban purchaser sample despite
the strong image of Section 235 as "home ownership for the poor" and
as a predominantly minority-oriented program. These purchasers are
characterized, in contrast with the others, by higher educational and oc-
cupational levels, as well as higher incomes and a rare dependence on
public assistance. As a group, they possessed a considerable degree of
upward income mobility, as evidenced by income gains during the early
years of ownership, though not as great as other white purchasers whose
incomes at purchase had not yet approached as close to their earning ca-
pacity. In their pre-purchase residential characteristics, higher income
white purchasers experienced the fewest housing deprivations -- usually
high rent burdens or overcrowding, rather than poor condition -- and
unlike the other purchaser groups, most expressed a degree of satisfac-
tion with their pre-purchase housing and neighborhood. Their dominant
dissatisfactions were with space and privacy issues and specific features
of their rental units, rather than with their basic condition. Sources of
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neighborhood satisfaction prior to purchase were varied, and their dis-
contents had no dominant focus.
For this group more than any of the others, the "push" factors of
poor residential conditions were probably weakest as motivations for the
235 purchase. They manifested strong tenure preferences toward home
ownership before the move, as well as a high degree of familiarity with
ownership. As a result, it is not surprising that their dominant reasons
for deciding to buy had to do nearly exclusively with tenure mobility, in
terms of the transition to ownership as well as its potential investment
and cost advantages. That they cited residential motives and family life
improvements so seldom, in contrast with the other groups, is further
confirmation that these had not been pressing issues in their pre-pur-
chase housing histories and were more likely to be taken for granted.
Had they been able to buy a suitable house prior to the 235 program,
undoubtedly many would have done so. Even at their relatively high in-
come levels, they tended to be priced out of the unsubsidized purchase
market. But, considering their subsequent income gains, a number of
them would have been able to effect a later purchase without benefit of
the 235 program. In that sense, the 235 program enabled many of them
to make an earlier entry into home purchase than they otherwise would
have been able to. Moreover, their expectations of the 235 move differ-
ed sharply from those of other purchasers in that fewer than half of these
purchasers viewed the move as a permanent one. For them, much more
than for the other purchaser groups, 235 ownership was perceived from
the start as a way-station toward the purchase of a preferable house in
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the future. In short, their orientation to the 235 move is characterized
by a high degree of tenure mobility as well as upward residential mobil-
ity, the latter indicating an ultimate move toward more optimal owner-
ship residence than they felt the 235 program could provide.
Their income levels and prospects, as well as the advantages of mem-
bership in the white majority, indicate that they had the pick of the 235
housing crop. These characteristics also made them the preferred pur-
chasers on the part of the more respectable 235 house suppliers. In
their house search, they seldom relied on brokers and found their houses
largely through builder advertisements, their own search efforts, and the
advice of people they knew. Nearly all bought new houses at the higher
purchase price levels available in the program; less than one out of six
purchased existing homes, and these were usually of post-war vintage.
As a result, these purchasers proved to be far less vulnerable than
others to serious house defects at purchase. By the time of the 1973 sur-
vey nearly all of their homes were free of any serious inadequacies, a
problem which continued to plague about a quarter of the other purchasers.
Though they experienced some increase in their housing expenditures
relative to their incomes, not surprisingly they had secured the soundest
investment values among the purchaser groups. A solid 85 percent of
them estimated that their houses had appreciated in value during the ini-
tial years of ownership, and only a small fraction -- from 2 to 5 percent
-- were uncertain or negative about their equity positions. Increased
levels of housing satisfaction were observed among this group of pur-
chasers, and were more consistently related to positive aspects of the
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house than for the other subgroups. While as a group they experienced
somewhat higher levels of neighborhood satisfaction as a result of the
move than did other white purchasers -- who were often negative about
the social characteristics of the 235 neighborhood -- they registered far
less change in this regard than did minority purchasers as a whole, who
experienced the strongest and most positive neighborhood transitions.
Some increase was evident in their already strong tenure preferences
for home ownership; their 235 experience had persuaded more of these
purchasers of the comparative advantages of ownership and dissuaded few.
More than any of the others, these purchasers found the strongest bene-
fits of home ownership to be ownership itself, and were more likely to
mention its positive investment advantages. A substantial proportion also
mentioned improvements in the quality of life associated with ownership.
But they were as strong in their dislike of the costs and responsibilities
of ownership as other purchasers. Nevertheless, their early 235 experi-
ence was more unqualifiedly positive, on both objective and subjective
grounds, than it was for the other purchaser groups and there were few
discrepancies between what these purchasers had expected and what they
had obtained.
Despite their relative income advantages and their strong footholds in
their ownership situations, owners in this group manifested a good deal
of difficulty in sustaining ownership over the initial years of the program.
About one out of nine owners experienced serious default, a rate compar-
able to families with lower incomes at purchase, though less than the
rate for minority owners who had been at similarly high income levels
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from the start. Observed frequencies of mortgage failure had the highest
incidence in this group, and seemed to be caused by a combination of fac-
tors: serious defects in the house, employment problems, and family
separation. Those few who found themselves in poor houses or in nega-
tive equity situations tended to abort ownership without exception, usually
by giving up the deed to HUD. Others experiencing employment or per-
sonal difficulties sometimes found their houses difficult to sell on short
notice, and left their homes after an attenuated period of default, leaving
the problem of turning over the house to HUD or to the mortgagee. In
part, the threats to the viability of these owners were most closely re-
lated to employment fluctuations. However, unlike other purchasers,
those who found themselves in sorely inadequate houses were quick to
evacuate them. Both the higher standards they were accustomed to and
their access to suitable alternative housing opportunities, in contrast
with many minority owners, lessened their commitment to sustaining 235
ownership. It is likely that once the early "walk-away" mortgage failures
subside, the cumulative failure rate among these purchasers will be sub-
stantially lower. But they are not likely to be stably situated in their 235
homes. As they had anticipated prior to purchase, a majority expect to
move elsewhere within 10 years after the 235 purchase, though they will
be somewhat more stable than white purchasers at the lower income lev-
els. For most of these purchasers, the 235 program will have functioned
to provide an earlier entry into home ownership than would otherwise have
been possible and a way-station in which they could consolidate equity
savings that will allow them to further optimize their residential choices.
-300-
D. Validity of the Adequist, Relativist, and Functionalist Perspectives
The motives, behaviors, and perceptions of urban purchasers over
the course of their early careers in the 235 program display important
trends and differences among the purchaser groups that are not fully ac-
counted for within the framework of either the adequist or relativist per-
spective of tenure. By adequist standards of physical housing accommo-
dation, most lower-income families fared better as a result of purchase
opportunities than they had in their previous rental situations -- in terms
of reduced overcrowding and perceived improvements in dwelling condi-
tion. Nor did those families who were housed most poorly by the 235
program, specifically lower income minority purchasers, seek to return
in great numbers to the rental market to secure preferable housing ac-
commodations. The survey data are a telling indication of the paucity of
decent housing opportunities for lower-income families in the rental mar-
kets of many of our major urban areas.
The irrelevance of tenure choice within the adequist framework, and
its nearly exclusive emphasis on rental opportunities, overlooks what
seems to be the considerable potential of a subsidized purchase market
in providing channels of housing betterment for many families. This
seems particularly true for minority families, among whom the conditions
of the rental market tended to be viewed more negatively than some of the
worst abuses of the 235 program, and who tended more than white pur-
chasers to view the 235 opportunity primarily as a means toward upward
residential mobility rather than tenure mobility. In that sense, the find-
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ings tend to confirm Ford's observations of black families in Harlem for
whom home purchase opportunities were less a manifestation of a quest
for ownership than a practical way of securing preferable residential con-
ditions. Despite the pervasive flaws in the 235 program, by and large
purchasers viewed themselves as better housed as a result of the program.
Though adequist standards of acceptable housing cost burdens were
violated in most instances of 235 ownership, it is important to recognize
that ownership burdens were not significantly greater than those families
carried in their prior rental situations. In that sense, the choices pur-
chasers made corresponded to their income expectations and to the kinds
of budget allocations for housing they had been accustomed to. 8 Most
importantly, though ownership extracted high costs from many families
who could ill afford them, most felt that owning was worth the additional
expense. The utility families attached to ownership occupancy, and
whatever diverse benefits and gratifications it represented when compared
with the conditions of tenancy, is a factor which is notably absent from
the calculus of adequist standards.
The strength of ownership preferences and motives among urban
lower-income families is apparent both from previous studies and from
the reasons that impelled families to participate in the 235 program.
7. Ford, op. cit.
8. This was less true of higher income minority purchasers who,
as a rule, had carried far lower rent burdens prior to purchase.
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And these preferences were reinforced and strengthened by the 235 own-
ership experience regardless of the problems that frequently attended it,
even among minority purchasers who reported a greater degree of dis-
interest in home ownership from the start and whose program experiences
had been the most exploitative. From the relativist perspective, which
views social norms of housing and residence as primary factors in iden-
tifying the nature of housing problems and appropriate policy responses,
the survey data tend to reinforce the importance of home ownership as a
mainstream norm and aspiration which is strongly shared by urban lower-
income families. This is apparent not only in the tenure preferences of
235 purchasers, but even more strongly evident in the dominance of
"owning" as a key motive for purchase and one of the signal gratifications
of house ownership itself. That is, "owning" itself is perceived as a sig-
nificant housing status and achievement in its own right -- a position or
state of mind that has its own attendant gratifications -- apart from the
purely residential benefits that were often associated with ownership oc-
cupancy or its potential equity yields. Indeed, for some 235 families
''owning" continued to be a primary source of gratification even in the
absence of acceptable housing conditions (by adequist standards) or pos-
itive equity in the 235 house.
However, the diverse priorities that compelled families to decide to
purchase under the 235 program give pause to a relativist formulation
which would incorporate home ownership as a universal norm to be em-
bedded in housing policy. The "urge to own" is not nearly as universal
or pervasive as the term would imply. Both strong tenure mobility
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motives and residential betterment motives were evident in the reasons
families gave for considering a move and deciding to buy. But families
differed in the priorities they attached to the two; half may be said to
have been primarily tenure-oriented, the other half primarily concerned
with the better living conditions they expected would be consequent to the
purchase. These differences were most apparent between white and min-
ority purchasers, with white purchasers the more tenure-oriented of the
two groups, and minority purchasers on the whole more concerned with
preferable residential conditions. This can be interpreted to mean that
white families did not think of themselves as having to buy in order to ob-
tain acceptable residential conditions which they took more for granted.
The rental market served them better than it had served minority fami-
lies, who, as a result, more frequently perceived purchase as one of the
few channels or opportunities available for extricating themselves from
what to them were the abortive conditions associated with rental tenancy.
That is, the differences in purchase orientations may be accounted for,
in part, by the racial stratifications that maintain in the rental market.
The presence of decent rental opportunities, that represented the decent
residential life by relativist norms, might have persuaded a number of
235 families -- particularly minority families -- to refrain from under-
taking a purchase and to forego the gratifications of home ownership.
Thus, while tenure choice is a critical aspect of a relativist approach to
housing policy, and home ownership was an over-riding motive and aspir-
ation among 235 families, the survey evidence strongly suggests that
there is substantial diversity in the degree to which tenure-related norms
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are significant among urban lower-income families and that the attain-
ment of norms related to satisfactory living conditions -- those families
consider will enhance their lives -- are likely to assume more universal
importance.
Moreover, the importance which the relativist formulation places on
broad societal norms of acceptable housing and residence needs to be
strongly qualified in terms of the differing articulation of these norms
that is manifested in the behaviors and perceptions of the various pur-
chaser groups. While broadly-held beliefs concerning the values of home
ownership and the good life in residential terms were compelling influ-
ences among all of the urban purchasers, they took on different manifes-
tations and visible forms among the home buyers. For instance, many of
the older houses purchased by lower-income minority families were a
far cry from mainstream images of the good suburban life or even of
sound housing by adequist standards, yet they constituted a "step up" for
many families in terms of attaining ownership, in establishing a relatively
stable or permanent homestead after repeated moves, in providing more
indoor and outdoor space for large families and preferable neighborhood
surrounds, in greater privacy, and -- importantly -- in extricating one-
self from the dependence on often negligent or intrusive landlords. If the
supposed joys and benefits of home ownership were diluted by worries and
cares about the house and keeping up mortgage payments, the program had
functioned nevertheless to provide better living conditions -- for family,
for children -- than the rental market could offer, and each mortgage pay-
ment could be seen as contributing to increased long-term equity in
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property whether or not the investment proved to be economically ration-
al. In short, despite the distributive inequities minority purchasers suf-
fered under the 235 program, it had functioned nevertheless to alleviate
some of the key residential stresses encountered by them within the ren-
tal market, as well as to provide some of the tangible and intangible ben-
efits associated with ownership. While the program failed in both ade-
quist and relativist terms in providing acceptable housing, it had succeed-
ed on several important functional grounds.
By contrast, white purchasers manifested behaviors and orientations
more consistent with mainstream patterns of upward residential mobility.
Budgets were stretched to the limit, particularly for white purchasers at
the lower income levels, to afford the newer, higher-priced homes avail-
able under the program that came closest to conforming to the suburban
ideal. To the extent that the 235 program worked well by external norms
or standards of ownership residence, it worked best for white purchasers,
particularly those at the higher income levels from the start. The dyna-
mics of the 235 purchase market made them owners of newer homes in
suburban settings, with fewer house defects in consistently stronger,
appreciating markets. Yet white purchasers were far more likely than
minority owners to move from their 235 homes during the early years of
ownership and in the anticipated future. They were not the stable home
owners who had been envisioned during the legislation of the 235 program.
In part, this trend toward greater residential mobility can be seen as a
consequence of their greater upward income mobility in contrast with
minority owners, and the range of alternative ownership opportunities
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available to them as a result. But it can also be seen as a consequence
of differences in subcultural norms, that white purchasers were more
attached to the widely-held societal norms of residence posited by the
relativist view, as well as having greater resources with which to achieve
them. That many white purchasers tended to view 235 as minimal home
ownership -- below acceptable norms -- is most apparent in the fact that
they were far less likely at the start to think of the purchase move as
permanent. This was most characteristic of higher income white pur-
chasers among whom more than half had realized from the start that the
235 house would be a temporary home. While white owners viewed resi-
dential mobility as a means of optimizing their strong residential prefer-
ences, minority owners tended to place greater value on the residential
stability that ownership would afford and were more likely to make do
with houses that would "satisfice" rather than optimize their preferences
for the benefit of long-term stability.
These differences in norms among the lower-income purchasers,
most visibly manifested between white and minority home buyers, are
not differences in perceived norms so much as differences in the way in
which such norms come to be differently transformed into behavioral
9
norms, depending on the situations and life conditions facing the group
in question. To the extent that the relativist perspective does not take
9. For an explanation of the differences between perceived norms and
behavioral norms, see the articles by Herbert Gans and Lee Rain-
water, in On Understanding Poverty, edited by Daniel P. Moynihan,
2- cit.
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into account the different manifestations of behavioral norms and residen-
tial life preferences among different subcultural groups, and, consequent-
ly, ignores what these groups perceive to be acceptable or optimal housing
forms from their own vantage point -- regardless of how they visibly com-
pare with mainstream norms -- to that extent the relativist perspective
can be seen to have ethnocentric overtones.
The differences in ownership behavior and orientations between min-
ority and white purchasers are differences in degree rather than categor-
ical differences. However, to the extent that they exist, they give cre-
dence to a more disaggregated, functionalist interpretation of the role of
tenure mobility, which distinguishes among urban lower-income families
in terms of the particular life conditions they face and the role of housing
and residential arrangements in ameliorating those conditions. Given the
more intense housing deprivations among modest-income minority fami-
lies in the urban context, and the greater constraints on the range of al-
ternative housing opportunities, it is not surprising that they would attach
higher utility in home purchase -- or in any other channel of housing
change -- simply to the prospect of solving their most pressing housing
needs: obtaining decent or better living conditions, a more acceptable
residential context for children, and a degree of residential stability they
were not able to find in tenancy. While they also aspired to mainstream
versions of home ownership, more closely approximated in the newer 235
subdivisions, their limited income prospects and the presence of dis-
criminatory barriers, coupled with a suppressed knowledge or familiar-
ity concerning how to negotiate the purchase market, made such aspira-
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tions relatively abstract when compared to the more pressing housing
needs that could also be solved through alternative purchase opportunities
more accessible to them.
The functionalist perspective, with its emphasis on how housing func-
tions within the particular socio-economic contexts in which families find
themselves, provides a more cogent explanation of the diverse forms
which 235 ownership took among different groups of purchasers, of the
diverse values and priorities attached to home purchase, and of the dif-
ferent, but nearly universal satisfactions it offered, even in the most
"deviant" cases and in the face of pervasive imperfections in the 235 pro-
gram. In that sense, the differences in economic and social position that
distinguished lower-income white purchasers from lower-income minor-
ity purchasers, rather than differences in preferences or aspirations,
best account for the observed differences in 235 program outcomes. Cir-
cuimscribed choices, limits on income mobility, opportunity constraints
both in the employment and the housing markets, provide minority fami-
lies with fewer resources and channels through which to optimize their
housing consumption against mainstream norms of which they are as
cognizant as are whites. In addition, repeated frustrations in the housing
market, and a greater vulnerability to employment and income fluctua-
tions, discourage the risk-taking associated with optimizing ownership
choices and encourage minority families to place more of a premium on
the satisficing benefits of what they already own, as well as to place a
higher value on residential stability and residential consolidation. The
greater upward income mobility and broader housing opportunities
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available to white purchasers are a spur to upward residential mobility
which more closely approximates middle-class norms, even at the cost
of some degree of residential instability, in contrast with the "minimal"
home ownership afforded by the 235 program. 10
In short, the experiences and orientations of lower-income families
who participated in the 235 program display important differences by
race and income, that are not fully accounted for in the more monolithic
generalizations and prescriptions of either the adequist or the relativist
perspective. The functionalist perspective, with its emphasis on social
and economic position as an important and key differentiator in housing
values and behabiors, more fully accounts for observed differences among
235 purchasers and for the differential functions the 235 program, and
tenure mobility in general, served among urban lower-income families.
E. Policy Implications
Consumer Values Inherent in Lower-Income Ownership Policies
Despite the imperfections of the 235 program, the findings concerning
early consumer experience confirm that from the vantage point of the
consumer there are considerable values and benefits to be derived from
future policies geared to lower-income home ownership in the urban
10. The gradations in perceived housing functions -- house as haven
versus house as presentation -- have been related to social class
gradations. See: Rainwater, "Fear and House-As-Haven in the
Lower Class," o2. cit.
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context. Among the major benefits are:
(1) Better living conditions.
The variety of problems purchasers had with their houses from the
start should not obscure the fact that they were able to make substantial
improvements in their living conditions as a result of participation in the
program. Overcrowding was considerably reduced, and a substantial
majority of owning families reported improvements in housing condition
and in housing-related satisfactions. Moreover, for minority households
and for large households, these improvements in housing accommodation
had been difficult to obtain in the rental market. In that sense, home
purchase opportunities represented a channel of upward housing mobility
for these households that did not exist within the rental housing sector.
The reasons for satisfaction with 235 housing were frequently associ-
ated with the amenities afforded by the single-family house: a larger
amount of interior space as well as the advantages of exterior site con-
ditions that made available more space for outdoor activities for both
children and adults. It is not surprising that levels of housing satisfac-
tion rose considerably over pre-purchase levels, particularly among min-
ority purchasers, and that owners found quality of life improvements to
be one of the strongest benefits associated with ownership in terms of
enhanced family life and a preferable milieu for raising children.
The 235 move nearly always involved a change in neighborhood as
well as a change in housing. In general, levels of satisfaction with the
neighborhood represented an increase over their pre-purchase levels.
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But such increases were somewhat more marked among minority purchas-
ers, for whom the program had undoubtedly provided preferable location-
al opportunities which were not as accessible in the rental market.
Whatever the dysbenefits of home ownership were for urban lower-
income families, even an ownership program as imperfect as Section 235
resulted in substantial improvements in residential living conditions and
satisfactions for families who participated in the program. That so few
families returned to the rental market or planned to do so in the future
despite high ownership cost burdens and subadequate homes is not only
an indication of the gratifications families found in home ownership status.
It is also an indication that the preferable residential conditions they
sought were made more accessible even in a minimal home ownership
situation. Had the 235 program provided adequate administrative safe-
guards, undoubtedly the perceptible improvements in housing condition
would have been even higher. Future ownership policies, ones that are
better formulated as a result of the lessons learned from mistakes of the
235 program, can be expected to have an even greater yields in terms of
the improvement of residential conditions for urban lower-income fam-
ilies.
(2) The advantages of equity accretion as family savings.
Since the potential equity investment advantages inherent in home own-
ership are obvious, the question is whether these advantages can be real-
ized in ownership programs geared to urban lower-income families. In
the aggregate, the 235 program did not work as poorly in this regard as
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its national image would suggest. By 1973, after the initial years of own-
ership, most 235 purchasers (69%) estimated that their homes had appre-
ciated in value since purchase by at least 5 percent; little less than half
(45%) estimated an appreciation of at least 15 percent, even over that
short period of time. If Secretary Weaver's cautionary concerns about
the potential "euchring" of the poor in a home purchase program were
taken to be predictive of pervasive trends in the 235 program, on the
whole his concerns were not reflected during the early years of the pro-
gram; the "typical" 235 purchaser found himself or herself in a positive
equity position and could expect to profit from the possible sale of the
house. While the equity investment effects of the program were regres-
sive in their distribution among purchasers, with minority families at
the lowest income levels suffering the greatest losses in much older
homes in declining neighborhoods while higher income white purchasers
buying new homes manifested the most consistent pattern of market appre-
ciation, these disequities in the program seem to be largely the aftermath
of 235 program abuses and maladministration.
In that sense, the spectre of negative equity is not an inherent part of
any lower-income ownership program. More effective and conscientious
administration would have served to reduce these inequities in the 235
program. At present, the recent inflation in house prices in most urban
areas can be expected to extend to many 235 submarkets, as it did during
the early stages of the program. In that case, the number of owners in
positive equity positions can be eCpected to have increased since 1973, as
will have the extent of appreciation in market values. Although the 235
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program was seriously flawed in failing to provide many purchasers with
sound homes in healthy submarkets, the generally positive direction of
the early results are indicative of the potential equity yields that might
be realizable, short of a major depression, under more effective owner-
ship programs.
(3) The achievement of a preferred housing status.
The findings uncovered in other studies, that indicate the presence of
strong home ownership motives and preferences among marginal urban
families, are generally confirmed in this study. Among most minority
purchasers and many white purchasers at the lowest income levels, the
blind "urge to own" was least apparent in the sense that their decision to
buy was primarily dominated by priorities related to the improvement of
living conditions and only secondarily to tenure mobility. Nevertheless,
the simultaneous presence of strong ownership preferences and desires
was undeniable. Home ownership and "the better life" in residential
terms were closely related in the perceptions of urban lower-income fam-
ilies.
Despite the hazards of 235 purchase and the frequent and persistent
frustrations during the initial years of ownership, the experience served
to reinforce and strengthen ownership preferences among nearly all pur-
chasers, even in the face of strong discontents with the house and the
recognition that it was substantially more expensive than renting. Most
tellingly, the strongest benefits attached to 235 ownership were the grati-
fications of owning itself. These were expressed most often in terms of
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self-evident values associated with "owning your own home" to be taken
at face value, or in terms of increased autonomy, or a new-found sense
of pride or achievement. Minority owners deviated somewhat from this
pattern of responses in that they stressed the autonomy aspects of own-
ership more frequently as a way of gaining independence from the pres-
sures and prerogatives imposed by landlords and housing authorities;
they were far more sensitive to the authority relation implicit in tenancy
and more positive about the prerogatives that home ownership afforded
them.
But whatever the initial seductions of home ownership had been, its
primary benefits after the early years of ownership were perceived as
those intrinsically related to ownership tenure itself rather than what it
meant in purely residential terms. Even a minimal ownership program
such as 235, with its deficiencies and imperfections, had served to make
that clear to families who had experienced its mixed blessings.
Destratification of Ownership Subsidy Programs
The survey data provide a clear indication of the tendency of the 235
program to develop sharp stratifications, by income and race, in the dis-
tribution of its benefits, to the point that it is difficult to generalize about
the functioning of the program without taking into account the differential
experience of particular purchaser groups. In the distribution of loca-
tional opportunities, the attributes of housing condition or quality, and
consequent investment or equity benefits, the program served least well
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its most disadvantaged group of purchasers -- minority families at the
lowest income levels -- while, at the other extreme, higher income
white purchasers reaped many of the benefits the program had to offer.
While it is possible to discount the maldistributive effects of the program
as inescapably tied to the "nature of things" in public policy11 or to ac-
count for them as interplay of individual choices and preferences within
the market of opportunities and, therefore, beyond public intervention,
there are a number of ways in which the potential stratifying effects of
future ownership programs might be minimized:
(1) Change in the subsidy formula.
The interest-rate subsidy formula under which the 235 program oper-
ated tied the amount of the subsidy to the capital costs of the house,
thereby guaranteeing potentially higher subsidies to those purchasers who
could afford the higher priced homes. The consequence was to reinforce
income stratifications within the 235 purchase market, by constraining the
lowest income families to cheaper houses, while it enabled higher in-
come families to aggregate themselves in the more expensive 235 sub-
markets. Since urban minority households have lower income levels
than white households, the income stratifying effects of the interest sub-
sidy formula also served to reinforce racially segregative forces within
the purchase market and to produce locational stratifications by house-
age submarket, which relegated the cheaper, older housing in the
11. The "them what has, gets" principle.
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centrally-located neighborhoods to minority purchasers and newer hous-
ing in outlying subdivision to white purchasers.
The relatively high income gains among white purchasers during the.
early years of 235 ownership served to reduce or eliminate their initial
subsidies. This pattern suggests that many purchasers at the higher
levels of eligible income required only temporary, and shallow subsidies
to enable them to make a first home purchase. In this regard, the re-
gressive income-skewing effects of the interest rate subsidy formula rep-
resents a clear distortion of equitable distributive priorities expressed in
the "maximum feasible" clause of the legislation. Alternative formulae
which are need-based rather than price-based, which would distribute
potential subsidy amounts progressively in terms of household income
and size, are not difficult to come by and have been increasingly used in
the more current housing assistance subsidies for existing rental housing.
While a cost analysis or cost-benefit analysis of alternative subsidy ar-
rangements is beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that a more pro-
gressive subsidy formula will exert a greater equalizing or destratifying
effect in terms of purchase outcomes.
(2) Entry into the program: the license to buy
The distribution of 235 program benefits among the purchaser sub-
groups and the resultirg stratification of program outcomes reflect, in
large part, the procedures through which families gained entry to the 235
program. Under FHA procedures, the agency's first consideration of a
potential buyer occurred upon the mortgagee's submission of a signed
purchase and sale agreement for a specific house. As a result, builders,
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brokers, and mortgage institutions -- the private sector -- became
the primary "gatekeepers" for the 235 program, determining not only
who was considered by FHA for eligibility screening, but also who was
considered for which purchase opportunities. Under the conditions of
high demand and limited supply which characterized the 235 purchase
market, suppliers could pick and choose among competing purchasers
in order to minimize possible difficulties FHA might raise about their
qualifications or to discriminate between preferred purchasers and those
who were considered undesirables. In some of the more desirable sub-
divisions there might be as many as three or four potential purchasers
for each house,12 and housing providers were free to do their own infor-
mal screening. If such screening prerogatives on the part of the private
sector were not a primary cause of the resulting stratification of 235 pro-
gram outcomes, they strongly reinforced a pattern in which minority
families and the more marginal home-seekers were either excluded from
the program or relegated to the less competitive submarkets consisting
of older housing in the more centrally-located neighborhoods.
For better or worse, potential purchasers were tied to mortgage in-
termediaries or housing suppliers, even at the point when they were
concerned about their very eligibility for the program. Not only could
builders and brokers mislead purchasers into believing that opportunities
were scarce and time short, they could decide whose application to pro-
cess and conduct their own screening of potential buyers. A useful analogy
12. OSTI field interviews.
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would be a system in which obtaining a driver's license was contingent
upon a commitment to purchase a given car, and on the willingness of a
car dealer to go to the trouble of processing your application -- particu-
larly when there were other more easily qualified buyers for the same
car.
Once a potential buyer made a commitment to purchase a given house,
this reliance on private intermediaries extended through the FHA applica-
tion and approval process. Communications concerning the progress of
the application -- information needed to ascertain the buyer's credit
standing and eligibility, the results of FHA's inspection and appraisal of
the house (if it had not been already approved) -- took place largely be-
tween FHA and the mortgagee. The purchaser was left to rely on the
mortgagee, the builder, or the broker both for "progress reports" and
for advocacy of his or her case. Survey responses concerning the pur-
chase process, among those families who made it into the program, fre-
quently cited the uncertainty and delays involved in the screening process,
misplaced reliance on the builder or broker for information regarding the
condition or appraisal of the house, and the lack of information concern-
ing other available opportunities under the program.
The stratifying potential implicit in these 235 procedures can be re-
duced in future ownership programs through more direct administration of
the program vis a vis the consumer and through appropriate changes in
entry procedures. If potential purchasers were to submit mortgage cred-
it applications directly to the administering agency in advance of house
selection, a determination of whether or not they qualify for the program
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and the maximum purchase price or monthly mortgage payment for which
they qualify could be made in advance of a purchase commitment. Once
administrative approval is conferred, a certificate or license to buy could
be used against any house within the purchaseable price range that met
agency inspection and appraisal standards. To account for "window shop-
pers" or families who cannot find a suitable house, certification or licen-
sing could be limited in duration to a period of several months in which
either the purchase option is used or the certificate expires. 13 Although
some updating of credit credentials may be necessary upon purchase to
take into account changing credit factors considered at initial approval,
the process of purchase itself would be substantially accelerated.
The institutionalization of prequalification procedures would provide
and regulate entry to the program for the targeted income range of eli-
gible families, without skewing it toward the higher income levels, and
contribute to a more equitable distribution of purchase opportunities.
It would also create an administrative context for pacing program demand
in accordance with available subsidies, and for dealing more directly and
effectively with program consumers than did the 235 program. Consum-
er-oriented efforts might take several directions as part of the prequal-
ification process: dissemination of information and listings on available
purchase opportunities; descriptions of alternative neighborhood charac-
teristics or profiles; information on how to conduct a house search and
13. Some of these procedures are currently in use in the Section 8 rental
assistance program.
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effect a purchase; information describing key differences between owner-
ship and rental tenure and how to deal with possible difficulties encoun-
tered during ownership. Assuming such informational services can be
effectively delivered, they can go a long way in equalizing purchaser re-
sources at the start of the house search and in minimizing the potentially
stratifying effects of differences in familiarity with purchase and owner-
ship among participating families.
One step further in recognizing the importance of informed consumer
choice in the program would be to set certain information prerequisites
for participation in the program, with qualification for subsidized pur-
chase contingent on passing an examination in much the same way that
applicants for driving licenses are required to do. While this may be
seen as an extreme form of assessing the competence of potential buyers,
it is a recognition that purchase decisions be considered choices in the
light of the conventional wisdoms that apply, and that such information is
to the purchaser's benefit as well as the program's. Examinations have
the further advantage of alleviating the need for potential purchasers to
undertake unnecessary counseling or briefing sessions as prerequisite to
ownership under the program; passing the test would constitute sufficient
proof of knowledgability. Nor is it clear that disadvantaged purchasers
would be penalized by such requirements, judging from the numbers of
them who have obtained licenses to drive. In any case, both the arguments
for prequalification of buyers and the simultaneous availability of a bat-
tery of consumer-oriented informational services are likely to lead to
substantial improvements in the equitable distribution of subsidized
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ownership opportunities.
(3) Access to alternative purchase opportunities.
No matter how well the distribution of locations and types of subsid-
ized ownership opportunities is planned in an urban area, the kinds of lo-
cational and housing stratification that occurred under the 235 program
will be difficult to avoid if potential purchasers do not have equal access
to alternative opportunities, short of what their differences in income en-
able them to afford. Survey responses indicated that many purchasers
were unaware of the range of alternative opportunities available under the
program, and had grasped an early opportunity after only a limited search.
The search process was often accelerated by high pressure salesmanship
that led purchasers to believe that opportunities were few and if they did
not act quickly the opportunity would be lost.
Disparities among purchasers in their level of familiarity with the in-
tricacies of home purchase, and in their knowledge of the metropolitan
housing market at large, account in part for the fact that many minority
purchasers tended to purchase in the more familiar core areas of the
city and were more likely to be captives of speculator-dominated ghetto
submarkets. While there may be strong reasons for many minority pur-
chasers to opt for more familiar and more centrally-located neighborhoods,
and for providing ownership opportunities in both inner city and outlying
areas, the survey data indicate that many such choices were constrained
by limited information about alternatives.
In short, it is not sufficient to provide diverse residential opportuni-
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ties, it is also necessary to develop program mechanisms which provide
the required communication linkages between the potential purchaser and
the available market of purchase opportunities. Such linkages include
listings of available houses within the requisite price range, information
about the neighborhoods in which they are located -- schools, transporta-
tion access, availability of shopping and other key facilities or services
-- as well as possibilities for direct assistance in the search process.
Although some of the voluntary counseling agencies associated with the
235 program performed a number of related functions, they reached few
purchasers, lacked the resources required to carry out these functions
systematically, and often had vested interests or ties to particular pro-
gram constituencies and to particular areas of the city. Not infrequently,
they were non-profit sponsors of 235 housing themselves. The provision
of consumer-oriented linkage services which are metropolitan in scope,
and which assist families in optimizing their purchase decisions, should
be a funded administrative component of any future subsidized ownership
programs if some of the stratifying effects of the 235.program are to be
avoided or minimized.
Ownership Viability: Reducing the Risks and Costs of Mortgage Failure
Any future programs of subsidized home ownership for urban lower-
income households need to correct for the pitfalls observed in the 235
program which led to greater risks and costs for the program and con-
sumers alike, beyond those which were normally to be expected. Any
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such corrections, however, are contingent on the ability of the production
sector to provide sound homes at affordable prices, at the least, homes
that are sound enough to last the life of the mortgage with normal main-
tenance and repairs. If that can be accomplished, along with more ef-
fective appraisal mechanisms that assure that property values have a
reasonable chance of sustaining themselves under relatively stable mar-
ket conditions, then the program costs attendant on mortgage failure by
an owner will be largely those incurred in effecting a transfer of proper-
ty without further substantial investment in the unit. 14 In the following
discussion of alternative means for reducing the risks of mortgage fail-
ure inherent in lower-income ownership programs, it is assumed that
sound homes and sound administrative procedures for inspection and ap-
praisal are necessary prerequisites.
It is also assumed that the 235 program experience clearly points to
the potential count erp roductivity of embedding lower-income ownership
programs within the cortext of volume production goals. However meri-
torious the national housing goals of the 1968 Act were in registering the
federal intention to solve urban housing problems, an over-riding concern
with volume mitigates against the kind of administrative care that should
be brought to the handling of these ownership opportunities. While the
"custom -tailored" services of non-profit sponsored ownership efforts
may not be essential, and the prerogatives of consumer participation in
14. As of 1974, the costs involved in bringing a foreclosed 235 home
into resaleable condition were estimated at $5,500.
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the open market are worth retaining, some administrative caution in pur-
suing high production volumes, particularly in the early stages of a pro-
gram, would seem to be one of the more cogent lessons to be learned
from the 235 program. Mbreover, the counterproductive aspects of high
volume extend beyond administrative issues. In some urban areas, and
under certain conditions, high program volumes can saturate the purchase
markets they create, thereby jeopardizing property values for those fam-
ilies who have already purchased under the program. A moderately-
paced program would permit greater administrative efficiencies as well
as sustain demand in subsidized purchase markets with high turnover.
Beyond these concerns, there are two important aspects of future
ownership programs that may contribute substantially to greater owner-
ship viability and lesser program risks and costs:
(1) Economic selectivity in the choice of program areas.
The 235 program waxed during a period of relative national prosper-
ity up to the point of the subsidy moratorium. Yet the survey data cover-
ing the early years of the 235 ownership experience point to the fact that,
even in the absence of a deepening and pervasive national recession --
such as the one that followed in late 1973 -- the incidence of serious de-
fault and mortgage failure was occurring at a mounting rate. Although
simultaneous actuarial estimates in 1973 indicated that the rate of pro-
gram losses would remain within acceptable bounds originally set for the
235 program, the question remains as to whether lower-income owner-
ship programs are currently feasible within the context of a worsened
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national economy beset by major problems of unemployment. If the
potential consumer values of lower-income ownership programs are evi-
dent from this study, the potential feasibility of such programs under ad-
verse national economic conditions is not.
However, the survey analysis confirms the observations made in the
Senate on the eve of the moratorium that the 235 program manifested a
highly differentiated pattern of mortgage degeneration in various urban
areas of the country. 15 Although these tended to be ascribed at the time
to differences in HUD program administration, and to the "walk-away"
consequences of systemic failures in the program, the analysis points
to the primacy of problems of employment instability associated with
"life at the margin" coupled with unfavorable local employment conditions
-- the "contextual" interpretation -- as more accurately accounting for
the differences in the incidence of mortgage difficulties from one urban
area to another. The significance of this finding in terms of the feasibil-
ity of future ownership programs is that local economic conditions tend to
be more predictive of program feasibility or risk -- of ownership viability
-- than are more general barometers of the national economy. As a re-
sult, it is possible that even within the current national economic context,
lower-income ownership programs may be able to avoid the kind of neme-
sis that Seattle represented for the 235 program, while providing viable,
subsidized ownership opportunities for lower income households in urban
15. U.S. Senate, Joint Economic Committee, December, 1972,
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areas where economic conditions are more favorable to sustained owner-
ship.
The current economic recession points to the fact that aggregate
trends in the national economy are not necessarily a universal reflection
of local economic conditions. Most indications are that the recession is
highly differentiated in its regional effects. While the urban areas of the
northeast and midwest have undergone an accelerated economic decline
and rising unemployment over the last few years, these effects have been
less intense in southern and western cities -- the so-called "sunbelt" --
where many cities and metropolitan areas manifest continued economic
growth and relatively stable or rising employment trends. In the absence
of a pervasive and intense national economic depression, or a global
prosperity, there may be little correlation between the health of the ag-
gregate national economy and its particular manifestations at the local
metropolitan level.
In those urban areas experiencing sustained growth, rising employ-
ment, and a persistent demand for purchaseable housing, conditions are
highly favorable to the viability of lower-income ownership programs.
In areas undergoing a continuing decline, it is likely that home owner-
ship strategies for modest income families will bear a high degree of
risk. As a result, it is necessary that future federal policies of lower-
income home ownership be sensitive to local economic conditions and
selective in their application to particular metropolitan areas, especi-
ally during periods of uncertain or negative trends in the national econo-
my as a whole.
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The principle of areal selectivity rather than universality in the dis-
tribution of federal housing benefits is a concept which is foreign to fed-
eral housing policy. FHA mortgage insurance emerged as a volume pro-
gram during sharply ascending periods in the national economy. So long
as a match could be made between a willing purchaser who met FHA's
credit standards and a house that met FHA's standards, price limits,
and appraisal criteria, federal mortgage insurance was granted. The
question of whether local economic conditions were favorable to sustain-
ed ownership was extrinsic to the process. Low failure rates, the actu-
arial soundness of the FHA insurance fund under universally favorable
urban economic conditions succeeded in keeping the question of longer-
term economic feasibility in the background. FHA's role in assessing
the local economic feasibility of engendering long-term mortgage commit-
ments, or in exercising any form of economic selectivity in that regard,
was largely non-existent.
The 235 program bore the vestiges of the universality of the earlier
FHA program, in that limited subsidy allocations were distributed univer-
sally to FHA insuring offices on a projected demand basis in accordance
with estimates of what the traffic would bear. These procedures were
also in accord with the concept of a national program to facilitate home
purchase by lower-income families at relatively high volumes in all ur-
ban areas of the country. But the early 235 experience and trends in the
study data demonstrate the particular vulnerability of lower-income home
owners to unfavorable local employment conditions. To the extent that
anticipated mortgage failure rates are an overriding criterion for the cost
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feasibility of future ownership programs, it would be advisable to gear
tenure choice opportunities under federal policy to anticipated local eco-
nomic trends, concentrating largely on rental opportunities in areas of
high or rising unemployment while selectively providing lower-income
ownership opportunities in metropolitan areas with more favorable eco-
nomic conditions.
The principle of economic selectivity can be viewed more as an en-
couragement of federal commitments to lower-income ownership programs
than a disparagement of continued commitments. For one, it implies that
so-called "life at the margin" explanation of ownership difficulties is less
a reflection of inadequacies among marginal urban families in dealing with
ownership responsibilities than it is a reflection of constraints in the lo-
cal system of economic opportunities. Moreover, there seems little
reason to deny ownership opportunities to lower-income families living in
metropolitan areas which manifest continued economic health or growth.
Increasingly, federal urban policies are coming to recognize inter-
metropolitan disparities that need to be taken into account in the allocation
of federal resources, as in the case of the federal revenue-sharing pro-
grams and the recent employment expansion programs.16 The 235 pro-
gram experience indicates that, short of a universal national prosperity,
a similar kind of selectivity is a sensible means of providing federal own-
ership subsidies where they can best be used.
16. For instance, the public works and public service employment pro-
grams of 1976 and 1977.
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(2) Mortgage relief.
In future subsidized ownership programs, greater economic selec-
tivity in the choice of program areas and improved program administra-
tion in the delivery of sound housing are likely to lessen the rate of mort-
gage default and failure that was seen to occur under the 235 program.
However, the risks of mortgage default among lower-income owners as
a result of intervening difficulties are likely to be higher than those main-
tained under the conventional FHA programs. Effective remedial inter-
ventions at the point of serious default may serve to lessen further the
likelihood of mortgage degeneration during a period of temporary income
stresses.
The problem is one of providing temporary relief to owners who have
entered serious default for reasons beyond their control and who are able
to make good on their back payments if given sufficient time to recover.
Although periodic single-payment delinquencies are to be discouraged,
the survey data indicate they are not in themselves reliable indicators of
continuing default; most delinquent owners were able to become current
in their mortgage payments by doubling their payments the following
month. Although mortgagees tend to find repeated delinquencies intoler-
able, the generous mortgage servicing fees, which under the 235 pro-
gram provided substantial incentives to mortgage companies to accrue
large servicing volumes, more than covered the cost of processing de-
linquencies. Mortgage servicing institutions should expect delinquencies
to be an inherent cost of participation in subsidized ownership programs,
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for which they are duly compensated.
With regard to more serious defaults of two or more months duration,
the behavior of mortgagees in the 235 program often discouraged or
thwarted the attempts of owners to recover back payments. As a rule,
mortgagees do not accept partial payments so that graduated repayment
was not available to defaulting owners. More importantly, families re-
ported that mortgagees refused to accept back payments unless the pay-
ment was large enough to make the mortgage current; an owner who was
two payments behind could not recover by making two successive double
payments. Since mortgagees generally initiate foreclosure proceedings
after two or three missing payments, this "all or nothing" policy tended
to make mortgage degeneration more irreversible than it needed to be.
As a result, one of the functional prerequisites of administrative inter-
vention to assist defaulting mortgagors is to provide, on the one hand, a
means for deserving defaulting owners to make good on their missing
payments over a reasonable period of time while, on the other hand, en-
couraging forebearance on the part of the mortgagee or, at the least,
forestalling hasty action toward foreclosure.
Appropriate intervention places a premium on timely and sound com-
munication between the mortgagee and the administering agency when
serious default occurs, and on conscientious administrative monitoring of
mortgage servicing practices to assure that they are being conducted
fairly and consistently. Such was not the case in the early years of the
235 program; FHA required notification of default by mortgagees only
upon 3 missing payments at a point when notification of foreclosure was
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imminent. Typically FHA's default records were extremely poor, and
their communications with mortgagees virtually ceased once the subsidy
commitment was made at the initial purchase. However, improved com-
munication with and monitoring of mortgagees will not, in themselves,
foster greater forebearance on the part of mortgagees, who prefer to
service all their mortgages consistently rather than give special treat-
ment to subsidized cases. Many are legally required under agreements
with investors to observe a fixed, pre-determined set of servicing pro-
cedures. That is, the administering agencies will undoubtedly have to
develop mortgage relief mechanisms that are in tandem with standard
mortgage servicing practices.
As a result, effective mortgage relief measures would require simul-
taneously a full repayment of back payments to the mortgagee and the
working out of independent arrangements with the defaulting owner for
gradual repayment of a temporary loan. A revolving loan fund handled
by the administering agency or a designated intermediary would provide
many owners with the time required to make up missing payments while
it kept the mortgagee from initiating foreclosure. Mortgage relief in-
surance mechanisms, such as those initially proposed by Senator Percy
in 1967, would be workable only if after an intial period of default, the
insurance made full restitution from the start of back mortgage payments
to the mortgagee. Although the details of loan relief and insurance relief
mechanisms need to be carefully worked out to prevent their abuse by
owning families and to assure their congruence with mortgage servicing
practices, it is likely that their additional cost is well worth the benefits
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to owning families who require only enough time to recover from tempor-
ary financial stresses.
Implications of Owner Mobility
Although much of the rhetoric attached to the passage of the 235 pro-
gram envisioned that the program would bring about a residentially stable
class of home owners who would lend greater stability and commitment
to the communities in which they lived, the survey data indicate a good
deal of anticipated mobility among 235 owners, particularly among white
purchasers. To some extent these reflect the administrative weaknesses
which were peculiar to the 235 program, which led to an early wave of
home abandonments among families who realized they had purchased ser-
iously defective houses, and to discontents among other owners with the
general quality of the homes they had purchased. But it is unclear
whether more soundly constructed houses would have substantially in-
creased the degree of anticipated residential stability among 235 owners.
The strong differences between white and minority purchasers in their
mobility plans can be viewed in part as the product of subcultural differ-
ences and differences in societal opportunities which lead many minority
purchasers to place a greater value on a permanent homestead while
white purchasers are more prone to and more able to optimize their res-
idential choices through a sequence of purchase moves. More important-
ly, they are a consequence of differences in upward income mobility be-
tween white and minority owners; the higher income gains experienced by
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white purchasers over the course of early ownership, and the fact that
the 235 program succeeded in putting far more of them into positive
equity positions, enabled them to instrument their desires for preferable
ownership and residential situations.
At the heart of the question of owner mobility is the fact that the 235
program could produce only minimal home ownership, a "way-station" or
"first purchase" for families who could subsequently afford better homes
and more residential amenities. Since it is unlikely that future lower-
income ownership policies will be able to produce more than minimal own-
ership housing, it seems unwise to assume that such programs will pro-
duce the level of residential stability that are manifested in more conven-
tional ownership situations.
Anticipated mobility among purchasers initially at the lower-income
levels has several implications for future policies of subsidized owner-
ship. For one, it is necessary to view upward residential mobility as an
inherent aspect and value attached to the program and to discard stereo-
typical images of residential permanence as a criterion of program suc-
cess, while recognizing simultaneously that the program should do as
much as possible to assure a maximal degree of residential stability to
purchasers who seek such stability or have fewer mobility opportunities.
More importantly, future policies should attempt to minimize some of the
potentially adverse effects of high owner mobility. High turnover rates in
concentrated lower-income submarkets can have a negative effect on mar-
ket values. While it is obvious that over-building for the lower-income
purchase market is to be scrupulously avoided -- and it did occur in some
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areas under the 235 program -- it is necessary to regulate the volume of
the program in such a way as to sustain demand over long intervals of
time for low-priced purchaseable houses rather than to allocate owner-
ship subsidies short-sightedly to meet or saturate present demands for
such housing. In most urban areas, it is preferable to maintain a low-
volume approach and a very gradual pacing of home provision, in order
to assure the health of program submarkets under conditions of relatively
high turnover.
Other initiatives might be taken to promote greater residential stabil-
ity among lower-income home owners. The large subdivisions consisting
exclusively of new, subsidized homes -- a frequent occurrence under the
235 program -- tended to stigmatize the community and set it apart from
other more affluent residential enclaves while it created an uncertain,
sometimes conflictful social climate among neighboring 235 owners.
Families who found such social adjustments difficult, particularly lower-
income white purchasers, anticipated a move to another home in a prefer-
able neighborhood.
The dispersion of new 235 homes within subdivisions containing higher
priced houses proved to be feasible in a number of areas, and it seems
advisable to attempt to bring about such dispersion in future ownership
programs in order to promote socially diverse neighborhoods in which
lower-income families can more easily find the kinds of social environ-
ments and networks they prefer without considering a subsequent move.
It would also be possible for owners to move to a preferable house --
one which is larger or has more amenities -- without severing neighbor-
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hood ties. Moreover, the concentrated negative market effects of high
turnover in minimal ownership housing -- the sense of wholesale evacua-
tion of the neighborhood that frequent "for sale" signs and vacancies con-
vey, and an associated decline in market values -- are likely to be avoid-
ed in more diverse residential settings. Where low land prices permit,
lot sizes for subsidized houses should not be minimal, but ample enough
to permit additions to the house to accommodate family growth, when
families can afford increased space, without necessitating a move to a
larger house.
E. Summary
Despite the extensive inadequacies and imperfections of the 235 pro-
gram, the reports and experiences of 235 purchasers obtained in the 1973
survey provide a clear indication that a complete federal retreat from
the concept of lower-income home ownership was not fully warranted.
Although future policies of subsidized home ownership are contingent on
national and local economic conditions favorable to sustained ownership
and on the technical feasibility of delivering sound homes at affordable
prices, the advantages and perceived benefits of tenure mobility to
lower-income families -- in terms of residential betterment, the achieve-
ment of a preferred housing status, corollary improvements in the quality
of family life, and the possibility of accreting equity savings -- are sig-
nificant enough to merit further consideration in any future agenda for
federal low-income housing policy.
-336-
A number of policy recommendations have been forwarded that would
reduce the risks and costs inherent in subsidized ownership programs
and promote a more equitable distribution of ownership opportunities
than was attained in the 235 program. Short of sweeping changes in the
character of the urban rental market available to lower-income families,
home ownership will continue to be considered a uniquely unsubstitutable
residential good by such families, and a compelling aspiration. Whether
it can be realized in the future, beyond the short and troubled life of the
235 program, is more than a question of technical ingenuity in learning
from the mistakes of past policies. As was the case in the 235 program,
it is also a matter of mobilizing the political will to undertake a renewed
commitment to the realization of these objectives.
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information upon which this research is based derives from field
work and a national household survey conducted under the direction of the
author as part of a larger study of the effectiveness of voluntary counsel-
ing efforts in relation to the Section 235 program of lower-income home
ownership. The original study was funded by the U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development under a contract with OSTI (Organization
for Social and Technical Innovation), Newton, Massachusetts, which
spanned the period from July, 1972 to May, 1974. Although the original
study efforts focused largely on issues related to the effectiveness of coun-
seling efforts, rather than those concerned with an assessment of the 235
program as a whole, the survey of Section 235 home purchasers in ten
diverse metropolitan areas across the country provided a unique opportun-
ity for the subsequent development of an analysis which would represent
a consumer-based assessment of the program and its consequences over
the initial years of 235 ownership experience. It is that assessment which
forms the body of this research.
Sample Design
(1) The Selection of Metropolitan Areas
Under the original OSTI study design, the choice o-f metropolitan areas
for the survey sample was constrained to the ten areas which were judged to
have had relatively strong voluntary counseling efforts for potential 235
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home purchasers. As a judgment sample, it was also designed to repre-
sent a diverse set of program contexts with regard to the following para-
meters:
(a) regional location: The ten metropolitan areas were to span as
many HUD regions as possible, in order to incorporate differ-
ences in regional housing contexts as well as differences in HUD
administration of the program.
(b) Section 235 program volume: Since there was an assumed asso-
ciation between high program volumes and administrative inef-
ficiencies in program operation, the metropolitan sample was to
reflect a diverse range of program volumes in order to avoid any
bias toward high or low volume HUD jurisdictions.
(c) Section 235 "problem rates": Problem rates were defined as the
combined rate of current mortgage default and cumulative mort-
gage failure as of December, 1971 for the HUD area or insuring
office servicing the metropolitan area. The metropolitan sample
was to represent a range of areas across a spectrum from low to
high problem rates, in order to avoid any overconcentration of
the sample in either high or low problem areas.
The major potential source of bias derives from the relation of the
sample of metropolitan areas to the presence of voluntary counseling ef-
forts. While this factor imposed strong locational restrictions, the scope
of counseling efforts themselves proved to be extremely limited. Only
three percent of the urban purchasers in the ten metropolitan areas finally
selected had any affiliation with local counseling efforts. By and large,
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the purchaser households who were ultimately selected for survey inter-
views had effected purchase and ownership without the assistance of a
counseling agency. In that sense, they were little different from pur-
chasers in other metropolitan areas.
The resulting sample of metropolitan areas was selected on the basis
of "best judgments", incorporating the sampling parameters already de-
scribed. A list of the selected metropolitan areas, and the profile of each
with regard to the sampling parameters are contained in Table A-1. Mean
trends, averaged across the ten metropolitan areas, approximate those
for the national program as a whole, with the possible exception of default
rates and resulting problem rates. The sample areas are less-benign
contexts for the program than the national mean would reflect, in that
they manifest higher default rates. While it is unclear how much bias is
reflected in the metropolitan area sample as a result, it does suggest that
findings will reflect more negative program assessments of mortgage dif-
ficulties than would be made of the national program effort as a whole.
In that sense, positive research findings are further reinforced.
In retrospect and in light of the survey findings, the ten metropolitan
areas included in the sample represent an even more richly diverse set of
program contexts for the purposes of analysis. This is apparent in terms
of a number of dimensions: the degree of minority participation in the
local 235 program; the diversity of market contexts in terms of the pro-
portion of new and used housing in the local 235 program; the tightness or
looseness of the local rental market in terms of rental vacancy rates; and
the local rate of unemployment for the metropolitan areas. (See Table A-2.)
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TABLE A-1. 235 PROGRAM PROFILE OF THE TEN METROPOLITAN
AREAS IN THE STUDY SAMPLE, AND COMPARABLE
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Program
Volume*
(Units Default*"
insured) Rate (%)
Denver
Indianapolis
Louisville
Milwaukee
Omaha
Pittsburgh
Rochester
Seattle
St. Louis
Washington, D. C.
5,900
6, 100
5,700
5,900
3,100
2, 700
2,000
7,600
1,700
1,000
1. 4%
3. 0%
2. 1%
1. 7%
2. 8%
0. 7%
10. 3%
2.6%
21. 0%
Failure***
Rate (o)
2. 0%
0. 5%
0. 6%
0.5%
0. 7%
0. 3%
0.1%
11. 7%
3. 9%
1. 8%
Area Mean
National Mean
4,170
3. 800
4. 9%
3. 8%
2. 2%
2. 0%
7. 1%
5. 8%
* Units insured by relevant HUD area/insuring office as of December
31, 1971.
Current mortgage default rate
December 31, 1971.
for HUD area/insuring office as of
**Cumulative mortgage failure rate for HUD area/insuring office as of
December 31, 1972.
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Problem
Rate (%)
3.4%
3. 8%
3. 6%
2. 6%
2. 7%
3. 1%
0. 8%
22. 0%
6. 5%
22. 8%
TABLE A-2. SELECTED PROGRAM AND AREA CHARACTERISTICS
FOR THE TEN METROPOLITAN AREAS INCLUDED IN
THE STUDY SAMPLE
Percentage
New 235
Construc-
tiona
Area Un-
employ-
ment
Rateb
Denver, Colo.
Indianapolis, Ind.
Louisville, Ky.
Milwaukee, Wisc.
Omaha, Nebr.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Rochester, N.Y.
Seattle, Wash.
St. Louis, Mo.
Washington, D. C.
Area Mean
National Program
34%
32%
19%
38%
18%
15%
6%
18%
94%
100%
37%
d35%
53%
74%
72%
62%
61%
76%
94%
74%
12%
9%
3. 2%
3. 6%
3. 6%
4. 5%
3.1%
7. 5%
5. 3%
3. 2%
59%
81%/
a. estimated on basis of sruvey findings
b. as of August, 1973, Department of Labor, _p. cit.
c. SMSA Census data, 1970
d. HUD, Housing in the Seventies, o cit., p. 4-45.
e. HUD, 1974 Statistical Yearbook, Table 131, pp. 120-121.
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Percent
Minority
Partici-
pationa
Rental
Vacancy
Ratec
2. 3%
3. 8%
2. 5%
1. 7%
3. 0%
2. 0%
1. 7%
3. 5%
5. 0%
2.4%
The selection of the metropolitan areas turned out to mirror closely
the degree of minority participation in the national program as a whole.
However, in terms of the proportion of new units, the characteristics of
the 235 house submarkets across the ten sample areas differs from the
national program, with the sample areas containing a larger proportion
of used housing. Since many of the worst program abuses were associ-
ated with the existing sector of the 235 purchase market, it is likely that
the incidence of associated program malconsequences will be somewhat
greater for the study sample than for the entire national effort. This is
another potential source of negative bias in the analysis, which would tend
to reinforce the validity of positive study findings.
(2) The Sampling of Urban Purchaser Households
The OSTI survey of urban purchasers called for a quota of 34 purchas-
ers in each metropolitan area for structured interviews. The 34 inter-
views conducted in each area were to be selected in a manner which made
them, as much as possible, representative of households who had purchas-
ed 235 homes in that area from the inception of the program through the
end of calendar year 1971. Later purchasers were excluded because of
the intention of restricting the survey to families who had at least a year
of 235 ownership behind them at the time of the interview period, which
extended from May through July, 1973.
The targeted sample was to reflect a "composite" sample of metropol-
itan purchasers, which gave equal weight to each metropolitan area. In
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that sense, the resulting survey interviews provided a composite picture
of the metropolitan functioning of the program as if the program were func-
tioning in a hypothetical metropolitan area which represented an equal
superimposition of each of the 10 selected areas. This sample design had
the further virtue of allowing more easily for intermetropolitan compari-
sons which could detect the relative influence of alternative local contexts
on program consequences. However, it should be noted that as a conse-
quence the urban purchaser sample was not intended to be representative
of the universe of urban purchasers aggregated across the 10 metropoli-
tan areas, which would require drawing a subsample from each metro-
politan area in proportion to program volumes. The possible benefits of
a more representative sampling design were sacrificed because of con-
venience -- program volumes were available only by HUD area/insuring
office jurisdictions rather than by metropolitan area -- and in order to
facilitate intermetropolitan comparisons within the analysis.
The potential bias inherent in the sample design is to over-represent
the lower volume HUD jurisdictions. However, this potential bias is com-
pensated for by the fact that half of the ten selected metropolitan areas
are high volume jurisdictions, exceeding the national average of 3,800
insured 235 units per HUD jurisdiction, while less than half of the 76 HUD
jurisdictions (44%) had similarly high volumes. Mbreover, as has al-
ready been observed, the problem rates associated with the metropolitan
sample are higher than those for the national program as a whole.
A systematic sample of 100 purchasers in each metropolitan area was
drawn from HUD insurance files in Washington, D. C. The files them-
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selves were organized by the date of purchase, and researchers drew a
proportional amount for every third month of the program, in order to
consolidate a list of 100 purchasers for each metropolitan area.
The survey interview process was administered and conducted in the
ten metropolitan areas by National Analysts of Philadelphia, a well-
reputed professional survey organization, under subcontract to OSTI.
However, the selection of purchasers from the list for each metropolitan
area was monitored by OSTI staff. A starting list of 34 households to be
interviewed in each metropolitan area was systematically drawn from the
initial list of 100. Substitutions were made only upon direct refusals or
three unsuccessful attempts to locate the 235 purchaser at his or her cur-
rent residence. If it became apparent that a household had moved from
the 235 house originally purchased, systematic attempts were made to
track the purchaser's new address through neighbors, through the post
office, through telephone directories, and through available city direc-
tories. To obtain the resulting 338 interviews which were ultimately
used in the survey analysis, it was necessary to draw a total of over 500
purchasers' names from the lists. The distribution of reasons for non-
interviews are provided in Table A-3.
The distribution of completed interviews within the larger drawn
sample of purchasers indicates that, as might be expected, those pur-
chasers who continued to reside in their 235 homes are somewhat over-
represented in the resulting sample, while those who have moved from
the 235 house -- either upon sale or after aborting ownership -- are cor-
respondingly under-represented, because of difficulties in locating them
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TABLE A-3. INCIDENCE OF AND REASONS FOR NON-INTERVIEWS WITHIN THE DRAWN
SAMPLE, BY RESIDENT STATUS*t,
Locatable Households
Total
(n) (%)
Resident*
(n) (%)
Non-Resident*
(n) (%)
Uncertain*A
(n) (%)
Interviewed
Refusals
Not at home --
3 visits
Scheduling, illness,
other problems
Aborted interview
Unlocatable Households
Incorrect address
New address unknown
Known to have moved to
another area
All Households
Drawn from Sampling
Rosters
(338)
(83)
(23)
(22)
(2)
63. (312)
16. (78)
4. (23)
4. (22)
--- (2)
(17)
(17)
(31)
(533) 100% (437)
71. (26)
18. (5)
33.
6.
(17)
(17)
(31)
100% (79)-
22.
39.
100% (17)
'refers to resident status in the 235 house originally purchased.
100.
100%
for interviews. These distortions in the representativeness of the sample
are somewhat more serious for the non-resident component; as many as
15 percent of the names drawn turned out to be non-residents, while they
constitute only 8 percent of the final survey sample. These sample losses
are largely accounted for by families who made relatively distant moves
-- beyond the metropolitan scope of the interviews -- subsequent to pur-
chase. However, the HUD figures for cumulative mortgage failures
across the ten metropolitan areas as of March, 1973 averages to 4. 4 per-
cent, a figure which suggests that the majority of unlocatable non-resi-
dents had sold their 235 homes rather than aborted ownership. But not
enough is known about the characteristics of these purchasers, the types
of homes they owned, or the conditions under which they transited from
235 ownership to determine what bias is introduced, other than to conclude
that survey data on the incidence of sales and aborted ownership are not
fully generalizable without substantial qualification. Distortions with
respect to still resident 235 owners are less significant; while they con-
stitute 82 percent of the sample of names drawn for interview, they repre-
sent about 92 percent of the completed interviews. However, on the whole,
the sample represented by those urban purchasers who were interviewed
contains a bias toward the more residentially stable of the families who
originally purchased under the program, a bias likely to be in favor of
positive consumer assessments of the program.
These potential biases in the sample of urban purchasers would be
more unfortunate if they were not an inherent aspect of any attempt to
obtain consumer assessments of their experience in a new housing
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program after the program has been in operation for several years. The
problems introduced by residential turnover are a nemesis to those who
attempt a longitudinal evaluation of housing programs through the means
of consumer interviews, even when survey samples are carefully selected
at the inception of the program. In light of the controversial history of
the 235 program, the absence of program data derived at the level of
program participants is deplorable, and this lack was amply noted during
the Joint Economic Committee hearings in December, 1972. 2 In that
sense, this research constitutes a belated response to those articulated
needs, and the best means that were available in 1973 to begin to incorpor-
ate consumer assessments of their program experience within the body of
what was already known, or misunderstood, about the Section 235 program.
Moreover, the resulting sample of urban purchasers closely approxi-
mates some of the key characteristics of the national program constituency
as a whole. Central tendencies in the income distribution of urban purchas-
ers are similar for the survey sample and for the national purchaser pop-
ulation, a median income of about $6, 500. (See Table A-4.) Minority
participation in the national program (35%) is almost identical to that ob-
tained in the urban purchaser sample (34%), as is the two-to-one ratio of
black to Spanish American participants. 3 Despite the problems encountered
1. See: Daniel M. Wilner et al. , The Housing Environment and Family
Life, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).
2. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, December, 1972, op. cit.
3. HUD, Housing in the Seventies, 22. ct, p. 4-45.
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TABLE A-4. ANNUAL INCOME AT PURCHASE FOR 235 HOUSEHOLDS,
10 SMSA SAMPLE AND PROGRAM-WIDE
Income Group SlVSA Sample Program -wide*
Less than $4,000
$4, 000-4,999
$5, 000-5,999
$6, 000-6, 999
$7,000-7,999
$8, 000-9, 999
$10,000 or more
Median Income
Mean Income
11.0%
12. 4%
18. 1%
16. 0%
18. 3%
18. 4%
5.9%
N=338 (100%)
$6,537
$6,107
* Source: HUD, Housing
and 4-47, representing
31, 1972.
in the Seventies, Tables 13-14, pages 4-45
program-wide purchasers as of December,
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2.4%
10. 2%
23. 7%
26. 4%
19. 3%
15. 9%
2. 1%
(100%)
in locating non-residents, the incidence of mortgage failure among the
urban purchaser sample (4. 4%) closely approximates the average for the
ten areas as of March, 1973 (4. 7%) just prior to the conduct of survey
interviews, although the figure is below the national level of cumulative
mortgage failures (6. 3%) which obtained by the end of 1972.
By the end of the survey process, there were minor deviations from
the targeted quota of 34 interviews for each metropolitan site: Denver
(38), Louisville (32), Omaha (33), St. Louis (33), and Washington, D. C.
(32). For the purposes of convenience and maintaining the largest number
of possible observations, none of the interviews were discarded. The re-
sulting sample of urban purchasers totaled to 338 in number.
In summary, the process by which the sample of metropolitan areas
and the sample of urban purchasers were composed is a source of sev-
eral potential biases in the analysis. The choice of metropolitan areas
involving relatively high program volumes, relatively high default rates,
and a large proportion of used homes in comparison with the national
program, suggest a possible bias in the direction of uncovering a greater
incidence of negative program occurrences than can be generalized to
the program as a whole. On the other hand, the bias in the purchaser
sample toward those purchasers who sustained stable 235 residence over
the initial years of ownership is in the direction of more favorable con-
sumer assessments of the program than might be merited. While those
potential sources of bias are in opposing directions, it is unclear whether
they compensate for one another in the results of the analysis.
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Design of the Survey Instrument
The survey instrumentation was designed to obtain structured infor-
mation from either the purchaser or the purchaser's spouse at the time of
purchase, and to cover an interview duration of from 60 to 90 minutes.
Two instruments were designed, one for purchasers still resident in their
235 homes, the other for non-residents.
The substantive structure of the interview and the sequencing of ques-
tions was, by and large, chronological in that it adhered generally to the
following sequence:
(1) Pre-purchase household and residential characteristics.
(2) Motives and orientations to the purchase move, and aspects
of the purchase process.
(3) Outcomes and perceptions immediately consequent to purchase.
(4) Selected aspects of the ownership experience, including default
episodes.
(5) Current household and residential characteristics, and current
assessments of the 235 ownership experience.
For purchasers who were still 235 owners, "current" responses were those
which were current with the interview. For non-residents, the questions
were designed to elicit responses "current" with the point at which they had
vacated their 235 homes.
Since each survey interview occurred at a single point in time, usually
after two to three years of 235 ownership, it should be noted that while the
information spanned by the interview was longitudinal in nature, the re-
sponses reflected the recollections and views of 235 purchasers current
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with the interview. In that sense, responses concerning the period
prior to purchase, the period just after purchase, and earlier aspects
of the ownership experience are retrospective in nature, and subject to
both the problems of recall and of possible coloration as a result of more
current perspectives and attitudes on the part of the respondent. While
a longitudinal survey would have been preferable, which interviewed
households at the point of purchase and again after two or three years had
elapsed, this was not a possible alternative at the time the OSTI study
was funded. However, to the extent that responses are colored by the
retrospect of respondents, they also reflect closely on the ways in which
respondent families view their residential past and present after the
initial years of 235 ownership. In that sense, despite the problems of
recall and objectivity that might be involved, the responses nevertheless
form a valid and uniquely useful base for registering consumer assess-
ments of their recent housing experiences.
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APPENDIX B: TABLES
Note:
In drawing major conclusions from the survey data, the analysis
depends on broad trends in the data covering a wide range of survey
responses. That is, the findings tend to depend more on the obser-
vations of reinforced trends in the data as a whole, rather than the
particular significance attached to a more parsimonious number of
tabulations.
In that sense, a number of tables included in this appendix are
intended to serve purely descriptive purposes. However, in cross-
tabulations which compare the incidence of certain "states", orien-
tations, or outcomes among the purchaser groups -- as distinguish-
ed by income and race -- the entries and frequencies included are
those that correspond to a statistical significance level of . 001 or
better. (Chi-square of 10. 8 or greater at one degree of freedom.)
In some instances, where the findings are considered substantively
important despite lower levels of statistical significance, the appro-
priate chi-square and significance level is noted. In no case are
significance levels below the . 01 level included in the purchaser
group cross-tabulations.
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TABLE IV. 1 PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS AMONG PURCHASER
HOUSEHOLDS, YEAR PRIOR TO PURCHASE
Per Capita Income Level Percentage of Urban 235 Purchasers
30. 5 %less than $1, 000
$1,000 to $1,499
$1,500 to $1,999
$2,000 or more
22.2
26.6
__20._7
100 % (N=338)
Median = $1,390
Mean = $1,450
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TABLE IV. 2 SELECTED PURCHASER HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERIS-
TICS, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000 Income $6,000 or more
Minority White Minority White All
Pur- Pur- Pur- Pur- Pur-
chasers chasers chasers chasers chasers
% of urban
purchasers 22 % 19 % 14 % 44 % 100 %
Median in-
come $4720 $4980 $7530 $8170 $6500
Median house-
hold size
(persons) 6. 9 4. 9 5. 1 3. 8 4. 8
% households
with two adults
present 50% 86% 80 % 94% 80 %
% completed
high school** 29 % 62 % 84 % 90 % 70 %
% at skilled**
occupational
levels 13 % 14 % 51 % 73 % 55%
% receiving 56 % 17 % 24 % 9 % 23 %
public assis- (n=76) (n=64) (n=49) (n=149) (N=338)
tance income
during owner-
ship***
*~ head of household or spouse.
** head of household or spouse. "Skilled" refers to occupations
usually classified as one of the following: skilled manual,
skilled clerical, skilled technical, and administrative, execu-
tive, or professional.
during year prior to interview.
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TABLE IV. 3 OCCUPATIONAL LEVELS AT PURCHASE
Level* Percentage of Purchasers
Unskilled manual 10. 8 %
Semi-skilled manual 20. 3 %
Semiskilled clerical 24. 0 %
Skilled manual 17. 5 %
Skilled clerical 12. 3 %
Skilled technical 12. 9 %
Administrative, Executive, 2. 2 %
Professional ---------
100 % (N=3 25 )
* highest level attained by purchaser or spouse
TABLE IV. 4 HOUSEHOLD SIZE AT PURCHASE
Number of persons Percentage of Purchasing Families
3 or less 18.1 %
4 19. 2 %
5 16.9 %
6 13.6 %
7 11.0 %
8 or more 16._6 %
100 % (N=338)
Median = 4. 8 persons
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TABLE IV. 5
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or
more
INCIDENCE OF PRE-PURCHASE HOUSING COST
BURDENS IN EXCESS OF 25 PERCENT, BY
PURCHASER GROUP
White
Purchasers
66. 7 % (n=63)
27. 0 % (n=148)
Minority
Purchasers
63.5% (n=74)
27. 0 % (n=48)
All
Purchasers
65. 0 % (n=137)
27. 0 % (n=196)
Total: 42. 6 %
(N=333)
TABLE IV. 6 INCIDENCE OF INTENSE PRE-PURCHASE HOUSING
DEPRIVATION (ON TWO OR MORE COUNTS), BY
PURCHASER GROUP
White
Purchasers
Minority
Purchasers
All
Purchasers
Income below $6,000 49. 2 % (n=63) 61. 6 % (n=73) 55. 9 % (n=136)
Income of $6,000 or
more
29. 9 % (n=147) 31. 3 % (n=147) 30. 3 % (n=195)
Total: 40. 8 %
(N=331)
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FAMILIARITY WITH HOME OWNERSHIP, PRIOR TO
PURCHASE
Previously Owned
High Familiarity*
Moderate Familiarity**"
No Familiarity***
17. 5 %
53. 0 %
23. 4 %
6. 2 %
100 % (N=338)
* Purchaser (and spouse) had had close friends or relatives who had
owned homes for at least five years, and also one set of parents who
had owned a home.
* * At least one but not all of the conditions for high familiarity obtained.
* No familiarity means none of the conditions for high familiarity ob-
tained.
TABLE IV. 8 INCIDENCE OF HIGH FAMILIARITY WITH HOME OWNER-
SHIP AND PREVIOUS OWNERSHIP (COMBINED), PRIOR
TO PURCHASE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6, 000 or more
All income levels
White Purchasers
79. 7 % (n=64)
82. 5 0/ (n=149)
81. 7 % (n=213)
Minority Purchasers
50. 0 % (n=76)
53. 1 06 (n=49)
51. 2 %/ (n=125)
Total: 70. 4 %
(N=338)
PERCENT PREFERRING TO BUY,
BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6, 000 or more
White Purchasers
84. 4 0/o (n=64)
79. 7 % (n=148)
PRIOR TO PURCHASE,
Minority Purchasers
73. 7 % (n=76)
67. 4 % (n=49)
Total: 77. 4 %6
(N=337)
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TABLE IV. 9
TABLE IV. 7
TABLE IV. 10 REASONS
Reason
Housing (Physical Factors)
Tenure
Owning
Cost/Investment
Neighborhood
Quality of Life
Forced to Move
No Move Required
FOR DECIDING TO IVOVE
% Purchasers Mentioning
52. 5 %
42. 5 %
34. 0 %
16. 9 %
25. 2 %
22. 2 %
7. 1 %
3. 0 %
(N=338)
TABLE IV. 11 REASONS AND MOST
CIDING TO BUY
IMPORTANT REASON FOR DE-
% Purchasers
Mentioning
78. 2 %
% Purchasers
Citing As Most
Important Reason
54.2 %
Owning
Cost/Investment
Housing (Physical Factors)
Quality of Life
Neighborhood
59. 2 %
48. 8 %
43. 2 %
35. 2 %
12. 7 %
(N=338)
31. 1 %
23. 1 %
21. 6 %
20. 1 %
4.1 %
100 % (N =338)
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Reason
Tenure
TABLE IV. 12 PERCENT OF PURCHASERS CITING TENURE-RELATED
REASONS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON TO BUY,
BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6, 000 or more
All income levels
White
Purchasers
56. 3% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
44. 7% (n=76)
63. 8% (n=149) 36. 7% (n=49)
61. 5% (n=213) 41. 6% (n=125)
Total: 54. 2%
(N=338)
TABLE IV. 13 PERCENT OF PURCHASERS CITING PHYSICAL HOUS-
ING FACTORS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON TO
BUY, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $ 6,000
Income $ 6, 000 or more
All income levels*
White
Purchasers
10. 9% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
29. 0% (n=76)
18. 8% (n=149) 32. 7% (n=49)
16.4% (n=213) 30.4% (n=125)
Total: 21. 6%
(N =338)
*chi-square = 9. 1, significance between . 01 and . 001 level
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TABLE IV. 14 NUMBER OF HOUSES AND NUMBER OF AFFORDABLE
HOUSES SEEN BY PURCHASERS DURING THE HOUSE
SEARCH PROCESS
Number of houses
purchased house only
two to four
five to seven
All houses seen
(% purchasers)
26. 2 %
26. 2 %
18. 8 %
Affordable
houses seen
(% purchasers)
55. 0 %
31. 2 %
7. 2 %
eight or more
100 % (N=3 38) 1'00 % (N=338)
TABLE IV. 15
Sources
SOURCES OF USEFUL PURCHASE ASSISTANCE
% Purchasers Mentioning
None used or provided
Private Market Actors
(builders, real estate
agents, lenders)
Friends or Relatives
FHA
Private Lawyers
Counseling Agencies
__28. 9 _%_ _ 6._6 % _
40. 2 %
30. 2 o
26. 5 %
5.9 %
2. 7 %
1. 2 %
(N=336)
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TABLE IV. 16 RESOURCE USED IN FINDING PURCHASED HOUSE
Resource
Real Estate Agents
Friends or Relatives
Advertisements
Direct Search (walking,
driving around)
FHA
Counseling or Social
Service Agencies
Percentage of Purchasers
39. 4 %
24. 9 %
20. 0 %
11. 8 %
2.1 %
1. 8 %
100% (N=330)
TABLE IV. 17 INCIDENCE OF USE OF REAL ESTATE AGENTS IN
FINDING PURCHASED HOUSE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
White
Purchasers
35. 0% (n=63)
Minority All
Purchasers Purchasers
68. 2% (n=72)
27. 2% (n=147) 39. 6% (n=48)
29. 5% (n=210) 56. 7% (n=120)
52. 6% (n=135)
30. 3% (n=195)
Total: 39. 4%
(N=338)
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TABLE IV. 18 EXPECTATIONS OF HOME OWNERSHIP:
RELATIVE COSTS
Cost Relative to Renting
Cheaper than renting
About the same
More expensive
Unsure
Percentage of Purchasers
50. 3 %
24. 6 %
20. 7 %
4. 5 %
100 % (N=338)
TABLE IV. 19
Income below $ 6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
PERCENTAGE OF PURCHASERS EXPECTING COSTS
OF OWNERSHIP TO BE CHEAPER THAN RENTING,
BY PURCHASER GROUP
White
Purchasers
53. 1% (n=64)
49. 0% (n=149)
Minority
Purchasers
54. 0% (n=76)
40. 8% (n=49)
Total: 45. 6%
(N=338)
TABLE IV. 20 EXPECTATIONS OF HOME OWNERSHIP:
RESIDENTIAL STABILITY
Residential Stability
Would live there per-
manently
Would move someday
Other (unsure, never
thought of it)
Percentage of Purchasers
61. 0 %
34. 0 %
___5. 0 %_
100 % (N=338)
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TABLE IV. 21 PERCENTAGE OF PURCHASERS EXPECTING THE
OWNERSHIP MOVE TO BE PERMANENT, BY
PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or more
White
Purchasers
65. 6% (n=64)
48. 3% (n=149)
Minority
Purchasers
73. 7% (n=76)
73. 5% (n=49)
All
Purchasers*
70. 0% (n=140)
54. 6% (n=198)
All incomes 53. 5% (n=213) 73. 6% (n=125)
Total: 60. 9%
(N=338)
*91chi-square = 8. 2, significance between . 01 and . 001 level.
PURCHASER PERCEPTIONS
TRANSITION AT PURCHASE
Extent of Neighborhood Transition
Same neighborhood
Nearby neighborhood
Distant neighborhood
OF NEIGHBORHOOD
Percentage of Purchasers
10. 1 %
19. 9 %
_ 70. 0 %_
100 % (N=338)
-365-
TABLE V. 1
PERCENT OF PURCHASERS BUYING NEW HOUSES,
BY PURCHASER GROUP*
Income below $6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
W~h it e
Purchasers
65. 6% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
18.4% (n=76)
85. 9% (n=149) 30. 6% (n=49)
79. 8% (n=213) 23. 2% (n=125)
All
Purchasers
40. 4% (n=140)
72. 2% (n=198)
Total: 58. 9%
(N=338)
the purchaser group crosstabulation has chi-square = 6. 8, with signi-
ficance at the . 01 level
TABLE V. 3 MEDIAN PURCHASE PRICE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Median Purchase Price
Minority purchasers,
Income below $6,000
White purchasers,
Income below $6,000
Minority purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
White purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
All purchasers
TABLE V. 2
$ 14,000
$ 17,100
$ 17,600
$ 20,000
$ 17,800
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TABLE V. 4 PERCENT OF PURCHASERS WITH INITIAL MORTGAGE
COST BURDENS OF 20 PERCENT OR LESS, BY
PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $ 6, 000
Income $6, 000 or more
White
Purchasers
14. 1% (n=64)
80. 3% (n=147)
Minority
Purchasers
50. 5% (n=74)
91. 7% (n=48)
All
Purchasers
33. 3% (n=138)
83. 1% (n=195)
Total: 62. 5%
(N =333)
PERCENT OF PURCHASERS WITH INITIAL
COST BURDENS OF 25 PERCENT OR LESS,
PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6, 000 or more
White
Purchasers
50.5% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
78. 4% (n=74)
98. 0% (n=147) 100. 0% (n=48)
MORTGAGE
BY
All
Purchasers
65. 2% (n=138)
98. 5% (n=195)
Total: 86. 5%
(N=333)
PURCHASERS WITH APPROXIMATE HOUSING COST
BURDENS OF NO MORE THAN 30 PERCENT AT
PURCHASE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6, 000 or more
White
Purchasers
34. 4% (n=64)
91.8% (n=146)
Minority
Purchasers
50. 7% (n=73)
91. 7% (n=48)
All
Purchasers
43. 1% (n=137)
91. 8% (n=194)
Total: 71. 6%
(N=331)
-367-
TABLE V. 5
TABLE V. 6
TABLE V. 7 MEDIAN PRE-PURCHASE HOUSING COST BURDENS,
MEDIAN MORTGAGE COST BURDENS AT PURCHASE,
AND APPROXIMATED MEDIAN HOUSING COST
BURDENS AT PURCHASE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Median
Housing
Cost Burden
Pre-Purchase
Median
Mortgage
Cost Burden
At Purchase
Median
Approximated
Housing
Cost Burden
At Purchase
Minority purchasers,
Income below $6,000
White purchasers,
Income below $6,000
Minority purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
White purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
All purchasers
28. 9 %
28. 4 %
17. 8 %
20. 3 %
23. 2 %
20. 0 %
25. 0 %
15.1 %
17. 7 %
18. 6 %
31. 4 % (n=73)
34. 0 % (n=64)
22.-8 % (n=48)
24.0 % (n=146)
27. 1 % (N=331)
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TABLE V. 8 HOUSE CONDITION AT PURCHASE, ALL PURCHASES
AND BY AGE OF HOUSE
Existing Existing
Houses, Houses,
Condition*, All New 30 years over 30
of House Houses Houses old or less years old
Adequate 34. 6 % 39. 7% 39. 7 % 18.5 %
(fine on all
6 counts)
Subadequate 40. 2 % 44. 2 % 41. 4 % 29. 6 %
(fine on 4-5
counts)
Inadequate 25. 2 % 16. 1 % 19.0 % 51. 9%
(fine on 3
counts or
less) -------- -------- -------- --------
100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
N=338 n=199 n=58 n=81
* The index of condition employed 6 counts of specific house functions
on which respondents answered positively or negatively: 1) heating
equipment in good working order? 2) signs of water leakage from
the outside in the basement or foundation? 3) signs of a leak in the
roof? 4) plumbing in sinks and toilets in good working condition?
5) problems with electric wiring? 6) problems with cracks in ceil-
ings or walls? The question instrument had been validated by the
Bureau of the Census as an accurate composite index of standard-
substandard house condition
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TABLE V. 9 PARTICIPATION IN VARIOUS HOUSE-AGE SUBMARKETS,
BY PURCHASER GROUP
Minority purchasers
Income below $6,000
White purchasers,
Income below $6,000
Minority purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
White purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
N=338
New
Houses
7. 0 %
21. 1 %
7.5 %
64. 3 %
100 %
n=199
Existing
Houses,
30 years
old or less
25. 9 %
20. 7 %
29. 3 %
24. 1 %
100 %
n= 58
Existing
Houses,
over 30
years old
58. 0 %
12. 4 %
21.0 o %
8.7 %
100 %
n=81
INCIDENCE OF ADEQUATE/SUBADEQUATE HOUSE
CONDITION AT PURCHASE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
White
Purchasers
68. 8% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
63. 2% (n=76)
85. 9% (n=149) 69. 4% (n=49)
80. 8% (n=213) 65. 6% (n=125)
All
Purchasers
65. 7% (n=140)
81. 8% (n=198)
Total: 75. 2%
(N=338)
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TABLE V.10
TABLE V.11 AWARENESS OF HOUSE CONDITION PROBLEMS
AT PURCHASE
Percentage of
All Purchasers
Percentage of Pur-
chasers With Problems
Had no problems
Aware of all problems
Aware of some problems
Aware of none of the
problems
100 % (N=337) 100 % (n=228)
TABLE V. 12 SEVERITY* OF HOUSE CONDITION PROBLEMS AT
PURCHASE, ALL PROBLEMS AND UNEXPECTED
PROBLEMS
All Problems Unexpected Problems
No Problems
Minor problems,
at most
Moderate problems,
at most
Major problem(s)
100% (N=337) 100 % (n=337)
* Major problems include structural deficiencies (foundation, basement
or roof leaks, cracked walls or ceilings) and basic functional prob-
lems with utilities (plumbing, wiring, heating). Moderate problems
include those with the durability of major house features (stairways,
partitions, commodes and sinks, etc.), and site finishing problems
(drainage, grading, paving, sodding, etc.). Minor problems refer to
broken windows, leaking faucets, and non-specific reference to
"quality of construction", "poor workmanship", and the like.
-371-
32.4 %
9. 2 %
10. 7 %
13. 6 %
15. 8 %
__47. 8_ _ _70._6 %
32. 4 0/0
9. 2 %
14. 8 %
42. 4 %
5. 4 %
11. 6 %
__43. 6 /_ _ _40._6 0/
i
TABLE V. 13 INCIDENCE OF MAJOR SEVERITY IN HOUSE
CONDITION PROBLEMS AT PURCHASE, BY
PURCHASER GROUP (ALL MAJOR PROBLE1V/
UNEXPECTED MAJOR PROBLEMS)
White
Purchasers
Minority
Purchasers
Income below $6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
39. 1/34. 4% (n=64)
34. 2/30. 9% (n=149)
35. 7 / 31. 9% (n=213)
60. 5/57. 9% (n=76)
52. 1/52. 1% (n=48)
57. 3/55. 7% (n=124)
Total: 43. 6/40. 7%
(N=337)
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TABLE V. 14 TYPES OF ABUSES MENTIONED/FREQUENCY
MENTION, AND DOMINANT ACTOR BLAMED
Number of
Purchasers
Mentioning
Defects in initial house
condition:
Correcting the defect(s)
Defective construction
Fraud! misleading
information
Failure in inspection
Fulfilling agreements/
promises
Misinofrmation on
mortgage costs
Bad information or advice
Delays in purchase date
Other (not being told of
buyer options, over-
pricing, etc.)
OF
Dominant
Actor(s)
Blamed
27. 5%
12. 7%
8. 9%
6.8%
5. 6%
Builder
Builder
Real estate agent
FHA .
Builder, real
estate agent10. 1%
3.0%
3. 0%
3. 0%
(none in particular)
(none in particular)
Builder
3. 6%
(N=338)
TABLE V.15 PURCHASERS REPORTING NO ABUSES RELATED
TO DEFECTS IN HOUSE CONDITION AT PURCHASE,
BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or more
White
Purchasers
71. 9% (n=64)
75. 8% (n= 149)
Minority
Purchasers
64. 5% (n=76)
75. 5% (n=49)
Total: 72. 5%
(N=338)
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TABLE VI.I DURATION OF 235 OWNERSHIP*&I (AS OF INTERVIEV)
Resident**"
Purchasers
Duration
Less than 1 year
1 year
2 years
3 years
4 years
(n)
128
81
312
92. 3%
Non-Resident**
Purchasers
(n)
1
7
9
8
1
26
7. 7%
All
Purchasers
(n) %
1 0.0%
11 3.3%
108 32.0%
136 40.2%
82 24.3%
N=338 100%
* duration refers to the last anniversary of ownership of the 235 purchased
house. Thus a duration of one year may mean an ownership period of
anywhere from 12 to 23 months, that is, over a longer period of time.
* Interviews were conducted during spring and summer of 1973. Resident
purchasers were those who, as of the interview, had sustained ownership
residence in the 235 house. 9 non-residents had sold their homes and
moved; 17 had aborted ownership and moved, including one purchaser
who had owned for less than a year.
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TABLE VI. 2 MEDIAN INCOME LEVELS, YEAR PRIOR TO
PURCHASE VS. IVDST CURRENT YEAR OF
235 OWNERSHIP, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Median
Income at
PurchaseGroup
Minority purchasers,
Income below $6,000
White purchasers
Income below $6,000
Minority purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
White purchasers,
Income $6,000 or more
All purchasers
$ 4,720
$ 4,980
$ 7,530
$ 8,170
$ 6,500
Median
Income Most
Current Year
$ 5,640-
$ 7,160
$ 8,000
$10,000
$ 8,530
Percent
Change
19. 4 %
43. 8 %
7. 6 %
22.'4 %
27. 1 %
FAMILIES CURRENTLY RECEIVING PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
White
Purchasers
17. 2% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
56. 6% (n=76)
8. 7% (n=149) 24. 5% (n=49)
11. 3% (n=213) 44. 0% (n=125)
All
Purchasers
38. 6% (n=140)
12. 6% (n=198)
Total; 23. 4%
(N=338)
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TABLE VI. 3
TABLE VI. 4 PARENTAL EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS, YEAR PRIOR TO
PURCHASE VS. CURRENT YEAR OF 235 OWNERSHIP
Stable* Single-Adult Households:
Current Year of 235 Ownership:
Year Prior to Purchase:
Parent Unemployed
Parent
Unemployed
(9) 10. 9%
Parent
Employed
(6) 7. 2%
Parent Employed (11) 13. 3% (57) 68. 7%
n=83 Total=100%
Stable* Two-Adult Households:
Year Prior to Purchase:
Neither
Parent
Employed
One
Parent
Employed
Both
Parents
Employed
Neither Parent
Employed
One Parent
Employed
Both Parents
Employed
(2) 0.9% (1) 0. 4%
(3) 1. 3% (150) 64. 9%
(25) 10. 8%
(17) 7.4%
(34) 14. 7%
n=231 Total=100%
* The term "stable" means there was no change in the parental
composition of the household between the purchase and the
interview.
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TABLE VI. 5
Condition
At Purchase
Adequate 34. 6%
Sub-
adequate 40. 5%
In-
adequate 24. 9%
HOUSE CONDITION, AT PURCHASE VS. CURRENT
(TIME OF INTERVIEW
Current House Condition
Adequate
(76) 65. 0%
(51) 37. 2%
(10) 11. 9%
(100%) (137) 40. 5%
Subadequate
(35) 29. 9%
(76) 55. 5%
(33) 39. 3%
(144) 42. 6%
Inadequate All
(6) 5. 1% (117) 100%
(10) 7. 3% (137) 100%
(41) 48. 8%
(57) 16. 9%
(84) 100%
(N=338
*i House condition index defined in Table V. 8.
TABLE VI. 6 INCIDENCE OF ADEQUATE/SUBADEQUATE HOUSE
CONDITION, CURRENT AND AT PURCHASE, BY
PURCHASER GROUP
White
Purchasers
Il\nority
Purchasers
All
Purchasers
Income below $6,000
At purchase:
Current:
Income $6,000 or more
At purchase:
Current:
All income levels
At purchase:
Current:
68. 8%
85. 9%
(n=64)
63. 2%
65. 8%
(n=76)
65. 7%
75. 0%
(n=140)
85. 9%
94. 6%
(n=149)
(n=213)
69. 4%
71. 4%
65. 5%
68. 0%
(n=49)
(n=125)
80. 8%
92. 0%
81. 8%
88. 9%
75. 1%
83. 1%
(n=198)
(N=338)
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TABLE VI. 7 ABILITY TO MAKE NECESSARY REPAIRS,
BY AGE OF HOUSE AT PURCHASE
"When things go wrong around the house that need to be repaired,
have you been able to have them fixed? Have you been able to
take care of most things, some things, a little, or almost nothing?
Or hasn't it been necessary?"
New
Houses
Not necessary
Most things
Some things
A little
Almost nothing
(19) 9. 5%
(154) 77. 4%
(14) 7.0%
(4) 2. 0%
(8) 4. 0%
(199) 100%
Used houses
less than 30
years old
(6) 10. 5%
Houses 30
or more
years old
(4) 4. 9%
(38) 66. 7% (32) 39. 0%
(9) 15.8% (23) 28. 1%
(2) 3. 5% (8) 9. 8%
(2) 3. 5% (15) 18. 3%
(57) 100% (82) 100%
PURCHASERS ABLE TO REPAIR ONLY "A LITTLE"
OR "ALMOST NOTHING", BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
White
Purchasers
6. 3% (n=64)
5. 4% (n-149)
5. 6% (n=213)
Minority
Purchasers
27. 6% (n=76)
12. 3% (n=49)
21. 6% (n=125)
All
Purchasers
17. 9% (n=140)
7. 1% (n=198)
Total: 11. 5%
(N=338)
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TABLE VI. 8
TABLE VI. 9 FUNCTIONAL HOUSING CONDITION*, PRE-PURCHASE,
AT PURCHASE, AND CURRENT
Pre-purchase At purchase Current
Adequate
on all three counts
Less than adequate
on one count
Less than adequate
on two counts
Less than adequate
on all three counts
100%(N=333) 100%(N=333) 100%(N=333)
* based on three counts -- plumbing wiring, and heating -- and whether
they were in working order.
TABLE VI. 10 PERCENT PURCHASERS ASSESSING CURRENT CONDITION
OF 235 HOUSE AS "BETTER THAN" PRE-PURCHASE
DWELLING, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $ 6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
White
Purchasers
71. 9% (n=64)
77. 2% (n=149)
Minority
Purchasers
64. 5% (n=76
79. 6% (n=49)
Total: 73. 7%
(N=338)
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72. 1%
15. 3%
6.0%
5. 7%
56. 5%
25. 8%
10. 5%
7. 2%
66. 4%
24. 0%
6. 0%
3. 3%
TABLE VI. 11 PERCENT PURCHASERS ASSESSING CURRENT CON-
DITION OF 235 HOUSE AS "SAME OR BETTER THAN"
PRE-PURCHASE DWELLING, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $ 6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
All incomes
White
Purchasers
89. 1% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
82. 9% (n=76)
92. 6% (n=149) 83. 7% (n=49)
91.5% (n=213) 83. 2% (n=125)
Total: 88. 5%
(N=338)
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TABLE VI. 12 INCIDENCE OF HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOOD SATISFACTION, PRE-PURCHASE
AND CURRENT, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Housing Satisfaction Neighborhood Satisfaction
Pre-
Purchase
Minority purchasers,
Income below $6,000
White purchasers,
Income below $6,000
Minority purchasers,
Income $6,000
or more
White purchasers,
Income $6,000
or more
44. 7%
51. 6%
50. 0%
62. 4%
Percent
Current Increase
68. 4% 54.4%
71.9% 39.4%
79. 6% 59. 2%
84. 6% 35. 6%
Pre-
Purchase
56. 6%
65. 6%
67. 3%
71. 0%
Percent
Current Increase
69. 7%
70. 3%
89. 8%
82. 6%
23. 2%
7. 2%
33. 6%
16. 3%
54.8% 77. 8% 42.0% 67. 9%
(n=76)
(n=64)
(n=49)
(n=149)
78. 4% 15. 5% (N=338)All Purchas ers
TABLE VI. 13
HOUSE:
Basic
busing Quality
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
Specific House
Features
satisfied
dissatisfied:
Quality of
Life
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
Ownership
Tenure
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
Housing Costs
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
SOURCES OF SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION WITH
235 HOUSE AND NEIGHBORHOOD, BY PURCHASER
GROUP
Frequency of Mention Among Purchasers
All
Pur-
chasers
31. 0%
34. 2%
19. 4%
16. 1%
20. 2%
5. 7%
8. 9%
10. 4%
5. 1%
8. 3%
Minority,
Income
below
$6,000
24. 0%
41.3%
10. 7%
12. 0%
17. 3%
9. 3%
8.0%
12. 0%
5. 3%
16. 0%
White,
Income
below
$6,000
42. 2%
42. 2%
21. 9%
18. 8%
21. 9%
18. 8%
6. 3%
12. 5%
6. 3%
9. 4%
Minority,
Income
$6,000
or more
16. 7%
35. 4%
6. 3%
22. 9%
16. 7%
6. 3%
6. 3%
6. 3%
6. 3%
2. 1%
White,
Income
$6,000
or more
34. 2%
26. 9%
26.9%
14. 9%
23. 7%
2. 7%
11. 4%
10. 1%
0%
0%
NEIGHBORHOOD:
Physical Char-
acteristics
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
Social Charac-
teristics
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
Quality or Char-
acter of the
Neighborhood
satisfied:
dissatisfied:
37. 5%
13. 4%
46. 4%
27. 1%
14. 3%
17. 0%
(N=336)
30. 7%
12. 0%
44. 0%
24. 0%
8. 0%
25. 3%
(n= 75)
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25. 0%
15. 6%
41. 7%
8. 3%
39. 1% 50. 0%
32. 8% 20. 8%
7. 8%
20. 3%
(n=64)
25. 0%
8. 3%
(n=48)
45. 0%
14. 8%
48. 3%
28. 2%
16. 8%
14. 1%
(n=149)
TABLE VI. 14 MEDIAN HOUSING COST BURDENS -- PRE-PURCHASE,
AT PURCHASE, AND CURRENT -- BY PURCHASER
GROUP
Pre-Purchase At Purchase Current
Minority purchasers,
Income below $6,000
White Purchasers,
Income below $ 6, 000
Minority Purchasers,
Income $6,000 or
more
White Purchasers,
Income $6,000 or
more
All Purchasers
28. 9%
28. 4%
17. 8%
20. 3%
23. 2%
31. 4%
34. 0%
22. 8%
24. 0%
26. 7%
28.8% (n=72)
26.9% (n=64)
24. 3% (n=48)
22. 4% (n=145)
24. 2% (N=329)
TABLE VI. 15 FREQUENCY OF CURRENT HOUSING COST BURDENS
IN EXCESS OF 35 PERCENT, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6, 000 or more
All incomes
White
Purchasers
15. 6% (n=64)
Minority All
Purchasers Purchasers
34. 7% (n=72) 25. 7% (n=136
3. 5% (n=145) 16. 7% (n=48) 6. 7% (n=192)
7. 2% (n=208) 27. 5% (n=120)
Total: 14. 5%
(N=329)
-383-
TABLE VI. 16 INCIDENCE OF TYPES OF HOUSE-RELATED EXPEN-
DITURES, BEYOND MORTGAGE AND UTILITIES,
BY AGE OF HOUSE AT PURCHASE
No Major Expenses
Structural Repairs
(roof, siding, foun-
dation, etc.)
Utility Repairs
(wiring, plumbing,
heating)
Building Improve-
ments (major
painting; insulation;
finishing attics, base-
ments, patios; addi-
tions)
Site Improvements
(grading, fencing,
sodding, paving,
drainage)
Furnishings and
Maintenance (furni-
ture, floor covering,
basic appliances,
termite and insect
control)
Other
New
House
34. 9%
4. 6%
13. 3%
23. 1%
40. 5%
26. 7%
Used House,
No more than
30 years
40. 4%
17. 6%
29. 8%
26. 3%
19. 3%
26. 3%
Used House
Over 30
years old
29. 3%
26. 8%
46. 4%
12. 2%
4.9%
12. 2%
2. 1%
(n=195) (n=57) (n=82)
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TABLE VI. 17 AMOUNT OF HOUSE-RELATED EXPENSES, BEYOND
MORTGAGE AND UTILITIES, SINCE PURCHASE, BY
AGE OF HOUSE AT PURCHASE
No Major Expenses
Less than $ 500
$500 to $999
$1, 000 or more
Mean Expense
New
House
34. 9%
28. 7%
15. 9%
20. 5%
(n= 195)
$640
Used House,
no more than
30 years
40. 4%
31. 6%
12. 3%
15. 8%
(n=57)
$580
Used House,
over 30
years old
29. 3%
37. 8%
13.4%
19. 5%
(n=82)
$590
TABLE VI. 18 MEAN HOUSE-RELATED EXPENSES, BEYOND MORT-
GAGE AND UTILITIES, SINCE PURCHASE, BY
PURCHASER GROUP
Wite
Purchasers
Minority
Purchasers
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or more
$620
$640
$590
$580
Total Mean = $620
(N=334)
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TABLE VI. 19 INCIDENCE OF PURCHASER ASSESSMENTS OF THE
HOUSE AS A GOOD INVESTMENT, BY PURCHASER
GROUP
White Minority
Purchasers Purchasers
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or more
76. 6% (n=64) 65. 3% (n=75)
88. 5% (n=148) 77. 6% (n=49)
All
Purchasers
70. 5% (n=139)
85. 8% (n=197)
All incomes 84. 9% (n=212) 70. 2% (n=124)
Total: 79. 5%
(N=336)
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TABLE VI. 20 ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE APPRECIATION/DEPRECIATION IN THE MARKET
VALUE OF THE HOUSE SINCE PURCHASE, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Appreciation/
Depreciation
35% or more
25% to 35%
15% to 25%
5% to 15%
All
Purchasers
10. 5%
15. 3%
69. 4%
18.6% (
24. 9%f
Minority
Purchasers
9. 6%
9. 6%
43. 8%
6. 9%
17.8%
White
Purchasers
7. 9%
14. 3% \ o
65. 1%
20.6% (
22. 2%
Minority
Purchasers
12.5%I
20. 8%
66. 6%
20. 8%
12. 5%)
White
Purchasers
11. 4%
16. 8%
84. 6%
22. 8%
33. 6% J
Break-Even(+5%) 12. 6%
- 5% to -15%
-15% to -25%
-25% to -35%
-35% or less
Don't know
2. 7
11.
1. 2%
4. 8%
6. 6%
100%
=333
4%
6. 9%
31. 5%
1.4%
19. 2%)
15. 1%
100%
n=73
3. 2%
9. 5%
4. 8%
--- f
4. 8%
100%
n=63
6. 3%
4. 2%
12. 5%
2. 1% 1
6. 3%
100%
n=48
1.4%
2. 0%
0. 6%
3. 3%
100%
n=149
Median Estimated
Appreciation Rate+14. 2% +17.9% +15. 9%
9. 6% 20. 6% 14. 6% 10. 1%
+5. 5%6 +13. 6%
TABLE VI. 21 TENURE PREFERENCES, PRE-PURCHASE AND
CURRENT WITH INTERVIEW
Pre-Purchase
Prefer to own 77. 5%
13. 4%Indifferent
Prefer to rent 9. 2%
100%
(N=338)
Current
90. 2%
6.9%
3. 0%
100%
(N=336)
INCIDENCE OF CURRENT PREFERENCES
OVER RENTING, BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6, 000
Income $6,000 or more
White
Purchasers
89. 1% (n=64)
89. 3% (n=148)
Minority
Purchasers
92. 1% (n=76)
89. 6% (n=48)
FOR OWNING
Total: 90. 2%
(N=336)
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TABLE VI. 22
TABLE VI. 23 MAJOR BENEFITS AND DEFICITS OF 235 HOME OWNERSHIP, BY PURCHASER
GROUP
Major Benefits
All
Purchasers
Income below $6,000
Minority White
Purchasers Purchasers
Income $6,000
Minority
Purchasers
or more
White
Purchasers
Tenure: Owning 69. 7% 59. 5% 64. 1% 59. 2% 80. 5%
Quality of Life 43. 2% 33. 8% 50. 0% 51. 0% 42. 3%
Tenure: Investment 22.3% 16. 2% 21. 9% 18. 4% 26. 9%
Housing 15.2% 16. 2% 14. 1% 8. 2% 16. 1%
Neighborhood 6. 3% 4. 1% 6. 3% 4. 1% 8. 1%
None 0.6% 2.7% ---
---------------------------- (n=336)--------(n=74)---------(n=64)-------- 4n=49)---------(n=149)
Major Deficits
Tenure: Costs of Ownership
Burden/Responsibility
Housing
Neighborhood
Loss of Mobility (Can't Move)
32. 2%
24. 7%
20. 1%
5. 1%
1.5%
35. 2%
20. 3%
21. 6%
2. 7%
2. 7%
32. 8%
20. 3%
25. 0%
4. 7%
3. 1%
26. 5%
24. 5%
14. 3%
0.0%
2. 0%
32. 2%
28. 9%
16. 8%
8. 1%
35. 7% 27. 0% 28. 1%None 34. 7% 43. 6%
TABLE VI. 2z.
Owning costs
Owning costs
Owning costs
Worth the
Uncertain
Not worth
Never rented
les
abo
RELATIVE COST OF OVWNERSHIP OVER PREVIOUS
RENTALS, AND PURCHASER ASSESSVENT OF
WORTHWHILENESS OF INCREASED COSTS
Percentage of Purchasers
s 15. 7%
ut the same 18. 1%
more
increased cost
it
own apartment
57. 1%
0. 3%6
8. 3%
0. 9%
100% N=338
65. 4%
TABLE VI. 25 CURRENT MORTGAGE STATUS
Aborted (non-resident) 5. 0%
Default, 6 or more payments 0. 6%
Default, 4 or 5 payments 0. 3%
Default, 3 payments 0. 6%
Default, 2 payments 1. 2%
Delinquent, 1 payment 3. 0%
Current in payments 86. 7%
Hotuse sold (non-resident) 2. 7%
100% n=103
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SEVERITY OF MOST RECENT DEFAULT EPISODE
Delinquent, one payment
Default, two payments
Default, three payments
Default, four or five payments
Default, six or more payments
Don't remember the number of
payments involved
100% n=103
TABLE VI. 27
Reason
REASON GIVEN FOR MOST RECENT DEFAULT
EPISODE, ALL EPISODES AND SERIOUS EPISODES
All Episodes Serious Episodes*
Insufficient income
Loss of employment
Medical crisis
Family separation
Dissatisfaction with
house condition
Other
No response 5.8%
100% (n=103)
2.4%
100% (n=41)
* A "serious" default episode is defined as one which went beyond
a one month delinquency.
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55. 3%
23. 3%
5.8%
4. 9%
5.8%
35. 9%
26. 2%
16. 5%
5. 8%
4.9%
4.9%
19. 5%
41. 5%
17. 1%
7. 3%
9.8%
2.4%
TABLE VI. 26
TABLE VI. 28 INCIDENCE OF DEFAULT
BY PURCHASER GROUP
AND SEVERITY OF MOST RECENT EPISODE,
All
Purchasers
Income below $6,000
Minority White
Purchasers Purchasers
Income $6,000
Minority
Purchasers
or more
White
Purchasers
Never defaulted
One month delinquency
More serious default
Unknown episode length
TABLE VI. 29 OCCURRENCE OF INTERVENING DIFFICULTIES DURING EARLY OWNERSHIP,
BY PURCHASER GROUP
All
Purchasers
Income below $6,000
Minority White
Purchasers Purchasers
Income $6,000 or more
Minority
Purchasers
White
Purchasers
Loss of employment
Major illness
Family Separation
No major difficulties
N=338 n=76 n=64
69. 7%
16. 6%
12. 2%
1. 5%
100%
N=337
60. 5%
29. 0%
9. 2%
1. 3%
100%
n=76
70. 3%
17. 1%
12. 5%
3. 1%
100%
n=64
69. 4%
11. 2%
18. 4%
100%
n= 49
74. 3%
12. 9%
11. 5%
1.3%
100%
n=149
16. 9%
28. 4%
4. 7%
60. 1%
9. 2%
17. 1%
6. 6%
71. 1%
18. 8%
43. 8%
~ 4. 7%
48. 4%
20. 4%
14. 3%
10. 2%
65. 3%
18. 8%
32. 2%
2. 0%
57. 7%
n1=49 n=149
TABLE VI. 30 ASSESSED CAUSES OF MORTGAGE FAILURE,
OBSERVED IN CASES OF ABORTED OWNERSHIP
Dissatisfaction with house condition 8
Loss of employment 4
Insufficient income 3
Family separation 2
Major illness 1
Dissatisfaction with neighborhood
n=19
TABLE VI. 31 PERCENTAGE OF NON-ABORTING OWNERS,*
BY PURCHASER GROUP
Income below $6,000
Income $6,000 or more
White
Purchasers
95. 3% (n=64)
Minority
Purchasers
94. 7% (n=76)
92. 6% (n=149) 98. 0% (n=49)
Total: 94. 4%
(N=338)
* includes those who have already sold their homes.
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TABLE VI. 32 AREA UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY METROPOLITAN
AREA* (August, 1973)
Denver 3.0%
Indianapolis 3. 2%
Louisville 3. 6%
Milwaukee 3. 6%
Omaha 4. 0%
Pittsburgh 4. 5%
Rochester 3. 1%
St. Louis 5.3%
Seattle 7. 5%
Washington, D. C. 3. 2%
* Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration,
Area Trends in Employment and Unemployment, Washington, D. C.,
October, 1973
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TABLE VI. 33 FIRST REGRESSION RESULTS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXTENT OF
MORTGAGE DEGENERATION
Variable
Local Unemployment Rate
Coefficient
-0. 8743
House Condition at Purchase 0. 4739
Duration of Ownership
Current Income Level
0. 9641
0. 1354
Standard
Error
0. 146
0. 122
0. 212
0. 060
Standardized
Coefficient
-0. 300
0. 202
0. 228
0. 117
Significance
under .001
under . 001
under . 001
.025
Unique
Variance
. 089
. 037
. 051
. 013
Multiple Correlation Squared =. 201. Percent of Variance Explained 20. 1%.
TABLE VI. 34 SECOND REGRESSION RESULTS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXTENT OF
MORTGAGE DEGENERATION
Variable
Intervening Difficulties
Local Unemployment Rate
Duration of Ownership
House Condition at Purchase
Current Income Level
Coefficient
Coefficient
-0. 9793
-0. 7475
1. 0631
0. 4564
0. 0428
Standard
Error
0. 187
0. 142
0. 205
0. 119
0. 024
Standardized
Coefficient
-0. 256
-0. 256
0. 205
0. 194
0. 092
Significance
under . 001
under . 001
under . 001
under . 001
.077
Unique
Variance
. 063
.063
.061
.034
.007
Multiple Correlation Squared = . 265. Percent of Variance Explained = 26. 5%.
ANTICIPATED RESIDENTIAL STABILITY IN THE 235 HOUSE PURCHASED, BY
PURCHASER GROUP
PURCHASERS)
(AS PERCENT OF PURCHASERS/PERCENT OF RESIDENT
Income $6,000 or moreIncome below $6,000
Anticipated Term
of Residence
Already non-resident
sold:
aborted:
Less than 2 more years
At least 2 more years
At least 5 more years
At least 10 more years
At least 20 more years
or "permanent"
Uncertain about plans
All
Purchasers
8. 3%
2. 7%
5.6%
6. 8/ 7. 4%
77. 7/84. 2%
65. 3 /70. 7%
44. 5/48. 2%
30.0/32.5%
7. 7 / 8. 4%
Minority
Purchasers
6. 6%
2. 3%
5.6%
5. 3/ 5. 7%
77. 6 /84. 3%
56. 6/61. 5%
48.7/52.9%
38. 2/41. 5%
9. 2 /10. 0%
White
Purchasers
12. 5%
7. 8%
4. 7%
7.8/ 9. 2%
65. 6 /77. 7%
46. 9 /55. 6%
31. 3/37. 1%
18.8/22.3%
10. 9/12. 9%
Minority
Purchasers
2. 0%
White
Purchasers
9. 4%
2.0%
4.2/ 4.3%
87. 5/89. 3%
75. 0/76. 5%
64.6/65.9%
43. 8/44. 7%
6.3/ 6.4%
2. 0%
7.4%
8.1/ 8.6%
79. 9 /85. 0%
57. 1/60. 7%
41. 6/44. 3%
26.2/27.9%
6.0/ 6.4%
N=337/311 (n=76/70) (n=64/54)
TABLE VI. 35
(n=48/47) (n=149/140)
REASONS REPORTED FOR MOVING FROM THE
Reason
235 HOUSE PURCHASED,
NON-RESIDENT STATUS
Resident
Better housing in
general
Need more space
BY RESIDENT* AND
Non-resident
7
2
Both
28
15
Equity or investment
issues
Intervening Difficulties
(employment, illness,
family separation)
Neighborhood- related
reasons
Major move necessary
Other
4
7
5
2-
n=62
8
2
2
1
n= 26
' 12
9
7
3
n=88
* only those resident purchasers who indicated they were "thinking
about a move" or "planning to move" were asked for reasons.
TABLE VI. 37 INCIDENCE OF PERCEIVED NEGATIVE EQUITY
SITUATIONS AMONG PURCHASERS, BY INCOME
AND RACE
Income below $6, 000
Income $ 6, 000 or more
White
Purchasers
9. 5% (n=63)
2. 0% (n=149)
Minority
Purchasers
31. 5% (n=73)
12. 5% (n=48)
Total: 11. 4%
(N=333)
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TABLE VI. 36
APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED INDICES
The Mortgage Degeneration Index
The mortgage degeneration index describes the degree of difficulty the
purchaser experienced in sustaining 235 home ownership, as reflected in
threats to the status of the
aborted ownership would seem to symptomatic of problems with ownership
viability, the same can not be said of a sale of the house. As a result,
the structure of the index ignores whether a purchaser has sold his or her
235 house.
For each case in the urban sample, a mortgage degeneration index
score was assigned. Low scores reflect serious mortgage difficulties,
high scores the relative absence of such difficulties:
Index Score Criteria
0 Ownership aborted (foreclosure, deed in lieu,
abandonment, etc.)
1 Ownership about to be aborted, based on se-
verity of current default, and the purchaser's
anticipation of mortgage failure in the near
future.
2 Owner experienced a default episode of 6 or
more months duration.
3 Owner experienced a default episode of 3 to
5 months duration.
4 Owner experienced a default episode of 2
months duration.
5 Owner experienced repeated episodes of one-
month delinquency.
6 Owner experienced a single one-month de-
linquency.
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Index Score Criteria
7 Owner never fell behind in mortgage pay-
ments.
The Intervening Difficulties Index
This index describes the incidence of difficulties encountered by own-
ing families -- loss of employment, major illness, family separation --
that the respondent reported had either affected the household's regular
income, or made it difficult to keep up mortgage payments, or caused
worry about the family's ability to hold on to the house.
Index Score Criterion
0 No intervening difficulties reported.
1 One problem episode reported.
2 More than one problem episode reported.
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